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THE GREAT REVOLT IN CASTILE

TORRELOBATÓN

THE GREAT REVOLT IN CASTILE

A Study of the Comunero Movement of
1520–1521

BY
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WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

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PREFACE

My most considerable obligations are to Professor R. B. Merriman, of Harvard College, with whom I began Spanish studies, and who has been constantly friendly and helpful; to Professor H. G. Pearson, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has been interested and practically helpful; to the late Enrique Pacheco y de Leyva, of the Spanish Royal Academy of History; to Señor Rafael Altamira, and to Señor J. Florit, of the Armería Real; and to the public spirit of George Ticknor, whose books in the Boston Public Library make the home of W. H. Prescott still a rich field for Hispanic studies.

Professor Merriman's chapter about the Comuneros in the third volume of his *Rise of the Spanish Empire* renders superfluous another treatment of the Comunero movement in its bearing on the empire and the foreign policy of Spain. Before I had seen this chapter, however, I had restricted my consideration to the internal history of the rebellion, of which an outstanding feature is its self-centeredness: so far as the record shows, few Castilians in 1520 had any interest in, or knowledge of, affairs in the other parts of Spain — still less of the world outside.

In regard to proper names I have observed no rigid consistency. Personal names I have preferred to use in the forms of the language to which they are native, except those most wholly Anglicised, such as *Columbus*. The provinces of Spain I mention in their English forms, since so many of these have been Anglicised; city names, of which many are unfamiliar in English, I use in their Spanish forms, though this involves the absurdity of writing *León* for the city and *Leon* for the province.

In rendering the documentary Spanish of the sixteenth century I have constantly simplified sentence structure. In the original, *and* and *that* are used almost as marks of punctuation, like a period or semicolon. The sentence division is commonly conjectural, for the documents often use no periods or capitals, or use them quite capriciously. Many letters of above a thousand words have neither period nor

capital. If rendered literally, many a sentence would be three pages long. I have, however, given many renderings so literal as to be crabbed and involved: they represent truly the difficult original texts. Words implied by the context I enclose in ( ); explanatory material in [ ]. All omissions are indicated by (. . .) Emendations so obvious as to be beyond doubt I make without noting them: dubious emendations or translation I give with indication of the extant text.

HENRY LATIMER SEAVER

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THE CASTLE OF TORRELOBATÓN *Frontispiece*

The granite castle of Torrelobatón is the most impressive monument of exclusively Comunero associations in Spain. It stands at the extreme northeast of the present village; its northeast and northwest sides rising on the edge of a steep declivity, the other two sides rising from level ground. The plan in Danvila (VI, 223) indicates a fosse, but I could see in 1921 no traces of more than an escarpment; and the castle was described in 1521 as 'without a traverse' (cf. p. 249). The plan is about 105 feet square, with circular towers] of 25 feet diameter at the north, east, and west corners, and at the south corner a donjon 35 feet square, itself carrying circular towers of 18 feet diameter on corbels at its four corners and four similar smaller towers at the middle of its sides. The walls average a dozen feet thick and are crested, as are the towers, with a machicolated parapet: they rise about 30 feet from the level ground and 50 from the escarpment. The donjon reaches a height of about 100 feet. (These dimensions are less than those contributed by Sr. Ortega Rubio to Danv. VI. 223, which seem estimated and exaggerated: they exceed, at least, my estimates and the dimensions of the measured drawing which Danvila includes.) The battlement has no crenellations (though Danvila mentions *almenas*) but the parapet is turned in a quarter-circle curving inward, to minimize the hold of the hooks of scaling ladders. The walls have but a few loopholes and one large gateway, to the right of the donjon, the rusted portcullis of which still hangs in its groove.

The plate shows the north tower photographed from the west tower.

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BOOK I

Carlos of Ghent

REFERENCES AND MONETARY TABLE

ANY strenuous reader, concerned to weigh the testimonial value of the authors cited in the footnotes, will find a full critical discussion of the sources in the Appendix. The frequent citations are to the following books:

Sources —

Alcocer: *Relación de algunas cosas que pasaron en estos reinos . . . hasta que se acabaron las comunidades* . . . Sevilla, 1872. (Edited by A. M. Gamero, for the Sociedad de Bibliófilos Andaluces.)

Danv. I–VI: *Historia Crítica y Documentada de las Comunidades de Castilla* . . . Madrid, 1897–1900. (Documents and text by M. Danvila, for Tomos XXXV–XL of the Memorial Histórico Español.)

Maldonado: *Movimiento de España* . . . Madrid, 1840. (Translated into Spanish from the Latin manuscript, by J. Quevedo.)

Martyr: *Opus Epistolarum Petri Martyri Anglerii.* Paris (Elzevir), 1570.

Mexía: *Historia de Carlos Quinto*, Paris, 1918. (Edited by J. Deloffre, as Numéros 105–06 of the Revue Hispanique, Oct.–Dec., 1918.)

Sandoval: *Historia de la Vida y Hechos del Emperador Carlos V* . . . Pamplona, 1634.

Santa Cruz: *Crónica del Emperador Carlos V* . . . Madrid, 1920–25.

Modern works —

Cedillo: *Cisneros, Gobernador del Reino*, Madrid, 1921.

Klein: *The Mesta* . . . Cambridge, 1920. (Vol. XXI of Harvard Economic Studies.)

Merriman: *The Rise of the Spanish Empire* . . . New York, 1918 ff.

Street: *Gothic Architecture in Spain*, New York, 1914. (Annotated Edition by G. G. King.)

Technical terms repeatedly used are explained with their first occurrence, and these explanations may be located by the Index. A table of money terms may be usefully included here: on the general matter, cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 32, n. 1; Klein, *The Mesta*, 58, n. 7; 129, n.; and the references there given.

1 *maravedi* = the smallest monetary unit, by comparison of the gold content = about .62 cents of American value.
34 *maravedis* = 1 *real* = about $.21.
51 *reals* = 1 *dobla de oro*, or *dobla de cabeza* = about $10.75.
272 *maravedis* = 1 *peso de ocho reales*, or 'piece of eight' = about $1.68.
330 *maravedis* = 1 *escudo* = about $2.04.
375 *maravedis* = 1 *ducado*, or ducat = about $2.32.
A *cuento* = 1,000,000 *maravedis* = about $62,000.00.

The purchasing power of money in the sixteenth century is almost impossible to estimate. Merriman's estimate is ten times that of the present. He notes (III. 202) that in 1539 a maximum price for a bushel of wheat was fixed by law at 240 maravedis, i.e. about $1.48. In Navarre in December, 1521, the army was paying 7 reals, i.e. about $1.47 (Danv. IV. 680); and for barley, one half as much. Pedrolasso as negotiator was allowed 5 ducats daily; Cuevas as captain-general, 20 (Danv. IV. 678). Haro's pay, as commander-in-chief, of 8 ducats daily, the Cardinal thought sufficient; but the Governors advanced it to 20 (Danv. IV. 480).

THE GREAT REVOLT IN CASTILE

* * *

BOOK I

Carlos of Ghent

CHAPTER I

ROYAL BREEDING

On September 19, 1517, the dreaded and suspected Hapsburg grandson landed in Spain to assume the crowns of the astute King Fernando and the saintly Queen Isabel. In this frail and diffident youth of seventeen had concluded the dynastic hopes, fears, and ambitions of the Catholic Sovereigns. They themselves were laid to their rest in Granada and would never see to what fate an Austrian heir might conduct their Spanish realms; but the Castilians who received the young monarch could augur but ill, from the lad's ancestry and from the course of events in Castile for a quarter century past, for a future committed to this boy prince of an almost foreign dynasty. The grave elder generation — for example, the venerable Jiménez de Cisneros, Cardinal Primate and Governor of Spain — looked only with distrust upon little Carlos of Ghent. They had seen Castile pass, under the Catholic Monarchs, from anarchy to order, from order to territorial unity, from that to world empire; and had then seen an irony of destiny entrust this tremendous structure of statecraft to the young heir about whom neither his grandparents nor his Castilian subjects could feel anything but misgiving.

He had come to the throne by a succession so indirect and as the result of so amazing a combination of premature deaths, that he seemed inevitably an intruder.

The hope of a Spanish heir had vanished twenty years before: the body of the only son of Fernando and Isabel lay

between the high choir and the high altar in the quiet Dominican church at the head of the long valley in the Ávilan hills.[1] Of this Infante, married though already in the shadow of death to Margaret, daughter of the Hapsburg Emperor Maximilian, a posthumous baby girl was born dead. The crowns of Aragon and Castile must pass to a daughter's line.

The heiress apparent, oldest daughter of the Catholic Monarchs, a girl widow of twenty-six, had wedded in reluctant second marriage only a month before her brother's death, the King of Portugal. To their children might pass a kingdom uniting all the realms of the peninsula, an Iberian empire — Portugal and its possessions in Africa and the Indian seas, Aragon and its Mediterranean dependencies, Castile and its New Indies in the West. Of that marriage a boy was born; but his mother died in childbirth, and this Portuguese grandson, Miguel, lived but twenty-two months heir of such a dazzling destiny. The Spanish succession was destined to pass through a second daughter of Fernando and Isabel, and to attain an even more astounding empire, in yet more alien hands and lands.

This girl, Juana, before there was any likelihood of her inheriting her parents' crowns, had been married to the Hapsburg Archduke Philip, son and heir of Maximilian. Juana was sacrificed in a match intended to secure friendly cousinly relations between the Spanish and the Hapsburg thrones — just as the marriage of the fifth child, Catalina, to the son of Henry VII was designed to secure the friendliness of England — a complex of alliances contrived against the power of France. From Juana's marriage there were six Hapsburg grandchildren: Leonor, Carlos, Isabel, Fernando, María, and a posthumous Catalina, all as healthy and destined to as long lives as the Spanish and Portuguese grandchildren were frail and short-lived. But Juana, even before her mother's death in 1504, when the daughter was twenty-five, had shown, though a woman of exuberant health, signs of mental disorder, induced by a jealous and infatuated devotion to a husband who constantly ignored and outraged it. Juana's authority in Castile, upon her mother's death, had consequently to be exercised by Philip

[1] The tomb of the Infante D. Juan in the church of Santo Tomás, Ávila, the work of a Florentine sculptor, is still extant, one of the purest and loveliest Renaissance monuments in Spain.

as King Regent and after his death by her father Fernando. His regency of ten years merely postponed the fated Hapsburg control, which, on Fernando's death, came in the fall of 1517, in the person of young Carlos, to dominate the destiny of the Spanish kingdoms.

What behind the sallow and impassive features and the awkward reticence of this young monarch — what in the history of his forbears could be discerned, prophetic of his personality and the consequent fate of Castile?

He was born in Ghent, February 24, 1500, and had always lived in the Netherlands. He understood and spoke no Spanish, but some Flemish and the French and German of his father's people. His name, as his father's, was hitherto unknown among Spanish kings; though a fifth Charles among the Dukes of Burgundy, he was the first Carlos of Castile. The royal Spanish genealogy was to abandon its Sanchos, Fernandos, and Alfonsos of the glorious medieval lines, its Juans and Enriques of the house of Trastamara, for successive Carloses and Felipes.

Carlos of Ghent seemed even the more foreign because his brother Fernando was a thoroughly Spanish boy, blond and full-colored, of full lips and large eyes, well built, with shrewd and sound perceptions; Spanish born and trained and having lived all his fourteen years in Castile,[1] the darling of his Aragonese grandfather, whom he much resembled and whose name he bore; a prince so dear to the Spanish people that King Fernando was tempted, in his wrangles with Philip, to set up little Fernando as claimant in defiance of the Burgundian Regent and the first-born but alien Carlos. Even after the resentments of that wrangle were ten years quieted, old Fernando by will made the younger brother governor of Castile; and it was reported in the court of Flanders that a division of the inheritance between the grandsons — the continental possessions to Carlos and the peninsula to Fernando — quite in the fatal tradition of the early Castilian monarchy — had been arranged by Fernando and approved by Maximilian.[2] Only by wise counsel and in the article of death was the Aragonese sovereign persuaded to refrain from such a challenge to

[1] Santa Cruz, I. 93; Sandoval, I. lix; lxiv. He was born March 10, 1503 (Mexía, 18; Santa Cruz, I. 9; Sandoval, I. xiii). Rodríguez Villa gives 1502 (p. 81; followed by Merriman, II. 325) without indicating source.

[2] Santa Cruz, I. 86.

the sovereignty of the coming heir, and to substitute as governor the venerable Jiménez, whom Fernando personally much disliked.

The foreign grandfather of little Don Carlos was still living, only fifty-eight years old, the most familiar figure in Continental politics, Maximilian, King of the Romans, Holy Roman Emperor-elect (for he had, characteristically, never completely established his rank by the necessary coronation); an embodiment of restless and superficial versatility and grandiose but impractical dynastic ambition. He was an incongruous and chevaleresque figure, a model of politeness, speaking six languages (few well), royally indulgent to the grafters of the Imperial court, fancying for himself a career to duplicate those of Fabius Maximus and Emilius Paulus, whose names he combined; gorged with resources exploited from the Netherlands and the German realms, yet with all his property mortgaged to the Fugger banking house; having annexed (by marriage) dependencies that extended Hapsburg control from the terrible Turkish frontier in Eastern Europe, to the Western ocean. In war he had as a youth established some repute, and lost it all; he undertook two great sieges, and abandoned both. Notorious under his Italian nickname as 'pochi denari,' he was yet the most lavish entertainer in Europe, spending 200,000 gulden to entertain royal guests in Vienna in 1515; and in 1518, when he was painfully making the last journey of his life, the Innsbruck innkeepers refused to entertain him because he was years in arrears with his inn bills. To the admiration of posterity he left the knightly bronze figures, Arthur, Theodoric, and the rest, for the never finished tomb in Innsbruck; these figures were already in pawn, and the city of Nürnberg forbade its casters to make the other figures, for which no pay could be forthcoming.[1]

The estimate of Quirini, the Venetian envoy, was this: 'He has a good intelligence, and one so alert that he is cleverer than any of his councillors in finding many expedients for every need; but he has one defect, that, however many expedients he may discover, he does not know how to

[1] Possibly the most permanently memorable triumph of Maximilian's career was on paper, the vast and resplendent engravings in the style of Dürer: the *Triumphzug* (1515); the colossal *Ehrenpforte*, from the master's own hand (1515); and the more lovely *Triumphwagen* (1522). These, with several engraved and woodcut portraits won Maximilian a permanent place in the world of art, where also he loved to consider himself monarch.

carry out one of them, and so he is lacking in power of execution as he is abundant in power of invention. Although out of two or three remedies for an evil he has chosen one as best, nevertheless he does not execute his design, because suddenly before he can execute it some other design takes shape in his mind which he thinks better, and thus he is so eager to change from a better thing to a better thing that time and occasion pass for doing anything.'[1]

Were the energy and sacrifice of Castile to go for a Spanish repetition of such a career of ostentation, in Maximilian's grandson? Yet in the effaced Burgundian grandmother was a fund of excellences from which D. Carlos's inheritance might have drawn. They had in fact appeared in D. Carlos's aunt, Margaret, sister younger by two years of Philip, who showed from the beginning of her pathetic story admirable force, judgment, and unselfishness. Widowed at seventeen of Infante Juan of Castile, and again at twenty-four of her second husband, Philibert of Savoy,[2] she began at twenty-six, with her brother's death, a twenty-three years' career of service, first as guardian of her nephew and later as his regent in the Netherlands. Had that nephew any of his aunt Margaret's quality, or more of his father's?

Philip himself, closing a line of dukes surnamed the Bold, the Fearless, the Good, was known as the Handsome — to the Castilians, Felipe el Hermoso: 'the French ladies in Paris upon seeing him accounted that woman happy who should have him for husband.'[3] He had too charm of personality. Courtly chroniclers said he was 'a prince of great humanity and goodness, very kindly and gentle, extremely free and liberal, a virtue which makes princes much beloved; and above all pious and devout.'[4] 'He delighted,' it was observed,[5] 'in the conversation and company of women, especially those of refinement.' Sharper judgment noted that he was 'easily persuaded, exuberant, more companionable than was fitting, very fond of the chase; he was

[1] Alberi, *Relazioni*, Serie I. Vol. VI. p. 27. The version is that of Prof. Paul Van Dyke, in an entertaining biographical essay, in *Renascence Portraits*, 259–375. Bacon characterized Maximilian, as brilliantly and more 'pressly,' in his Henry VII (Spedding, VI. 101): 'Maximilian, whose property was to leave things then when they were almost come to perfection, and to end them by imagination, like ill archers that draw not their arrows up to the head.'

[2] The daughter, like the father, lives through her patronage of the fine arts, in particular the ornate and beautiful tomb monuments in the church of Brou, wherein she and Philibert are buried.

[3] Sandoval, I. xxi. [4] Mexía, 34. [5] Santa Cruz, I. 22.

not ambitious and had no covetousness at all; nor was he any friend of business, but preferred that others should direct that and relieve him of it. He was changeable according as those to whom he gave credit changed him — a course very different from that of his father-in-law throughout his reign.'[1]

Domestic dealings with D. Felipe gave a sorry impression — of frivolous indifference to the interests of his Spanish wife and her people. The terms of Juana's marriage settlement were not satisfactorily executed; to which D. Felipe retorted that neither were his sister's in Spain.[2] Backed by his father and flattering courtiers, the archduke assumed, in the face of protest from King Fernando, the title of prince of Spain before his wife was heiress apparent.

Even in the second year of the young pair's married life the Spanish parents suspected unhappiness and sent a reverend Prior to spy out the facts.[3] The first anxiety of Queen Isabel, in regard to her daughter's piety, was soon quieted. Another Spanish cleric had admonished the girl: 'They tell me Your Highness has had as confessors certain Friars who are in Paris, and that you gave one thirty florins to enjoy his picknicking about the Paris shops. I think Your Highness should confess only to such friar as remains in the monastery of the Observants and does not himself own a pin; nor should Your Highness make him any gift or favor, but to his monastery, for in an Observantine monastery he will give to God a good accounting of your soul.'[4] The inquisitorial Prior observed that Juana sometimes omitted confession; but he was able later to report that 'in her household there is as much religion as in a strict order, for which she deserves to be praised, though they think the contrary here. She has the elements of a good Christian woman.' Her servants, it appeared, were ill paid: complaint to the arch-ducal council brought only the answer that the natives of the country were entitled to more than her people; and complaint to her husband was at once referred to the council, 'which got her into much trouble.' She had written

[1] Zurita's, quoted in Rodríguez Villa, 58.

[2] Rodríguez Villa, 23, 38.

[3] His letters, Aug., 1498; Aug. 16, 1498; Jan. 15, 1499, are in Rodríguez Villa, 31–33.

[4] Rodríguez Villa prints from the Simancas archives this little letter, of charming austerity, introducing to her service a young Observantine Franciscan. Sep. 1, 1498 (p. 33).

but briefly to her parents, but promised to do better. She changed from fixed intentions in a sudden fashion, unaccountable unless it were due to the dictation of the council, or her Treasurer, or Madam Aloyn, 'who have the lady so overawed she dares not raise her head. She is so needy that she does not have a maravedí for charities.' In this year of her pregnancy, a customary grant, of 70,000 florins, never came to her hands, but to those of the archducal Collector, and was spent in favors.

Between the Prior's lines appear glimpses of a girl disappointed and unhappy in her princely marriage, withdrawn — suspicious of the Prior's questioning — through fear and pride, into an unfilial silence. 'I told her among other things that she had a hard and undisciplined heart, without pity, as is true. She said that, on the contrary, it was so weak and broken that she never recalled how far away she was from Your Highness without choking with tears to realize she was so far separated, and forever. This was New Year's eve.' Another royal spy, Bishop of Córdoba, a year later reported that, whatever the outcome of the Princess's personal difficulties, 'it must be attributed to her alone, for she has not a living soul to help her with a single word.' [1]

The young princes came for a brief period under the eyes of the uneasy parents: in 1502 the heirs apparent visited Castile, responding at last to the obvious importance of being sworn in the Cortes as the heirs of the crowns, and to the insistence of the monarchs that no sovereign might hope to rule successfully in Spain without considerable experience of the nature, customs, and institutions of the Spanish people.[2] So soon, however, as he had obtained this recognition, D. Felipe returned home at the end of the year by way of France, then at war with Spain, in spite of the advanced pregnancy of his wife and in the face of her parents' protest and a similar official remonstrance from the Cortes of Castile.[3] This reluctance seemed vindicated when D. Felipe contracted, in excess of his specified powers, on the very eve of imminent and conclusive victories of the Great Captain in Italy, a pusillanimous peace with Louis XII — cajoled into concessions, as was believed in Castile, by flatteries and by his own Council, which was bribed by the French.

[1] Rodríguez Villa, 60.
[2] P. Martyr, Epist. CCXXI, and CCL; Rodríguez Villa, 58–59, 67.
[3] The royal letter and the Cortes message in Rodríguez Villa, 68, 70.

In his absence the Princess bore the second boy, Fernando. She was happy, as usual, in an easy childbirth; but three months later the court physicians wrote to King Fernando a letter which somehow escaped the precautionary advice inserted that it be at once burned:[1] the Princess is thin and melancholy, sleeps ill, eats little or nothing; will not talk; 'in this as in other effects which indicate she is deranged (*trasportada*) her illness is much advanced. The usual treatment is by affection and appeal, or by fear. Appeal and persuasion she will not take, rather quite refuses to accept; then by compulsion she becomes so much excited, and sometimes feels so acutely even the slightest compulsion exercised that it is a great pity to try it, nor do I believe anyone would wish or dare to do so.'

Determined to join her husband Juana proceeded as far as Medina del Campo, where, in Isabel's great fortress of la Mota[2] it was at last felt necessary to deal with her as with a person not responsible. Fonseca, Bishop of Córdoba, director of the Princess's household, was ordered by the Queen to detain her 'as gently and graciously as could possibly be.' His persuasion was of no avail, nor a messenger from her mother, nor a letter from the Queen's hand assuring Juana that her mother would come at once to Medina. It was arranged that Juana's horses should be withheld; the Princess, proposing to go on foot, forced her way to the outer gates of the castle, where Fonseca though threatened with death ordered the portcullis lowered and the bridge drawn. In a frenzy Juana established herself on the parapet, whence she would not budge for a day and a night, nor accept the shelter of hangings against a bitter November cold. She remained, housed in a kitchen or a sentry-box between the inner and the outer works until her mother, forcing herself from a sickbed in Segovia, came to Medina. Assurances that she should join her husband and that no one had a notion of separating her from her children somewhat pacified the Princess, who, dragging through two months of waiting on the winds in the port of Laredo, finally, at the end of May 1504 sailed to Flanders.

There a humiliation awaited her which seriously ag-

[1] MS. of the letter in the Royal Academy of History; printed in Rodríguez Villa, 83. For ceremonial and obstetrical nonchalance in the sixteenth century, see Sandoval, I. xiii.

[2] Cf. illustration and note.

La Mota Castle, Medina del Campo

This fortress of a grandee was taken over by Queen Isabel and became one of her favorite residences and the scene of her death, shortly after the pathetic struggle there over her insane daughter and heiress, Doña Juana. (*Cf.* Book I, Chap. I, *ad fin.*)

The fortress is built on a low hill overlooking the shallow river-bed. The central rectangle was part of a thirteenth-century castle, which was enlarged and strengthened about 1440 by erecting the donjon, the outer works, the bridge, and its barbican, and by cutting the fosse in the native rock. The Queen completed the construction in 1479 and installed a luxurious interior. The outworks, at the edge of a steep escarpment, have a complete crest of merlons and, below, tiers of galleries with loopholes, the upper series of which, in the form of circles surmounted by a cross, permit both plunging and direct fire. The construction is in thin brick in thick courses of mortar. The crests of wall and donjon crumbled into disrepair, recently restored. The fresh color of the restored masonry shows clearly in my drawing. The interior is wholly empty, stripped to the bare walls.

(*Cf.* Dieulafoy, *Spain*, in the series *Ars Una*, Chap. V; and an enthusiastic paragraph in Street, Vol. I, Chap. VIII.)



LA MOTA CASTLE, MEDINA DEL CAMPO

gravated her mental trouble. The report that circulated in the court of Castile was committed to a letter by old Peter Martyr in July:[1] 'Alas for the great! no happiness or rest on earth! To none is it granted to suck sweet honey or licorice but he must swallow so much tares (sic, *zizaniae*) or abhorrent gall, an accumulated draught. I suppose you have heard with what trouble of mind Juana, heiress apparent of so many realms, has desired the embrace of her husband Philip of Burgundy, Archduke of Austria and Count of Flanders. She has arrived; her husband is with her — and nothing wretcheder than she! For when she arrived in Flanders she realized that her husband's feeling was alienated, and suspected a mistress. After the fashion of all women, especially those who have a chaste love of their husbands, she went hot and more stirred up than a snake in midsummer. With wrath in her breast, gnashing teeth, and a face blazing fire, they say she cuffed that blond mistress, who was one of the noble damsels of her own train, and had her hair, which had so much pleased Philip, clipped to the skin. When this was reported to Philip, they say he went hotfoot to his wife and upbraided her with oath and insult; and they say she has withdrawn into greater grief and wretchedness. Juana, who as a girl was brought up exquisitely and tenderly, amid a royal delicacy, is reported to be very sick, shaken in her mind — which is naturally rather headstrong — by excessive distress of spirit.'

The story, through servants of the Princess, reached the ears of her mother, already weak in her last illness. She added to her will a significant codicil: leaving 'her husband D. Fernando governor of these realms in the absence of the Queen Dña. Juana her daughter; and if she, when present, would not or could not reign, that the King, D. Fernando, should reign.' Isabel died in la Mota, November 26, at midnight.[2]

[1] Epist. CCLXXII. Santa Cruz's manuscript ('Estanques'), as often, renders Martyr word for word (Rodríguez Villa, 92–93). Santa Cruz (I. 12) is almost identical, adding the detail that Felipe not only reviled but also struck his wife.

[2] Foronda, Boletín R.A.H. April 1920. She was only fifty-three years old (Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, Part II, Chap. 16, note 17). The details of the Queen's age, and the date and place of her death are reported with the most baffling discrepancies by the chroniclers. This is a classic instance of the difficulty of determining details about even the greater figures of history.

CHAPTER II

ROYAL SCUFFLE

UPON the Queen's death followed an extraordinary struggle, Fernando and Felipe contending in Juana's name for the control of Castile, the girl torn between father and husband, each of whom proclaimed her incompetence as pretext for his own rule, and magnified her authority, to exclude his rival's rule; a struggle full of humiliations for the sovereigns and perils for the subject, the whirligig of Time finally bringing sudden and spectacular revenges.

Juana's incapacity, evident in the Court circle since the winter of her stay in la Mota, was now certified, with documents, to the Cortes at Toro. Each party, in the wrangle ensuing, tried to minimize this incapacity whenever a communication from Juana, or her presence, seemed to tell in his favor;[1] but the main issue was clear: whether Fernando should be regent, according to Isabel's codicil, or Felipe and the party of Flemish courtiers and of restless Castilian grandees which he was rapidly building up.

D. Felipe promptly took an exacting stand, asking D. Fernando to withdraw at once from Juana's realms. He was not persuaded — as in the light of Fernando's sinister reputation in diplomacy was quite natural — that the King of Aragon would remain within his quasi-legal rights as governor, and equally unimpressed by Fernando's reminder that the Catholic Monarchs had built up an orderly rule out of discordant provinces seething with insubordination, whereas Felipe was himself but a novice in rule.[2] D. Juan Manuel and other favorites were ready with malicious hints to Felipe that he 'resolve to be sovereign more absolute than to accept command from another'; and hints to the courtiers that, with Felipe established in Castile,

[1] Note King Fernando's disclaimer, in Oct., 1507, of the certification of Juana's incapacity before the Cortes of Toro of 1505. Rodríguez Villa, 103, 196. Of course those who like to explain the unusual by the astounding suggest that Juana was not mad, but a Protestant: cf. Bergenroth, *Kaiser Karl u. Seine Mutter* (*Historische Zeitschrift*, XX. 231); V. Lafuente, *Dña Juana vindicada de la nota de herejía*. These and other controversial matters are treated in Rodríguez Villa. For the testimony of the Toledan, Pedro López de Padilla, cf. Alcocer, 15.

[2] Peter Martyr, Epist. CCLXXXII; Rodríguez Villa, 98.

they should see great wealth and good jobs whence they might obtain it.[1]

King Fernando maneuvered to win over D. Juan Manuel, since he who controlled the favorite would in turn control D. Felipe.[2] He obtained through Secretary Conchillos a signed request from his daughter that he continue to govern the realm which had cost him and her mother so much effort to reduce to order and justice; but the bearer showed it, on his way to D. Fernando, to D. Felipe, who at once cruelly imprisoned the secretary and placed Juana in strictest confinement under a guard of archers, quite excluded from communication with any Spaniards. Plainly, madness in great ones must not unwatched go; but among the Castilians immense suspicions were roused by a rule which required, and perhaps was exploiting, the imprisonment of Isabel's daughter.

Further to confuse the situation, a letter inconsistent with the earlier one to her father came from Juana's troubled mind, addressed to M. de Vere, her ambassador in Castile, and signed with her own hand.[3]

'*The Queen: M. de Vere*

'I have not written to you till now, for you know already how reluctantly I do so; but since they have the opinion here that I am out of my mind, it is reasonable to defend myself a little, though I ought not to be surprised that they raise against me false testimonies, since they raised them against our Lord. But since the matter is of such character and at such a time maliciously said, do you speak to my lord the King my father in my behalf; for those who give that out are acting not only against me but against His Highness. For there are even those who say he is glad of it, for the sake of ruling our realms, which I do not believe, since His Highness is so great and so Catholic a King and I his so obedient daughter.

[1] Santa Cruz ('Estanques'), quoted in Rodríguez Villa, 99.

[2] For the dominance of J. Manuel over D. Felipe, cf. Alcocer, 4, 19. Pedro López de Padilla was threatened with death to extort declarations favorable to J. Manuel. *Ibid.*, 15.

[3] It bears perhaps the last signature she affixed; for she refused thereafter to sign any document, perhaps from reluctance to offend either husband or father, or from the timid wariness of deranged persons before any act that appears to commit or entrap them. Rodríguez Villa, 120 (September (?), 1505); 130 (Dec. 10, 1505); P. Martyr, Epist. CCCXVIII. Later, in an inconsistent moment she appears to have signed a few writs, and then broken off the business. (Letter of Conchillos, March 7, 1507. Rodríguez Villa, 218.) She was apparently deceived into signing two writs in 1507 (Rodríguez Villa, 229).

'I know indeed that my lord the King there wrote in his own justification, bringing some charge about me; but that ought not to pass between parents and children — all the more so because, if I did give way to passion at all (*si en algo yo use de pasion*) and ceased to maintain a condition befitting my dignity, it is well known the cause was none other than jealousy. And that passion is not in me alone; but my lady the Queen [i.e., Isabel], (to whom God grant glory!), who was a person so excellent and rare in the world, was likewise jealous: but time cured Her Highness, as with God's pleasure it will me. I request and direct you to speak there to all persons to whom it shall seem to you fitting, that the well-intentioned may rejoice at the truth, and the ill-intentioned may know that, though I felt myself such as they would wish, it were not for me to take from my Lord the King my husband the rule of those realms, and all those in the world which might be mine; or fail to grant him all the powers I could — both for the love I bear him and for what I know of His Highness, and because I could not with reason surrender the government to any other than his children and mine and all their successors, without doing what I ought not to do. I hope in God that we shall very soon be there, where my good subjects and servants will be glad to see me.

'Given in Brussels, the third day of May, 1505. I, the Queen.

'By the Queen's command.

'PERO XYMENEZ.'

A document in madness, and how difficult of interpretation! Perhaps D. Felipe extorted it to offset the effect of the previous letter to D. Fernando and the certifications to the Cortes of Toro.[1] From his dictation and from what tearful and humiliated compulsion can only be imagined, may have come the reference to Isabel's well-founded jealousy and that to Fernando's rejoicing in his daughter's incompetence which gave him rule. Only the signature, as usual, is in royal autograph: 'Yo la Reyna'; yet the note of incoherence and of troubled self-defense seems dictated by Juana's own blurred intelligence.

Less doubtful documentary warrant D. Fernando obtained in repeated acts of the Cortes of Toro, confirming him as governor; but he was astute enough to feel that he was losing ground. Constantly undermining his position was the old Castilian dislike of the Aragonese. In Castile the restless nobles might hope, in the discord, and still more under an idle young sovereign, to recover that defiant in-

[1] This is the understanding of Rodríguez Villa, who discovered this pathetic document, and prints it, with a facsimile, p. 110.

dependence from which it had been the greatest triumph of the Catholic Monarchs to humble them.[1] Even of his own Great Captain, who was flatteringly approached by D. Felipe, Fernando felt doubtful. To Pope Julius II Felipe sent a turbulent spirit, Antonio de Acuña, Bishop of Zamora, commissioned, if only by audacious defamation, to discredit with His Holiness some of the greatest of the Castilian clergy, even Jiménez himself; and to persuade His Holiness to remove them from Castile by summoning them to Rome 'for some genuine or pretended reason.'[2]

But the most important ally in the struggle was Louis XII. Friendliness to France had always been Felipe's personal preference and a policy largely prescribed by the dangers to him of French hostility. This friendliness was a great grievance to his Spanish parents-in-law, to whom France was the perpetual arch-enemy. By a diplomatic about-face, August 1505, Fernando captured from Felipe this ally, by conceding to Louis, in the treaty of Blois, points in regard to theoretical title (but not possession) in the disputed Italian lands, and by marrying Louis's young niece, Germaine, daughter of Louis's sister and Jean de Foix. Fernando must have realized the price he was paying: a son, should one be born of this twenty-three-year-old wife, would succeed to all the realms of Aragon and the Mediterranean, to the exclusion of his older half-sister Juana and her heirs. The great achievement of his long reign with Isabel, the territorial unity of the Spanish kingdoms, would be undone. This perilous price, however, purchased some immediate concession: Felipe proffered compromise, which was formulated in the Concert of Salamanca, November 1505, providing joint governorship and division of income. Whether this balance of power would be upset when Felipe and Juana came to Castile would depend upon the attitude of the Spanish grandees.

The young sovereigns arrived, in an armada armed like an invasion, with 1500 troops, in April 1506 — avoiding any prompt meeting with D. Fernando, in order that the grandees might have time to rally to the new monarchs. This they promptly did. The old navigator who had given to Castile and Leon a new world sought the archduke's favor; the Constable of Castile joined him; the Great Cap-

[1] Sandoval, I. lxiv: *pareciendoles que a rio tan rebuelto era cierta la ganancia.*

[2] Acuña's commission in Rodríguez Villa, 114 ff.

tain appeared to hesitate; Fernando realized he was abandoned. Felipe then denounced the Salamanca Concert. To readjust relations an interview was at last conceded to the old king, to which he went with a small unarmed retinue and Felipe with full escort of war. On both sides was hysterical suspicion. Felipe might be sure that in the diplomatic field the wily, experienced, and unscrupulous Aragonese, notoriously the sharpest diplomat of the Continent, would trick and defeat him. Every grandee in Spain recalled in Castilian history, from ferocious Pedro who was mangled by his brother Enrique, first sovereign of Trastamara, at the interview of Montiel, down through the reign of Isabel's brother, Enrique IV, royal colloquies that were either ambushes or assassinations. The agreement, reached at Villafafila, June 27, 1506, excluded Fernando from the government of Castile, with certain compensations of income, and formally eliminated Juana from consideration. Quietly acquiescent in such defeat, Fernando was nonetheless filled with wild projects: a surprise raid and abduction of Juana, in whose name he would rouse Castile. He secretly prepared a sworn protest that his agreement was void because extorted by personal peril. But he judged the situation too astutely to attempt resistance. He withdrew into Aragon, so discredited that upon his way certain grandees refused him hospitality, and Astorga upon its hill closed its gates as to an enemy.[1]

[1] Rodríguez Villa, 175 note. All this dramatic duel is narrated in detail in Book IV.

The intense animosities among the Spanish rival parties are illustrated by the episode narrated in Alcocer, 12.

CHAPTER III

A ROYAL PROGRESS

KING FELIPE PRIMERO'S hands were now free. Only the rivalries of Flemish courtier and Castilian grandee disturbed the prospect of exploiting Castile. Felipe's appointees took over palaces and fortresses. The Cortes of Valladolid in July swore to the young sovereigns, Juana in her own right and Felipe as her legitimate spouse; and granted large taxes. Only by the opposition of the Admiral was the Cortes prevented from authorizing the confinement of Juana, who, sensing in some manner a proposal to imprison her, was thrown into a frenzy of fear. Passing once a town with a fortress 'she threw herself from her horse to the ground, suspecting they proposed to leave her in the fortress of that place, either because she herself conceived that fancy or because some one who loved to tattle told her. She was convinced that her husband D. Felipe and his Councillors, whom she hated, wanted to put her in a fortress, and therefore remained that night on her mule going up and down through the open country, unwilling to enter the town.' [1]

But the festivities of royal welcome went on. Amid the celebrations in Burgos, D. Felipe, after playing a violent game of pelota, drank excessively, contracted chills and fever, and within a week was dead, September 25, 1506, in his twenty-ninth year.[2]

Then there was recalled in Castile a strange circumstance: an old woman in Galicia who had seen the gay young Burgundian when he came first into his realms, said he would make a longer journey dead, in Castile, than he would alive. This erratic fancy was brought to pass by the young wife who had been the center and chief sufferer from all this shabby scuffle for power. Her hysterical jealousy gave place to a melancholy as insane but more profound. Tearless, in a trance of dumb loneliness, she could not separate herself from the remains. They lay in the mon-

[1] 'Estanques' (i.e., Santa Cruz) in Rodríguez Villa, 177; again a literal equivalent of P. Martyr, Epist. CCCXII. A similar incident is related by Alcocer, 13.

[2] Dr. Parra's testimony in Rodríguez Villa, 441. Santa Cruz, I. 21. Even contemporaries repudiate the usual allegations of poisoning: Maldonado, 27.

astery of Miraflores,[1] on the long bare hilltop three miles up the Arlanzón valley. There amid the Carthusian silence Juana demanded the opening of D. Felipe's coffin, and kissed the bared feet of the body. This devotion she repeated through many weeks; then finally started with the remains for Granada, where it was D. Felipe's desire to lie. A funeral procession of Franciscans, with the Prior and a few Carthusians from Miraflores, daily singing masses and vigils, accompanied by the Queen widow, bore the body by stages across Castile in the dense misty weather of winter, mostly with wind-blown torches at night; repeating with each day's halt the ritual of devotion, the opening of the coffin, with distressing odors of mortality, and kissing the feet.[2] The cortège paused in Torquemada, where Juana was delivered of Felipe's posthumous daughter, Catalina.[3]

Persuaded on her father's return from Italy to take up her residence in the salubrious town of Tordesillas on the high northern bank of the Douro nineteen miles southwest of Valladolid, Juana laid her husband's body in the royal nunnery of Santa Clara there.[4] The royal tomb was visible at any moment to Juana's gaze; and not till her own death did her son Carlos take Felipe's body and hers to the royal burial chapel in Granada. Isolated in a wary melancholy of madness, she gave her thought, not to the realm of which she was titular Queen, but to the body of death. Her father reigned for her, and died; and the octogenarian Cardinal exercised her authority after him, till the Hapsburg grand-

[1] Isabel's father Juan II and her mother and her brother, the Infante Alfonso the Pretender, were here buried. The three alabaster monuments, two before the altar and one on the side wall, which the Queen had erected are among the triumphs of ornate Renaissance sepulchral design, as lavishly ornate as the tomb of her son, the Infante Juan, in Ávila is simple.

[2] This episode has been often embroidered in imaginative literature and art in Spain. All the details above, however, are recorded in contemporary sources. Rodríguez Villa, 214, 222; P. Martyr, Epist. CCCXXXII, CCCXXXIX; Letter of Conchillos, Dec. 23, 1506, in Rodríguez Villa, 215; Sandoval, I. xxiv; Peter Martyr, Epist. CCCLIX: 'Noctu semper graditur ajens: Non decere viduas, sole maritali amisso, solis ultra lucem, in itineribus praecipue, ne conspiciantur, intueri.' Maldonado, 28–29.

[3] She was named after Juana's sister, whom the Queen had visited in England, recently widowed also of her first husband, Arthur, first-born son of Henry VII. This sister later married the English prince who became Henry VIII, and had, as Queen Katherine, almost as tragic a story as her sister Juana.

[4] The nunnery is not visible to travelers; but in its church are relics of the time when the town was lavishly beautified by the ferocious Pedro of Castile, who founded the nunnery: a gorgeous artesonado ceiling and a portable altar piece, upon which Pedro's eyes probably looked.

son arrived, as ignorant as his mother of the land he was come to rule.[1]

In November 1517 the Flemish court reached Tordesillas and Juana saw her two children whom she had left in Brussels mere infants in November 1505. The Chamberlain Chièvres was first presented to her, and assured her that her son was grown and entirely equal to assuming rule, from which she might consequently be wholly relieved. The youth and his sister Leonor were then presented — 'grown so much in a few years!' — welcomed, and promptly dismissed, to rest from the fatigue of their voyage. Chièvres easily obtained the Queen's approval of his suggestion that D. Carlos should at once assume full royal right; and the boy king resumed his progress, thus dexterously relieved of an embarrassing parent.[2]

Of another embarrassing obligation of gratitude, toward the venerable Cardinal Governor Jiménez, he moved quickly to free himself by despatching a letter extending to him an ungracious 'permission to retire.'

[1] The period of Jiménez's rule is treated in the admirable *Cisneros, Gobernador del reino*, 1921, by the Conde de Cedillo.

[2] The narrative of Laurent Vital, of D. Carlos's train, in *Voyages des Souverains des Pays Bas*, III. 93 ff., is the basis for the account of Rodríguez Villa (270–72) and of Merriman (*Spanish Empire*, III. 29–30).

CHAPTER IV

THE REALM OF CASTLES

THE land itself, to the Prince hitherto familiar only with the flat, moist, and exuberant scene of the Low Lands, must have seemed singularly stark.[1] His cavalcade passed in a few days through the passes of the Asturian mountains, whose bleak granite was wrinkled into greener valleys, over onto the vast plain of Castile, dun in the great expanses of fallow, straw-colored in the stubble, dusty in the white powder of the roads or the driven chaff of the threshing floors at the summer's end. He descended from one immense terrace to another, each a day's journey wide and breaking sharply to the next lower level in those gleaming white chalk cliffs that rim every landscape in northern Castile against the cloudless sky of the Spanish summer. It was a land of agricultural decline. The forests in which medieval kings hunted had, save in the coastal highlands, almost vanished. Reckless cutting for American shipping probably hastened the deforestation, and even more the sheep grazers' practice of burning the trees to force an abundance of smaller green spring undergrowth.[2] Towns guarded jealously their pine growths, the *pinares* which supplied somewhat inferior timber, and charcoal.[3] Local agriculture was meeting scarcely more than local need. An alarming succession of bad years after 1503 marked the beginning of the need in Castile for imported grain.[4] The more fertile South grew wheat, the olive, the vine, and the fig enough for export; but even here a bad year involved import of Sicilian grain. The eastern uplands of Castile

[1] On the unfortunate first impressions, see the narratives of his companion Laurent Vital and of the English envoy Thomas Spinelly, quoted in Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 26 ff.

[2] Klein, *Mesta*, 307, 321. The incomparable Venetian ambassadors noted the decline. Not long after D. Carlos's arrival Spain was importing lumber from Flanders and carpenters from Italy.

[3] These are still the verdant feature of the Castilian landscape, and some of them notably beautiful, in particular those about the fortress of Coca.

[4] On the economic and industrial conditions cf. Altamira, *Hist. España*, §§510–13, 591–94; Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, II. 136 ff.; III. 201 ff. An appalling picture of suffering among the poor is in Laurent Vital, *Voyages des Souverains des Pays Bas*, III. 181. A long report by the Admiral (Danv. V. 87) indicates how Spain is crippled by two bad harvests.

grew wines; but already Jerez had established the greater fame of her 'Sherris.' [1]

The land was evidently habitable only to a population endlessly laborious; should any considerable portion of its laboring classes be drained away by military service or for other adventure abroad, it would face starvation. Indeed in 1517 so scarce was the food supply that the king's cortège had to adjust its course and the length of its halts to the precarious possibilities of supply; and he had to forbid a considerable assemblage of grandees to welcome him, because it would be impossible to feed the numbers.[2]

For agriculture had for a generation been sacrificed to the interests of a greater industry, which yielded so much in various forms of local and royal taxation that it had been nourished by every sort of legislative and judicial favor since the time of the Catholic Monarchs. In the upland country through which the royal train passed into Spain, and still more in the highlands of Leon to the west or about Soria and Cuenca on the eastern rim of Castile, vast droves of merino sheep were assembling in mid-September, reddled, and rounded up by the heavy sheep dogs, and in six weeks the creatures with their herdsmen, following ancient and legally defined sheep-runs, legally assured of certain pasturage privileges on their way, and with legal dues to be paid out on their course, would reach the plains of Estremadura and Andalusia, where the ewes would lamb and the flocks remain until, in mid-April, they followed the grass north again over the peninsula.[3] These migrations

[1] The valor that comes of sherris is expounded by Falstaff, II *Henry IV*, act iv, sc. iii. On Sicilian grain cf. pp. 80, 240.

[2] Sandoval, III. ii. Jiménez, upon learning of D. Carlos's proposed visit to Spain at once ordered supplies to all the northern ports. Cedillo, 323; Spinelly in *Letters and Papers Henry VIII*, II. No. 3705. Similarly in 1522, Danv. V. 182.

[3] All this picturesque and important aspect of Spanish life is fully discussed in J. Klein, *The Mesta*, 1920. The sheep dog was short-haired and powerful, seemingly like the beasts in Velázquez's pictures. The wool growers' gild in 1517 listed 2,860,000 migratory sheep. Mutton was not commonly consumed; the animals were believed to produce better fibre if not fattened. Later, the armies in the great revolt seized flocks for food: cf. p. 320, n. 2. The dues payable in a year's migrations have been estimated at 4 or 5 per cent of the animals in a flock (Klein, 222), in the time of Fernando and Isabel. In this very year of 1517 town justices (*alcaldes*) were especially required to see that migratory shepherds were not exploited (Klein, 229). Garcilasso the poet was one of thousands of litigants involved with the Mesta about grazing privileges. (Klein, 237; Garcilasso's Egloga, I. 189–93.) The Segovia washing vats usually cleansed 9 or 10,000 bags of wool. Danv. V. 142.

were regimented and escorted by carts and pack animals carrying the long nets that served for night folds, salt, and the supplies for the human and animal army that directed them. So important was the industry that the gild of wool growers, the *Mesta*, was the most powerful corporation in Castile; and the senior member of the Council was by act of the Catholic Monarchs, *ex officio* president of the gild.[1]

The production of wool and other raw materials was the chief undertaking of Spanish industry until the reign of Isabel, when a policy of import dues upon cloth and export dues on wool encouraged native textile manufacture in rivalry with Flemish woolen and Neapolitan, Turkish, and Indian silks; and in the year of Isabel's death the silk industries in eight Andalusian cities contributed nine *cuentos* of taxes to the Treasury.

The cities, then, of this unfamiliar realm would indicate something of Spanish wealth, resource, and elegance of which the impoverished country districts suggested nothing. There the young king could see energetic and thriving populations producing the objects which he would in his birthplace have recognized as typical Spanish products: fine woolen cloth and the marvels of the Toledan bladesmith, the goat leather of the Cordovan cordwainers,[2] lustred tile and other pottery, and the exquisite ware of the Sevillan silversmiths.

The Spanish cities [3] had in large part come into existence as military necessities during the recovery of the land from the Moor, as garrisons posted in recovered territory still requiring defense. They had their walled fortifications typical of the medieval city,[4] and even small places had their fortress or castle. These were so numerously dotted over the realm as to give it its name of Castile. Before the time of D. Carlos many of the castles of the rebellious baronage had been demolished by Fernando and Isabel; but each of the great municipalities had its fortalice or *alcázar*, held by a royal warden (*alcaide*), and in the strongholds (*lugares*) of the lords similar forts were maintained. Just as the battered

[1] Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, II. 139.

[2] A word derived from the place name, like *sherry*, and *bilbo* (from Bilbao iron). On iron industries cf. Danv. IV. 198.

[3] On municipal life and organization in general cf. Altamira, *Hist. España*, 450; Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, I. 184 ff.; II. 144 ff.

[4] One city, Ávila, still preserves them entire, though in considerable portion restored.

ruins of many a fortress stood as memorial of the period of the great independent barons, so the town governments of D. Carlos's time were survivals already partly in decay of the famous independent cities of medieval Spain. As a necessity of their position as garrisoned outposts in a no-man's-land, the Castilian towns had been granted most liberal charters (*fueros*) and had developed a vigorous organization of self-government. The typical town government (*concejo*), selected by the burghers (*vecinos*), was bicameral, with an upper council of some two dozen councillors or *regidors*, administrative functionaries drawn largely from the gentry, and a lower council of deputies (*jurados*). Municipal judges (*alcaldes*) had civil and criminal jurisdiction; and the authority of the town administration (*ayuntamiento*) was embodied in a chief police officer or sheriff, the *alguacil* (often called simply the *justicia*), bearing a symbolic staff of authority (*vara*), and entrusted with arrests and the preservation of order.[1]

All this vigorous development of Spanish medieval municipal life, however, had been sapped by encroachment of royal authority, and in particular by the development, under the Catholic Monarchs, of the institution of the *corregidor*, a crown appointee in every city, with extensive powers of supervision, report, and interference. The municipal check on his power consisted in his obligation to undergo at the end of his term a formal review or inquest (*residencia*) in which all charges were examined by a special justice of inquest (*juez de residencia*). Further, one important right remained undiminished in the Spanish municipalities: eighteen of the greater cities of the realm chose the deputies who constituted the Cortes or national legislature, Ávila, Burgos, Córdoba, Cuenca, Guadalajara, Granada, Jaén, León, Madrid, Murcia, Salamanca, Segovia, Sevilla, Soria, Toledo, Toro, Valladolid, Zamora.

In contrast with the evident wealth of the cities D. Carlos might well note the poverty of the royal house. Even in a great city the monarch often owned no palace and had to accept the hospitality of its powerful grandee, or even to obtain lodging in public houses, the charge for which, placed

[1] On the organization of the Castilian cities, cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, I. 185 ff. and II. 144 ff. Maldonado explains most of these terms, *Movimiento de España*, 80: the alguacil's *vara*, he says, was an ash rod of the diameter of a finger and as tall as a man.

to the national account, was a constant topic of haggling in the Cortes. The Catholic Sovereigns, and Jiménez as Governor, lodged with D. Pedrolaso in Madrid.[1] D. Fernando, when forced from Castile in 1506, had difficulty in finding lodging; and indeed died in a modest inn, 'a hired and public house.' [2] Between Valladolid and Santiago, a distance of over one hundred leagues, the monarch, as the popular leaders later reproachfully reminded the grandees, had but three strongholds of his own.[3]

The impressive residences of the Spanish nobility, whose hospitality D. Carlos had often to accept, were symbols of a power still formidable.

[1] Cedillo, 17. This is Pedrolaso de Castilla, of Madrid, not the more famous one of Toledo. Cf. Danv. I. 377; IV. 40.

[2] Mexía, 59, followed by Sandoval, I. lxi, with due moralizing remarks on the final humility of even royal mankind. Even in Valladolid the King was lodged in the house of a grandee (Sandoval, III. iii). Queen Germaine was delivered of D. Fernando's short-lived child in the house of the Admiral in Valladolid (Sandoval, I. xxviii). Even Felipe II was born in the house of a noble in Valladolid (Sandoval, XVI. xii). Monasteries often received the royal party (Sandoval, I. lvii). Cf. Danv. III. 92; V. 427.

[3] Valladolid to the Governors, Jan. 30, 1521, Danv. III. 91; Santa Cruz, I. 425; Sandoval, VIII. xxxiv.

CHAPTER V

THE BARREL OF THE VIPER AND THE ADDER

For Spain passed, as did all the medieval states of Europe, through a period of tumultuous disorders due to the arrogant rivalries of an almost independent baronage. Germany was still defiant of the negligible voice of Maximilian, in a chaos of terrorism maintained by robber nobles. In Castile, as in the other countries, the emergence of a strong monarchy, in alliance with the growing power of the cities, had suppressed the anarchic nobility; but there this result was attained only at the end of the middle ages. Before the reign of Fernando and Isabel, several boy princes succeeded to the throne, the tools, repeatedly, of powerful favorites who used the sovereign's inexperience not only to amass more than royal wealth and estates but to consolidate essentially sovereign power. Thus Isabel's father, Juan II, had been the tool of the great Álvaro de Luna; and her brother, Enrique IV, of the favorite Beltrán de la Cueva, whose scandalous intimacy with his queen had been pretext for the exclusion of the Queen's daughter, Juana, nicknamed *la Beltraneja*, as illegitimate. The first task of Fernando and Isabel, to reduce the baronage to obedience, had been easier because of their second task, the expulsion of the Moor; for the turbulent spirit of the Spanish grandees was diverted from the rivalries that constantly precipitated civil war, to the common effort against the Infidel. But that obedience had not become habitual. The struggle between Felipe and Fernando had shown how defiantly the grandees returned to their quarrels so soon as they saw it was safe to do so. Indeed the main business of Fernando in his ten years' regency after Felipe's death was to reëstablish the habit of civil obedience in the Castilian nobility. How little habitual it had become was clear enough to Jiménez, when on Fernando's death he took over the governorship for the young D. Carlos — troubled by the thought that he could for only a few years maintain such order as might enable the boy to learn the character of his powerful nobles and acquire some experience in conciliating or controlling them.

The chief figures in this arrogant group, so far as titular

office was concerned, were the Admiral and the Constable of Castile. The naval and military importance implied by those titles had a generation before passed from them, partly as a consequence of reforms in the fleet and the army, partly of the fact that they had become almost hereditary.

The titular distinction of *Almirante* was then worn by D. Fadrique Enríquez de Cabrera, a man of almost sixty years, and successor, thirty-two years earlier, on his father's death, to that title.[1] He had won some military distinction in the service of Fernando and Isabel. He had estates scattered all over Castile, notably the town of Medina de Rioseco, where he founded the Franciscan monastery which contains his tomb. Through his mother he was related to the even more powerful family of Velasco.

In this family had become hereditary the title, equally honorific, of *Condestable*. D. Íñigo Fernández de Velasco was third Velasco to be Constable, succeeding to an older brother, Bernardino, who was second Constable of Castile.[2] Their ancestral home was Burgos, where the father, Pedro Fernández de Velasco, first Constable, had built his palace and a sumptuous burial chapel, 'del Condestable.'[3] As the father had saved the crown for Enrique IV at the battle of Olmedo and served in the Moorish wars, so the son had real military experience and prestige, and his son, another Pedro Fernández, Count of Haro, had military ambitions also.[4] The Constable's mother was of the house of Mendoza, a daughter of the poet and philosopher of the literary court of Juan II, Íñigo López de Mendoza, first Marquis of Santillana.[5] The irresponsible power exercised by the Constable was evidenced in his terrorizing of the city, at the death of King Fernando, until Jiménez reimposed order.[6]

[1] The father, lord of Simancas and Rioseco, was arrested and exiled to Sicily by Queen Isabel when Spain was first subjected by the Catholic Sovereigns (Altamira, *Historia de España*, II. 372). Danvila leaves the reader to choose between 1466 (VI. 231) and 1477 (VI. 127) for the Admiral's birth: his own memorial in 1521 (Danv. IV. 355) says he is then sixty.

[2] Cf. Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, Part II, Chap. XX, note 34.

[3] For the palace cf. illustration and note. The ornate Lady Chapel, embroidered inside and out with the arms of the founder, contains his tomb. Cf. Street (Ed. King), I. 22. The lantern of the Constable's chapel is almost as conspicuous an external feature as the lantern of the crossing.

[4] Haro married his cousin, Juliana Ángela de Aragón, daughter of his uncle, the second Constable, and his wife, Juana de Aragón, bastard daughter of King Fernando. Sandoval, I. xxviii, xlvi.

[5] Cf. Fitzmaurice-Kelly, *Littérature espagnole*, 92 ff.

[6] Cedillo, *Cisneros*, 26–27.

The Casa del Cordón

Of the three chief civil monuments still surviving which have close association with the events of the Comunero revolt[1] not the least impressive is the two-storied stone palace of the Constables in Burgos, known as the Casa del Cordón. Built in the last half of the fifteenth century by D. Pedro F. de Velasco, Grand Chamberlain of King Enrique IV, Constable of Castile, and Doña Mencía de Mendoza, his wife, the structure was from the first designed to entertain the monarchs of Castile, as the royal arms crested with a crown indicate. The heraldic splendors of the family appear above the great portal. The Velasco arms (proper right) bear seven checkers vair alternated with eight checkers blank, and the royal lions and castles in the bordure. (The Constable was, through his mother, a great-great-grandson of King Enrique II, and licensed to bear the regal emblems in his arms.) Of the Countess's arms (proper left), the first and fourth quarters are quartered saltire-wise, bearing in the quarters of chief and base a bend and a chain bordure; the other quarters flanked with the Mendoza device: *Ave Maria gratia: plena Dominus tecum.* The second and third quarters of the Countess's blazon bear canting arms, five fig leaves, of the Figueroa family. Upon the ribbons including the Velasco arms runs the family device: *Un buen morir dura toda la vida* (A noble death is lifelong). The corresponding ribbons about the Mendoza arms read: *Omnia pretereunt pretert* (sic) *amare deum* (They renounced all but the love of God). The contracted inscription across the keystones records: *Esta casa mandaron fazer D. Pedro Fernandez de Blasco Dña Mencia de Mendoça segundos Condes de Haro.* Above appears the I.H.S. in the flaming sun, symbol popularized in the fifteenth century by the Franciscan S. Bernardino of Siena. The knotted cord of S. Francis encloses the whole portal.[2] In the corners of the door opening, bracket-wise, are two hounds, symbols of fidelity.

Through this portal in 1497 Columbus passed, to be received by Fernando and Isabel, temporarily resident there. To this interview the discoverer took the showy booty of his second voyage, Indians, idols, fabrics, parrots, and gold: the latter Queen Isabel devoted to ornamentation of the altar, then in construction, at Miraflores. In the Casa del Cordón in the same year were celebrated the espousals of the Infante D. Juan with Margaret of Austria. Here on Christmas Day, 1506, King Felipe died. The palace was of course the center of the struggle between the Constable Iñigo de Velasco and the Comuneros (cf. p. 181). Francis I of France, while a prisoner in Spain, February, 1526, was briefly entertained here.

For these and other details see the monograph of Cantón Salazar: *La Casa del Cordón.* Burgos. 1884.

[1] See the views of La Mota Castle (p. 10) and Torrelobatón (frontispiece).

[2] Street (*Gothic Architecture in Spain*, Ed. King, I. 64) is so hostile to all work save pure Gothic that he calls the Casa del Cordón 'a bald ugly erection . . . its entrance a square-headed doorway . . . enclosed with enormous chains.'



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THE CASA DEL CORDÓN

Every city of Castile was rent by the rivalries of such great houses, and could often find no municipal peace except in the exile of both families. In Córdoba, for instance, two marquises, of Comares and of Priego, led rival parties and the city secured quiet only by excluding both.[1] Sevilla was kept in tumult by ancient animosities between the houses of Arcos and of Medina Sidonia — which ranged from resentful rivalry as to who should draw and bear on Saint Clement's day (when the city had been recovered from the Moors) the sword of King D. Fernando, up to the disputed possession of the title and vast duchy of Medina Sidonia. 'When those gentlemen are here together the city is simply, as they say, the barrel of the viper and the adder.'[2]

From all these arrogant families hostility to the crown was always possible, but it was almost certain when two families were rivals for an office or the control of an estate, because the royal support which conciliated one rival as inevitably alienated the other. Countless such disputes awaited settlement in Castile when the young king came to Spain, to face the embarrassing difficulty of deciding between angry, proud, and powerful contestants.

The contest for the Priorate of San Juan, 'which in Castile is of much value and prestige,'[3] he tried to compromise.

D. Diego de Toledo, son of the Duke of Alva, was appointed Prior by King Fernando while regent of Castile, and confirmed in the Priorate by the Grand Master of Rhodes. But the family of Zúñiga contended that Fernando had taken it wrongly from D. Álvaro de Zúñiga who was encumbent from the time of Enrique IV and who had renounced it in favor of his nephew D. Antonio. D. Antonio brought suit in the Rota and obtained the award. Don Carlos from Flanders urged his governors to exert pressure on the Duke of Alva and his son, and, if in vain, to execute by force the Roman award. Jiménez did so; but D. Carlos, arrived in Spain, ambiguously arranged that both should be Prior and the income of the Priorate shared, with a pension

[1] Danv. II. 173.

[2] Anonymous report in Danv. II. 174. The squabble about the sword is in an undated document (Danv. II. 161) in which the dating of four week days fixes the year-date as 1515. 'The remedy of all this,' it concludes, 'would be for those grandees to get out and leave the city and the justicia in peace and without such faction as there is to-day.'

[3] Sandoval, II. xxxix.

and possession of Consuegra, the fortified capital of the Priorate,[1] to D. Antonio. The Knights, however, would recognize only D. Diego until his death: 'wherewith quite ended the differences, which were notable and dangerous, between those houses, which were great and feared in Castile, because of the factions and feuds that began to arise between them.'[2]

An angrier contest for office was the prolonged affair of D. Pedro Girón.

In February 1516 a quarrel occurred as to the Duchy of Medina Sidonia, between Doña Mencia de Guzmán, sister of the deceased Duke, and D. Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, her half-brother, son of a second marriage, who, she maintained, could not claim the Duchy, though in actual possession, because that marriage was invalid, through kinship within forbidden degree. Doña Mencia's husband, D. Pedro Girón, son and heir of the Count of Ureña, claimed title and occupied the town of Medina Sidonia; but King Fernando forced him to desist. During the precarious rule of Jiménez D. Pedro made a second attempt: he organized his faction, supported by the Duke of Arcos; threw Sevilla into an uproar, assembled an army, and laid siege to a town of the disputed duchy. But the Cardinal Governor was determined and sent an equally determined soldier, D. Antonio de Fonseca, lord of the great fortress of Coca in Castile, with troops of the realm, and D. Pedro was forced again to withdraw.[3]

This was a case hardly to be compromised, which the persistence of D. Pedro would surely force the King to decide. Indeed the quarrel merged into the general angry strife of the time and Fonseca and Girón appear again in the increasingly stormy story.

Toledo, the metropolitan city of Spain, was divided like the Verona of the Montagues and the Capulets. The leader of one faction was the Count of Fuensalida, who was alguacil mayor and head of the house of the Ayalas; and most considerable in his following was the family of Ávalos, among whom was D. Hernando de Ávalos, popular and astute, a regidor of the town council. D. Juan de Ribera,

[1] Santa Cruz, I. 167.

[2] Sandoval, II. xxxix, enlarging on Santa Cruz, I. 140, 167.

[3] Sandoval, II. iii; verbatim from Mexía, 62. Maldonado, 181. Documentary support of their narrative in Cedillo, *Cisneros*, 27 ff.

later Marquis of Montemayor, and warden (*alcaide*) of the alcázar, was the head of the other, the Ribera faction, whose most considerable following was the family of Silvas, including the Count of Cifuentes. As the Riberas and Silvas had supported King Fernando, the Ayalas and Ávalos supported King Felipe, who appointed Hernando de Ávalos corregidor of Jerez de la Frontera, above the bay of Cádiz, a reward he promptly lost on Felipe's premature death. At Fernando's death Jiménez restored him, only to be dismissed again by D. Carlos's Flemish Chamberlain Chièvres, a dismissal aggravated by a scuffle with a portero at an interview in the royal palace.[1] Ávalos became thereafter the center of disaffection in Toledo. The town had known but brief intervals of repose. The struggle over accepting D. Fernando's *corregidor* or D. Felipe's was settled by the happy compromise of accepting neither; but this precarious truce was broken by a pair of young squires (*mozos de espuela*) in a squabble over a wench, rousing the factions by shouting in the streets 'Ayala Ayala' and 'Silva y Padilla.'[2]

Of the Ribera-Silva faction was the family of D. Pedro López de Padilla, who had been Ambassador to Portugal, and held the castle of San Servando, across the Alcántara bridge, with troops of his brother, the Comendador of Calatrava. Though thoroughly exasperated by the tyrannies of the Flemish camarilla which accompanied D. Carlos into Castile, Padilla and his son Gutierre López de Padilla balked at joining armed revolt, in which the other son, Juan de Padilla was to play a notable part.[3]

Faction alienated members of other Castilian families, for instance the very distinguished house of Lasso de la Vega. Following the founder, Pedrolasso, *almirante* of the medieval scholar-king Alfonso the Wise, there were three generations of Garcilassos, the second of whom vanquished in a duel a Moor of Granada who had dragged at his horse's tail an Ave Maria. For this victory, one of the series of feats that

[1] D. Pedrolasso de la Vega, of the Arcos faction in Sevilla, got possession of the place later. Cf. Danv. IV. 160, a document not dated, but anterior to D. Carlos's election as Emperor, which was known in Spain in July, 1519. The whole situation in Toledo is described by Santa Cruz (I. 217 ff.), who gives the comprehensive indictment of D. Carlos's reign which Ávalos circulated in Castile.

[2] Alcocer, Chap. V. The writer represents Padilla sympathies, but not Comunero.

[3] Alcocer, IX. p. 42. Cf. also Martín Gamero's note 6, on the Toledan factions; and Danv. IV. 675, on Gutierre López de Padilla.

marked the Granada campaign of the Conqueror D. Alfonso XI, Garcilasso's descendants, including the house of Mendoza, carried in their arms an Ave Maria azure in a field or — the 'celestial Ave Maria won at the Salado.' [1] The third Garcilasso married into the house of Cisneros; so that in D. Carlos's time the Lassos were kin of both the families that contributed the great cardinals to the Catholic Sovereigns. After the three Garcilassos the descent passed for two generations through daughters, so it was by resumption of an ancestral name five generations remote that the family of the sixteenth century were Lassos de la Vega. The elder woman married into the house of Mendoza and her son was the Marquis of Santillana. Her daughter married into the family of Figueroa and this daughter's son kept the Figueroa name; but his son, resuming his great-grandfather's name, was Garcilasso, ambassador of Fernando and Isabel in Rome, so skilful that Louis XII called him 'ambassador of kings and king of ambassadors.' He followed King Felipe in his short-lived triumph, and was consequently out of favor with D. Fernando for the rest of his life, which closed in 1512. Of his seven sons, heirs of this most brilliant ancestry, the most famous were Pedro the oldest, and Garcí, the accomplished scholar, poet, and soldier whose career in the court of D. Carlos so closely resembles that of Sir Philip Sidney in Elizabethan England of the next generation. These brothers found themselves on opposite sides of the struggle that was beginning in Castile.

[1] The anecdote is commonly related of a later Garcilasso, in the Granada campaigns of Q. Isabel (Altamira, *Hist. España*, II. 377); but the earlier date is accepted in the *Vida del célebre poeta Garcilaso* (*Documentos inéditos*, XVI. 138). The device appears in the arms of the Cardinal Mendoza (ob. 1495) and in those in the Capilla del Condestable (begun in 1482; the Constable died in 1492).

CHAPTER VI

THE OLD PRIMATE AND THE YOUNG

YET this turbulent and contentious society, fed on memories of arrogant independence in the days of their fathers, their predatory appetites whetted by momentary indulgence during the brief reign of an irresponsible young king who bought their support by indiscriminate concession, then galled by the dominance of an Aragonese monarch, widower of their Queen, was still in 1517, with ominous indications of impatience, respecting the governance of the last survivor of the just and vigorous rule of the Catholic Monarchs, the venerable prelate who was now the will, the brain, the conscience of Castile.[1]

Jiménez as governor maintained order in the realm until the young sovereign arrived. Further, he defended from French invasion the recently annexed province of Navarre, and advanced the Spanish power in Africa, a success which meant not only missionary triumph but protection of the peninsula from corsair raids. But his imperative spirit had somewhat further exasperated the irritable pride of the grandees: the Duke of Alva declared 'his family was not one to serve a friar.'[2] Many, from the Constable down, he had reduced to obedience by armed force. Rebellious cities he had also suppressed; at one time indeed he had by an attempt to organize a compulsory militia service, inflamed the whole circle of the great towns, which combined with the nobility in a protest so formidable that his plan had to be tactfully withdrawn.

His long career as primate, unswervingly subordinating all civil interests to a narrowly conceived programme of advancing the church by exterminating Jewish and Moorish culture, he had that summer crowned by the completion of his greatest scholarly enterprise — alone comparable with his development of the University of Alcalá — the publication of the first work that combined the most accomplished

[1] A full and admirable study of the closing years of his career is made by the Conde de Cedillo: *Cisneros Gobernador del Reino*, Madrid, 1921. Sketched in Sandoval, II. xviii–xx; xxxviii.

[2] Cedillo, 60.

scholarship and the finest printing art of the Christian Renaissance, the six-volume, critical, polyglot edition of the Bible. After fifteen years' labor the concluding volume [1] had just come from the presses of Alcalá; and the great Cardinal might well have presented it to his young master as his farewell gift, in evidence of the Christian learning of the realm he had come to govern. But they never met. Jiménez died November 8, within a journey of only two days to the monarch into whose hands he was come to deliver his charge, and but a few hours before the arrival of the letter in which D. Carlos dismissed with the scantest expression of appreciation the man to whom he owed more and who commanded more respect than any other in Spain.[2]

If this letter was known and seemed ungracious to any in Castile, the appointment made to replace Jiménez touched off an explosion of far greater indignation; indeed ingenuity could hardly have made a choice more irritating, of an absentee Flemish boy, Guillaume de Croy, nephew of the hated Grand Chamberlain Chièvres.[3] The chief rival claimant, the King's uncle, Alfonso, bastard son of King Fernando, already Archbishop of Zaragoza, appeared forthwith to urge his claim, supported by the known desire of Fernando and the promise of D. Felipe; but the appointment was already determined and steps thereto taken on November 9. Since Isabel's will forbade granting ecclesiastical office to foreigners and the matter was a sore point in Spanish feeling, a writ of naturalization was issued to Croy November 14. The youth was already absentee bishop of the rich see of Coria, and a bull translating him to Toledo arrived in the first week of 1518. The appointment was the occasion of the petition in the following Cortes that no foreigners be naturalized or appointed henceforth and that

[1] Vol. IV, the latest to be printed, July 10, 1517, concluding the Old Testament, where 'midway between the Greek of the Eastern Church and the Hebrew of the Synagogue, we have placed Saint Jerome's Latin version, of the Roman Church, even as Christ was crucified between two thieves.' Cf. Cedillo, 194, n. 7; J. P. R. Lyell, *Cardinal Ximenes*, 1917. To anticipate the Spanish work Erasmus hurried out his Greek New Testament, 1516, a less careful but a vastly more influential work, historically. Cf. Froude, *Erasmus*, Lecture vii; Emerton, *Erasmus*, 200 ff.

[2] Cedillo, 339 ff. Santa Cruz (I. 162) says Mota inspired the letter, out of jealousy. His date is surely wrong, Dec. 8; and the text *despidimiento honesto* looks like an obvious misprint. Cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 30–31.

[3] The whole story of Croy is treated by A. Poschmann, Boletín de la R. Acad. de la Hist., lxxv, 201–82. Maldonado (p. 32) notes that the annual income of the see was over 300 gold crowns.

Primates of Castile

The series of portraits of the Primates of Spain, which encircles the chapter-house hall in the cathedral of Toledo, terminates, at the archiepiscopal cathedra, with likenesses of Queen Isabel's Cardinal Archbishops, González de Mendoza and Jiménez de Cisneros. A fresh series, at a lower level, begins again, the other side of the archbishop's throne, with the likeness of Croy. The older likenesses are conjectural and insignificant; those of the Renaissance period are contemporary and of the highest authenticity and interest. No clearer light is thrown on the real causes of the Comunero revolt than that visible in this group: of the honest, lewd, and powerful face of Mendoza; of the wilful, ascetic, and noble face of Jiménez; of the amiable, dreamy-eyed, and flaccid face of Guillaume de Croy, in whose name the Flemish camarilla collected the income of the richest see of Castile.

The three, as archbishops, wear mitres, the 'precious' gemmed mitre — Croy's without infulæ, apparently — and have before them their cardinal's hats. They carry a cross instead of a crozier, though not the double-barred archiepiscopal cross. Jiménez's book is, I take it, a reference to the Polyglot Bible. For the erroneous date of Croy's death, cf. p. 234.

GONZÁLEZ DE MENDOZA (LEFT) AND JIMÉNEZ DE CISNEROS

GUILLAUME DE CROY

Croy should reside in his see; to which, having accomplished his appointment and with small intent of keeping his promise, D. Carlos agreed.[1]

The wire-pulling preceding the selection contemporary gossip narrated in the following manner: 'As the archbishopric of Toledo was vacant and many grandees were negotiating for it, some for sons and others for relatives and friends, they offset one another; and some finally, seeing they could not have it, to ingratiate themselves with Chièvres, advised him to ask it for his nephew, for they thought thus, by giving it to a foreigner, no native would feel outraged. Among those who so advised him one was the Marquis de Villena, saying the estate he possessed was near Toledo, and he would have the appointment obeyed. . . . Since the church of Toledo resisted taking possession . . . finally, as the Marquis went to Toledo, the matter was arranged, through his being influential there, so that possession was given. . . . The Marquis did so with the idea that Chièvres would compass it that he should be restored to his marquisate; and it was a just judgment of God that neither did Croy enjoy the archbishopric nor was the Marquis restored.' [2]

Possession was not conceded until matters were on the brink of conflict; excited caballeros swarmed in the cathedral and the corregidor had to put the Marquis's following in one chapel and the party of the opposition in another while the chapter debated the issue.[3]

[1] Croy already had Papal indult of Oct. 12, 1517 freeing him from obligation of residence in any office he might then *or in the future* have. Poschmann, 217 (from the Toledo archives).

[2] Santa Cruz, I. 167–68. Mexía (78) has a similar account, which Sandoval takes over, attributing the motives indicated in Santa Cruz (III. iv). Poschmann (211) uses a slightly different text of Mexía, in which is slipped a surely impossible negative: 'pero *no* oy decir entondes.' (Perhaps a misprint for *yo?*) Maldonado, 52.

[3] These lively details in Poschmann, 228–29.

CHAPTER VII

ROYAL BRETHREN

RIVALRY and insubordination were not confined to noble houses, but troubled the household of the prince himself. The story of royal brothers in Castile, though he recalled no farther back than his great-uncle, the Infante Pretender, brother of Isabel, might inspire a Turkish distrust in the most Catholic king. Would the Infante Fernando, conscious of his immense popularity, hold out loyally against the flattery of a great clique of nobles seeking to make a figure-head leader of him; or even against his own resentful knowledge that he had been considered as heir of the Spanish realms, or at least as governor of them? What his grandfather had for a time planned for him and most of the Spanish people undoubtedly wished for him — would he refuse this if offered by a group of the first grandees of the realm, risen with power to assure his possession?

He had not been treated with tact or conciliation.[1] From babyhood, as a possible figurehead of rebellion, he had been smuggled from fortress to fortress. In the scuffle of D. Fernando with D. Felipe he had been kept in Arévalo. Felipe had brought him to Valladolid; and proposed to establish the whole family of Garcilasso de la Vega in charge of the prince's education, but D. Garcí declined the honor, which involved living away from court. The child was lodged in the castle of Simancas, whence, in the confusion at D. Felipe's death, a conspiracy, thwarted by the caution of his governor, tried to spirit him away — by whom organized and in furtherance of what revolt was never afterward discovered. Thence the child was transferred to the Monastery of San Pablo in Valladolid. When D. Fernando returned to Castile as regent, he took the Infante always with him, 'though the Queen his mother wanted to have him; but the King would not permit it, for, as she did not have sound judgment, she would not let him go outside of a few rooms,

[1] Sandoval closes Book I with a biography of the Infante, taken, he says, from a life written by the boy's governor, Fray Álvaro Osorio de Moscoso.

and had him eat too much, and it was feared the child, with such excess, might lose health and even life.' [1]

For ten years thereafter Fernando was his grandfather's pet and the favorite of the court of Castile; and the old king's death, in January 1516, made a cruel difference to the thirteen-year-old lad.

The first mortification resulted, at the old king's death, from Fernando's assuming title as governor of Castile during D. Carlos's absence from the kingdom, as provided in the earlier will of the late sovereign — only to discover that the later will had substituted for him the venerable Cardinal Primate.[2]

That the Infante's household was a center of intrigue, and that there was a real danger that he might be used for treasonable purpose was clearly the belief of the man who knew most of the whole long story of noble intrigues and who was responsible for preventing another. Jiménez wrote to his agent in the Brussels court: 'So soon as the Catholic King died I went to Guadalupe solely to take precautions in regard to the Infante D. Fernando that there might be in these realms no revolts and controversies, which at other times have occurred on similar occasion. And since, I have not dared a single day to depart or to remove him from my residence; nor was it well to do otherwise, for there were not lacking persons with other purposes, much opposed to what befits His Highness's service. And if His Highness has to wait [in Flanders, before visiting Spain] he should at once appoint two persons to have charge of the Infante, who should be trustworthy persons, for those who now have charge are nowise suitable. . . . Otherwise matters may be perilous, and by this appointment it may all be prevented; for in truth I dare not leave or quit this place a single day, and I keep him in my own company and residence to have everything secure.' [3]

A letter of September 7 [4] from D. Carlos in Flanders, probably inspired by Jiménez's reports, administered sharp rebuke to the Infante; and Jiménez and Adrian, Dean of

[1] Sandoval, I. xliv.

[2] The earlier, Burgos, will was destroyed and the later written *de novo*, 'so that there should appear no trace of what was provided at Burgos' (Santa Cruz, I. 96, repeated in Sandoval, I. lx); but evidently the Infante in some way learned of the earlier provision (Santa Cruz, I. 98, repeated in Sandoval, II. ii).

[3] Cisneros to López de Ayala, *Cartas de Cisneros*, p. 103, No. lxii; Cedillo, 154.

[4] Cedillo (*Cisneros*, 157) gives the date; Rodríguez Villa the text (498).

Louvain, sent as Carlos's ambassador, to Spain, were directed to rebuke and remove from Fernando's household his guardian, Pero Núñez of the powerful house of Guzmán, his master of horse, and others — 'because these, they said, had dealings with certain grandees of the realm who favored the Infante.' [1]

The King's orders were fulfilled, but with recriminations, for through Adrian word reached the Infante before it reached Jiménez, and the Prince precipitated an angry interview,[2] 'in which words were passed whereby the Infante was displeased with the Cardinal and the Cardinal with him, who used before to be friends.' [3] The Infante and his following, despite desperate appeals to the Council and others, had to yield before a show of force; 'and all or most of the servants he had in those realms followed the Commune which arose within two years.' [4]

[1] Santa Cruz, I. 155, taken over by Sandoval (III. i), who adds the phrase 'in order to accomplish a rising with him.' Rodríguez Villa (497–98) gives a slightly different version, indicating no source. Maldonado, 51.

Cedillo (*Cisneros*, 156, 158) notes the most improbable charge, attributed without much support to the Archbishop of Granada, that Adrian himself countenanced the Infante's supporters.

Danvila (I. 328) prints from the Simancas archives a document essentially and in large part verbally identical with the letter of Carlos to Cisneros given by Rodríguez Villa (499): the salutation reads: 'Rmo et e muy Rdo in Christo padre Cardenal de Tortosa, nuestro muy caro e muy amado amygo, e nuestro enbaxador.' It is undated, and Danvila puts it with documents of 1520. But the episode occurred in 1517, when Carlos was about to leave Flanders, and Cisneros was his governor, and Adrian his embassador in Spain. Santa Cruz (I. 155) records that Carlos wrote such directions 'to the Cardinal [i.e., Cisneros] and the Dean of Louvain [i.e., Adrian], his governors.' Danvila's document is evidently the letter to Adrian: he did not receive the Cardinal's hat until Nov. 1517 in Valladolid, but the date of his elevation to the cardinalate probably precedes Sep. 1517, when the letter was written.

[2] Cedillo, *Cisneros*, 158–60. [3] Santa Cruz, I. 155.

[4] Sandoval, III. i.

On the whole matter of the removal of the Infante Fernando, cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 4 ff.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CORTES OF VALLADOLID

D. CARLOS entered Valladolid in the middle of November and a round of festivities until Christmas served at least for a moment to efface the unhappy first impressions.

For the young King, it was the first glimpse of a splendid Spanish city — splendid with a few ancient monuments, with historic memories of his ancestors, and with a wealth of recent buildings displaying in gorgeous examples the 'style of the silversmiths,' the late Gothic *platéresque*. Scarce a trace of the Moors remained, save, on the doors of the old church of Santa Maria, the knockers wrenched from the Córdoba mosque when San Fernando took that city. In Valladolid in a private house, October 1469, Isabel and Fernando had been secretly married; here the great discoverer had died, May 1506. The Catholic Monarchs had made of the city an administrative metropolis, establishing here the courts of chancery; and the renovated or the newly completed churches gave to the city something of the teeming ornateness with which the King had been familiar in the cities of Flanders.[1]

For the Castilians it was the first glimpse of the boy sovereign at his best. An enthusiasm which took him out of his shy and awkward self was that for military exercise and spectacle. In Valladolid there was 'a tourney of lords and gentlemen Spanish and Flemish, on horse, so fierce and obstinate that of the encounters of lance and blows of the sword many gentlemen were struck down and wounded and seven horses killed, a thing very fair and fearful to see: and the joustings were no less, in some of which the king himself entered. Notably, the first time was in one held February 17, in which he rode out to joust with trappings over his

[1] San Pablo, home of the Cortes, had been remodelled in 1463 with the façade which still stands like an intricately carved altar *retablo* on the street. The French destruction required further remodelling in modern times; and San Pablo's subsidiary buildings are evidently lopped and telescoped. Cf. Plate 276. The similar façade of the college of San Gregorio was completed in 1496. It has been suggested that the strange stone wild men supporting the arms of the monarchs were inspired by the conquests in the new world.

arms and his horse of white velvet and satin, broidered and wrought with gold and pearls with excellent craft and splendor, and he supremely armed. . . . The King broke three lances in four courses he ran, though he yet lacked six days of eighteen years: all which he did with the best judgment, bearing, and spirit, and with more skill and dexterity than any other of all who entered that or the other jousting. And so was awarded him the jewel of best jouster, in pure reason and justice; for truly in this matter this prince excelled in two respects: one, in knowledge of arming himself and having arms made, of such beauty and splendor, of such avail in lightness and suppleness, without ceasing to be strong, that all who treat of arms and war say that in our time experts have learned of him in making them, and gentlemen in arming. And the other is the ease and attitude he maintained in arms, on foot or on horse; which indeed was so considerable that sometimes when he wished to enter jousts and tournaments covered and disguised, he was recognized by his remarkable pose and grace.' [1]

A further splendid ceremony, which was also business of state, was the reception in the royal presence, in the monastery of San Pablo, of the cardinal's hat, so earnestly sought by the King for his tutor, Adrian, Dean of Louvain, now resident as his ambassador in Spain.[2] Then, after the holidays Carlos faced his first Cortes.[3] Spain might see if the young monarch could deal more tactfully or generously with the national institutions than with individuals.

D. Carlos sought from the deputies of his people two things, the oath of allegiance, and money grants (*servicios*). The Cortes might hesitate to swear to Carlos while his mother was still living and rightfully sovereign of Castile.

[1] Mexía, 80–81. Cf. Sandoval, III. xiii, which is a compound of Mexía and Santa Cruz, 169. The latter says: 'Great joustings were arranged, in which the King D. Carlos jousted, which was the first time he had done so in his life'; but he had of course long been trained to tourney, and Mexía says (68) that in Flanders 'he, though of tender age, entered in them personally many times.' Probably he had previously entered only in the less strenuous and dangerous general tourney, and not hitherto in the joust.

For the armor he wore in Valladolid, cf. illustration and note.

[2] Sandoval (II. xliii) reproduces almost verbatim the passage in Santa Cruz, I. 154: that it was publicly asserted — but a thing unworthy to suppose — that Leo X received 10,000 ducats from each of the twenty (including Adrian) then made Cardinal.

[3] Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 33 ff., has interesting comment on the Cortes of 1518.

The Valladolid Harness

No Renaissance royal figure may be pictured to the mind's eye more vividly in his habit as he lived than the monarch who had a passion for jousting and fine armor, and who counted among his subjects the first armorers of Europe, the Helmschmieds of Augsburg and the Negroli of Milan. The gems of the Armería Real in Madrid are the eighteen panoplies of D. Carlos, each with many duplicate or alternative parts, authenticated by an inventory with minutely careful water-color drawings and notes, and an attested list, of the year 1560, with most interesting historical memoranda, of all the pieces of the Emperor's armor delivered to the keeper of the jewels of his son D. Felipe II.

The official chronicle of D. Carlos's visit in Spain notes, in regard to the tournament at Valladolid in 1518: '*Après marchait le Roy bien gorgiasement monté et armé d'ung fin harnais d'Alemaingne plus reluisant que d'argent brunti.*' The inventory pictures and the list describes but one plain jousting harness, burnished, of German make: the pieces corresponding have been assembled in a mounted figure and are known as the panoply of Valladolid. (From the 'pieces of change,' alternative pieces for special forms of jousting, two other figures are armed.) The design is of the beginning of the sixteenth century, the details of technique German, and the proportions those of a youth. The tilting helm, of 19 kilos weight, 2 mm. thick on the back and 1 cm. thick at the point, was bolted to the breastplate and backplate of the cuirass. The visor slit is scarcely more than 1 cm.: only by most extraordinary chance might a lance splinter penetrate and inflict, as upon King Henri II, in the tournament at the marriage of Felipe II in 1559, a mortal wound. The bridle arm is protected by a huge heavy coude, and a curved and ridged targe or manteau d'arme bolted to the cuirass so as to leave free the bridle hand, protected by a long-sleeved and almost rigid gauntlet. The brace and vambrace of the lance arm are light and elastically adjusted; and the laminated tassets, depending from taces, are on the right thigh shorter than those on the left, to leave the maximum freedom of maneuver to the lance side of the body. The heavy lance rest has five notches which permit it to be bolted at any one of five heights to the cuirass. A similar rest on the back plate received the butt of the spear. (The tip of the rest appears in the Plate projecting beyond the corner of the manteau.) The high passeguard protecting the right shoulder joint appears also behind the manteau. The cuisses, greaves, and sollerets are not of the original panoply. The leg armor of jousting harnesses was often light and the barding of the horse lighter than that upon this figure: the barrier in later tournaments was so high that the jouster was scarcely exposed below the waist.

All the details and beautiful illustrations are given in the splendid *Catálogo* of the Conde de Valencia de Don Juan (Madrid, 1898). Señor Florit, Director of the Armería, extends to all visitors seriously interested a willing courtesy that would be notable outside of Spain.



Photo. Hauser y Menet. By permission

THE VALLADOLID HARNESS

Further, the Cortes was certain to resume the usual struggle with the monarch, requiring his acceptance of certain previous or new obligations or promises, requested in *capítulos* or petitions of grievance, before they would take oath or grant supply.

The resistance was led by Dr. Juan Zumel of Burgos, and the first skirmish [1] was a vain protest that in the Cortes of Castile none might properly sit save Castilians — a protest precipitated by the appointment of Flemish nobles both for President and for Counsel (*Letrado*) of the session. The matter of the oath [2] was long discussed in a stormy private conference between the Chancellor and the deputies of Burgos, Sevilla, and Valladolid, in which all the general grievances of Castile were stated. In public session Zumel returned to the contest, armed with a petition of the deputies that the King should swear to observe certain laws of the realm, including provisions in the wills of the Catholic Monarchs which had been confirmed in Cortes. The Court leaders bullied him alone one day; on the next, accompanied by the León deputies, he had an interview with more definite results, for Chièvres agreed that the King would accept the laws and privileges but would not swear to the specific item that no offices or benefices should be given to foreigners. This interview was interrupted by formal session of the Cortes at 4 of the afternoon, in the King's presence, where the oath was offered and taken by most of the deputies without further resistance; whereupon the King swore to observe the laws — not specifying anything in regard to office for foreigners. To some specific acceptance Zumel held pertinaciously; and the King repeated his formula: *Esto juro*, without its being any clearer that he accepted the specific item under contest. Pressure was brought on Zumel through the Constable, since Zumel was in the service of his house, and by attempts to secure the election of a different deputy from Burgos; but he persisted, and with deputies from Córdoba, León, and Valladolid, obtained an audience with Don Carlos and secured some vague indication of concession: the young King showed annoyance at their request for more explicit confirmation, but pleased them by speaking to

[1] Sandoval, III. vi. There is record of the petitions but not of the proceedings in *Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de León y Castilla*, IV. 260–84.

[2] Ignored in Mexía; mentioned in Santa Cruz (I. 168), who says the resistance was not so much determination not to take oath but rather a demonstration of loyalty to the Queen; detailed in Sandoval, III. vii–ix.

them in Spanish.[1] With this rather ambiguous success the deputies contented themselves and took the oath. The only tangible concession of the Court was the stipulation that 'if at any time God should grant health [2] to the Queen . . . the King should give over rule and the Queen should govern alone.' [3]

The business of the Cortes, formulated in the petitions of grievance,[4] was largely that of any contemporary state — much of it repetition of old requests, and much an expression of dissatisfactions for which the young sovereign was in no wise responsible or in any considerable degree able to relieve.

A long list concerned ecclesiastical affairs — to which, in general D. Carlos replied merely that he would negotiate with the Holy See. They were directed mainly against abuses of clerical power or the sacrifice of national interests to Curial advantage: requests for juster administration of the Inquisition; or to prevent more real estate from passing by sale or bequest to churches and monasteries, which already possessed so large a portion of the realm; or to permit clerics to bequeath property.

Many concerned economic or sumptuary legislation: to forbid the export of precious metals, and money, of horses,[5] meat, or cattle; to forbid gaming with dice, or wearing brocades or finery; to regulate physicians and apothecary shops, mendicant vagabonds, and the contagious sick; to protect and renew forests; to secure fairness in measuring cloth and silk; to provide coinage of small denomination. As many more asked for reforms in the administration of justice.

Some touched closely the practices of the Crown or the court and were therefore political issues. Immediately personal to the Royal family was the request that the Queen be maintained in appropriate state; that D. Carlos marry; that he learn to speak Spanish; that the Infante D. Fer-

[1] It is to be suspected that his very slight knowledge of the language added much to the ambiguities and reluctances of all the contest.

[2] Santa Cruz puts it 'restore her reason' (I. 169).

[3] Sandoval, III. ix.

[4] Sandoval (III. x) gives 74; Santa Cruz (I. 170 ff.) 46: the divisions are different and there are minor discrepancies.

[5] The use of mules was so largely replacing that of horses that repeated laws prescribed that gentlemen must go on horse back. The horse was essential for heavy cavalry and for artillery. Cf. p. 320, n. 3. An interesting paragraph in Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 203, treats this matter. D. Carlos's first impression of Castilian poverty was the shortage of horses. Merriman, III. 29.

nando should not leave the realm until the King were married and had children. To the last D. Carlos's answer was ominously evasive: 'that he was concerned for naught more than for the Infante's advancement, he loved him so; and all he should provide in regard to his person should be for his advancement and for the good of the realm.'

The most vital items concerned the power of foreigners in the realm and the royal levies of money. Petition was made that offices and dignities should be granted only to natives (as Queen Isabel's will provided), and that this provision should not be evaded by granting naturalization; and that the primate (since a foreigner was already appointed) should be required to reside in Castile. This vital requirement Carlos promised henceforth to observe, and he promised to insist on Croy's coming to Toledo. He conceded also the petition that the personnel of the royal household should be Spanish; but refused the petition that the embassadors of the realm should be native also.

His agreement not, 'save for extreme necessity,' to order or request other money grants during the three years in which the current grant was to be levied would pretty certainly become merely a dispute as to what constituted 'extreme necessity.'

So the young royal gentleman was sworn to and got his money, 600,000 ducats.[1] 'Most of the gentlemen went home little satisfied.'[2] It was to soothe these irritations that the magnificent tourney was held in which D. Carlos himself jousted; but contemporaries remarked that the celebration cost 40,000 ducats.[3] 'His Majesty began to show himself very liberal.'[4] Further, whatever enthusiasms these great shows kindled were much dampened by the dismissal, in the face of the Cortes request, of the Infante Fernando. This step Jiménez himself had advised, with recommendation of caution and of reward for the Infante out of the vast realms

[1] Mexía's figure (80); Sandoval (III. x) quotes this, and adds the alternative figure of A. de Guevara, 150 cuentos.

In the sixteenth century the ducat may be roughly estimated as equal to 375 maravedís. The cuento equals a million maravedís. The two figures consequently are: (Mexía) 225,000,000 m; and (Guevara) 150,000,000 m. Apart from the untrustworthiness of Guevara, it is true that the value of the maravedí fluctuated so that it is very difficult to estimate sums in other, contemporary monetary units, and still more in modern values. Cf. Klein, *The Mesta*, 58, n. 7; 279, n. 1. Sentenach in *Revista de Archivos*, xii (1905), 195.

[2] Santa Cruz, I. 182.

[3] Mexía, 80; Sandoval, III. xiii.

[4] Santa Cruz, I. 169.

of his grandfather the Emperor.[1] A more influential voice than Jiménez's urged it. D. Carlos's Flemish favorite, the Chamberlain, M. de Chièvres, learning in the Cortes of Valladolid that 'Don Carlos was abhorred of many and the Infante his brother beloved of all, whom they held as their native prince, and his brother a foreign king, . . . advised the king to send him from the realm in order that, if at any time any caballeros revolted in Spain, they might not have the Infante Fernando as their head.'[2]

So the boy was sent away in April from the land of his youth, with the further precaution that his household was mainly Flemings, to the murmuring indignation of his people, who had known and loved him for fourteen years.[3]

Further offense was occasioned by D. Carlos's departure to his eastern realms without even visiting Burgos, which lay almost on his route.

Proper precautions doubtless prevented any from knowing that on March 15 a royal writ had ordered for Dr. Zumel a douceur of two hundred ducats.[4] But it soon became current belief that the royal method was to buy off constitutional opposition, and that that opposition was ready to be bought. Would public opinion become angry enough to resort to some sort of opposition not constitutional and not to be bought?

[1] Gómez de Castro, *De Rebus Gestis*, lib. VII, fol. 212, v; Cedillo, *Cisneros*, 161. The decision was taken in Flanders: a letter of March 8 from the Bishop of Badajoz to Jiménez said the removal of Fernando from Castile was intended so soon as D. Carlos arrived. Cedillo, *Cisneros*, 155, note. Cf. Rodríguez Villa, 499.

[2] Santa Cruz, I. 182. Cf. Sandoval, III. xiv.

[3] Sandoval, III. xv. D. Carlos tried vainly to secure Erasmus as tutor of the prince. Letter of Erasmus to the Infante's physician, Louvain, Feb. 13, 1519 (Opera III. 415). Cf. Poschmann, in Boletín R.A.H. LXXV. 214.

[4] Danv. I. 84.

CHAPTER IX

THE FLEMISH PILLAGE

D. CARLOS went into Aragon to be sworn as sovereign of the eastern realms, as he had just been in Castile; but his reception there was even more contentious than in Valladolid, and his absence continued into a second year — and he had not yet visited Valencia, which was in an uproar bordering on rebellion. Meanwhile the Castilians might discover how much they had really gained in the Cortes of Valladolid in 1518, and how far the royal administration or the young King would live up to the spirit, or even the letter of the promises there made.

The administration meant the Council of Castile, unhampered now, to be sure, by so dominant a figure as the late Cardinal Governor, but awed and perhaps terrorized by the Court personnel of Flemings that had escorted the sovereign into Spain.

With the Council the Castilians had, long since, a grumbling familiarity. The President, for a dozen years past, was D. Antonio de Rojas, a prelate who had advanced through many bishoprics to the archiepiscopal chair of Granada. His enormous unpopularity — perhaps inevitable in the exercise of that office — was not reduced by his reputation for rectitude:[1] 'a man,' he was reported, 'of distinguished descent . . . from the Rojas and Manriques; of the greatest fidelity; as clean of hands and untainted of blood[2] as a man can be; upright and zealous for justice: he has a certain impetuous and angry temper . . .' and 'a nasty tongue with those who have to do business with him.' Of the more venerable members, Oropesa, scrupulous and slow

[1] Characterizations of the Councillors were noted by Lorenzo Galíndez Carvajal for D. Carlos, at some date after 1519, perhaps as memoranda to guide the monarch in the reorganization of the Council in 1522. (Cf. R. B. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 119.) His judgments, followed largely in the above characterizations, seem shrewd, but are of course merely those of one man. Galíndez Carvajal was a contemporary jurist, editor of the Crónica of Juan II. (Cf. Fitzmaurice-Kelly, *Littérature espagnole*, p. 100.) His notes are printed in *Documentos Inéditos*, I. 122 ff.

[2] Galíndez Carvajal's notes specify, for each individual, whether or no he is 'limpio' or 'tiene un poco de converso,' i.e., Jewish or Moslem taint in his ancestry.

even among Castilian administrators, hardly ever attended, though continuing to draw salary. Licenciado Zapata, though aged and sickly, continued activity, 'friendly to those who are submissive and harsh to those who are not, by natural temper'; 'since the business of Castile,' noted another reporter,[1] 'has for so long a term passed through his hands, he understands the times and knows how every matter and every grandee should be handled.' Dr. Palacios Rubios, so infirm as never to attend the Council, though 'very learned and of long experience in affairs,' managed, through excessive good-nature to bedevil much business.[2]

The prestige of the President carried with him a certain following among the Councillors of less distinction, such as Dr. Cabrera, who was suspected of alien ancestry. Outside factions had footing in the Council, as in Licenciado Acuña, relative and friend of the Marquis of Villena; and Coalla was probably not alone in being reputed 'very friendly to his friends.' Of the more active members, whose effectiveness was enforced by experience, was Licenciado Polanco; whereas Dr. Fernando de Guevara, brother of the court preacher and *littérateur*, was without much learning and quite without experience. A few were of positively bad repute: Dr. Tello had amassed unaccountable increase of wealth during his brief service as Royal Accountant;[3] Dr. Beltrán, a person of insignificant ancestry, of notoriously evil living, and of dubious fidelity, was learned and shrewd and noisily busy about the King's business. Quite the most active and influential Councillor was Licenciado Vargas, an official of notable capacity but somewhat ambiguous repute: holder of offices so many that they paid him as much as all the Councillors' salaries combined; too busy to attend sessions of the Council save to advance business of concern to himself and his friends, yet exercising, as paymaster, a formidable influence there; immensely grasping in business relations, he had accumulated and spent vast sums, and had for years held the responsible and powerful office of Royal Treasurer.

The administration of the Council, however, as was well

[1] Report of D. Carlos's special envoy, Diego Hurtado, Nov. 4, 1521, Danv. IV. 634. It is clear that the Governors later felt constrained by Zapata's knowledge of precedent.

[2] The *Mesta*, for which he was responsible, seems to have got much out of hand. Cf. Galíndez Carvajal, *Doc. Inéd.*, I. 124.

[3] For the office of *Contador* cf. R. B. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 190 ff.

appreciated before D. Carlos came to Castile, must be superseded, at least temporarily, by that of the Court, which accompanied the young monarch into Spain, and which consisted of a considerable personnel of Flemings, advised by a few Spanish grandees. These were the Grand Chamberlain, Chièvres; the Grand Chancellor, Lachaux, succeeded by Jean Sauvage, the unwelcome president of the Cortes of Valladolid, who died of the plague in Zaragoza, June 7, 1518, and was succeeded by the accomplished Piedmontese gentleman, Mercurino de Gattinara; the Master of Horse, Charles de Lanoy.[1] Spaniards filled two important administrative offices, the experienced F. de los Cobos that of Secretary, and Dr. Tello that of Accountant; of greater influence for the moment, however, were D. A. Manrique, Bishop first of Córdoba then of Badajoz, and Pedro Mota who in 1516 succeeded him in that see. Singular in this selfish and intriguing group was the grave and righteous cleric, Adrian, Dean of Louvain, tutor of D. Carlos's youth and sent as ambassador to Castile when D. Felipe died.

Such a person had little in common with the ambiguous Chièvres; report ran that Chièvres had sent Adrian as ambassador to Castile because 'as is usual between such, the shadow of Adrian's virtue frightened him.'[2] The others had a very bad repute in Spain. Lachaux as Chancellor 'had much influence in the government and was much disliked by the Spaniards and of no good repute.'[3] No better things were said of Jean Sauvage of Bruges, who, as Chancellor, was the chief medium for the sale of office.[4]

Most exasperating in this corrupt court, however, were the Castilians who flocked there like harpies. 'Before the King D. Carlos came to Spain . . . so soon as the Catholic King died, many went from His Majesty's court — and most of them of low station and of whom little was known

[1] He appears in the Spanish chronicles as Íñigo Bal, and is disguised by Sandoval as Mingo Bal.

[2] Sandoval (I. lviii) attributes the report to an unnamed Flemish author, and adds his own opinion that Adrian was chosen because he knew the state of things in Spain.

[3] Mexía, 85.

[4] Santa Cruz, I. 143, taken over by Sandoval, II. xl. (Having in this passage named the Chancellor as Sauvage, Sandoval later (III. xvii) says that Gattinara succeeded on the death of the Chancellor in 1518 'with very few tears from the Spaniards, by whom he was entirely abhorred. And he too preferred their gold to their persons or their thanks. This M. de Laxao had a very evil name.')

here — with the purpose of getting offices and influence in the King's houshold, and others to put through difficult business to which they had become committed [1] in the lifetime of the Catholic King, and to provoke and slander any to whom they had ill-will. And indeed for the good of the realm and service of the King it were better they had never gone thither, for they involved matters in greed and tale-telling and ill counsel, which the Flemings previously knew nothing about; whence followed many evils in these realms, through what they — and certain grandees who secretly favored them — attempted and advised to the King and those with him: among others, that he should remove the members of his Council, who were men of great learning and experience, in order that there might be none to tell him the truth in the business. And though to this M. Chièvres did not agree — who was the man who controlled everything — they who thus went to negotiate purchase of office did not for that desist; so that often past services did not suffice, nor good character, nor experience, unless accompanied with money.' [2]

The controlling figure of this whole camarilla was thus notoriously Chièvres; and the general dissatisfaction with royal rule was essentially indignation against him. Every indictment of him included an exculpation of the young monarch who was up to this time but a figurehead in the government. 'He was then somewhat beyond seventeen years and a half, surely a tender age for so grave and heavy a charge as is the rule of so many realms and lordships, especially those of Spain, whose laws and customs he could not have understood, both on account of his youth and because he was born and brought up away from them — for he did not even know well how to pronounce our language, nor did he have full acquaintance with the characteristics and temperament of the Spanish people. So with his discretion and good natural gifts, desiring to meet these difficulties, he decided, as the best means, never to settle anything save with counsel and advice. And as the loyalty and prudence of M. de Chièvres were known to him, and he was so fond of him, he referred almost everything to him

[1] 'En que se habian respondido.' Sandoval (II. xl) replaces this difficult phrase with 'no abian podido alcanzar.'

[2] Santa Cruz, I. 143. Peter Martyr (Epist. DCLXIII, Feb. 24) similarly blames the unpatriotic Spaniards.

and the business was despatched through his hands; and Chièvres took advice and guidance, in Spanish affairs, from Master Mota, Bishop of Badajoz. Yet many people, because they did not all understand the prudent policy of the king, put evil interpretation on it and complained, some judging it lack of affection, others contempt, others lack of prudence or ability.' [1]

The Chamberlain himself was descended of the Flemish aristocracy, 'a man of good presence and clear judgment, who spoke well and was careful in business . . . patient and sanguine; from childhood ambitious of honor, which he sought in every way he could, especially with the Emperor Maximilian, to whom he rendered many services; covetous of wealth more than he should be; . . . in the control he wielded in the realm, absolute, unwilling to admit or consult the judgment of others.' He was governor of Flanders in the absence of Felipe and Juana, but on Felipe's death was removed by Maximilian, who appointed his daughter Margaret as Governess. But Chièvres by intrigue obtained the office of Grand Chamberlain, and by large advances of money influenced Maximilian to declare Carlos of age at fifteen and to appoint Chièvres majordomo of the prince's household. In this relation he showed 'many virtues, was a friend of peace, very desirous that the prince should be informed about the government of the realm, that, when of age, he might succeed therein.' [2]

But that the rapacities of Flemish courtiers should be quieted by offices and privileges in Spain was a shabby arrangement in which Chièvres wholly acquiesced. He was himself Administrator of the Royal Revenues there, at a salary of 4000 ducats.[3] He was urging the candidacy of his nephew as successor to Jiménez in the see of Toledo. Even the upright Adrian was absentee bishop of Tortosa. In Spain traffic in offices, though kept out of D. Carlos's notice, was notorious — one of the scandals of which was the demand, in Chièvres' name, from a member of the administration, that all holders of Court office should pay a substantial fee for renewal of their appointments, whereby

[1] Mexía, 78; Sandoval, III. iv. Similar defense of D. Carlos in Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 8, and 12.

[2] An extended sketch in Sandoval, II. xxxv. A pacific and Francophil policy was a necessity to Flanders, but hateful to the Spanish. On the success of Chièvres' régime, cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 15–16.

[3] On the office of *Contador Mayor* cf. Merriman, III. 189.

some 20,000 ducats were cleaned up for the Chamberlain. The Council of Castile made vehement representations to the sovereign, citing the evil example of his great-grandfather and the admirable practice of his grandfather and grandmother, the Catholic Monarchs.[1]

A quite frank intention of immediately forcing upon Castile heavy advances in taxes was revealed immediately upon the arrival of the Court. Of that Court no unimportant members were the agents of the Fuggers, D. Carlos's Augsburg bankers.[2] In January 1518 the dues of the wool growers' gild, the richest civil corporation in Castile, were jumped more than fifty per cent, a demand followed precisely a year later by requirement of a subsidy such as the Cortes made.[3] Heavy demands were addressed to the clergy; and bequests of Jiménez amounting to 212,000 gold ducats were seized, on the ground that they were needed to repair the devastations of the defense of Navarre.[4]

[1] Santa Cruz, I. 143 ff., taken over and supplemented in Sandoval, II. xl–xli. Santa Cruz (I. 330) gives the indictment drawn by the Junta in its letter to the King of Portugal; of which Sandoval (VII. xiii) prints a long alternative version. The Junta estimate was that 1,400,000 ducats in cash went out of the realm as Flemish plunder.

[2] Klein, *Mesta*, 282. [3] Klein, *Mesta*, 279.

[4] *Letters and Papers Henry VIII*, II. 3937, and Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 31.

CHAPTER X

THE RIGHT TO PETITION

LITTLE satisfaction was felt in Castile, after the Cortes of Valladolid, with this traditional method of negotiation between the cities and the crown: the time and the place remaining quite at the discretion of the sovereign, who, indeed, if he secured supply from other sources, need not summon Cortes at all. Petition would become a real check on the crown if initiative might pass into the hands of the cities; if they, choosing the moment favorable to themselves, might with some impressive unanimity, petition for redress, unhampered by the secret and traditional Cortes procedure, which experienced courtiers manipulated, much to their own will. The King was not long departed to his eastern realms when a defiant challenge provoked such an attempt at concerted petition.

The tax farmers proposed a plan for advancing taxes, whereby the crown should obtain increased revenue and they increased profit, 'as such persons commonly do.' [1] Such advance was a violation of an agreement of the Catholic Queen, confirmed by D. Carlos in the Cortes of Valladolid.[2] Segovia promptly proposed to Ávila a concerted protest of the cities.[3] Ávila transmitted the request to Toledo, which urged that all the Cortes cities join, and forthwith appointed four petitioners: D. Pedrolasso and A. Suárez, regidors; and A. Ortiz and M. Hita, jurados. Of these Ortiz held a domestic office and was constantly at Court. Regidor Gaitán, as organizer of the whole mission, was immediately sent to join Ortiz.[4]

[1] Sandoval, III. xl.

[2] No. 14 in Sandoval, III. x; the answer: 'Que le placia se hiciesse como lo pedian.' For the character of this change cf. *infra*, p. 121, n. 1.

[3] Segovia was quick to feel economic disturbance; it was the center of the wool trade. The migratory sheep were sheared in the spring, on their northbound route. Segovia was on the line of the eastern migration, and had the largest storage houses (*Lonja*) in the kingdom. She was one of the four headquarters of the wool growers' gild. At Medina del Campo, a day to the north, were held the great fairs, where English and Flemish agents made immense purchases of merino wool for the northern cloth factories. Cf. Klein, *Mesta*, 8, note 2; 29. Burgos, a few days further to the north, was the assemblage point for the wool to be shipped over sea. Klein, 36.

[4] Sandoval (III. xlvi) says he got his account from a narrative by Ortiz. Danvila (I. 91) summarizes Toledo's letter to Jaén.

Other cities were prepared to join;[1] but the plan was nipped in the bud by the alertness of the Count of Palma, corregidor in Toledo, and by a prompt response from His Majesty in Barcelona,[2] which was an absolute prohibition of the mission, on the ground that he would shortly return and hold Cortes. This command forestalled the other deputations, but Gaitán had already started, and his city appealed from the royal order, urging that the matter concerned His Majesty's service and should be heard.

The occasion which called D. Carlos back to Castile was a crisis which no far-sighted person in Spain could have failed to anticipate, but one which involved essential repudiation of the promises he had given in Valladolid: the active candidacy, namely, of the young monarch for the Imperial crown of his grandfather Maximilian, who died January 12, 1519.

This candidacy was in many ways ominous to Castile. It involved squandering enormous sums in bribery, which would be but the beginning of incalculable expense, if the Imperial dignity was secured.[3] It meant prolonged absence of the sovereign from Spain. It meant involving every Castilian national interest in compromising considerations of Hapsburg dynastic ambition: the Spanish realms committed to expenditures, to sacrifices in commerce, diplomacy, war, to the cosmopolitan interests of an empire chiefly Teutonic and Flemish, and to the preferences of a monarch not native to Castile, nor speaking its language, nor acquainted with or caring for its society. Two centuries earlier a monarch with all these advantages which Carlos lacked had sought the imperial crown, a Castilian king of such intellectual prestige that history called him the Wise, the son of Saint Fernando; his ambition had cost him the throne of Castile. Don Carlos, an eighteen-year-old boy, son of a Flemish beau, sought the same honor!

Carlos was elected June 28; 'certain persons were so fleet of foot that, to win the reward of good news, they started and went from Frankfort to Barcelona in nine days, which

[1] Sandoval, III. xl *ad fin.*

[2] D. Carlos was in Barcelona from May 1518 to January 1520. Foronda, 157–59.

[3] The *Servicio* demanded of the Mesta was for the bribery in connection with the Imperial election. Klein, *Mesta*, 280.

is about 300 leagues by land.'[1] Official notice reached him August 22; and on September 5 he assumed a title phrased with intent of conciliating Castilian sensibilities, which resented any subordination of national independence to imperial state; but the phrase stirred enormous indignation because the boy's imperial title preceded his mother's queenly title.[2] It was quite in vain that he issued an extended pragmatic disavowing any of the resented implications.

At Court on September 18 a letter from their city reached Ortiz and Gaitán bidding them continue, though alone, in their mission. A second letter to the King appealed from his prohibition, urging that 'His Majesty should throughout his life consent to listen to their deputies, since what they sought to petition through them was matter concerning his service and the good of the realms, and His Majesty should be informed thereof.'[3]

To break the force of this determined request by official deputies from the first city of the kingdom, the usual maneuvers were adopted: the king was gone hunting when they presented themselves, and they were received by Chièvres, who understood no Spanish and communicated through Bishop Mota. The next day they saw D. Carlos, who referred them to the new Chancellor, the Italian Gattinara. Him they attended in his lodging, and they vigorously expounded their grievances: they protested against the mistaken unwillingness of D. Carlos to listen to representations, and requested again that he withdraw his prohibition; they pointed out the disastrous effects from increase in taxes, especially the sales taxes; and they reported the deep chagrin caused throughout Castile by the curt transit of the King, who had visited but one city of his realm and was now

[1] Sandoval, III. xxxi.

The average time necessary for communications may be inferred from some dates. Adrian in Valladolid says he received D. Carlos's letter of August 20 from Flanders, on August 29 (Danv. I. 489). A letter of D. Carlos in Brussels of June 25 reaches the Constable in Burgos July 7 (Danv. I. 413). A letter of D. Carlos in Flanders Sep. 22 reaches Briviesca Sep. 30 (Danv. II. 40). Corregidor de Córdoba in Toledo acknowledges on Feb. 27 letters from Valladolid of the 20 and 24. He receives on Feb. 27 a letter from Burgos of Feb. 20 (Danv. I. 289, 291). For communication between Spain and Germany cf. p. 186, n. 2. Guevara's letter to P. Girón, 15 Sep., 1523 (*Epístolas Fam.*, 49, 54) discusses the speed of communication, of course with many classical parallels.

[2] For the dates, Sandoval, III. xxxv; Santa Cruz, I. 195, 199. For the title, Mexía, 102; Santa Cruz, I. 205; Sandoval, III. xxxvi, following Santa Cruz.

[3] Sandoval, III. xlii.

known to be preparing immediate departure. The Chancellor in reply emphasized the urgency of the King's departure, which, he assured them, would not be prolonged beyond two years. Chièvres himself expounded the sonorous imperial interests, with which D. Carlos's mind was filled, his promises to the Swiss, his coronation in Rome, the defense of the realm in his absence. With this fanfare the Toledan mission seemed to end. Gaitán reported, however, that the business had frightened the Court.[1]

At any rate the determined radical group in Toledo were not silenced by the failure of their independent petition; they started a stream of letters to the Cortes cities, reiterating the proposal of a united petition. With the rejection of her petitioners the tone of Toledo became exasperated. A letter of October 19[2] discussing only the advance of the taxes, proposed a union of petitioners at Court for November 20. The communication to the Toledo town council of D. Carlos's pragmatic about his title, October 21, precipitated another circular letter, proposing united petition against the King's departure and against the form of the title, and a demand that the promises at Valladolid should be kept and that, if a governor were appointed for the King's absence, he should, as the law required, be a native of the realm.[3] A rebuke from the sovereign on November 4[4] provoked a bold advance. Under the leadership of Juan de Padilla,[5] Toledo sent another letter dated November 7, drawn by a committee including him and Ortiz. Previous letters had been to individual cities, suggesting that they write to others; this was a circular to all. Further, it contains hint of a conference of cities to precede petition: 'You know already and will recall, of the coming of our lord the King D. Carlos, how desired it was, and now how sudden his departure; and his absence now no less grieves us than his presence then rejoiced. As his royal person lingered long in Aragon and dwelt but little in these realms of Castile, there has been much occasion that the affairs of

[1] Sandoval, III. xliii–xlvi. De Córdova, Feb. 27, 1520; Danv. I. 294.

[2] Danv. I. 242. The letter seems somewhat singular a month after the rebuff of Gaitán and Ortiz. Possibly Sandoval's date for that is mistaken, or the dating of this letter.

[3] Summarized in Danv. I. 243. [4] Danv. I. 92.

[5] Santa Cruz (I. 220) attributes it to the 'malice' of Padilla and his group. He considers it 'under the circumstances, scandalous,' a judgment reproduced by Sandoval (V. iv).

this realm attained no settlement: and since, if His Majesty depart, as he is doing, affairs, going further, will become perilous, it seems well to us — if also to you, señores — that, since the harm touches all, we join in considering remedy. . . . It seems well that we should upon three matters assemble [1] and confer, and upon the proper despatch of them send our messengers to His Highness, namely, to entreat him, first, not to go from these realms of Spain; second, in no wise to permit the withdrawal of money therefrom; third, to provide remedy for the offices which have there been given to foreigners.' [2]

Answers to this appeal came from some dozen Cortes cities within a month, and, as a fair indication of general sentiment, determined for Toledo her subsequent procedure.[3] Distinct promises of support were given in the replies of Salamanca;[4] of Murcia, on November 15;[5] of Córdoba, on November 18;[6] of Cuenca, on December 7;[7] of Segovia, on December 12;[8] and of Toro, on February 24.[9] Jaén was prompt with cautious assent, on November 16.[10] Madrid, on November 11,[11] and Soria, on November 22 [12] asked to delay response. Guadalajara, on November 16,[13] suggested action through the Cortes soon to meet — in Burgos, she assumed. Sevilla, on December 14,[14] urged that a better occasion, even before His Majesty's departure, might be available. Burgos did not approve.[15] Granada,

[1] Mexía's summary (p. 117) uses a more explicit phrase: 'que se juntassen en algun lugar senalado a platicar en el remedio . . . y que se debia de inbiar a suplicar y requerir al emperador que no se absentasse,' etc.

[2] This letter is one of those suspected by M. Morel-Fatio as a Guevara invention: cf. *infra*, pp. 373–74. Santa Cruz's text (I. 220) is better than Sandoval's (V. iii), which jumbles the sentence last quoted and has an impossible blunder (*majestad* for *magnifica*) in the close. Danvila (I. 244) emends Sandoval's *enviar* to *envian*, without seeing the correction which becomes evident from Santa Cruz. That the text given by Santa Cruz and Sandoval is a rewriting of the actual circular is perhaps indicated by the existence of a version differing in some sentences, extant in the Simancas archives, summarized in Danv. I. 95.

[3] Mexía (119) gives a general analysis. Most of the replies were found by Danvila in the archives, including that of Sevilla, which, Mexía said, did not reply.

[4] Date uncertain. Sandoval, V. iv (Pamplona edition of 1654 skips iii in enumeration).

[5] Danv. I. 246. [6] *Ibid.*, 247. [7] Danv. I. 249; Sandoval, V. iv.
[8] *Ibid.* [9] *Ibid.*, 282. [10] *Ibid.*, 246. [11] *Ibid.*, 245.
[12] *Ibid.*, 247. [13] *Ibid.*, 246. [14] *Ibid.*, 249–50.

[15] Sandoval, V. iv. The King's letter of Dec. 23 (summarized in Danv. I. 250) shows they had asked that the Cortes sit in Burgos.

on December 2,[1] appealed to Cortes, explicitly objecting to a suggestion of Toledo: 'that we should entreat His Majesty to give the cities the part which the law allowed them in regard to providing for the form of government.' 'Since our lord the King has the age and ability which he has, those considerations cease which usually apply when the cities have the right to interfere in such an affair.'

In the midst of this correspondence the Crown interfered, through the corregidor, who on December 2 communicated the letter of the King of November 4, announcing D. Carlos's intent of summoning Cortes in Castile, where Toledo and others might present their requests; and his command that, as he was detained by Aragonese business and had not time for Castile, they send no messengers, and recall any if sent — promising, in regard to the tax and any other matters, all that befitted the occasion and their loyalty. By this interference, however, Toledo refused to be silenced. To the town council, reassembled on December 5, the corregidor advised retreat; but a large number agreed to the proposal of regidor Fernán Pérez de Guzmán that, as His Majesty was ill informed of their motives for sending messengers, the city should acquaint him with the just cause that moved them to ask hearing and justice. Fernando de Ávalos [2] and Juan de Padilla drafted the letter which the jurados Solano and Ortiz were deputed to deliver: expressing surprise that the messengers should not first be heard, to ascertain the truth of what was going on; explaining that they sent to Aragon because that was His Majesty's seignory just as was Castile and in each he provided for the weal of the other; and, as the Castilian matter was so grave, he needed to be at once informed.[3]

Recognizing the importance of these first symptoms of defiance, the King by letter of December 17 [4] replaced the mild Count of Palma — who further was brother-in-law of D. Pedrolasso [5] — by Antonio de Córdova. Formal charges

[1] Danv. I. 247. The sentence quoted, 'That we should entreat,' etc., is not to be found in the version of Toledo's letter of Nov. 7 printed by Santa Cruz and Sandoval; but is in the Simancas variant printed by Danvila.

[2] Guevara says (*Epístolas fam.*, 231) that Ávalos was J. Padilla's uncle. Ávalos had, according to Maldonado (Movimiento, 77) a personal grievance against Chièvres for ousting him from the corregidorship of Xerez, against which he had made a vain journey to Barcelona to protest.

[3] Danv. I. 248–49. [4] *Ibid.*, 250.

[5] Sandoval, V. vii. P. Martyr (Epist. DCLXVI) reports him as appearing

were preferred against Palma in a residencia: that he shared the profits of the tax-farmers from advance in the taxes at which he connived; and that he favored the family and party of Lasso de la Vega, endeavoring to get Pedrolasso chosen deputy. Palma remained in authority, however, until the new year; and through him went still another letter from the King, of January 22, 1520,[1] forbidding yet again the sending of messengers, rendered now unnecessary by the fact that summons for the Cortes were already issued and the King would within the week reach Castile; expressing surprise at their persistence in a forbidden course which could accomplish nothing but to involve the towns in expense; and explaining that the new corregidor, de Córdova, would neither give occasion for nor countenance to their undertaking.

These reiterated prohibitions became sharper after D. Carlos reached Castile and de Córdova became corregidor in the metropolitan city. From Burgos, February 20, he sent a writ[2] forbidding correspondence with other cities to arrange for sending any other messengers than the Cortes deputies, under penalties to person and property which de Córdova had full power to exact.

A meeting of the Toledo council on that same Monday, February 20,[3] chose the petitioners, the same Pedrolasso, Suárez, Hita, and Ortiz of the abortive mission of September preceding. The determined majority was led by Juan de Padilla, the minority by Antonio Alvárez, a friend of Bishop Mota, who kept the Court party informed; and the contest was so angry that, as was reported,[4] daggers were drawn. Whether the messengers would start in the face of such absolute prohibition as that in the King's order of February 20, then on the way, might be questioned; but Pedrolasso wrote as follows to jurado Ortega, one of the radical group, then in Valladolid, apparently[5] organizing the party of resistance.

'Your despatch came Sunday at nightfall, and Señor Juan

at Santiago to explain to the King his helplessness in Toledo — an exculpation, that was curtly dismissed.

[1] Danv. I. 259. [2] *Ibid.*, 279.

[3] A letter of de Córdova, mentioned in his letter of Feb. 27, reporting all this is unhappily lost. Sandoval's account (V. vii) is confused. Pedrolasso's letter of Feb. 21 is the most definite source. Danv. I. 279–82; 287–95.

[4] Sandoval, V. vii.

[5] Notice the phrase in de Córdova's letter, p. 56, n. 1.

de Padilla came here at once, and he and I read your letters; and we wish indeed that city would take more open determination. . . . I can assure you our messengers will start the day credentials are granted them and the petitions we are to make are signed, which will be the first day of the council meeting. . . . If the gentlemen there have the determination which they have written us, now is the time to show it. . . . I tell you what must be done thus expressly, because, though the corregidor forbid it and impose all the fines in the world, we shall appeal from all, and will not desist from going before our lord the King for all the world combined. For of going to one's prince none can deprive one.' [1]

After selecting the petitioners the election of Cortes deputies was adjourned to Wednesday.[2] As this was the first day of Lent, de Córdova agreed to postpone the meeting till Friday, secretly hoping a letter of instruction might come from the King. Just such a letter came, on Wednesday, struck one: that of Burgos, February 20; and to receive the royal message he summoned the council for Thursday. Their answer was amazed protest; 'they were a good deal stirred up, saying it was a thing new and unheard of that His Majesty should forbid their going to petition whatever suited them.'

Their proposal was encouraged by an offer of support put through the cathedral chapter in face of the almost solitary opposition of the Dean; and in the house of the divinity professor (*maestroescuela*) were drafted the petitions, a partial copy of which the Dean secured for the corregidor. They[3] are uncompromising demands, every one of which it

[1] Despite obscurities, Pedrolasso's letter breathes a frankness of wrath rather refreshing amid the hypocritical phrases about royal benevolence and dutiful devotion. This very letter would appear, though Danvila does not remark it, to have been intercepted by the corregidor, according to a paragraph of his report of Feb. 27: 'I was told last week that Don Pedrolasso was writing to Valladolid, to a jurado of this city who is there managing this business which, as appears, they are about; and I had notice when the messenger was starting. I sent two men with a sheriff; and, outside the jurisdiction of this city, they seized him, saying he was a robber, and got the letters he carried, without his perceiving it. That which goes herewith was copied and sealed again as it was; and they gave them to the messenger without his knowing it had been copied; and, saying he was not the one they sought, they let him go.' Danv. I. 293. De Cordova's letter complains of loss of earlier ones: 'they went with an expert post whom certain Genovese were sending. They say he died on the road.' Danv. I. 290.

[2] Pedrolasso's letter. Danv. I. 281.

[3] Sandoval, V. vii, closely paraphrased from Mexía, 120.

was known D. Carlos was determined to ignore: that the King should not depart, as Spain was unused to governors; that no offices be given to foreigners, and those given be withdrawn; that no money be exported; that no tax be asked in these Cortes, especially if the King left; that the Cortes be postponed, and held in Castile; that office and authority be not sold; that the Inquisition be reorganized; and that private grievances be righted.

With the next week [1] the messengers slipped out of Toledo: 'pretending,' wrote the corregidor, 'they were going to their estates.'

The Toledan council on Monday, February 27,[2] despite the royal writ of the 20th served on them by de Córdova, with its fine of 2000 ducats upon each who resisted, proceeded with its intent. Guzmán, supported by Gaitán, Padilla, and their group, protested that the writ was the most extraordinary innovation known in the present or the past. Padilla moved that 'the messengers who have gone be sent, that His Majesty, seeing the appeal and hearing the messengers, may realize how entirely the city's wish is for the service of His Majesty . . .' To block matters de Córdova forbade the Chief Notary or his deputy to issue credentials to messengers; but the notary objected that the corregidor showed no royal writ for this order — in which the corregidor persisted, as did the notary also in his objection. Similar technical objection enabled the radicals to block granting power to the Cortes deputies.

Credentials were later somehow secured for the messengers, who presented themselves in Valladolid, March 4, where they were witnesses, if not accomplices, in the first outbreak of the long, violent story of the communal revolt.

The further story of the Toledan petition is interwoven with the events of D. Carlos's struggle with the Cortes of Santiago-Coruña.

[1] De Córdova states in one report Sunday, in the other Monday.

[2] Danv. I. 287. It is an instance of Danvila's inattention that he here calls the corregidor Acuña.

CHAPTER XI

IMPERIAL HASTE

THOUGH natural enthusiasms might incline the Castilians to welcome joyously the return of the sovereign, a young man now just completing his twentieth year and able to speak Spanish,[1] his first act on Castilian soil was a challenge to renew the struggle of two years before. From Calahorra on the Castilian side of the Ebro on February 12 he issued the Cortes summons:[2] the cities were to elect two deputies, empowered, according to a model commission which accompanied the summons, to discuss and grant tax, in Santiago. Cortes, not in Burgos, as that city asked and some expected,[3] not even in Castile but Galicia, 'or in any place where the King may be' on the day of session! Thus the center of gravity of the kingdom was to shift to the coast whence the Emperor-elect might sail, and, vanished in the mist of the northern horizon, leave a governor — Bishop Mota, for instance? — to collect from Castile a new tax to support Hapsburg prestige in Germany! Perhaps the Flemish favorite, fearing even for his life, appointed the last struggle in a port whence he could securely escape with the wealth extorted from Spain.[4]

Burgos had been circumspect hitherto. The Toledan letter of November 7 she had not approved. Her conduct the King had commended in a letter of December 23, though he evaded therein their request to call the Cortes in their city. Another letter three weeks later (January 18) informed the city that the King knew of the Toledan solicitations and the reply of Burgos, which was well, and such as he expected of them. The Dean and chapter of the cathedral had petitioned that the expense of housing the Court should not be laid on them, but their liberties respected;

[1] But it is notable that the first letter that D. Carlos wrote in Spanish to his governor appears to be that to the Constable, received in December 1521. Danv. IV. 690.

[2] *Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de León y Castilla*, IV. 285–88. The model commission is 288 ff.

[3] Cf. *supra*, p. 53, n. 15.

[4] Such is Sandoval's explanation, V. xi. King Felipe's favorite, Juan Manuel fled from Spain the very night of that monarch's death. Alcocer, 19.

D. Carlos replied that he had always cherished the Church's freedom, and felt assured that, in the dearth of inns, his petitioners would themselves take pleasure in receiving the Court in their homes.[1]

In the late winter the royal train descended the broad shallow valley of the Arlanzón, and on February 18 D. Carlos rested in Miraflores, where he saw the magnificent monuments his grandmother Isabel had erected over the ashes of his great-grandparents, Juan II and his Queen. In the same church, too, had lain his father's body during the days of his mother's pathetic devotions.

From the Carthusian silence fraught with such associations the young monarch passed the next day into Burgos, the second sumptuous Castilian city of his acquaintance. In its Cistercian nunnery of Las Huelgas, where the sisters were all noble ladies (not *sores* but *señoras doñas*) were the tombs of most of the medieval kings and queens of Leon and Castile.[2] The cathedral was freshly resplendent with ornate spires but half a century completed, and a Lady chapel, 'of the Constable,' almost more majestic than the church itself.[3] The massive Casa del Cordón, recently built palace of the Constable, housed the monarch, for he possessed himself no such mansion in Burgos. Beneath the huge granite cord of St. Francis over its portal his father passed, stricken with death, thirteen years before.[4] The quaintest relic of the city, however, was the little aisleless Gothic church of Santa Gadea, where the Cid had extorted a triple oath from Alfonso VI, before that monarch ascended his throne.[5]

Monarchs were still held to oaths, and the Emperor-elect was required to swear, as had all his royal ancestors, before entering the city, that he would 'respect, keep, and fulfill all the rights, liberties, franchises, and prerogatives which the city lawfully enjoyed.' On the bridge midway of the stream he pledged this oath to J. de Rojas and Dr. Zumel, the somewhat tamed lion of the Valladolid Cortes.[6]

[1] Danv. I. 259; 278–79; Mexía, 112 (Sandoval, III. 1); Santa Cruz, I. 222.

[2] In the choir, and not visible to to-day's tourist. For the beautiful buildings see Street (Ed. King), I. 38–52.

[3] The present ornate lantern was built in 1567. Street (Ed. King), I. Chap. II.

[4] Cf. illustration facing p. 26, *Casa del Cordón*, and note.

[5] Still extant; indeed a bolt over the door purports to be that by which Alfonso swore.

[6] Mexía, 112.

The celebrations which followed this rather punctilious welcome D. Carlos broke off by hurried departure, on February 27, to Valladolid.[1]

The election and commissioning of Cortes deputies was about to take place in Burgos when D. Carlos left; the same business — interrupted and exasperated by Girón's affair and the demands of the Toledan petitioners — occupied the King during his four days, March 1–4, in Valladolid.[2]

The temper of this town through the winter had been defiant and excited, solicited by the Toledan circular, and now, further, by a recent letter from the clergy of Salamanca, urging a drastic set of petitions and refusal of any but very limited powers for the Cortes deputies.[3] Corregidor Juan de Acuña had exercised what restraint he could: royal letters from Burgos, February 25, had ordered election of deputies as directed in the summons, and had warned against admitting outsiders (contentious Salamancan clerics, for instance, or Toledan petitioners or their emissary Señor Ortega, with impudent proposals?) into the council sessions — at least till the deputy business was settled. But the Vallisoletans had balked at granting power to the deputies, and had instead sent His Majesty a stiff list of petitions, asking a written promise, on his royal honor, that they should be granted at Santiago: the usual ones about withdrawing money from the realm, about giving office to foreigners; and his royal word, in a writ signed in his name, to return in three years.

Immediately upon arrival the King summoned the members of the town council to his quarters in the monastery of San Francisco, and explained to them the motive of his voyage and his need for 300 cuentos in taxes. The example of the city which was the administrative center of the realm would, it was pointed out, influence many others; and to secure their consent the King promised to return in three years and to grant the petitions which the Valladolid deputies asked in the Cortes. A group of dignitaries present at the conference was calculated to impress the city officials; the Archbishop of Santiago, Bishop Mota, the Count

[1] Santa Cruz, I. 222; Danv. I. 279. A very detailed work is Salvá, *Burgos en las Comunidades.*

[2] Mexía, 124–27; Santa Cruz, I. 223–24; Sandoval, V. vi; viii–ix, is an interweaving of the preceding two. Danv. I. 275; 282–85; 297–305.

[3] Cf. *infra*, p. 103, n. 7.

of Benavente, the Marquis of Astorga, the omnipresent Chièvres. The officials asked time to consider, and withdrew.

A promise to return in three years, but oral, not written; could one be sure of his ability to fulfill it? And a promise to concede the petitions — could so large a concession be more than a desperate momentary yielding, sincere for the time being but to be explained away later or forgotten? In the Cortes in that same city two years before, D. Carlos had promised that the Archbishop of Toledo should come to his see; but he had not yet come, and the immense revenues of Toledo were collected and spent by Chièvres,[1] who sold its offices!

Removed a little from the awe of the Presence they could better estimate the temper of the town and the possibility of satisfying the young King. Meetings of the town council in San Pablo were debating the empowering of Cortes deputies; and there, with much negotiation to and fro between monastery and palace, the struggle continued, conferences succeeding through day and night, as a heavy March storm gathered in the rainy Pisuerga valley.

The wildest excitement awaited the outcome of the council meeting which was to grant or refuse to the deputies power to vote the tax demanded. Deputations passed from the awe of the populace back to the awe of the Presence: if His Majesty would consent to remain in Spain, not 300 cuentos but all their wealth, and their lives and their sons they were ready to spend in his service; otherwise, they could not consent.

The Court party, supported by some of the regidors, urged that the 'extreme necessity' had arisen, and recalled the precedent of money granted to support the doubtful claim to the Imperial title advanced by the great Alfonso the Wise, eleven generations before D. Carlos. Castile was ready then to rise, at whatever cost, to an imperial destiny; how shamefully would she to-day, with her King actually elected, make the great refusal!

Though some officials were won over, resistance continued. Then there was a first show of violence: some of the opposers were expelled from the session as disloyal. The town was roused to fury, expecting that concession would be extorted from a Rump council. Rumor ran on Sunday

[1] Poschmann, Boletín R.A.H. lxxv. 234 ff.

that the council had yielded. D. Carlos had, indeed, determined to wait no longer: he was said [1] to have remarked that he required no more than the consent and the signatures which some of the regidors had already given; as for the others, he would undertake the correction of them in due time.

Even wilder rumors were current on the lowering Monday morning March 4: [2] preparations were evidently being rushed at the palace for the King's departure; and he would not, it was reported, leave Spain alone, but would take with him the Queen, the only child of the great Isabel left living in Castile.

During the session of the council the Toledan petitioners arrived. As they were about to dismount at San Francisco, jurado Ortiz, the member of their commission resident in Court, informed them that the King, at the moment at mass, would, immediately after a meal, depart for Tordesillas, but that, by repairing at once to the palace, they might delay His Majesty long enough for a hearing. Thereupon certain of the councillors and citizens came to the Toledans to consider concerted action.

How much determination or desperation really lay under the decorous Toledan proposal of presenting petitions? Their mission, even if for no more violent protest, was in violation of royal command; but it might well be they were, as they asserted, within their rights. Yet there was reason for suspecting [3] that a considerable part of the Toledan following proposed petition merely as a threat, and pretext for coercion. It was quite possible to carry through heroic measures: the populace could be roused, to prevent the King's departure; Chièvres and the Flemings were to be seized; in this bold stroke D. Pedrolasso would join if the town officials would take oath to support the movement. Whether or not with so explicit and defiant a plan,[4] the

[1] Not in contemporary sources, but in Sandoval, V. vi, supported merely by 'They say.'

[2] For the events of this day we have, besides the chroniclers, a letter of Peter Martyr. Danv. I. 304, from R.A.H. MS.; and printed as DCLXV in the *Opus Epistolarum*. The Latin text does not give 'el día 4' of Danvila's version, but 'nudius quartus.' [The letter is dated 'pridie idus Mart.' =March 14.] Danvila points out (I. 305) that Foronda and the documents indicate March 4.

[3] Sandoval (V. viii) is not alone in reporting this. Santa Cruz says (I. 224), 'They concerted secretly to slay M. de Chièvres and all the Flemings, and detain the Emperor so that he might not depart from Spain.'

[4] Sandoval alone implicates D. Pedrolasso.

D. Carlos and D. Felipe

Two of the better contemporary panel portraits of D. Carlos and his father D. Felipe, anonymous works of the Flemish school, are these in the Louvre. Both monarchs wear the collar of the Golden Fleece, an adornment of all the later Dukes of Burgundy. The absence of any royal symbols somewhat implies that the portraits were painted before either succeeded to his crown. Though uninscribed, the abundance of unquestioned contemporary likenesses of the two sovereigns makes the identification certain. On portraits of D. Carlos, see the elaborate iconographical discussion of the late Señor Enrique Pacheco y de Leyva.

THE KING D. CARLOS

THE KING D. FELIPE

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Toledans, before presenting themselves at the palace ('which,' observes Mexía, 'were the righter plan'), proceeded to San Pablo; explained the petitions they were bearing to the King, 'all couched in the best possible terms'; and urged that Valladolid join with Salamanca and Toledo, that many petitioners might the more persuade. Officially, however, the city remained uncompromised. Speaking for the council, D. Hernando Enríquez, brother of the Admiral, replied that the councillors were not yet decided, but would act as seemed to them best for the realm. The Toledans, feeling thwarted ('we wish indeed that city would take more open determination'), turned then to the palace, where they found the cloth was just being removed, and where they asked immediate audience. D. Carlos was busy disciplining a protesting noble.

The pertinacious D. Pedro Girón, not discouraged by defeat at the hands of old King Fernando, and again, through the determination of Jiménez, at the hands of Antonio de Fonseca, sought a final decision from D. Carlos.[1] In the Presence were the Toledan royalist the Marquis of Villena, and the former corregidor Palma; the Constable and his son the Count of Haro; the archbishop of Santiago, the Bishop of Palencia, and Chièvres; the Marquis of Brandenburg, husband of the widowed Queen Germaine, and others. Before these D. Pedro demanded of the King that he perform his year-old promise — of which he had twice been reminded — to do justice in regard to the property rights of D. Pedro's wife; he himself, he asserted, since the King was leaving Spain without keeping his promise, would take all measures allowed by law to an injured caballero.

D. Carlos answered, 'Don Pedro, you are wise; I do not think you will do anything wherefor I should be compelled to punish you — for if you *should* do this, I would order your punishment.'

'My lord,' returned Girón ('speaking quite publicly so that all might hear'), 'in doing what I say, I do nothing I should not do; and Your Majesty, in refusing to do, does not as do I. For those from whom I am born never thought

[1] Santa Cruz (I. 223) has an account somewhat differing from Sandoval, V. ix. Santa Cruz says D. Carlos told Girón that, if he meddled with the King's justice, he would order his head off. D. Carlos had learned Spanish and spoke directly, not through interpreters. Peter Martyr (Epist. DCLXVI, April 5) repeats the same anecdote, essentially; but places it in Santiago. Maldonado also (p. 181) has a version of the interview, which evidently was widely narrated.

to do thing they ought not; nor do I. What I have told you I should do is to take measures for my redress such as the laws of these realms permit; and if, for doing what I should, you, my lord, undertake to punish me, you will discover whether, in that, you do what you owe yourself.'

'I intend to do you justice, Don Pedro, as I have said,' affirmed the King, 'and I have fulfilled what I promised.'

'My lord,' returned the old courtier, 'you are my King, and I will not reply. What you promised me stands here in this decree and may quickly be seen; and what was done yesterday in your Council is to-day very well known.'

Further insinuations were cut off by the Marquis of Villena; and D. Pedro left the Presence. The Count of Benavente and other caballeros gathered about the still-protesting Girón in the antechamber.[1]

To the young King in such an inauspicious mood was thereupon presented the request of the Toledan petitioners for audience. D. Carlos pleaded his immediate departure and declared there was no time to inform him properly; to which Pedrolasso urged that it were better, especially on so stormy a day, to delay and consider a matter which much concerned the weal of the realm. The King, already knowing the substance of their message and disliking their manner, declared that none was concerned more than he for the weal of the realm; that he was going to Tordesillas, bound for Santiago, and at the first halt beyond Tordesillas they should have audience.

Thus curtly freed from one annoyance the King turned with doubled anger to consult with his Council for the arrest of Girón. But a still angrier town had taken matters into its own hands.

Those who from experience knew the temper of the nation realized how little was the chance that Valladolid would give way to the royal demands. The old Court tutor, Peter Martyr, had written to his fellow Italian, the chancellor, on the day of the King's arrival:[2]

Everywhere there is nothing but maledictions, protesting that to call the Cortes in Santiago, empowered only to obey what the King ordered, is to filch their freedom, and what

[1] The *hauteur* of D. Carlos in audience was for years noted and resented: cf. the rebuking comparison drawn by the Admiral, in his long report of 1522 (Danv. V. 97), between D. Carlos and D. Fernando the Catholic.

[2] Danv. I. 303, summarized from R.A.H. MS. Epist. DCLXIII.

one orders from a chattel slave. 'Do not trust to the fact that Burgos, a capital city, yielded. They say Master Mota, the Burgalese bishop of Badajoz, who is shrewd and intriguing, corrupted and bribed certain regidors in order to flatter the Cæsar and the Goat,[1] whom he fears, and to mount higher on fortune's wheel.'

Northwest in the city, midway from the great square to the river, stood the old parish church of San Miguel,[2] in the tower of which swung the great bell of the council, rung for wars and alarms. Some one — not a Castilian, but a Portuguese ropemaker, as later reported — tolled the bell; and there swarmed into the drenched streets a mob of five or six thousand men, armed with what weapons were at hand. Enríquez, bishop of Osma, got word to Chièvres, who would not believe, till uproar was heard and shouting in the streets: 'Live Don Carlos our King and death to evil counsellors!' Concerned for their own freedom, the King and the Flemings dropped their business of arresting Girón, left the palace, and made a dash for liberty through the riotous town, under a downpour of rain 'so black as never men remember to have seen.'[3] The King's party, and the mob, partly retarded by the storm, reached the South gate together. Some in the van tried to bar the gate but were scattered by the royal guard; and D. Carlos dashed out, and, accompanied solely by Chièvres, reached Tordesillas, nineteen miles distant, that night, soaked and mud-laden. Just two years before, he was the admired figure in the tourney of Valladolid, in his armor with surcoat of white satin and pearls.

The populace shifted its wrath to the regidors, whose lives, Martyr said, were in peril; then, discovering that the council had not yielded, quieted down somewhat abashed and no little frightened at its attempt actually to lay hands on its king.

His Grace of Osma wrote Chièvres on the 7th promising to quiet the town and urging His Majesty to pass over the matter as a superficial explosion, and to appoint a conciliatory corregidor. In default of the undiscovered Portuguese, other wretched folk implicated in the inquest had their feet

[1] Martyr commonly puns thus on the name Chièvres.

[2] Still extant, submerged by the modern industrial city.

[3] Sandoval. All the reports mention the heavy rain. Santa Cruz says Chièvres and Carlos slipped out unperceived.

cut off or were flogged or exiled, their property seized and their houses destroyed. An honorable citizen, a silversmith, was flogged for having received letters from the Portuguese. Three clerics who were in San Miguel and, by report, had consented to the alarm, were gyved, mounted on packmules, and driven, accompanied by the entire justiciary, through the rag-market, the harness shops, and the potters' quarter, to be lodged in the King's fortalice a league away, whence after many days they were released when the King was satisfied and ordered the matter dropped.

Perhaps D. Carlos had at some time heard from his parents how his grandfather Maximilian, thirty-two years before this adventure, was shut up in Cranenberg by his people of Bruges, and held from January till May, when, upon signing certain concessions, he was released.

CHAPTER XII

AUDIENCE TO THE PETITIONERS

AFTER pathetic and futile farewell to his mother Juana in her retirement in the palace of Tordesillas, D. Carlos's cavalcade mounted the long slopes of the western upland of Castile, spending the 10th and 11th in the Constable's town of Villalpando. Here awaited him not merely the Toledan petitioners, but the Salamancan deputies, D. Pedro Maldonado and Fernández, and three petitioners, all directed to act with the Toledans. Sunday March 11 after mass the Toledans were received at the palace by García de Padilla and the bishop of Palencia, whom they understood to be merely emissaries of Chièvres. Suárez and Pedrolasso explained that their city commissioned them to speak only to their King. This audience refused unless they would make preliminary report, they communicated part of their message and were granted audience at two in the afternoon, before a few courtiers. At last the list of the familiar petitions was put before D. Carlos, including that which had offended Granada: that if he *must* depart, the cities should share in the government.[1] To them, and to the Salamancans, who later made similar petition, he gave no reply save to appoint still another audience in Benavente, where the Council was, by whose advice he would reply.[2]

Thus lured another stage on their will-o-the-wisp journey the messengers preceded the royal train to Benavente, beyond the bare Castilian plain into a region of brimming streams and deciduous trees, facing always on the west a blue panorama of the Galician mountains. The Council, there assembled, declared that, considering the form, time, and origin of the embassy, it deserved punishment rather than any fair answer. The messengers were admitted to the Presence; and with severe expression D. Carlos declared he held himself little served by their deeds; did he not know whose sons they were, he would order punishment; and the

[1] Sandoval, in one of his sympathetic bursts, adds: *and other petitions so just that a portero wept to hear.*

[2] Mexía, 127–28. Sandoval (V. x) takes over Mexía almost verbatim, adding some anecdotic detail.

President of the Council would tell them what to do. Their excuses the King did not listen to hear, but left the room. García de Padilla rebuked them, declaring that the King's voyage was for the good of the realm; but that their insistence, because of Toledo's prestige, would unsettle the Cortes deputies. Then his Grace of Granada, President of the Council, further admonished them that their petitions should be offered by deputies in Cortes, whom the King would consider; but they must cease to meddle and persist in innovations, and, rather, get their cities to send deputies. This advice the Toledans — seconded in all by the Salamancans — rejected, declaring they held it matter of honor to persist in their undertaking; and they followed their King to Santiago, where they solicited the deputies to their views and urged them to petition as had Toledo.[1]

[1] Mexía, 128, closely paraphrased and copied by Sandoval, V. x; Danv. I. 306.

CHAPTER XIII

HOLY WEEK IN SANTIAGO

THOUGH the futility of petition was quite obvious, the usefulness of the Toledan mission as a measure of agitation and publicity was clear. Failure to obtain audience before the Cortes on Palm Sunday, April 1, the second day of the session,[1] considerably baulked their mission, except for personal influence; but a dramatic stroke remained possible which would raise enormous difficulties for the Crown by bringing into question the legality of the Cortes and all its acts and grants. Accompanied by the Salamancan deputies, who had been excluded for defective credentials, the Toledan petitioners registered formal protest, with due legal forms, that all done in the Cortes without such representation was void, and the interests of Toledo and of the realm could not thereby be prejudiced: 'and there was an immense scandal in the Court.'

On that same night, however, the Crown acted. With nightfall Secretary Cobos went to the inn of the Toledan messengers with orders that Suárez on the Monday morrow retire to what captaincy of men-at-arms he had, there to stay till further ordered, on pain of losing said captaincy and all his property; and that D. Pedrolasso retire also, on Monday and within forty days, to his holding, the fortress of Gibraltar, there to stay till further ordered, on pain of losing said holding and property; that the *jurados* leave Court at once; and that inns should refuse them harbor.

The ever-serviceable Ortiz started negotiations to relieve the Toledans from this peremptory exile: he secured a two-hour night conference with Chièvres, and it was agreed that Suárez and Pedrolasso in sign of obedience should withdraw to the little town of Padrón on the Galician coast five leagues to the south. Ortiz insisted to Chièvres, who had reported D. Carlos as inflexible, that the affair was of the gravest; they were leading gentlemen of Spain, doing only the bidding of their city, which would take the affront to

[1] No traces of this in the *Actas*; but in Mexía, 130, and in Sandoval (who takes over almost every word of Mexía), V. xi, xiv–xv, xxi. Cf. also Santa Cruz, I. 226; Danv. I. 315, 322; and Peter Martyr's letter of April 8 (DCLXVII).

herself; that all the realm knew the messengers acted for the common good and were exiled, as would be believed, not for disrespect but for serving the realm — whence ill must follow. 'What insolence is that of Toledo!' interrupted Chièvres, 'What insolence is theirs that this king is no king!' The sentence of exile stood.[1]

To the Toledans on the first stage of their exile came on Tuesday of Holy Week (April 3) letters from Toledo: the city asked for its messengers respectful hearing, and appealed from the King's order of March 24, which ordered to Court Padilla and all the radical leaders, on the ground that these gentlemen were busied with matters concerning the good of the state, and the city would suffer by their departure. The assiduous Ortiz, armed with this disconcerting material, returned to the attack. D. Carlos had retired for Holy Week in the monastery of San Salvador; los Cobos was unmoved, Chièvres angered, by Ortiz; and García de Padilla administered another rebuke, declaring his opinion that the King should make the ten-day trip to Toledo to administer exemplary punishment. 'Would God he came,' returned Ortiz, 'to see plainly the evils, which he would then rectify!' The exiles lingered, not too much alarmed, until Ortiz carried to them the warnings of the Constable and of Garcilasso, D. Pedro's brother,[2] to start at once lest the King visit on them his wrath over the news of an outbreak in Toledo.

D. Pedrolasso started on his journey of exile across the length of the peninsula — having five left of his forty days — to meditate in the fortress of Gibraltar on the right to petition. He got, by way of Zamora, where he left all the reports of the Cortes, as far as Toledo.[3]

Meanwhile, in all the Cortes cities, struggle had gone on in selection of Cortes deputies. This was usually by lot, but candidacy was frequently limited to certain officials or families. The credentials, however, especially if the lot had already named deputies sympathetic with the Crown claims, were the subject of long contest. The attempt, by prescribing a model commission, to deprive the cities of restraint on

[1] That Pedrolasso was actually confined under arrest is reported only by Maldonado (p. 63), not an important witness about matters outside of Burgos.

[2] *Documentos Inéditos*, XVI. 19.

[3] Sandoval, V. xxi. If correct, D. Pedro left on May 6; his respite would expire May 11, forty days from Palm Sunday.

their deputies caused wide indignation.[1] The judge in residence in Burgos so reported to His Majesty: 'they are unwilling to give unrestricted Instructions to vote whatever Your Majesty may ask, for they have observed that deputies win rewards by the tax which the realm pays; and they say that the freedom of powers introduced by the Catholic Queen to avoid confusion in the Cortes was corrected by Instructions limiting powers; and to order unlimited Instructions was to destroy the order and authority of the realm: if introduced now it would become perpetual, and they were much aggrieved at it.' [2]

Cities dominated by the Court party did not tie the hands of the deputies.

Córdoba, February 18,[3] empowered her deputies to vote tax, but asked that the city have control of collecting it; and added a formidable list of petitions, repeating, as was so constantly necessary, practically the whole list of the Valladolid Cortes, the promises of which had not been fulfilled.

Segovia [4] likewise appended to the powers of her deputies, Vázquez and Tordesillas, a long list of petitions — none of which, however, precluded a vote of tax.

Into the session of the Zamora council, February 27, attempt was made to introduce an extended letter from the Salamancan clerics, a document which served as a sort of manifesto or party programme and which there was attempt also in Valladolid to make the basis of opposition. This communication, urging restricted powers and an exacting series of petitions, Corregidor Fadrique de Zúñiga got excluded. The Notary, however, balked at issuing unrestricted credentials.[5] Finally unrestricted power was granted, controlled by their promise under oath not to act without communicating with their city.[6]

Madrid,[7] solicited by Toledo, refused to grant powers, at the end of February; but a royal order — probably exasperated in tone, since it issued from Tordesillas on March 7 — extorted obedience, accompanied, however, by full statement of grievance amounting to a poignant manifesto for

[1] Peter Martyr's letter. Cf. *supra*, p. 64.
[2] To D. Carlos, March 11, Danv. I. 310.
[3] Danv. I. 276.
[4] A confused account in Danv. I. 308–09.
[5] Danv. I. 271 ff.; 285.
[6] Sandoval, V. xxxviii.
[7] Danv. I. 285, 306.

the whole movement of protest.[1] 'We have granted full powers; and if Your Highness accept the truth we tell you, you will recognize the signal service we have rendered.' Yet the granting of power under Royal compulsion might later constitute ground for protest by the deputies themselves at Santiago.

In Valladolid [2] the selection of deputies was quiet, de la Serna and Santisteban being chosen; but from the beginning there was effort to convert the sessions into general meetings of public protest. First (February 24), the Corregidor had to forbid the proposed admission of 'certain gentlemen, citizens, and clerics'; then he struggled to prevent any acknowledgment of the letters from Salamanca and Zamora. Even the personal insistence of the King in the March days failed to extort the required authorization of deputies.

Independent as had been the form in which Burgos welcomed D. Carlos and angry as she had been at his departure, her mood was at first docile. Martyr explained it as due to Mota's manipulations; the local Judge *de residencia* was able to report on March 11 that the city was disposed to favor at least a half of the servicio asked,[3] and he thought insistence would secure unrestricted authorization. The Court party also triumphed in the selection of the deputies: alcalde Juan Pérez de Cartagena and the Comendador Garcí Ruiz de la Mota, brother of Bishop Mota. But to these men the city would not grant unrestricted powers; and when, after the session opened, it was reported that a huge grant was asked, Burgos wrote its deputies not to vote any grant for any purpose whatever.

From Toledo,[4] of course, nothing docile could be expected. If lot assigned deputies favorable to the Crown, they would obtain only the most restricted authority. The radicals in the session of February 24 found a pretext for delaying the selection of deputies; they excluded from the drawing the name of de Córdova, who was corregidor; he claimed the right to be included; they appealed to the Crown to determine the law. But de Córdova to thwart their pro-

[1] Ferrer del Río printed it as Appendix 3 to his *Decadencia de España;* summarized in Danv. I. 307.

[2] Danv. I. 275, 282, 295.

[3] Danv. I. 285 (mainly from Salvá), 310.

[4] Mexía, 118, copied in Sandoval, V. vii. Danv. I. 291 ff.

gramme of delay waived his claim under protest, and the lots were drawn, falling to regidor J. de Ribera and jurado Aguirre, both supporters of the Court party.[1] The session of February 27 consequently refused to grant the authority demanded by royal writ.[2] In this refusal they persisted through repeated sessions, February 29 and March 1.[3] With hands so tied as the radical majority required, the deputies refused to go, and the deadlock was not broken in time for any Toledan representation at Santiago — a result which the opposition was probably maneuvering to accomplish, and the full political effect of which their petitioners exploited at the Cortes.

An unofficial but powerful deputation accompanied the Toledan petitioners viz., the corps of legal and financial agents of the great *Mesta*, which had been bled for the suddenly mounting expenses of an imperial ambition and which now took the precaution of sending lobbyists to the Cortes.[4]

The Cortes opened in Santiago March 31.[5] The selection of a President was not conciliatory, a foreigner again, as at Valladolid — the Italian Chancellor, Gattinara. An incident revealed at the start the touchy mood of the Court. The Count of Villalba, having vainly, with other Galician nobles, sought to secure the unprecedented admission of deputies from Galicia, passed angry words with Garcí Ruiz de la Mota and his brother the bishop, and threatened finally to join Pedrolasso — which threat alone was punished by immediate banishment from Court.[6] Differences between Fonseca, Archbishop of Santiago, and Chièvres so alienated the prelate that he withdrew from Court and was reputed to be assembling troops secretly.[7]

Of the eighteen Cortes cities two did not participate. The current explanations of the absence of the Salamancans were

[1] De Córdova's report, Feb. 27, Danv. I. 291; Mexía, 118. Ribera is the same person as *Juan de Silva* of Sandoval's text (V. vii), which follows Mexía, and prints *Ribera* in the margin.

[2] Danv. I. 294. [3] Note that 1520 was a leap year.

[4] Klein, *Mesta*, 281.

[5] Mexía, 129; Santa Cruz, I. 225 ff.; Sandoval, V. xii–xiv; xv; xxv–xxviii; Danv. I. 310–21; 326–28; 331–34. A letter of Peter Martyr summarized from R.A.H. MS. in Danv. I. 315. All the narratives of the Cortes — in regard to which, because of secret procedure, contemporaries were ill-informed — must be checked by the *Actas*, in *Cortes de los antiguos Reinos de León y Castilla*. Madrid, 1882. Vol. IV. Santiago, 285–308; Coruña, 309–34. Danvila is singularly careless in using this material.

[6] Sandoval, V. xii. [7] Sandoval, V. xiii.

contradictory: either they refused the customary oath unless His Majesty would first concede the petitions;[1] or they opposed the grant and were expelled.[2] The official acts record that Maldonado and Fernández presented themselves and were rejected on the ground of defect in their credentials, and that second credentials were sent by the corregidor of Salamanca. But the Salamancans took no part in the sessions.[3]

From Toledo no deputies appeared — through no fault of the city, as the Toledan petitioners protested: credentials had been issued, but so restricted that the deputies, who were of the Court faction, would not accept them.[4]

The contest in Santiago was another chapter of the story of Valladolid and all the earlier sessions of Cortes, a contest to obtain answers to the *capítulos* and thereafter to appropriate moneys according as these were or were not satisfactory. The Address of the throne, composed by the Bishop of Tuy, was read by Bishop Mota on the day of opening, full of vague promises: everything was provided so that in the King's absence — which should not exceed three years — 'every one might be lord of himself and his house'; provisions were made to prevent export of wealth; the royal word was pledged that, during the King's absence office should be given only to natives; and a Governor should be appointed, adequately empowered, of authority, dignity, virtuous and holy life, zealous for the service of God and the King and the good of the realm. D. Carlos with a personal word confirmed these promises.

Garcí Ruiz de la Mota, as senior deputy from the capital of Castile, made response, decorously compounded of admission that the royal provisions were satisfactory, and the occasion of his departure and request for supply, adequate;

[1] Mexía, 130; followed by Sandoval, V. xi.

[2] Martyr's letter in Danv. I. 315, from R.A.H. MS.; DCLXVI in the *Opus Epistolarum*. Wild rumors of course circulated since there was no public report of the sessions. D. Pedrolasso took all these rumors to Zamora. Cf. Sandoval, V. xxi.

[3] It looks as if the deputies got from the city a commission (drafted by Francisco Maldonado, Danvila says, I. 360) limiting their powers, which the corregidor refused to authenticate but sent a commission according to the royal model, which the deputies refused to use. I find no authority for Danvila's statement (I. 359) that Maldonado and Enríquez (*sic*) were sent as messengers, independently of the deputies. D. Pedro Maldonado, the Salamancan petitioner (*supra*, p. 67) was a cousin of Francisco Maldonado, regidor of Salamanca. Both were latter Comunero captains.

[4] Santa Cruz, I. 225; Mexía, 134.

and of petition that he would consider the *capítulos*. Burgos, leader of the realm, would in matter of tax maintain her traditional loyalty.

In the next day's session, April 1, the Chancellor repeated the request for granting tax, and the deputies of León and Córdoba moved that the Cortes consider nothing before examination of the petitions. A dozen cities supported the motion, some rather ambiguously;[1] three, which throughout accepted the Crown programme, opposed: Burgos, Granada, Sevilla. Battle was joined.

Upon the issue, usage, if without formal sanction of law, was clearly with the Crown; and the Chancellor insisted on the precedent, at the afternoon session. What manipulations during the noontime had affected the deputies so that seven voted to yield, and the others abstained, pending conference?[2] 'Any deputy who would not vote the grant, and opposed his will to Chièvres, could not gain admission to the palace or anything else to his advantage.'[3]

On April 3 the dissenting Granadan deputy relented so that the city again supported the Crown group, now totaling eight. The León-Córdoba opposition varied somewhat in degree of dissent. Jaén divided.

With the next day's voting many of the cities in opposition added to their vote that petitions be considered first, a conciliatory explanation that this was not necessarily a refusal of tax; some even added a promise to vote tax — hoping perhaps to establish a precedent or at least to satisfy popular feeling, even if they had finally to acquiesce in the tax.[4]

Gattinara adjourned the Cortes over Easter, and to the port of Coruña.

[1] *Actas*, 302–03: Córdoba, Jaén, Valladolid, Murcia, Toro, Segovia, Zamora, Guadalajara, Soria, Cuenca, Madrid; doubtless León also, though not listed. Ávila asked for discussion.

[2] Burgos and Sevilla as before; Cuenca and Segovia won over; Ávila, Soria, Guadalajara assenting with ambiguous provisos. Granada and Jaén divided. León repeated her motion, but asked time for conference — followed by Córdoba, Valladolid, Zamora, Murcia, Toro, Madrid.

[3] Santa Cruz, I. 226.

[4] León and Toro appended disclaimer; Valladolid almost promised. Jaén still split. Madrid drops out, disclaiming authority to vote tax.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CORTES OF CORUÑA, APRIL–MAY, 1520

THE Court politicians had strenuous Easter business.[1] They secured a useful writ of the Crown on April 3: since 'certain deputies had made pledge and oath and given word and other securities to do and fulfill certain things, so that they had not complete freedom, nor could truly serve the King nor do what befitted the good and common advantage of the realm,' the King, 'using his absolute royal power, annuls said pledge, oath, and word, and delivers them free and quit thereof, so that neither now nor at any time may aught be demanded of them, nor any blame, charge, or dishonor imputed, for not fulfilling them.' A similar writ was signed April 5, releasing the Zamora deputies from such pledges.[2] *Quodcumque solveris super terram erit solutum et in coelis!* On Good Friday, April 6, a second, insistent summons was sent to bring to court all the leaders of the radical opposition in Toledo.

In the remote port of Coruña, tempers exasperated by the events at Santiago and by news from Toledo — that the mob had snatched Padilla and Ávalos from the power of the Court — the deputies and the Crown politicians renewed the struggle, which was hurried through amid violence and protest to a confused conclusion.[3]

On Sunday, April 22, the sessions were resumed by a conciliatory announcement of the measures already taken to prevent export of coin from the realm, followed on the next day by renewal of rather vague promises about offices for foreigners, about appointing a suitable Governor, and about the King's return in three years. A decisive answer was demanded in regard to the tax. The job had been none too

[1] It is to be noticed that the King himself was in retreat in the Convent of San Lorenzo, April 6–12; and in Santiago, April 12–May 4; and in Coruña, May 4–20. Danv. I. 314.

[2] Danv. I. 320.

[3] Danv. I. 326. Danvila's brief summary fails to bring out the dubious legality of the result. He contributes the invaluable list of bribes. Santa Cruz, I. 228–29; Sandoval, V. xxvi, xxx. Mexía has a sentence wholly misinformed, which is taken over by Sandoval.

The official name in the *Actas* is the Cortes of Santiago-Coruña.

well prepared.[1] On the final vote eight of the sixteen cities counted clearly for granting the servicio, led by Burgos — with an appended appeal that the King provide for the petitions. Among these eight, Burgos, Sevilla, and Granada had supported the Crown from the beginning; and in the Santiago sessions Ávila had been won over from ambiguous, Cuenca, Guadalajara, Segovia, and Soria from outspoken opposition. Five voices — those of León and four followers, Córdoba, Zamora, Valladolid, and Toro — were ambiguous: they had besought the King to consider the matters asked in the petitions, 'and, His Majesty having done so, that should be done which he desired in the matter of tax.' Three cities did not count: Jaén was divided; Madrid did not vote, pleading limited credentials; Campillo of Murcia did not vote, his colleague Saorín being sick.

Did eight votes, in a Cortes where eighteen cities should speak, carry the proposal? Even ignoring Toledo and Salamanca, was it more than a tie? The Chancellor declared the expression final; but immediately the opposition tried to recover. Valladolid presented forthwith a written declaration that tax was granted on condition that the quota from each city must not exceed that of the current tax; and that His Majesty confirm what he had promised at Valladolid, and promised again so emphatically at the present Cortes.

On April 25 in the royal apartments in the monastery of San Francisco, His Grace of Badajoz [2] spoke for the Crown significant words in an address acknowledging the grant of the tax, thanking 'those who voted the grant, whom in general and particular the King will cherish and acknowledge. Toward the cities which refused,' the Bishop continued, 'he holds no resentment; but with those deputies empowered to grant and refusing, he has no reason to be satisfied.' Then followed the announcement of the Governor: a Fleming, Adrian of Utrecht, Dean of Louvain, Cardinal of Tortosa, described by a thin pretense as 'a native of these realms by the length of time he has been there.' [3]

[1] For evidence that the Crown was till the end uncertain of its triumph, see the alternative measures proposed to raise the money, in Santa Cruz, I. 228.

[2] Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, translated at this time from the see of Badajoz to that of Palencia (Merriman, III. 49), with retention, as Martyr notes (Epist. DCLXXVII), of the former see. (Martyr's letter is of July 1, and seems to speak of the translation as recent.) Danv. I. 362.

[3] Mexía (p. 138) gives as the reason that the appointment of any Spanish

The address was a challenge the cities could not ignore.[1] Was it to be admitted that tax was legally granted? Was no notice to be taken of the appointment of a foreign governor, after promise under oath at the Cortes of Valladolid to appoint only natives? Sevilla approved all, even the appointment of Adrian. Burgos approved, with a note asking for reconciliation: 'We kiss Your Majesty's hands that Your Majesty rests satisfied with the other cities, even though they did not vote tax; and since they did not refuse it, we implore you to consider all the petitions.' Segovia 'kisses Your Majesty's hands and feet for Your Majesty's grace in leaving in Your Majesty's absence the person appointed.' Soria approved the appointment 'with other natives to counsel and guide him aright.' Murcia asked that His Majesty waive the law this time, and swear never to appoint foreign governors again!

The less docile cities renewed more or less uncompromisingly their former protest. Cuenca indicated the irregularity of the grant: 'Since among the deputies there has not been, in the matter of the tax, that conformity which were well, and has been, in former Cortes, we beseech Your Majesty to secure conformity though Your Majesty have to grant more petitions than he desire, that it may not be said out of these realms that Your Majesty asked aught not granted as fully and willingly as ever these realms have done.' Toro, Zamora, Valladolid, Córdoba, and León reaffirmed their previous vote, seeming to imply that in the face of that vote the tax could not be said legally to have been voted. To be sure, Mexía of Jaén at last joined his colleague in voting for the tax, yet with the almost nullifying condition 'that it begin to run at the expiration of the existing tax.'[2]

Protest against the appointment of Adrian was more outspoken. The Count de Luna declared for León that 'His Majesty has the city's petition that the Governor be native: appointing such would be to His Majesty's service.' Valladolid reminded the Crown: 'We have always besought Your Majesty that any governors left be native, according to law; and so we would wish it.' The Cordovans were most emphatic on both these matters: 'As to the Governor, who is not native, it would be unlawful and prejudicial to the

grandee would have created rivalries and envy. So also Santa Cruz, I. 235. Sandoval's refutation of this is in V. xxx.

[1] Cf. Sandoval, V. xxvi. [2] *Actas*, 318.

good of these realms; therefore we cannot consent without communicating with Córdoba. As to the President and Council, we will obey them. As to the tax, Your Majesty providing and observing what is besought in the petitions, Córdoba ever had and has desire to serve Your Majesty with all her power.' [1]

In those closing days of confused struggle came the most disconcerting news, of the explosion in Toledo. The exile of her messengers on April 1 had precipitated a riot on April 16; but with the beginning of May came report of the seizure of the alcázar and the suspension of the King's justice.[2] Don Carlos was with difficulty dissuaded from his desire to visit the city and administer punishment in person. The Cortes business was concluded drastically. Lest there be any basis of protest as to the legality of the money grant a majority was obtained after adjournment. The deputies of León, who had led the active, and then the passive resistance to the tax, were brought, by what coercion is unrecorded,[3] to vote the grant on May 19 before Bishop Mota, witnesses, and a notary.[4] On the same day, the answers of the Crown to the petitions were published, promises the value of which the appointment of a foreign governor sufficiently indicated.[5]

On this Saturday a stiff breeze sprang up; the pilots approved; the King announced his departure for the morrow. Before dawn on Sunday, May 20, he confessed and heard mass. The Archbishop of Santiago, the Bishop of Burgos, the Constable of Castile, the Marquis of Villena, the Count of Benavente, the Marquis of Astorga, and many other caballeros accompanied the young Emperor-elect to the water's edge; and with some Spanish grandees, including his unregretted Grace of Badajoz, and most of the Flemings he put to sea, the anchors weighed 'with great music of all the reed players and the clarinets.'

[1] *Actas*, 312–20.

[2] Sandoval (V. xxv) says it was published in Coruña May 8. Word of the tumult of April 16 could certainly reach Coruña in less than 22 days. Cf. Peter Martyr, Epist. DCLXVIII.

[3] For the impression created in Castile cf. *infra*, p. 88.

[4] *Actas*, 320.

[5] P. Martyr's letter of May 29 (DCLXX) notes: 'moestos vidi Castellanorum omnium vultus, qui miseram Hispaniam cernunt versam in provinciam ab Oceano glaciali gubernandam. Gubernatorem reliquit Dertusensem Cardinalem. Contra regni leges arguunt factum Castellani. Alienigenae vetant id munus posse salvis legibus praeberi.'

His Majesty's address of April 25 had said that the adjournment and delays in the Cortes were intended, 'because His Majesty desired in the discordant sessions, the aid not only of reason but also of time, which cures wills and may bring all round to reason.' The Court managers had made use of that time for more eloquent sorts of persuasion, recorded, in business fashion, in a secret document: 'The maravedis wherewith our lord the King rewarded certain cities of the realm and their Cortes deputies in the matter of tax (*en el servicio*) [1] which they granted in the city of Coruña; whereof Juan Ramírez His Majesty's notary despatched the writs of their rewards, is as follows.' [2]

Burgos, Granada, and Sevilla from the first supported the Crown. 'To the city of Sevilla was granted in reward 1500 *doblas de cabeza* [3] from the three years of the tax, in satisfaction for the 1500 *doblas* she paid as award of the suit she had about the import taxes. To the city of Granada 400,000 mvds from the *servicio*, paid in three years, in satisfaction of the 400,000 of sales tax she paid on the barley and wheat brought to the said city by sea to sustain her inhabitants, wherewith she may redeem the city property pledged to pay them, and buy back what they sold therefor.' A writ of May 17 ordered payment to Garcí Ruiz, brother of Bishop Mota and deputy of Burgos, 600 gold ducats, awarded him in remuneration for his services and as an aid toward marrying a daughter. Another writ of the same day ordered 500 gold ducats to corregidor Bobadilla of Burgos in reward for services rendered in matters important to the Royal interest.

In the first day's contest Ávila was in the morning evidently open to conviction and in the afternoon somewhat apologetically voted tax. 'Diego Hernández of Ávila, who abstained from the first vote in the morning indicated in the afternoon that he was for voting the tax; and in fact this vote was rewarded by 150,000 mvds from the first year of the grant.' The same morning Segovia and Zamora supported the León opposition. 'Rodrigo de Tordesillas and Juan

[1] The *en* may mean the bribes were to be paid from the *servicio* as it was collected.

[2] Danvila discovered this corruption list in the Simancas archives and prints it in I. 332 ff. As he prints it the comment (quoted in each case in my text) would appear to accompany the items in the original; but I suspect the comment, though within quotation marks, is, in some cases, Danvila's.

[3] On this coin cf. Klein, *Mesta*, 129, and note.

Vázquez del Espinar [the Segovia deputies], who at first agreed with the haughty attitude of León to grant tax *afterward*, received as reward, the first 300 ducats; the second 50,000 mvds from the first year of the tax, it appearing there was due him 100,000 mvds which King D. Felipe (may he inherit heavenly glory!) paid him as deputy in a former Cortes.' From Zamora 'Francisco Ramírez, who in the morning asked that before all else provision be made for the cities' petitions, in the afternoon withheld his vote till conference with other deputies and in Coruña voted the *servicio*, receiving from the first year of it reward of 37,500 mvds.' Corregidor Manrique of Zamora by writ of May 17 was rewarded by another corregidorship.[1] Cuenca already on the morning of April 1 indicated readiness to concede the matter of precedence 'if otherwise expedient.' 'To Juan Alvárez de Toledo and D. Luis Pacheco, who on April 1 besought His Majesty to consider first the petitions . . . [and] voted the tax on the afternoon of the same day; . . . to the first of the said deputies they allowed 50,000 mvds from the first year of the tax, and to the second deputy 65,000.' On April 1 Valladolid was in emphatic opposition. 'Francisco de la Serna, who voted to take up the petitions and memorials before tax be granted and in the afternoon said he could not answer till talking with other deputies, said on the 4th that Valladolid did not oppose the said *servicio*. He received as reward for his inconsistency 300 ducats from the first year of the tax.' [2] Further a writ of May 7, since their city did not allow her deputies more than 4000 mvds, ordered a ducat a day, up to May 9, to both the Vallisoletan deputies from the city rents.

From the income of the tax newly granted by the cities the King also appropriated sums to the various grandees, in acknowledgment of expenses in which they had been involved, a parting distribution of royal favors in which the Constable alone declined to share.[3]

[1] It will be noticed that Zamora remained to the end in ambiguous dissent.

[2] Surely this phraseology is Danvila's?

[3] Sandoval, V. xxix. (Misnumbered xxvix in Ed. Pamplona, 1634.)

BOOK II

JUANA, BY THE GRACE OF GOD

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CHAPTER I

SIRE, NOT A REVOLT . . .

FROM the time of D. Carlos's return from Aragon, exaggerated reports and complaints were current in the capital of the Visigoths. To the irritation of receiving no royal visit were added the disgust and fury roused by the gift of the see of Toledo to an absentee youth, the creature of Chièvres. The Ávalos-Padilla faction took pains to circulate the stories of the King's reception in Burgos and Valladolid: that old Girón had spoken rude words to D. Carlos, who had to swallow them; and that a new tax of 400,000 ducats was to be asked at Santiago — rumor for once reporting a matter in but a half of its proportion, for the tax actually demanded was 300 cuentos or 800,000 ducats. The repeated rebukes to the Toledan messengers on their long journey, taken at their own expense,[1] terminated by exile, had brought public temper to a pitch needing but slight further provocation to explode in serious violence.[2]

Upon such provocation the Court ventured in the very days of opening the Santiago Cortes, by its repeated summons of the popular leaders to the Court. Ávalos and Padilla did not this time appeal from the royal order but let it be well known in the city when they should depart; and Ávalos took farewell telling his neighbors and friends, if they heard of their death, to care for the wives and orphans of those sacrificed for the public weal.[3] April 16, as the two were passing, dressed for their journey, before the great western door of the Cathedral,[4] an immense mob, armed,

[1] Pedrolasso's letter, Feb. 21, Danv. I. 282.

[2] The material about the Toledan explosion is in Mexía, 131–37; Santa Cruz, I. 224–28; Sandoval, V. xvi–xx, xxii–xxiv. Danv. I. 321–25 adds nothing.

[3] Alcocer (Chap. IX) declares that Padilla sincerely tried to obey the royal summons. This testimony is however suspect, since it comes from so partisan a source.

[4] Puerta del Perdón as Santa Cruz calls it and as it is still called. The cloister

seized them despite their elaborate protests and lodged them, on word of honor not to attempt escape, in the chapel at the northeast corner of the cloisters.[1]

Juan de Ribera (deputy but not representing his city at Santiago) took, as captain of the city fortifications, such precautions as he might in the face of five or six thousand persons; but as no military necessities had been for many years considered both the fortress and the fortified bridge-heads were in no state of supply or defense. The mob, unchecked by any heroic stand on the part of corregidor de Córdova undertook the evidently possible but audacious business of mastering the city's defenses.[2]

Brought to an actual trial of strength the forces proved very unequal. Ribera, with sons and brothers and a few soldiers hurried in from his estates, joined also by a few leaders of the Court party, took refuge in the alcázar; others dared not appear or even remain in Toledo.

The fortified Visagra and Cambrón gates [3] were mastered almost immediately; secure of the north and west approach, the assailants turned to the immense granite bridges that spanned, at the west and the east throat of the ravine, the opaque stream that seems to lie like an agate green tile on the floor of the gray gorge. The Alcántara to the east, a Moorish arch, had only a small tower recently built on the city side, of which the absent petitioner Hita was captain; his lieutenant could make scarcely a brief defense. The western bridge, of San Martín, had at each head a large donjon; the cliff however rises so abruptly behind the bridge that streets and structures only a few hundred yards distant quite overlook even the donjons. The boys of the city established themselves on a rubbish heap on the level of the tower and were able with slings to wound the de-

and the portals are not substantially altered since 1520. Cf. Street (Ed. King), I. 323 ff.

[1] Identified because Sandoval calls it Tenorio's chapel; it is extant to-day, known as the capilla de San Blas, and contains Tenorio's tomb. Street (Ed. King), I. 343.

[2] In Sandoval's day it was urged that de Córdova might, with the very willing Ribera-Silva faction, have nipped the whole rising in the bud. He says the mob rescue was at first proposed to certain caballeros of Padilla's kin, only to be indignantly repudiated; and next to the friars of San Juan, only to be wrecked through a quarrel with the chaplain; and entrusted finally to leaders of the roughest elements in the population.

[3] The Visagra gate was recently cleared and restored so far as necessary to prevent actual ruin.

THE ALCÁNTARA BRIDGE AND THE CASTLE OF SAN SERVANDO
TOLEDO

fendants. Entrance was forced into the nearer tower; and though the captain, wounded and captured, refused under threats of death to order the surrender of the tower on the farther bank, these defenders yielded perforce.[1]

Ribera held the almost impregnable alcázar, but he had supply neither of food nor of water, and some four hundred refugees to sustain, with no means, because of the vigilant blockade maintained by the city, of provisioning himself. To avoid loss of life certain clerics arranged a surrender on condition that the garrison quitted Toledo (April 21), leaving a servant holding the alcázar nominally for the King.

Less than nominal authority remained with de Córdova. By threatening his life the mob of April 16 had forced him to recall the summons of the popular leaders, and even to forbid their departure. Similar threat forced him to retain staff of office in the name of the Commune. From another mob attack after the capture of the fortifications he escaped, by an irony of circumstance, into the house of D. Pedrolasso.

That exiled petitioner, on his way to Gibraltar, had been intercepted by a troop of horse from the city and compelled to return thither: an enthusiastic populace escorting him to the cathedral. His popularity enabled him to harbor de Córdova and other officials till they could be smuggled out to safety.

Thus without loss of life Toledo extinguished the royal administration and substituted a provisional commune.

[1] These bridges practically unrestored are to-day the glory of the city, next to the stark splendor of its site and the sumptuous splendor of its cathedral. Cf. illustration.

CHAPTER II

A MONTH OF MOBS

FORMIDABLE outbreaks of disorder, after the King's departure were entirely to be expected; one city had tried by mob to prevent his leaving Castile; during the session of the Coruña Cortes the oldest and most influential city of the realm had risen in the most outspoken revolt. As news of the voting of tax at Coruña and the appointment of a foreign governor spread through the kingdom, indignation was universal and became fury when the deputies returned, upon whom their towns could wreak vengeance. Suspicion was strong that bribery had secured the necessary majorities at Coruña — a suspicion which the Constable was bold enough to specify in a letter to his master: 'they got the deputies at Coruña to vote the grant some by rewards and some by offices.' [1] The Governor also reported to the King the common charge that the grant was extorted: 'Your Majesty by communications (*pláticas*) less honest than was fitting obtained the consent of certain cities after the Cortes were over.' [2]

Within ten days of the King's sailing the returned deputies had reported through the realm the results of the Cortes and all the rumors thereabout; and woe to those who had voted the supply! Those of Segovia had the promptest indication of the temper of their constituency.

On Tuesday of Pentecost, May 29, occurred the customary town assemblage, in the Church of Corpus Christi,[3] to discuss finances. The accumulated wrath of the populace stood ready to explode.[4]

'Señores,' said one,[5] 'you realize that Don Juan de Acuña

[1] Letter to D. Carlos, July 7, Danv. I. 413. The Junta's letter to the King of Portugal, in the fall of 1520 makes similar charge. (Santa Cruz, I. 332.)

[2] To D. Carlos, July 6, Danv. I. 414. Cf. previous note.

[3] Mexía, 142. The church, a synagogue of the Moorish period, still exists, carefully restored, an interesting relic of Mudéjar architecture. Its portal (cf. Plate 342) provides in the modern town one of those glimpses of Moslem Spain which are rare but delightful in Castile.

[4] Santa Cruz (I. 235) is expanded in Sandoval (V. xxxi), with some details from Mexía, 142.

[5] 'Despues de haber . . . bebido muy bien.' Santa Cruz, I. 235. Note that the

is corregidor of this city, who has never set foot here; and, not content to despise us, he keeps here officials who labor rather to rob us than do justice. Further he has set here a bailiff not so much vigorous as mad, who is not content with his outrages by day but he has a dog to take men by night. If a man do what he should not, it seems to me, he should be taken in his house like a Christian and not hunted by dogs in the mountains like a Moor. For an honorable man feels more an arrest in a public place than the bonds which are cast on him in prison.'

The defense of the authorities was taken up by an old fellow, for many years catchpoll (*corchete*) to the alguacils, and hated by the whole town, of the name of Melón: 'Truly, señores, what this man said does not seem to me well; and worse that men of such honor as are here should give ear to him. For he who has to speak in public about the ministers of justice should speak moderately and with temperance of tongue, for in an officer of the King we should see not the person but that which by his staff of office he represents. As to the dog which our alguacil has with him, the young man has him rather for his pleasure by day than for arrests by night. And though it were not so I cannot account it so infamous that he have given no accounting to the populace, for after all, it is to my friends or neighbors, not to strangers that I am accountable. If the alcaldes or alguacils do aught against law and justice, as yet they have not, by right of Christian or gentleman we should admonish them in private, not defame them publicly. If what I now say please you not, perchance what happens later will please less, for ill words rashly spoken are sometimes paid in all seriousness.'

The anger of a few precipitated uproar among all, and without further discussion or delay he was seized by the populace, haltered, dragged through the streets and outside the town, where a vast mob gathered and hanged him, already half dead from beating, from a gibbet, by his feet.[1] Flocking back to the city they met in the little market another catchpoll, Roque Portalejo, whom one of the mob hailed: 'Portalejo, I have to inform you that your comrade Melón commends himself to you: he remains on the gibbet

somewhat antithetical report of Santa Cruz becomes elaborately so in Sandoval, who, however, is plainly following Santa Cruz's text.

[1] The mobs, says Maldonado (p. 106), used to declare that traitors ought to suffer death by hanging, head downward.

and says he awaits you there to-morrow; and it were no great matter to force you to accept his invitation, that as comrade of his wrong you be comrade of his punishment.' Portalejo ventured a perilous reply: 'God preserve the King my Lord and his justice; for I hope some day you will repent — and Segovia, that she has permitted it. For the blood of innocents poured out, though men forget, stands ever crying out before God.' [1] It was noticed that he had pen and paper: one cried that it was to list the names of those concerned in the death of Melón. Shouts of *Muera! Muera!* arose. He was seized, rushed to the gibbet, hanged by the feet, and soon died wretchedly.

Though these victims were officers of the Crown, the affair had hardly more seriousness than that of a bloody encounter of the toughs and the police force of the city, unless popular wrath should reach out for a more important victim. On the next day, scorning the advice of his fellow deputy Vázquez to take refuge in his home outside the city, and despite the warning of friends the previous night, deputy Rodrigo de Tordesillas appeared riding on his she-mule, and dressed in cloak and tabard of crimson velvet [2] to account for his Cortes deputyship before the town council, assembled in the church of San Miguel. The priest of the church had implored him, in the midst of his way, to desist. The people knew he had voted the tax at Coruña: 'he had managed the city's business there very ill, but his own very well,' recorded Santa Cruz,[3] securing the farming of the taxes and a commission of 100,000 maravedis to repair the town walls; obtaining also appointment as corregidor and recovering a job he had held in the Mint. All this probably was not generally known; still less the cash bribery at Coruña.[4]

A mob, armed, including doubtless those who had the day before lynched the two catchpolls, recruited mainly from

[1] Maldonado (79) reports even more explicit threat. His account accords essentially with that of the historiographers.

[2] Detail in Sandoval, but not in contemporary narratives. Many such picturesque touches, it may be presumed, reflect reminiscence current in Sandoval's day, rather than sheer inventions of his. Sandoval's account is, however, in many circumstances duplication of reports that Peter Martyr recorded. Epist. DCLXXI.

[3] I. 236. The facts are noted without comment by Sandoval, V. xxxi. Alcocer (p. 41) notes that one Segovia deputy voted 'como el Rey queria, y el otro como devia.'

[4] Danv. I. 332; *supra*, p. 80.

the woolcarders, gathered at the church demanding the traitor; and, when refused, forced entrance by several ways, and, none daring to resist, dragged him from the church. Tordesillas shouted, 'Listen to me, Señores, for I wish to render account to you; see, here are the petitions of grievance. Quiet down and let us go to some place where you may inform yourselves!' Some cried, 'Give us the petitions'; and he drew forth all his memoranda of what he had done at Coruña, which they tore to bits unread. Next the shout rose, 'To the jail! There we shall find out the treachery of his course!' So they hurried him toward prison, but shouts rose for halter and hanging, and a great howl of *Muera! Muera!* Some one brought a halter and they threw him and dragged him along the streets, beating his head with sword hilts, though he cried and groaned, 'Listen to me, Señores; why do you slay me?' In sight of death he asked time to confess, but they refused, though the Dean and canons came out vested, and the wretched man's own brother, a friar, very solemnly, vested for mass, with the sacrament in his hands, and all the friars of San Francisco with the crosses of the churches, kneeling and asking them with tears not to slay him. The mob was of the basest sort, with small reverence for the church.[1] As well as he could Tordesillas struggled to one of the friars and spoke three or four words in confession; but dragging him and rending him they got him to the gibbet, bound him, half strangled by the halter, and left the crimson figure hanged head downward between the bodies of the two who perished the day before.

In the same days that Segovia, in the east of Castile arose, Zamora, on the west rim of Castile, tried to wreak its wrath on the deputies Ledesma and Ramírez. In their defense the corregidor Juan de Porras urged the circumstance that they had resisted at Coruña. The Zamoran vote had finally been an ambiguous acquiescence in the tax — even that degree of consent, however, being a violation of restrictions imposed on them, under oath, by their town. The royal dispensation they were as little likely to report as Ramírez's bribe of 37,500 maravedis. Neither chose to face the Zamorans, but they took refuge in a monastery a

[1] Sandoval, V. xxxi. *Mechanici artes deserunt*, says Martyr, *arma capiunt.* He also records the lynching of a notary who was observed to be writing — presumably the names of the lynchers. Mexía, 142. For a later story of a confession of two men concerned, cf. Sandoval, VI. xxi. Cf. *infra*, p. 118.

day's journey outside the city. Their homes were sacked, burned, and would have been quite destroyed, but for the dissuasions of the count and countess of Alva de Liste. Effigies were dragged through the streets and burned and likenesses placed on the Consistory with abusive records of the men's names, their evil deeds and broken promises. Messengers threatened to burn the monastery if it did not expel the deputies: these, plucking up courage, asked safe conduct to the city, to give an accounting; but the town wanted only to slay, not to hear them.[1]

In Madrid the contest was between the Commune and the King's warden, Francisco, grandson of Treasurer Vargas, who held the alcázar. With her deputies Madrid could have little quarrel, for they had refrained from voting, on plea of inadequate commission; but the impatient temper of the town, which had made her ready to unite with Toledo — 'both populace and nobles,' said Adrian, 'with such determination that they will not read or receive letters sent by Your Majesty's Council'[2] — was exasperated by the arrival from Valladolid, early in June, of a Court alcalde, Hernán Gómez de Herrera, come, report said, to recruit forces against Toledo. The Madrileños were perhaps as gravely concerned about the considerable military stores deposited in the city, which the Court might desire to secure even more than recruits. 'Madrid also,' the Cardinal reported,[3] 'is in uproar, for the people have seized the staffs of justice and entrusted them to other persons. It is said the uprising is because certain persons declared that alcalde Herrera had gone accompanied by 2000 men-at-arms to punish them — of which certainly there had been no notion. But the said alcalde had gone to said city with Your Majesty's command, to prevent a congress of clerics.' In the rising Vargas's house[4] was destroyed, the city gates seized, the fortress beseiged. Despite threats that, if he did

[1] Mexía, 141; Sandoval, V. xxxviii; Danv. I. 320, 346. The two latter disagree somewhat as to the restrictions imposed on the deputies. Peter Martyr wrote (Epist. DCLXX, May 29): 'Relatum est Zamoram . . . procuratores *patriae proditores*, quod annuerint de donativo, promulgasse. Ni aufugissent, in frusta secti a furenti populo fuissent.'

[2] Report to D. Carlos, July 6, Danv. I. 414.

[3] The letter (Danv. I. 374) is undated; but Martyr's letter of June 5 (Epistola DCLXXII) pictures the same situation.

[4] P. Martyr's letter of June 5 reports that the destruction was proposed, and notes that Vargas had built two sumptuous residences, in the city and in the suburb.

not surrender, all defenders would be hanged, Vargas made an alert defense. By night he slipped away six leagues east to Alcalá, where he recruited some forty to reënforce his small garrison. His most cautious attempts, however, to throw them into the fortress secretly, by pairs, at night, were detected; the town rose in uproar and under the skilled leadership of certain gentlemen forced Vargas to flee back to Alcalá. Spirited defense, however, was kept up by the alcalde's wife, who told the townsmen they labored in vain, for, where she was, her husband would not be indispensably needed. So the fortress continued fighting well with fireballs and ballestas and stones.

Early in July a temporary truce intervened.[1] Adrian then ordered to the relief certain troops returned from the Gelves expedition, under Diego de Vera, who might have turned the tables; but they arrived weary with marching and angry over long arrears of pay; and from his native Ávila de Vera had letters threatening the destruction of his home there, if he attacked.[2] His temporizing permitted the arrival of 500 men and 30 lances from Toledo, under regidor Gaytán. Mines were driven from four sides, but with such losses by fire from the alcázar that operations were continued only by night, with mantlets and parapets, placing sons and relatives of the defenders atop. The artillery duel, heavy and effective from the fortress, which was well armed but had few men to serve the cannon, was suspended by the clergy for mediatory negotiations, only to be renewed the next day, when the sole competent artilleryman of the alcázar was killed, and the defenders, short of food and water, surrendered to Castillo, *alcalde mayor* of the Commune. With the fortress were captured the extensive supplies of arms and munitions deposited by the Catholic Sovereigns.[3]

But ten days had passed after the ferocities in Segovia when the venerable capital of the Counts of Castile was in uproar.[4]

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, July 6, Danv. I. 414.

[2] These troops had arrived in Cartagena July 2 (Danv. I. 429). De Vera reported to Adrian, Aug. 29, that he had from J. Arias 200 horse, but insufficient foot. The fall of the alcázar was hourly expected when Adrian reported, Aug. 31 (Danv. I. 494). On the Gelves troops cf. p. 170. Martyr's letter of Sep. 13 (DCLXXXV) reports the fall of the alcázar.

[3] Sandoval, V. xlviii; confirmed by de Vera in Adrian's report. (Danv. I. 494.) Cf. Danv. I. 368. De Vera was especially desired because he was an artillery officer.

[4] All of Mexía (143–44) is absorbed in Sandoval, V. xl, which is three times

The populace of Burgos was in no wise represented by the subservient deputies at Coruña. Garcí Ruiz de la Mota they hated as brother of Pedro Mota, Bishop of Badajoz. Meneses de Bobadilla as corregidor was a puppet of the Court.[1] Uneasy, perhaps, as to the behavior of a city traditionally independent and excited now by the example of Segovia, the corregidor, hoping probably to check their excitement, assembled the town council on June 10, in their usual meeting place, St. Catherine's chapel in the cathedral.[2] Certain base fellows, a bladesmith, a knife maker, a hat maker, were turbulent, even giving the lie to the corregidor, whereupon the touchy official ordered their arrest. Fired thereby, an armed mob sacked Bobadilla's house and drove him to the monastery of San Pablo, which they besieged, and forced him to surrender his staff of office. A commune improvised on the steps of the noble south transept portal [3] sought a more compliant corregidor. D. Diego Osorio, corregidor of Córdoba,[4] happened to be in Burgos visiting his family, and on him they forced the staff of office. He withstood in vain their proposal to sack the house of deputy Ruiz de la Mota. Riotous and insulting mobs coursed the streets and his authority was merely nominal. The hysteria of the populace was vented on obnoxious property: the house of Ruiz, his linen and tapestries, clothing, and diplomatic documents and property records of great value deposited by his brother the bishop, who was archivist, were burned in the square — 'without attempt to appropriate anything, which is much to be marvelled at, considering the character of base folk.' [5] The woodland of

as long. Sandoval says Osorio fled the night of the outbreaks; but he was clearly in the city till the Constable came. Deputy Soria did flee. Danvila (360 ff.) uses material of Maldonado, and the elaborate modern account of Salvá: *Burgos en las Comunidades*. Danvila's narrative should be supplemented by data he himself prints from the letters of the Constable (pp. 386, 413–14), and the Cardinal Governor (pp. 374, 376–77, 379–80, 430, 436). Sandoval adds to Mexía's account most of the details in Maldonado's full story.

[1] Cf. Danv. I. 96, for further details about Bobadilla.

[2] This beautiful room still exists, on the east side of the Gothic cloister — the 'new cloisters,' Sandoval calls them — of the fourteenth century, among the loveliest in Castile. Cf. Street (Ed. King), I. 32 ff.

[3] This, the Sarmental portal, is extant, splendidly revealed by clearing away the houses which had encroached on the broad passage before it.

[4] D. Diego and the famous Bishop Acuña were natural sons of Bishop Luis Osorio de Acuña (Sandoval, VI. xx bis.).

[5] Sandoval, V. xl. The loss of documents is especially deplored by Peter Martyr in his letter (DCLXXIV) of June 13: *Castellae nulla fides restat ges-*

View from the Alcázar, Segovia

Of the fortress that, in the year of the Comunidades, frowned from its 300-foot promontory upon the branching valleys of the river of Segovia very little remains. The modern construction, a military museum, is however an impressive conjectural restoration of the medieval alcázar, and its site provides a splendid vision of the scene of the year-long siege of the Royalist garrison in 1520–1521.

VIEW FROM THE PLATFORM OF THE ALCÁZAR OF SEGOVIA

the Carthusians of Miraflores they were dissuaded from burning by a nephew of the Constable, Pedro Suárez de Velasco, Dean of the cathedral,[1] through the gratitude of a popular leader whose son the Dean had received as acolyte in the church. 'Though well enough,' he urged, 'it was quite superfluous when the world was roasting to burn wood uselessly in the field which might be kept for winter.' The tumultuous day was ended by emptying the jail and destroying in the Plaza the pitchers used to measure wine in collecting tithes. The frowning alcázar challenged from the hill above the cathedral spires; an attack on that must await considerable preparation and another day.

Life had not yet been taken. The second Coruña deputy, though less disliked, had prudently hidden and escaped. But an attack on the alcázar must involve resistance. At daylight June 11 the mob, doubtless reënforced from the jail, was ready. On their march Osorio, the Dean, and others met them, trying to dissuade, but obtaining only delay for conference with the warden and a truce till the afternoon. The fortress was not defensible: the mob easily passed the fosse and placed their ladders against the merlons; whereupon the warden at the direction of the nobles handed over the place.

Drunk with this success the populace returned to the ruins of the deputies' houses and thence to destroy the home of Castelón, collector of the royal rents, spreading in their attack a general conflagration. An evil chance turned the affair from tumult to tragedy.

More hateful than any of the houses yet destroyed was that of Jofre de Cotannes, a French noble esteemed by King Fernando, later influential with Chièvres, and *aposentador* to D. Carlos. He was naturalized and married in Burgos and had built there a sumptuous residence; further the King had given him tenancy of the castle of Lara, never before held by any but citizens of Burgos.[2] By disastrous chance Cotannes arrived, escorting an ambassador of François I, in Burgos the

torum suorum cum vivente quoquam. Maldonado (89 ff.) distinctly states there was thieving.

[1] Nephew, not son as Sandoval says. The Constable repeatedly refers to him as nephew.

[2] The petition in the Valladolid Cortes that Lara should not be so given (No. 11 in Sandoval, III. x) was dismissed with ambiguous refusal. Peter Martyr (Epist. DCLXXIV, June 13) notes that the tenancy of Lara made Cotannes *civibus illis exosus.* Cf. Maldonado, 97 ff.

same afternoon that the mob gained the alcázar. The ambassador fled precipitately; Cotannes escaped the next day to a monastery without the city. Fleeing thence toward France on the day following he learned of the destruction of his houses and threatened vengeance, vowing to rebuild them 'with the wealth of the Burgalese hogs who had wrecked them — on a foundation of their bones, two skulls for every stone removed, and cemented with their blood.'

A charcoal burner on the road who overheard this repeated it in the city, which rose in fury. Extorting from Osorio oral warrant for the arrest of Cotannes they sent a force of horsemen who overtook him in a village church three leagues toward the mountains. He was dragged forth despite the protest of a priest with the sacrament. Some proposed to slay him forthwith, but certain caballeros sought discreetly yet bravely to distract the more vengeful. Warned by the corregidor, the Count of Salinas and the Dean sheltered Cotannes in the jail; but the populace stormed Osorio's house demanding sentence of death; others meantime had forced the jail and despatched him. They then dragged the body by the feet to the ruin of his home and thence to the gibbet, stabbing it so angrily that only by trampling it could they extract the blades. There they hanged it upside down, and forced the corregidor to pronounce against it solemn sentence of death, after which the body was given to the gamins to drag through the streets.[1]

During the mood of reaction following this murderous outburst Osorio was able to exercise some restraint; he refused to sign a letter appealing to the mountain towns to the North [2] to revolt. Any real hope of quieting the town, however, lay in one person, chief of the leading family of Burgos, the Constable, then at Villalpando. At the request of the Cardinal, the President of the Council, and certain gentlemen of his native city,[3] the Constable entered Burgos — unaccompanied but welcome, especially to Osorio, who

[1] Besides Sandoval's account there are Maldonado's (p. 100), and the letter of Peter Martyr (DCLXXIV) of June 13, giving many of the same details: *Mille Giofredum vulneribus confectum suspenderunt, dehinc raptandum pueris tradiderunt.* The same barbarities are reported about a victim of the mob in Medina. Martyr, Epist. DCLXXXV.

[2] The so-called Merindades de Castilla. Maldonado (pp. 138 ff.) explains the term.

[3] Such is the Constable's own statement. Danv. I. 386.

transferred to him the handling of affairs. Velasco's position was not only perilously difficult but also distressingly ambiguous: the chief grandee of the realm presiding over a city in revolt. Already the mob had destroyed property, seized the fortress, and taken life. 'The comuneros had thirty-two houses marked for destruction and sack, the day I entered,' the Constable reported to his sovereign;[1] 'since [Osorio] could not with the staff of office serve the King as he had attempted, I agreed to take it, so that the Commune might, if I bore it, have more respect.'[2] But the very proclamation of order involved an ambiguity. His defense continues: 'I decided to proclaim that none should dare to make tumult or take arms, and the proclamation read, "The Queen, the King, their Constable, and the Commune." This was merely a proclamation. I thought it well it should read thus in my name, for new situations often require new means of remedy; and as I was here present they might fear a proclamation made in my name. . . . The very next day I had a proclamation issued: "The Queen and the King command" as is use and custom;[3] and the comuneros, seeing I was omitted, accepted the fact that they were not named.'

Of this procedure the Cardinal Governor was not wholly assured, and he wrote to the King:[4] 'The Constable is a good man, and, they say, is much grieved at what has happened. In Burgos he has taken oath and allowed a proclamation in the name of the Queen, the King, their Constable, and the Commune of Burgos: which has appeared to many very ill.'

Velasco meanwhile was endeavoring to acquire some real power in the city. 'As soon as I arrived here,' he wrote to the King, 'I labored with the Commune that they should admit themselves at fault and as such send to ask pardon of the Cardinal and Council; upon which business went the Count of Salinas and my nephew the Dean; and they had such ill success that it made the Commune rise again and

[1] Danv. I. 386 ff.

[2] The text is incomplete but seems easily amended: *acordé de tomalla por (que tra) yendola yo, ubiessen mas empacho.*

[3] It will be noticed that the Constable was tactful enough not to rouse popular wrath by using the Imperial title, though D. Carlos before departure had prescribed the use of his name and imperial titles even before the Queen his mother's. Cf. Santa Cruz, I. 205; Mexía, 102; Sandoval, III. xxxvi.

[4] Danv. I. 374.

declare they would join with Toledo and the other cities already in revolt.' [1]

The Constable gathered a small force to maintain order, garrisoned the tower of San Pablo, and even arrested the popular leaders when insolent; but he had to release them the next day, and later a powder explosion damaged his house.[2] By frequent private meetings through the third week of June he tested the temper of leading citizens and the means of establishing lawful power. By June 25 the Cardinal was better assured, and wrote the King: 'The Constable was summoned by the deputies in the town council and, as he has written . . . , required to take oath of fidelity to stand with them in good and evil; and he did so in this wise: that he would stand with them and aid and favor them in all matters for the service of God and the Crown of Castile and pacification of that city and good of the realm.' [3]

In Guadalajara, the deputies, Luis and Diego de Guzmán, escaped death by flight on horseback. The town, led by a carpenter, Pedro Coca, razed their houses, plowed the spot, and sowed it with salt, declaring that a traitor's home must be salted, to check infection. The riot, however, was vigorously checked by Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, third Duke of the Infantado, who assembled his numerous vassals, imposed quiet, arrested Coca and had him strangled in prison. Then the town assumed a threatening attitude, demanding that the Duke join them — else not a grandee might remain in the city. To hold the revolt in bounds, the Duke and his son, the Count of Saldaña, agreed, the latter to accept the captaincy, the former to write the Governor, urging impartial pardon, remission of the Coruña tax, restoration of the *alcabalas* to the conditions of twenty-five years before, and the restriction of office and benefice to natives — and all this promptly. Their ambiguous part had to be played very solemnly: a glimpse of the drama was communicated to the Cardinal-Governor and by him to the absent King: the Count of Saldaña, mounted on a stone bench before the door of San Gil, with a cross in his hand

[1] Danv. I. 387–88. Danvila says (I. 366) Osorio persuaded the town to send a commission, the Count Sarmiento and the Dean, to ask pardon: he gives no references, but is evidently quoting Maldonado, 113. Peter Martyr noted in his letter of July 9 (DCLXXIX) that Salinas had come asking pardon, and been refused. García Mota, Maldonado states, persuaded the Council to listen to nothing but the execution of the delinquents.

[2] Maldonado, 113 ff. [3] Danv. I. 377.

like the preacher of a Crusade, took oath from every one in the crowd, each coming singly to lay hand on the cross — an affair consuming two full hours.[1]

In Cuenca on the far eastern rim of Castile, one Calahorra was leader of the populace with another, Frenero,[2] whom the city obeyed as lords, to the despite of D. Luis Carillo de Albornoz, Lord of Torralva y Beteta. As his Lordship was passing one day down one of the steep medieval streets that pitch into the ravines of Cuenca a rascal of the Commune jumped on the rump of his mule shouting 'Get along, Luis Carillo!' Though great and influential in the realm the señor had to tolerate the insult; and indeed escaped with his life only by brave and prudent dissimulation.[3]

[1] Sandoval, V. xliii; Danv. I. 347. The Governor's letter in Danv. I. 373. Peter Martyr (Epist. DCLXXIX) adds the gossip about a quarrel between the Count and his father.

[2] If indeed this is a proper name and not merely the indication of the man's trade as maker of bits and harness.

[3] His wife was reported by Sandoval to have taken ghastly revenge: feigning sympathy and planning a celebration for the leaders of the Commune, she invited them to a sumptuous supper, and when they were heavy with wine had the servants slay them all and hang the corpses from the windows on the street. (Sandoval, VI. vii.) Danvila (I. 370) attributes the story to J. P. M. Rico, *Historia de Cuenca*; and declares, unaccountably, that Sandoval has none of it. The romanesque character of the story makes it seem improbable: further, it seems difficult to reconcile with the position of Carillo as indicated in Danv. I. 411; and I find no echo of it in any contemporary writing.

CHAPTER III

'THE QUEEN, THE KING, AND THE COMMUNE'

BOTH the habit of obedience — operative even in the rebellious — and the prudence or astuteness of the most radical turned in every city disorganized by the June mobs to some person of authority, some official or grandee less hated than the corregidor whom popular wrath had chased out of town, and asked him to accept direction of a provisional government. In Burgos the corregidor of another city was nearest to hand. In most cities of Castile some old family of distinction was the traditional leader of the city's life, and often sympathetic with local feeling even when proud of ancestral loyalty to the Crown. These grandees found power thrust into their hands, sometimes with very compromising conditions; they had frequently to acquiesce in revolutionary names and forms, the seizure of the local fortress, the substitution of a newly elected town council calling itself the Commune, and the administration of the King's justice by an improvised personnel. They tried in many cases to bring round to obedience the soberer second thought of the responsible public; but in many cases this attempt revealed to them the fact that they were figureheads put forth for respectability by a thoroughly determined and thoroughly revolutionary clique, which threw them aside the moment their moderation became irksome. For many who held no office the mere security of their property or, as feeling became exasperated, even their lives, depended on their acquiescence or passive assistance in revolutionary movements.

Though Valladolid (whose name, the Arabists said, meant the 'City of the Governor') had received him and the Royal Council, the Cardinal Governor knew that sentiment there was strongly comunero. Though the presence there of the government resulted in their immediate acquiescence, Valladolid was still the city which had, last March, mobbed Chièvres and D. Carlos.[1]

[1] Peter Martyr's letter (DCLXXVI) records the threats addressed to the Duke of Alburquerque in Valladolid. (The date printed, X. Calend. Junii = May 23, is probably misprinted for X Calend. Julii = June 22.) The Terror established in Medina by the woolbeater Bobadilla is sketched with horror in P. Martyr, Epist. DCLXXXV, Sep. 13. Cf. also Sandoval, VI. i = Mexía, 152.

In Burgos it might be hoped that the tactful pressure of the Constable was, as he promised it would, bringing the city gradually round to loyalty and order.

But as His anxious Eminence surveyed the widely scattered cities of Old and of New Castile, or even of the farther South, he found almost as grave though not as acute occasion of concern as was exacting his immediate interference in defiant Toledo and Segovia.

In Toledo since May there was no legal government; the corregidor was expelled and a Commune under the influence of Padilla ruled the first city of Castile. In Segovia since the June riots the Crown was unrepresented, and the feverish life of the city was directed by a Commune, dominated by Juan Bravo, and stimulated to the military resistance which Adrian had decided finally to challenge. The Comendador of Calatrava was besieged in the alcázar, which, with the adjoining Cathedral, he had manned; but the Segovians broke the great aqueduct, that supplied water to the garrison.[1]

Roundabout the rim of Old Castile city after city hovered on the brink of defiance.

In Soria at the headwaters of the Douro, in the mountain country made famous by the Roman sieges of Numantia, sentiment as in most of the smaller places was moderate.[2] Such was the case in the small city of Toro, perched on its red cliffs fifty miles downstream from Valladolid.

Twenty miles downstream beyond Toro lay the cliff city of Zamora, one of the first to catch the fire of revolt; for D. Pedrolasso on his exile to Gibraltar had lodged in the Franciscan monastery without its walls, where he had been visited by gentlemen of the popular party, to whom he preached the cause of Toledo and resistance. The Count of Alva de Liste, who held the fortress for the King, had equipped it and was helping corregidor Fadrique de Zúñiga to maintain the King's peace. But the Coruña deputies had given ground for intense wrath;[3] and the comunero party was led by an amazing person, the bishop of the city, a truculent member of the Church Militant, whose rugged cathe-

[1] Peter Martyr's letter (DCLXXII) June 5. [2] Danv. I. 541.

[3] Adrian reported them as starving in Valladolid and asked for them royal assistance, July 20 (Danv. I. 437) and August 31 (Danv. I. 493). Adrian's reports discuss Zamora in Danv. I. 374, 429, 437, 481. P. Martyr's letter of Sep. 13 (DCLXXXVI) has brief reference. Maldonado (p. 82) notes some rioting in Zamora.

dral frowned, alongside the fortress, from the precipice overlooking the broad river.[1]

D. Antonio de Acuña was bastard son of Luis Osorio de Acuña,[2] who was bishop of Segovia and after of Burgos, where he built the chapel in sight of the high altar which contains his tomb. As a young cleric D. Antonio served King Fernando in negotiations for the annexation of Navarre, diplomacy so contentious that the diplomat was arrested by the Navarrese monarch and had to ransom himself with a good sum.[3] 'The Catholic King became incensed with him because D. Antonio was restless, fond of fighting, impatient, and violent; and he presumed beyond what his profession and rank required. He was honest in a large way; and no mortification whatever touched him.'[4] Still archdeacon, Acuña desired the bishopric of Zamora and joined the party of D. Felipe, who used him on a mission to Rome to discredit Jiménez.[5] In the summer before D. Carlos's arrival, Acuña, already Bishop of Zamora, joined the rebellious nobles who defied Jiménez, though it involved coöperation with the Count of Alva de Liste, with whom, as his rival in Zamora, Acuña was not on good terms.[6] 'I doubt,' wrote Santa Cruz, 'if there were in the whole war two distinguished persons who so heartily hated each other or more distinguished themselves in arms.'[7]

Zamora consequently responded with episcopal enthusiasm to the proposal of a congress of comunero cities, supporting a radical programme and advocating Ávila as the city of the congress.[8] Alva de Liste in the middle of August seized the bridge towers and tried to possess himself of the tremendous donjon-like tower of Acuña's cathedral.[9]

Zamora's neighbor in the Guadarramas to the south, Ávila, was at first pacific and received from the punctilious

[1] Cf. illustration and note; and Street (Ed. King), I. 112–24.

[2] And brother consequently of D. Diego Osorio, corregidor of Córdoba and, briefly, of Burgos. Cf. Danv. V. 432.

[3] Sandoval (I. xlv–xlvi) says he knew one who knew and served Acuña, from whom he got information. Santa Cruz, I. 333 gives also these details. There is a brief German monograph '*D. Antonio de Acuña*' by C. Höfler, 1882.

[4] Sandoval, VI. xx bis. [5] Cf. *supra*, p. 15.

[6] Cedillo, Cisneros, 118. [7] Santa Cruz, I. 334.

[8] Letter to Toledo, July 23, Danv. I. 441.

[9] Danv. I. 505, 509. (Summons of the Junta to Alva de Liste, Prior of San Juan, and D. Pedro Enríquez to surrender the places and leave Zamora, August 31.)

Acuña's Church

The tremendous Romanesque west tower of Zamora Cathedral is its least altered and most impressive feature. The lantern over the crossing is, however, one of the three in the neighborhood, including Toro and the old Cathedral of Salamanca, which have structurally so interested the architects. *Cf.* Street, I. 114.

ACUÑA'S CHURCH
The Cathedral of Zamora from the west

Cardinal a letter of appreciation in the midst of the riotous June days;[1] but Sancho Zimbrón was organizing comunero sentiment and to excite it may have had some knowledge of the bribe accepted at Coruña by the Ávila deputy D. Diego Fernández.[2] The deputies made no accounting; but their city on June 19 repudiated all their votes in the Cortes, refused to pay the grant, and entered into correspondence with Toledo for a congress of cities.[3] At last a Commune was organized, moderated however by a spirit of compromise; the nobles saved from destruction the homes of the Coruña deputies, and the loyal captain of the fortress, which he had quietly put in a state of defense, was left in possession under a truce which both the Commune and the Cardinal agreed to.[4] The cathedral chapter too was friendly to the proposal of a congress of cities and shared in the initial steps thereto. By July 8 Ávila was urging the other cities to a junta; and at the end of the month the Cardinal was negotiating with the Ávilans only to find them of much the same determination as the other Cortes cities.[5] Civic vanity and commercial advantage might make the town more ready to listen to the proposal of the radical group to hold the junta within her famous medieval walls.

On the west rim of Castile, Salamanca, city of the University and the lawyers, pertinacious and contentious folk, was in tumult. When excluded from the Cortes at Santiago, her deputies followed a course merely of protest and obstruction.[6] Many nobles of the distinguished Salamancan family of the Maldonados sympathized with the radical movement; and the Salamancan clergy were outspokenly comunero, especially the Franciscans, whose Guardian wrote a manifesto which was used by the radicals to determine the wavering.[7] The ingenuity of the lawyers suggested the plan of depositing the taxes, including the Coruña grant, collected during the King's absence, and of prohibiting their disbursal until his return. Corregidor J. de Ayala

[1] June 6, Danv. I. 372.

[2] Danvila (I. 393) prints the summons (June 5) to D. Diego to appear with his colleague for an accounting.

[3] Danv. I. 394–95.

[4] *Ibid.*, 408. This agreement may be the subject of the memorial Adrian forwarded to D. Carlos, July 6 (Danv. I. 420). Sandoval, VI. viii.

[5] Danv. I. 421; 443 (Letter to D. Carlos, July 28).

[6] Adrian's reports are in Danv. I. 374, 376, 437, 439, 481.

[7] E.g., Valladolid. Cf. *supra*, p. 60.

— who labored, as Adrian reported,[1] 'with much diligence and at risk of his life' — had his task complicated by the solicitations of the turbulent bishop of Zamora, who was in Salamanca on July 12 concerting a plan to expel him. On the 18th a mob of 2000 pursued a certain unpopular noble, burning his house and the door of the monastery of St. Francis, and searching the church of San Esteban, trying to get him. No taxes could be collected, because the people were determined to prevent the accumulation of great sums to be sent to Flanders.[2]

'In the city of León,' Adrian reported after the riotous days[3] 'similar riots were on the point of occurring against the Cortes deputies, had not God specially prevented it: and thereto it aided much that I am on most friendly terms with the party opposed to the deputies, i.e., with Juan Ramírez, brother of the Comendador Mayor of Calatrava. But they all agree on this: that of the grant they will not pay a thing, though the deputies did vote it. . . .' Even this family, the distinguished Guzmáns, who were personally friendly to Adrian, were sorely irritated against the Crown, because they had been ejected from their positions in the household of the Infante Fernando.[4] On the last day of June reports from León were reassuring enough for Adrian to write that though at first tottering the city was at last firmly established in loyalty; and he asked D. Carlos to thank the Count de Luna, Cortes deputy of the city for his patient service in a long and expensive task.[5]

In New Castile, the vast basin of the Tajo, over the Guadarramas to the South, Toledo dominated the political life of all the cities: Cuenca, on the crest of the eastern watershed; Guadalajara on the northeast affluent, the Henares; Madrid, a small town on the west slope of the Henares valley.

Cuenca indeed, with León and a few smaller towns, offered Adrian support;[6] but Toledo plied her with solicitations for a congress of cities, and a Commune was organized in July, which on the 10th repudiated the grant of the Cortes. A reorganizing of the town government was in process,

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, July 13, Danv. I. 429.
[2] Danv. I. 433, 437, 439. [3] To D. Carlos, July 25, Danv. I. 378.
[4] Sandoval, VI. x. Cf. *supra*, p. 36.
[5] June 30, Danv. I. 384. Cf. Adrian's letter of Aug. 12, Danv. I. 480.
[6] Report to D. Carlos, June 3, Danv. I. 384.

including the selection of a new corregidor, on August 21, when an event occurred which gave a new turn to all the commotion in Spain.[1]

Guadalajara[2] had experienced an outbreak during the June riots; but Adrian reported June 21: 'The Duke of the Infantado told me that the city of Guadalajara is now reduced to royal obedience; and they have restored to him the fortress and the staff of justice: but on two conditions which he said he would try to obtain (not that he had made absolute promise): that they should not have to pay aught of the grant at Coruña; and that all done in the uprising should be pardoned them. The husband of a daughter of his had commission to tell me that, despite this provision, if the other cities or most of them paid the grant, he would induce this city to pay it; and he did not wish that pardon should be granted them without three or four of the principals having to be punished. I also replied moderately enough and in such wise that I am not pledged by my letters to anything.'[3] The Cardinal was not wholly reassured, however. In the next report[4] he remarked: 'We have much occasion to suspect that so considerable rebellion rises and has root with the grandees. And the confirmation of this opinion the deputy of the Duke of the Infantado told me — how the Duke himself has been coaxed by grandees and the people to consent to join the people and favor their side; and, in order to serve Your Majesty, he has refused.[5] But I have understood from his people that he complains that, besides the favors which Your Highness has refused him, he cannot even get pay for matters which are owing him. Your Majesty should do him favor and keep him in your grace and service, for earthen vessels easily break.'[6]

The Duke's position was later more precisely expounded to Adrian and by the Cardinal transmitted to Carlos:[7] 'On

[1] Danv. I. 410, from the town archives.

[2] Peter Martyr, Epist. DCLXXII, June 5; DCLXXIX, July 5. The Duke of the Infantado had been successful in a vigorous course, punishing the more notorious rioters; but he had tumults to deal with in his own rebellious household.

[3] Danv. I. 378, Adrian to D. Carlos, June 25. Sandoval (V. xliii) implies more detailed and more honest recommendations.

[4] June 30, Danv. I. 384.

[5] Peter Martyr's letter of June 5 notes that the Duke was forced to acquiesce.

[6] The Duke was still querulous July 29. Cf. Adrian to D. Carlos, Danv. I. 442. (The text dates July xxviiij, though Danvila's title reads July 28.)

[7] Letter of July 10, Danv. I. 424.

the 7th of this month the husband of that bastard daughter of the duke of the Infantado who is here deputy in the duke's name has asked for a reply to Guadalajara in regard to the grant conceded at Coruña, and the tax-rates; and, as I told them I had yet received no reply from Your Highness but expected it would soon come, he said he was commissioned by the duke to tell me two things in his name: (1) that he was ever ready for Your Majesty's service and would never fail or stray therefrom; (2) that M. de Chièvres deserved no favor from Your Majesty; and Your Majesty should consider that it was on his account that there was given at Coruña so bad response to His Majesty's business. And therefore that, if he did aught against the said Chièvres, it should not be blamed or taken as if it were against Your Majesty, for often the grandees, though they have controversies among themselves, are loyal to their king.'

Madrid had been among the most violent of the mob towns; but Adrian hoped, as Guadalajara became pacified, Madrid, less panicky now that she possessed the alcázar, would follow her neighbor's example.[1]

From the remoter south Adrian derived none too much reassurance. Of the Andalusian cities two mattered very much, and were fortunately the least disordered, Sevilla and Córdoba; Jaén, a hill town of the upper Guadalquivir, was of far less consequence.

So far as her conduct at Santiago implied, Sevilla, sitting at the receipt of the customs of the Indies by the tidewaters of the sea, was true to her traditional loyalty.[2] But the very importance of the city through which, by a royal monopoly of which she was very jealous, passed all the western trade of the empire, made the Cardinal uneasy. Almost all the cities repudiated the Coruña grant; some had begun to collect for the Communes other established taxes, such as the cruzadas: to lose the financial resources of Sevilla would be well nigh fatal.

'On the 23rd of this month,' reported Adrian,[3] 'the asistente [4] of Sevilla asked me with much insistence to see to it that Sevilla follow not sedition and uprising, as in other

[1] Letter to D. Carlos, June 25, Danv. I. 378.

[2] The emblem of the city was a true lovers' knot, and her motto two words for knot, *nodo* and *madeja*, which, recombined, produce a sentence: *no m' ha dejado*, 'she forsook me not.' This motto commemorated her fidelity to King Alfonso X.

[3] June 25, Danv. I. 379. [4] The corregidor of Sevilla was so entitled.

parts of these realms, for she has an important population and is as it were a third part of the realm. And he has told me that the Duke of Arcos is already trying to stir up the people and very soon the scandal will be manifest if speedy provision be not made. All that I can I will do, with the intervention of the Councillors, to stop it; but often we hold council vainly because we lack what is necessary to execute and fulfill what we have agreed on.' The asistente evidently took an alarming view of the situation; a month later Adrian was informed [1] that 'in Sevilla, Córdoba, and Granada there is great lack of justice because the asistente of Sevilla through fear of losing his life has not dared nor yet dares to go to that city. D. Diego Osorio, corregidor of Córdoba, is absent.[2] And they say these two are not at all adequate or suitable for the administration of justice in these cities, especially in this time of revolt. Against D. Antonio de la Cueva [corregidor of Granada] are charged so considerable crimes and excesses that they cannot be ignored without great dishonor to Your Majesty, but *residencia* should be held. And since without consulting Your Majesty I am not permitted to change the asistente or the corregidor of Granada, Your Majesty must depute some one to provide in this matter; for defect of justice, through scant and inadequate ability of the corregidors, is in large part the cause of the disturbance in these realms.'

On top of this disquieting advice news came to Adrian which he reports [3] as follows: 'This morning I got letters from the father of the Duke of Arcos telling me Sevilla is already in great peril and there is no means of stopping that city from rebellion unless I manage to get the caballeros out. The asistente of the said city, Sancho Martínez de Leyva, on the 21st and 22nd of this month has warned me through letters of his wife and his deputy that, if promptly, through Your Majesty or through me, declaration be not made to them that Your Highness accounts the Coruña grant as remitted or void, the rebellion in that city will be as great as elsewhere. They say I put them off with good words but the certain end will be deception. Your Majesty must observe and consider lest by putting off and ignoring

[1] Letter to Carlos, July 20, Danv. I. 436.

[2] It will be remembered that he had been drafted as corregidor by the Commune of Burgos. Cf. *supra*, p. 94.

[3] Letter to D. Carlos, July 24, Danv. I. 438.

this business the ill become incurable. I am doing faithfully what I should to advise and persuade Your Majesty; and I am free and without blame for the ruin of Spain, if it is through Your Highness's neglect. I suffer infinite annoyances and therein have great displeasure that Your Majesty should hold these so important matters in so little account as to provide for them no due remedy.' The men who provided and equipped ships for the African expedition have not been paid, and they are all 'so desperate that they threaten and say they will man their ships and station themselves at the mouth of the river of Sevilla and seize all ships that come from the Indies and thereby pay themselves all that is due them.'

The city of the Califs had resisted as consistently as any at Coruña; but her conduct was wholly loyal after D. Carlos left. Her deputies had a clean slate and there were no disorders. The repeated invitations of Toledo to a congress of cities Córdoba refused, declining at last to answer communications on that matter.[1]

The smaller mountain towns of the upper Guadalquivir, such as Úbeda, Baeza, and Jaén, inclined to comunero politics, but were held somewhat in check either from Córdoba or Granada.

One Cortes city was on the sub-tropical Mediterranean coast, Murcia. As early as May 17 a Commune was there proclaimed. The Marquis de los Vélez, the local magnate, proposed moderate and conciliatory treatment; but the Council sent down a Court judge, Leguizamo, who by exasperating inquest and ferocious punishment soon had the town by the ears. Once chased from town he found no satisfactory support either from Diego de Vera nor from the Marquis, who seemed to him to be flirting with the comunero party; and he was finally pursued, with peril of death, almost to Valladolid.[2]

Finally, the palace city of the Moors on the narrow vega of the oleander-choked Genil, stood loyally unresponsive to the solicitations of Toledo, and wrote to hold Sevilla, Córdoba, and Jaén to the same correct attitude.[3]

[1] Danv. I. 431 and note.

[2] *Ibid.*, 349 ff. Leguizamo's own account — amusingly exasperated — is in Danv. I. 555; and another of his faction I. 562 ff. Peter Martyr (letter summarized in Danv. I. 440–41) relates it briefly. For de Vera cf. *supra*, p. 93.

[3] *Ibid.*, 459.

In this precarious state of public sentiment there were clearly two dangers. The party of discipline contended that exemplary punishment, though probably not likely to deter the desperate, would restrain the acquiescent and indifferent, always a majority in any community. But intimidation, effective in a small area, might prove disastrous if all the realm sympathized more with the punished than it feared the punisher. The main motive power of the Commune organization was genuine and widespread indignation. Time would necessarily dull that. Chièvres was gone and Adrian an evidently better person. The Flemish Court was gone and the worst of their Spanish accomplices, notably Bishop Mota. The slow but irresistible gravitation of time and custom would draw things to their former courses unless ferocity, especially if it chanced to be thwarted, should sustain or exasperate that wrath whereby the extreme faction lived.

The other risk was that some sort of union should consolidate all the local grievances and, taking on national proportions and organization, enlist some of the loyalties of nationality.

CHAPTER IV

UNION

THE proposal of a congress or junta of cities, which loomed so threateningly on Adrian's horizon, was not new in Castile, even within the reign of D. Carlos. Upon Jiménez, as Governor before the boy king's arrival, Burgos as head of the realm had urged a congress of cities to consider the ills accumulating, in the absence of the sovereign. The Cardinal reminded them that Cortes could assemble only on summons of the monarch; and 'from such an assembly or congress many and grave difficulties might follow — for, though your purpose be good, others of those who assemble there may have an ill purpose; and where many assemble no rule or limit can be maintained to prevent discussion of other matters and affairs, from discussing which there would follow disservice to their Highnesses and much prejudice to the royal prestige, and scandal, and bad example.' [1] Jiménez was prompt, by pardon, to prevent serious ill consequences from following his vastly unpopular and tumultuously resisted attempt to develop a militia; and he reported, but a month before D. Carlos's arrival: 'We have had much difficulty here in preventing the cities from holding assemblies about His Highness's coming, and other matters, whence there could not but follow many scandals and grave ills.' [2]

The first proposal of Toledo looking toward concerted protest, against the tax-farmers' jobbery, had been halted by royal writs; and the second attempt, provoked by the prospect of the King's prolonged absence in Germany, in the face of similar prohibition and because of the hope of securing some redress at the forthcoming Cortes, had produced only a second petition, in which Salamanca alone, at the end of their Odyssey, joined the persistent Toledans. Still, the Toledan circular of November 7, 1520, favorably met throughout Castile, was a clear invitation to a congress of cities; and the ambiguous results of the Coruña Cortes, together with the indignation at the government there appointed, would certainly keep alive such a proposal. It was

[1] Rodríguez Villa, 299. [2] *Ibid.*, 301. March 18, 1517.

fraught with obvious danger: its procedure and personnel would surely be practically identical with those of regular Cortes; and from that an easy step would lead to assuming identical authority. So the corregidors and the Cardinal Governor kept on the alert to discourage the notion.[1]

The Constable, struggling to reduce Burgos to law and obedience wrote to the Cardinal, a month after D. Carlos sailed: 'Toledo has written again to Burgos about a congress of deputies which they wish to have. I have prevented a reply four days; now I have striven with much importunity to have a determined answer sent. But in the present state of the business I believe, if Your Lordship does not grant this people what they sent to ask of you, though Toledo should abandon the invitation she is urging, they do not propose to abandon it. The truth is, Señor, that the affairs of the cities are in such state that they are few who could dissuade them from their proposal.' [2]

Similar uneasiness the Cardinal transmitted to the King a week later: 'The Toledans are tempting the minds of all in the realm, and say that, for the good of the state they wish to hold Cortes or congress of the cities and towns; and they have such a way of persuading and urging this that they are inducing the other cities which are yet obedient, and inclining them to do the same as they. I fear it will be in the end impossible to prevent it, for they advance not only colorable but even just reasons, saying that what Your Highness promised them . . . is not fulfilled.' [3] And in the same letter: 'Your Majesty will easily understand with what zeal and extreme diligence Toledo, Salamanca, Segovia, and Toro are endeavoring to assemble the cities of the realm. . . . We are resisting it by all ways and means we can. We are afraid many cities will assemble, in spite of us, and afterward easily bring the others over to their opinion. Your Highness will please consider whether it is Your order that we should persist in what we have begun in the matter, preventing it so far as we may; or whether permission be given to all, to assemble here with me in Valladolid, with safe-conduct for the rebels, whereby we might possibly win many

[1] The accounts of the effort toward union are chiefly in Mexía, 117, 119, 147, 149; Santa Cruz, I. 220, 243, 248–52; Sandoval, III. xl–xli; V. iii–iv, vii; VI. xiii; Danv. I. 91, 242–47. For the Toledan circular, cf. *supra*, p. 52.

[2] Constable to Cardinal, June 29, Danv. I. 368.

[3] Cardinal to D. Carlos, July 6, Danv. I. 415.

votes that Your royal rents should not be stopped or withheld until Your Majesty's return. . . .' [1]

The Cardinal may have seen some chance of diverting into lawful channels the excitement attendant upon a junta of cities. Burgos wrote — perhaps through a maneuver of the Constable — asking permission for a lawful assembly of cities; [2] but Adrian, hampered by very limited authority, put them off, saying he had already raised the point with His Majesty, 'in order that they might delay the matter until Your Highness had replied.' [3] Not even Burgos, however, was in any spirit to brook delay. One matter doubtless of general knowledge in Castile was the fateful decision made in the Governor's Council early in June to punish Segovia; and the appointment and equipment of a judge for bloody assizes in the first weeks of July could not be kept secret. In the face of these preparations any assembly of cities would be not conciliatory and coöperative, but hostile. Burgos, therefore, got out of the Constable's control, and wrote on July 9 to Toledo, suggesting Segovia as the place of Congress (defiant selection!), and asking Toledo to inform the other cities.[4] Again, July 13, she wrote to Zamora explaining that she had made an unanswered appeal to the Cardinal and was now proposing for the end of the month a congress in Segovia, which was centrally located.[5] But already the state of guerilla warfare about Segovia seemed to preclude assembling there. So Toledo issued the summons, for August 1, in Ávila. The radicals who looked fearlessly to the possibility of civil war doubtless considered the great military strength of the mountain city an important advantage.[6]

The Cardinal tried to exploit the change of meeting place, as he explained in cipher in his report to D. Carlos on July 29:[7] 'We are trying to sow division among the cities in regard to the place of their meeting, offering security to those willing to come to this city to draw the petition that is to be presented to Your Majesty, as Burgos has requested. We know not whether it will avail. The wise fear that if they all

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, July 6, Danv. I. 420.
[2] Danv. I. 420.
[3] Adrian to Carlos, July 10, 1520, Danv. I. 422.
[4] Danv. I. 422.
[5] Danvila (I. 426) found the letter in the Zamora archives.
[6] So Santa Cruz, I. 248. Toledo's letter to Murcia is of July 17 (Danv. I. 431); that to Zamora of July 18 (Danv. I. 441). The text, undated, is in Santa Cruz, I. 248, and, ornamented, in Sandoval, VI. xiii.
[7] The text reads *xxviiij*; Danvila's title is July 28. (Danv. I. 442–45.)

assemble and swear to the items of their programme (which are: to take our lady the Queen Dña Juana; to change Governor and Council; and — these once changed — to forbid our lord the King from drawing money from the realm; and other matters), they will maintain with their blood items thus sworn rather than abandon their own proposals and business thus ill undertaken.' [1]

Important cities, too, still had misgivings. The Murcia council on July 24 declared that matters had gone far beyond their expectations, since they had no intention to disobey King, Governor, and Council. Córdoba, moreover, which had maintained so consistently her constitutional opposition at Coruña, declined to join; and Granada did likewise.[2]

[1] The text, deciphered in Danv. I. 444–45 seems to require slight emendation: *travajamos para meter deuision entre las villas quanto al lugar de* [a] *su ayuntamiento. . . . de mudar el gobernador, y consejo y mudarlos* (read *mudados*) *de enbargar. . . .*

[2] Danv. I. 431, 441.

CHAPTER V

THE HANGING JUDGE

THE first problem the very unpopular authorities faced was the delicate and difficult matter of discipline: how severely should the murders and destruction of property be punished, and in what cities? Obviously the revolt from the beginning the most defiant and the most serious was that of Toledo: there, even before D. Carlos sailed, his rule had been publicly suspended and the city taken over by a revolutionary junta. But, though punishment might most justly be visited on the leader in rebellion, that course was, in view of the forces and the defenses of the city, most risky. Burgos, capital city of Castile, had destroyed property, seized the administration, and murdered an official of the Court; but the situation there was already in the hands of the Constable, who was feeling his way to the establishment of order and perhaps later some punishment. A third city notably guilty, the first to pass under mob rule after the King's departure, was nearer the headquarters of the government, and probably unprepared despite its fortified site to resist. The advocates of a stern justice therefore agreed upon the chastisement of Segovia.

Yet the question of any chastisement at all in the explosive state of public opinion was to some of those most concerned in the decision gravely debatable. The chief advocate of leniency was the Constable; at least it is clear he judged the situation critical, and in a letter of July 7 urged upon the young monarch very considerable concessions, remarking, as to the turbulent cities, that he had often heard the Catholic King say that small offenses must be punished to prevent greater, for very grave offenses could not be punished; their punishment must be royal clemency, aiming rather at amendment of errors than vengeance for guilt.[1]

Another precept of the shrewd old monarch was urged

[1] This material is presented most ambiguously in Danv. I. 413: summarized, not quoted; the documentary reference inserted in the middle of the summary, though the clear implication is that all the summary is of the same letter. Further, the sentence concerning the remedies is attributed to the Admiral — by mistake of the summarizer, I assume, for all the context implies it is the opinion of the Constable, author of the letter.

upon the Cardinal by a grandee of the realm who likewise advised leniency: 'I received a letter from Your Reverend Lordship in which you bid me raise the troops of my house for business befitting the service of the Queen and the King, our Lords, and the pacification of these their realms. I am always ready, Señor, for what is for Their Majesties' service . . . and shall be so with my person, household, and troops. Your Lordship sent me a letter of the King our Lord in which His Highness bids me undertake the pacification and quiet of two places in these realms. . . . I desire to know what form and measures I should take to carry it out as His Majesty bids; for it seems to me that it is more to His Majesty's service than to put the matter through by force. My judgment, Señor, would be — under Your Lordship's correction — to do so by inducing the towns to quiet, before any further assembling of troops be made, so that the Communes may not become more aroused, perceiving there remains to them no remedy other than death in defense of their persons, property, children, and wives. . . . I remember, Señor, hearing the Catholic King (may he inherit glory!) say that though a horse give his master a couple of kicks, one need not kill him for that; and, since he was in everything so wise and ruled these realms in such peace and quiet, his words, Señor, should have the authority of law.' [1]

The party of severity scouted such moderation and suggested immediate punishment of Burgos — an easy matter, they insinuated, if the Constable would leave the city and permit others to do there what befitted His Majesty's service and honor.[2] The voice most influential on this side was that of the Archbishop of Granada, Antonio de Rojas, President of the Royal Council. The hostility of opinion rested on a deeper hostility of temperament between the two leaders. 'The President of the Council,' the Constable explained to the sovereign,[3] 'is on ill terms with me, for I am of opinion that all the realm will quiet down through punishing moderately and pardoning. This he does not wish, but beheading and burning; in such wise that things done now are worse than the former, and those to come will be still worse. . . . If His Majesty does not lay hand on the President, these

[1] Duke de Alburquerque to Cardinal, July 14, Rodríguez Villa, 304.

[2] So Adrian notes in a letter to D. Carlos, June 25, Danv. I. 380.

[3] Danv. I. 386; entitled as of June 24, though no date appears in the text.

realms are headed to destruction. It is not enough to provide remedy; it must be prompt. I beseech Your Majesty to inform yourself, from discreet persons on whom you may rely, of the judgment and temper of the President, and consider if it befits Your Majesty's service to entrust to him so responsible a charge as has been given to him; for for that charge he ought to be judicious, moderate, patient, and of good will, and should consider the present difficulties and what may follow from them. Many of Your Majesty's servants feel that he does not possess any part of these, and that he has many defects even for private affairs — how much more for the whole affair of the realm to depend on him! I wish him all honor and advancement, for he is my kin and friend; but I value Your Majesty's service more, and so I say this, which I would not do in a personal matter.'

The momentous issue came up for decision before the Governor's Council after they were established in Valladolid on June 5.[1] The case against Segovia was presented by the President: her *crimen lesae majestatis*; the murder of a deputy 'not for offense done them but service done the King in Cortes'; the graver because the first of a series of outbreaks provoked by the Segovian example. The disculpation of Segovia he brushed aside as he had dismissed the embassy which presented it, as absurd — the plea of 5000 citizens who failed to resist or subsequently to punish 50 rioters![2]

D. Alonso Téllez Girón replied with a shrewd analysis of the actual situation, expounding the complication of consequences which made the question much more than an isolated case of justice; avowing his grave doubt of their ability to chastise (yet how disastrous would be failure in that attempt!); remarking the certainty that Medina, in whose great fairs Segovia marketed her cloth, would make common cause with Segovia; and stressing the obvious injustice of conniving at the Toledan rebellion while punishing a city

[1] The rhetorical text of the speeches in Santa Cruz (I. 238 ff.) is reproduced, with variations slightly more antithetical and moralizing, in Sandoval, V. xxxiv–xxxv. An absurd reading (*es muy feo*) of Santa Cruz (probably a misprint in that carelessly printed text) may be corrected from Sandoval (*es mi fin*). Conversely in the same speech Sandoval confuses the orderly phrasing which is clear in Santa Cruz: *Si somos poderosos . . . si no somos poderosos.*

[2] Sandoval (V. xxxiii) notes that this rude repulse of their apologetic embassy enormously exasperated the city.

which had not armed, nor overthrown the King's justice nor seized the fortress.[1]

Decision was made to discipline Segovia.[2] The first business was to send a judge of inquest to report on the murders there. The person chosen had made a dignified entrance on the historical page; Rodrigo Ronquillo, the son of a regidor of Arévalo, Bachiller of Salamanca, judge first in Toledo and then at Court, had escorted the body of old King Fernando from the humble house of the Friars in Madrigalejo to its royal rest in Granada, where lay already the body of Isabel.[3] Alcalde Ronquillo, even to those who praised him as 'just and nowise avaricious,' was reputed 'rather severe in punishing, for which reason he was much disliked.'[4] He was especially hated in Segovia, where he had already exercised discipline; the city had instructed its deputies at Coruña to obtain repeal of a sentence imposed on an innocent regidor when Ronquillo sat upon the inquest investigating certain riots in Segovia on Trinity Sunday. In response to the first capital sentences of the judge by drumhead courts-martial, the Segovians erected a new gallows in a spot daily swept and sprinkled for the hanging of Ronquillo.[5]

Exemplary punishment, if it is not to make bad matters worse, must inspire more fear than indignation. Ronquillo was given a force of some thousand horse, mainly composed of veterans of the over-seas excursion against the Moors, under experienced captains.[6] Reconnaissance of the city convinced them that they could not attack so strong a place,

[1] Sandoval gives a judgment of the Chronicler-Captain Gonzalo de Ayora, who was not a member of the Council, and which was expressed after Ronquillo had started.

[2] The Segovia business is recorded in Mexía, 146–51; Santa Cruz, I. 242–47; 285–87; Sandoval, V. xliv–xlvii; lii; VI. iv; Danv. I. 442, 444, 453, 463–66; 514–16; 526–31 (suit brought by Ávila Junta vs. Fonseca et al.).

[3] Not in the present gorgeous chapel but the former humble one which D. Carlos enlarged as 'too small for so great glory.'

[4] Santa Cruz, I. 242.

[5] Santa Cruz, I. 243. Sandoval (V. xlvi) as usual adds the picturesque detail such as gathers not too trustworthily about tradition two generations old.

[6] Mexía, 146. Sandoval, having repeated these figures in V. xliv, says in V. xlvii he had but 300 lances and a few foot. The term *lances* very commonly implies the man-at-arms himself, and his esquire, armorer, and other attendants; so that 300 lances may involve upward of 1000 soldiers. The arrival of the Gelves troops in Cartagena, July 2, was announced to the Cardinal in a letter of July 7, and on July 13 he was debating whether they were more needed for Valencia or for Ronquillo. (Letter to D. Carlos, July 13, Danv. I. 429.) Peter Martyr's gossip in Valladolid was that Ronquillo had 400 horse and 2000 foot. Epist. DCLXXIX.

even though the fortress on the west promontory was held by a garrison of the King. Further, Ronquillo was conducting civil inquest, with warning from his superiors to avoid bloodshed; and he established court, with due proclamation and summons, in a village at the respectful distance of five or six leagues.[1]

The Segovians thus challenged mustered an undisciplined force of some 4000 foot and provoked a skirmish.[2] Apparently Ronquillo might have forced a completer defeat, though he routed them with loss of colors, artillery, and packtrain, and some prisoners, whom he hanged. This course merely infuriated; but the judge followed it up with virtual blockade of the city. Under this pressure the Segovians sent on July 29 to Toledo for succor, pointing out that the punishment of Toledo must inevitably follow on the crushing of Segovia; disavowing responsibility for the mob murders and even for the skirmish with Ronquillo, carried out 'against our wish'; and reporting that they were so closely blockaded that all venturing forth were seized, those accounted innocent held to ransom, those suspected put to torture, and those declared guilty hanged in sight of the city.[3]

Among the latter, according to a story current long after, two, pretending to be carders from Salamanca returning home because Segovia was in such disorder, were brought before Ronquillo, who got from them confession, the one that he had obtained the rope to drag Tordesillas, the other that he had dragged him and torn his hair. The judge had the latter's hand cut off and both then hanged, drawn, and quartered.[4]

[1] Sandoval takes Santa Cruz's figure of five instead of Mexía's six. Twenty-three miles on the present railroad. Santa Maria is still a center of woolen manufacture. Surely a force of 1000 veterans could safely have approached nearer; there was probably real desire to avoid conflict, and uncertainty as to the temper of the troops, long in arrears of pay. Cf. Adrian to Carlos, Aug. 12, Danv. I. 479.

The date is early July. Toledo, writing July 17, notes that Ronquillo is close upon Segovia, which needs assistance. Danv. I. 431. Peter Martyr's letter of July 5 (DCLXXIX) reports the first skirmish.

[2] Santa Cruz and the Segovian letter say 5000; Mexía three or four; Peter Martyr (whose figures are erratic) says 8000 foot and a few horse.

[3] One of the letters suspected by Morel as a Guevara forgery. It is in Santa Cruz, I. 243–45, and in Sandoval with verbal variations (V. xlv. The number is skipped in the enumeration of the Ed. Pamplona 1634). Ronquillo's siege is briefly described by Maldonado (p. 81).

[4] Sandoval, VI. xxi.

Should Toledo send considerable succor the affair would quite change complexion, passing from disorganized resistance to a judge's inquest into the first battles of a civil war. Such conflicts must be entrusted to Fonseca the Captain-General appointed by His Majesty on leaving Castile, properly provided with troops and siege artillery.

CHAPTER VI

LEST BY DELAY WE LOSE THE CHANCE

THE defiance of Toledo was known to D. Carlos while still in Coruña, where news of the revolt was published May 8. His boyish impulse was to dash to Toledo at once and inflict swift punishment, a course which his severer advisers encouraged. But the imperial business was of the utmost urgency and Chièvres dissuaded him, urging the facts that the revolt was in its first fury and likely to defy even the natural reverence for the Royal presence, but likely, as do all popular outbursts, to burn out for want of fuel. The tremendous military strength of the city also counted; and it might well be that Chièvres desired to get safely out of Spain with his profits: 'Where is the treasure, there is the heart also.' [1]

Ignorant of the gravity of the situation in Castile, D. Carlos pursued his voyage to England, where he visited his aunt, the already unhappy Queen Katherine; [2] and passed, after diplomatic wrangles and rounds of festivities, to the continent. He reached Flanders June 1; and from Brussels, June 24, wrote soothing letters [3] to Valladolid praising the pacific reception accorded to the Governor and Council by the city that had mobbed its King. Through that very week, however, that Governor was sending letter after frantic letter detailing the risings in every Castilian city and recommending the widest and promptest concessions to allay the tempest that had broken after the King's departure.[4] 'So much longer as Your Majesty delays declaring openly that he renounces the grant [of the Coruña Cortes] . . . will be sowing evils in these realms, and the people cannot be wholly placated or pacified.' And a week later: 'Your Majesty must not believe there is any hope of stopping or quieting the revolt of the people unless you totally renounce the Coruña

[1] The remark is Sandoval's (V. xxv). Mexía, 137. Rojas, President of the Council, much resented Chièvres's advice (Sandoval, V. xxxiv).

[2] She had then lost five of six children, little Mary Tudor alone surviving.

[3] Summarized in Sandoval, V. xlii. Another letter of the same date recounted his voyage; Sandoval states it was addressed to the city but the context seems somewhat to imply that it was addressed to the Cardinal.

[4] Danv. (I. 373 ff.) prints three, the two later dated June 25 and 31.

grant, and the *encabezamientos* stand as was promised them here in the Cortes of Valladolid.[1] If all this is not done by Your Majesty without delay these dangers will increase and multiply. . . . It seems fitting also to the wise and prudent that Your Highness grant me permission and power to pardon the Toledans wholly or partly, on the sound and mature judgment of the Royal Councillors, lest by delay we lose the chance. And in this common guilt one must sometimes pardon guilty individuals in order to obtain vengeance or chastisement of others. . . . I have given hope to all that Your Highness will observe what I have promised in regard to the *encabezamientos* and will remit the grant, which they say was not lawfully conceded. The next day when the post came and brought no despatch on this matter I could scarcely calm them, for every one is wrought up and disposed to tumult. I told them the post could not yet have reached Flanders when Your Majesty bade sent this last despatch.[2] Meanwhile they ask constantly if perchance the post be come: and I surely fear, if it does not bring the two things, viz. that of the grant and of the *encabezamiento*, there will be here a rising and tumult.' [3]

The next day rumor ran that the grant had been remitted to the people of Valladolid, and free market and fair privileges, with sale untaxed of fish, wheat, and barley.[4]

[1] The uncertain and probably unwise form of taxation known as *alcabalas* or sales tax had for the last ten years of Isabel's reign been commuted for a fixed sum or *encabezamiento* assessed upon each city in proportion to its population (hence the name). The sales tax, which at times reached even 10 per cent, was collected by tax-farmers; the *encabezamiento* was collected by the city. Isabel's will provided for the permanent replacement of *alcabalas* in this fashion; and D. Carlos promised at Valladolid in 1518 that such commutation should stand and be extended to localities that did not already enjoy it. (*Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos*, IV. 265. Item 14 in Sandoval, III. x. Item 5 in Santa Cruz, I. 170.) The King broke the promise the next year, when tax-farmers offered him a greater sum for restoring the *alcabala*. (This outrage was the occasion of the Toledo petition: cf. *supra*, p. 49.) On the two forms of tax cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, I. 251; III. 160, and note 3; Klein, *Mesta*, 260, and note 2. Cf. also Sandoval, III. xl. Peter Martyr (Epist. DCLV, Dec. 31, 1519) reports the chorus of protest 'de mutando *alcabalae* tributo, qua mutatione universorum Castellae regnorum agricolae negociorumque tractores a quaestoribus excoriabuntur (uti fieri alias solebat).'

[2] Clearly some communications had come from Flanders. It seems doubtful that D. Carlos's letters of June 24 mentioned in Sandoval could arrive by June 30.

[3] Adrian to D. Carlos, June 30, Danv. I. 382.

[4] Letter of P. Martyr, July 1, summarized from R.A.H. MS. in Danv. I. 412; Number DCLXXVII in the *Opus Epistolarum*. It is addressed to the Chancellor Gattinara. 'Sero sapuistis' is Martyr's pregnant comment.

But Adrian had not at the time of writing his letter of July 6,[1] any directions from his absent master, to whom he again pointed out the inevitableness of concession: 'If Your Highness should suppose he may ever obtain and use this grant it would be a great mistake. There are none in all the realm, neither Sevilla nor Valladolid nor any other cities, which would ever consent to pay any of it. The grandees and all the Council are amazed that Your Highness should maintain that any obligatory force should derive from that grant of supply. . . . Though this alone followed from remission of that grant and from keeping your word in the matter of the *encabezamientos*, viz. that the cities not in revolt persevere in obedience to the King, it would be well to lose a sum amounting to twice the loss which might be urged from remission of the grant and from keeping the promise about the said *encabezamientos*. . . . The moment that people know that Your Highness is unwilling to remit the grant or to admit that it was not lawfully voted, or to keep your word about the *encabezamientos*, without any doubt whatever they will all revolt and we shall not be able to keep Valladolid in obedience.'

The same note runs through the Cardinal's letter of July 10,[2] with a further warning that a junta of all the cities seems now inevitable, and even their five chief demands have been formulated. For that which concerned the appointment of natives to office the distracted Cardinal suggests a simple remedy: 'It seems best to me that Your Highness give them a governor native of the realm; and for that I see no one more ready and suitable than the President [of the Council]; and as to the point they urge — that Your Highness breaks the laws of the realm in giving them a foreign governor — their complaint would be anticipated. It would be a great service to me to be relieved of so great a charge, which has ever seemed to me unendurable.'

Nothing of the same despair seemed to touch the thought of the young monarch, far away and busy with more showy business. On July 13[3] no warrant for pardon or conces-

[1] Danv. I. 414. [2] *Ibid.*, 422.

[3] To D. Carlos, Danv. I. 429. The 'letters from Your Majesty of the xxv of the past month' may be the same as those summarized in Sandoval (V. xlii), though he says they were of June 24. If others were sent the day following, it is clear from Adrian's letter that they gave him no decisive directions.

sion had reached the governor, who had remained without instruction or command of any sort since D. Carlos's letters of June 25. The two concessions were again frantically demanded in letters to the King on July 20 and July 24.[1]

To Adrian it was becoming daily more imperative that he should have full power to concede and pardon as he saw fit. Many of the concessions certain to be demanded in a junta of cities he himself felt to be just. His own word was pledged that concession could and would be obtained. Many a city trembled on the edge of defiance, settling into the conviction that his promises were unwarranted hopefulness or mere deception. He was embarked on a perilous business of discipline, which was merging into civil war. Reverses in that contest might make even concession forever useless, because it would appear yielded only to fear.

The news from many sources of the events in Castile finally convinced the Flanders Court, and toward the last week of the month concession was authorized.[2] Empowered at last, Adrian wrote on July 31 to Palencia, then wavering in uncertainty about joining a junta of cities, that the Coruña grant was not to be collected in cities still loyal.[3] To envoys of Salamanca, equally agitated, a similar letter was sent the next day, cancelling the grant and restoring the *encabezamiento* at its former figure; and on that same

[1] Danv. I. 434, 437.

[2] This concession left Flanders in time to reach Adrian by the last of the month. Action in regard to native governors was not taken till Sep. 5. The two concessions seem therefore to be separated by a month and a half, not simultaneous, as implied in Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 81. Merriman (*ibid.*, 80) is misled, by a mistaken title in Sandoval (VI. xvii), into supposing the King's letter of Sep. 12 the first communication from D. Carlos to Adrian. The letter in Sandoval does complain of having heard nothing since the King's departure; but it is, as Sandoval's text says, from the President and Councillors. Santa Cruz's version (I. 271) is correctly so entitled; but Sandoval's is entitled 'The Cardinal and the Councillors.' The letter is apparently a bit of peevish punctilio on the part of the Council, which had not received any letter addressed to itself. That Adrian had letters at least of as early date as June 24 is clear (Sandoval himself summarizes them: V. xlii); and earlier ones are almost certainly implied (Cf. *supra*, p. 121, n. 2.). The story of the Council's letter is in Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 14 (Danv. II. 22): 'The councillors could not be satisfied with the posts and letters I have sent Your Majesty without sending one from their own body to explain to your Highness in due order all that has happened here. I should prefer myself the expense might be avoided; but since they all together insisted so warmly I felt I ought not to oppose their will in the matter.' The assertion they have had no news is a disgruntled hint of the Council that the King has ignored their official existence.

[3] Danv. I. 537.

August 1 from Ghent D. Carlos himself wrote to Córdoba granting both concessions.[1]

But the tax thus remitted all Castile, even loyal Sevilla,[2] had long since flouted the mere notion of paying; and it was remitted only to the cities in obedience. The Cardinal used the concessions for what they yet might win — extending them, for example, to the military orders of Calatrava and Alcántara,[3] whose cities had remained obedient; but his letters to the King hardly so much as acknowledge the concessions in regard to revenues — affairs had already passed to issues of life and death, and he needed authority to pardon and remit capital sentences. So letter after letter begged of his royal master authority for including the rebellious cities in the concessions and for full freedom in regard to amnesty. '[The Toledans] are much confirmed in their obstinacy by their conviction that Your Majesty has no money, and no concern to provide what I have written is necessary for all the cities both obedient and rebellious: the fulfilling of what was promised about the *encabezamientos*, and remission of the Coruña grant.'[4] The earnestness of the letters grew from week to week: 'When it is replied that it would not be becoming for Your Majesty . . . and that malefactors would become the bolder to stir up tumults quite at their fancy, they answer in behalf of the realm[5] that such regards and considerations must be set aside, since of evils the least is the best. The shrewdest say that in spite of Your Majesty's remission there would nonetheless remain sufficient ground for punishment; for the interests of the injured parties remain untouched, and so, on request from them, punishment might be imposed just as if Your Highness had never remitted it.[6] The peril is so grave and so universal, and the outcome of what is undertaken by force of arms so dubious and uncertain that it seems to me better to pardon entirely some cities so that others may be punished.'

[1] Danv. I. 475, both unfortunately only in summary, and without indicating their whereabouts.

[2] Adrian to D. Carlos, July 24, Danv. I. 438–39.

[3] August 7, Danv. I. 567.

[4] Adrian to D. Carlos, July 28, Danv. I. 443.

[5] The letter is mutilated and it is not clear what persons are discussing. Adrian to D. Carlos, August 8, Danv. I. 477.

[6] This legal chicane appears to be the *Parte Quejosa* which the Constable also dangled before the monarch's eyes. Cf. *infra*, p. 167, n., 188, n.

In Adrian's report of August 31 [1] a deeper note was sounded: 'As to the affairs of this realm, they are apparently going to total ruin if God lay not hand specially to the remedy and quieting of them; and there is not a city which may be reduced to obedience unless remission be given for all that is past.' But at that writing the first disaster had followed upon the appeal to arms.

[1] Danv. I. 489.

CHAPTER VII

CONFLAGRATION: MEDINA DEL CAMPO, AUGUST 21

TOLEDO, immensely encouraged and rejoiced by her success in bringing together representatives of the Communes in a Junta, which was holding its first session in Ávila on the very day the Segovians sent their appeal for help against Ronquillo, responded promptly and vigorously. Juan de Padilla as Captain-General was commissioned to recruit 1000 foot and one hundred light cavalry with some pieces of field artillery, to which Madrid added 400 men and fifty horse under Captain Juan de Zapata. The troops left Toledo on the same day with the deputies for the Ávila congress.[1] They were met in the passes of the Guadarramas by Captain Juan Bravo with the troops of Segovia, which brought the total force to 1000 foot and 500 horse.[2]

Some approximate parity in force seemed to have been effected; and the Commune forces took to the same methods of dominating the district by trials and executions which Ronquillo had used. The judge had to avoid engagements, save for a raid of defiance into the outskirts of Segovia, and withdraw, in a campaign of evasions, upon Coca, the great fortress of the Fonsecas.[3] Here on the edge of the pine lands, a dozen leagues north of Segovia, he awaited reënforcement.

D. Antonio de Fonseca, to whom he was to hand over the situation, was lord of the castle of Coca and had long followed a military career. He had commanded an armada sent to relieve Arcila in 1508,[4] and had shared in the defense of Pamplona against the French in 1512, in which triumph of arms Juan de Padilla had also shared.[5] He was the military member of the Royal Council at D. Fernando's

[1] Mexía, 149. Sandoval (V. xlvi) differs as to numbers. In all the military history there is wild disagreement among the authorities.

[2] *Ibid.*, 149; repeated in Sandoval, V. lii; VI. xxiii. Adrian's report (to D. Carlos, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 483) was of 1500 foot from Toledo and Madrid together. Alcocer (43) says Padilla took 200 horse and 2000 foot from Toledo, and had, before Segovia, 500 and 5000 respectively.

[3] Cf. illustration and note.

[4] Sandoval, I. xxvii. [5] *Ibid.*, xlvi.

The Fortress of Coca

The shell of Coca Castle still frowns on the ravine where occurred the massacre of Cauca in the wars of the Roman conquest, 151 B.C. It is made of thin brick laid in thick courses of mortar, like Queen Isabel's La Mota, with which it is approximately contemporary. (*Cf.* Dieulafoy, *Spain*, in the series *Ars Una*, Chap. V.) The river-bed is fertile under irrigation, a carpet of green amid the gray sand, which, on the level of the plain, supports only the extended pine forest that was famous in the district four centuries ago. The castle is privately owned and has not been restored. It is quite destroyed within, only the thick brick walls remaining. The moat, now dry, was flooded from the river.



THE FORTRESS OF COCA

death.[1] The determined Cardinal Governor Jiménez had employed him to restrain D. Pedro Girón, in 1516.[2] D. Carlos appointed Fonseca Captain-General, on leaving Spain in 1520.[3]

Alarmed by the junction of the Comunero forces, Adrian sent the Captain-General at the beginning of August, with troops of the Court which were at hand,[4] to join Ronquillo and equip himself from the royal stores in Medina del Campo with siege artillery such as should enable him to reduce Segovia. Valladolid was in such uproar over this well-understood intent of the authorities that Fonseca had to make his escape secretly from the city; and on August 18 the Cardinal was bullied by a mob into ordering the withdrawal of the forces to Arévalo.[5]

Medina was the chief city of Castile for the manufacture of artillery and munitions, for which it employed the rich neighboring growth of elm and poplar;[6] and since the time of the Catholic Sovereigns the great castle of la Mota, thoroughly renovated by Queen Isabel and fortified with outworks, had been a principal location of military stores. The town council of Medina was approached in the King's name by Juan de Fonseca, Bishop of Burgos, who asked for the artillery required by his brother; but the Segovians, whose woolen merchants were already attempting similar business in Medina, at once in a letter of August 17 sent a counter appeal,[7] emphasizing the close economic dependence between the Segovian manufactures and the Medina fairs,

[1] Sandoval, II. i; here stated to be brother of Juan de Fonseca, Bishop of Burgos (so also Santa Cruz, I. 245).

[2] Sandoval, II. iii. [3] Mexía, 138.

[4] Arévalo estimated the combined force at 1000 men-at-arms, 1000 guardsmen, 230 arquebuseers. (Letter to Valladolid, Sep. 3, Danv. II. 216.) The term *escopetero* appears always to mean arquebuseer; the musket was not in general use till 1550. Cf. Encyc. Britan., Index, s.v. *arquebus*.

[5] Adrian to D. Carlos, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 484. There is a vivid picture of Fonseca's entry into Arévalo on Aug. 19 in a letter of that town of Sep. 3 (Danv. II. 216). Peter Martyr's letter (DCLXXXI) records the tension in Valladolid, where it was written.

[6] Santa Cruz, I. 245.

[7] Medina wrote the Cardinal on Aug. 11 that they had been warned by Segovia and were determined not to surrender the artillery. (Danv. I. 515.) The Segovia letter in Santa Cruz (I. 246) appears in Sandoval (V. liii, numbering skipped in Pamplona Ed. 1634) with a few literary embellishments; and the omission in one passage of the Bishop's name *Juan de Fonseca*, and the mistaken substitution in another of the name *Alonso de Fonseca* (who was Bishop of Santiago). Danvila is also inconsistent in these names, following Sandoval's error in this place (Danv. I. 517).

and suggesting that the artillery be refused on the ground that no writ of the King was presented in warrant of the demand.[1]

Fonseca meanwhile established his base at Arévalo, half way between Medina and Segovia, where Ronquillo joined him.[2]

Tuesday, August 21, just three months since the departure of the young Emperor-elect, the Captain-General mustered his force, estimated by the Medinese later as 800 lances and 500 foot, for an engagement of war, the assault on a city and seizure of the artillery which that city refused to the first military official of the government. Resistance was unlikely, and futile if attempted; succor could not arrive from the Comunero forces centered on Segovia unless resistance were surprisingly prolonged. He appeared before the town at dawn. Through the morning negotiations progressed, favored by Corregidor Gutierre Quijada, for peaceful surrender of the artillery; but the townspeople, unalarmed by the threat of fire and sword, took advantage of the hours to assemble, arm, and place cannon in the streets. So soon as they were prepared they defied Fonseca; and the old captain in command of la Mota fired on the invaders. Evidently the Captain-General could no longer avoid a bloody attack through the streets of the town. His lancers broke through barricades and charged into the plaza, but stubborn resistance surrounded them; and to distract this resistance fires were started which soon involved the town in a vast conflagration, and by nightfall the great donjon of Isabel looked, across the shallow river bed, through clouds of sparks, smoke, and glare, upon the ruin of half a city: of the church, the monastery of San Francisco, the great storehouse where, for the fairs, were deposited the products not only of the chief cities of Spain but also wares imported from Italy, Flanders, and England— 'gold, silver, pearls, coral, jewels, brocades, silks, linens, arms, tapestries, velvets, and a vast quantity of jewelry and cloth; among

[1] The Cardinal must of course have issued any necessary papers: the suggestion implies repudiation of the Cardinal's authority, such as was threatened by Córdoba at Coruña. Danv. (I. 515) mentions a document implying that they urged this objection to the corregidor. Peter Martyr's letter (DCLXXX) notes the economic solidarity of the towns.

[2] The sources for the ensuing conflict are in Mexía, 149–52, 156; Santa Cruz, I. 245–57; 254–58; 260; 287–89; Sandoval, V. lii–VI. i; VI. xxi–xxiii; Danv. I 486, 513–32; Maldonado, 120 ff.

which it was reckoned that there had been burned that day in that hall alone, a value of 400,000 ducats.' [1]

Life also was sacrificed, both of soldiers in the street fighting and of women and children who were caught and perished in the flames. The Host was rescued in the monastery and sheltered in an elm trunk near the well, but the friars were left quite without property or shelter.[2]

Fonseca helped to deal with the conflagration and withdrew his forces, to leave the Medinese freer to save their city, a measure of doubtful expediency, for the indignation throughout Castile at the burning could hardly be increased, and, had he taken full advantage of the emergency to secure the artillery, he might have inspired fear, which was the sole justification of his campaign.[3] He returned to Arévalo with Corregidor Quijada.

An immediate consequence of the burning of Medina was a lurch of popular sympathy toward the radical party. It threw at least temporary power into the hands of those who by violence and murder won a clamorous support among the lowest classes. In Medina itself a brute who assassinated his master, suspected of complicity in Fonseca's at-

[1] Santa Cruz, I. 254; Maldonado, 123. Peter Martyr's letter (Epistola DCLXXXI) giving many of the same details estimates the loss at 2,000,000 ducats. Cf. Santa Cruz, I. 288. The suit brought names the total loss of 950 cuentos, upward of two and a half million ducats.

A monograph of C. Espejo and J. Paz, 1912, discusses 'Las Antiguas Ferias de Medina del Campo.'

Maldonado notes that the resistance was popular, in defiance of the preference of the regidors and nobles for compliance; and says the fires were started 'perhaps at Fonseca's command.' The ruins smouldered for three days.

[2] Medina to Valladolid, Aug. 22 (in Santa Cruz, I. 257; embellished with historical and moral instances in Sandoval, VI. i). Sandoval's version Morel suspects as a Guevara forgery. It is noteworthy that the reference to Bishop Fonseca in Sandoval's text is not in Santa Cruz's; Guevara or Sandoval might have incorporated it from an earlier paragraph of Santa Cruz's narrative. Sandoval's text mistakenly calls him Alonso, though Santa Cruz's text of Segovia's letter of Aug. 17 (I. 246) gives it correctly as Juan. This letter also appears in Sandoval, V. liii, reading Alonso for Juan; though Sandoval, V. i, following Santa Cruz, I. 97, names him Juan. Cf. Maldonado, 126.

[3] The Segovians, writing to Medina, Aug. 24, urged unremitting vigilance lest the artillery yet be secured by treachery. (Sandoval, V. liv.) This letter, suspected by Morel as a Guevara forgery, mentions, though dated Aug. 24, events of the 28th and 29th. (It begins: 'Yesterday, Thursday, which was the twenty-third of this month of August.' August 23, 1520, was a Thursday. Santa Cruz's text (I. 262) has: 'Ayer jueves, que se contaban 28 de Agosto,' probably a misreading or misprint of 28 for 23, in that very carelessly printed edition.) Letters seem in several instances to have been composed in portions at different dates and cannot therefore be proved forgeries because mentioning events subsequent to their dating.

tack, rose to influence.[1] 'And the same happened in the other cities, for in each there rose to distinction the most criminal and bold, and, by such feats as he, gained such authority that thereafter he ordered and ruled as he pleased. Thus it was one Villoria, a leather-dresser, in Salamanca . . . and other such in other places. And by them and their supporters were perpetrated intolerable wrongs and insults, slaying and exiling whom they pleased, seizing those who wrote or negotiated with those who remained in the king's service. . . . So that to the will of such men were subjected the most distinguished gentlemen who followed that faction and moved in the Commune cities, and they maintained themselves and their influence with them by subterfuge and flattery, which was surely a sad and wretched condition.'[2]

The rise of such persons into power was of course accompanied by more or less mob violence. In Valladolid, where the presence of the government had hitherto prevented excesses, mobs destroyed by fire the very splendid house of Fonseca and looted that of a wealthy merchant, Pedro del Portillo, and those of deputies La Serna and Santysteban, who had voted tax at Santiago.[3] The owners saved themselves by flight. 'It is public report,' wrote Adrian on August 24,[4] 'that, had they not had respect for my person, they would have torn from my house the President and two members[5] of the Council, and I fear they would have slain them. Licenciado Vargas has disappeared. The President is much frightened, and has told me they want to burn his house and he is in great peril. Through the efforts of the Count of Benavente these tumults and riots were on the 22nd of this month somewhat remedied and quieted.' The hated Councillors, however, had to fear not merely the fickle fury of the mob but also systematic pursuit from the Ávila Junta, which had urged upon the Val-

[1] The warden of la Mota wrote a long report (Danv. IV. 302) of his helplessness and the difficulty of protecting the property of the merchants at the subsequent Medina fairs. For Bobadilla's terrorizing Medina cf. P. Martyr, Epist. DCLXXXV, Sep. 13: and Maldonado, 124.

[2] Mexía, 153. Cf. Santa Cruz, I. 259, a fantastic story about the Medinese bully such as often attaches to bloodthirsty revolutionary leaders.

[3] Accounts differ as to the extent of damage. Adrian's reports in Danv. I. 484, 487; Mexía 154; Santa Cruz, I. 256; P. Martyr, Epist. DCLXXXII; Maldonado, 125.

[4] Danv. I. 485.

[5] Santa Cruz (I. 252; followed by Sandoval, VI. xxiv) says Vargas of the Treasury and Zapata of Justice were especially hated.

ladolid Commune their arrest. A week later [1] they were in hiding: 'The heart and will of the cities seem daily more inflamed against all through whom attempts seem to them to have been made to withdraw money from these realms for Your Majesty. None of the deputies who voted for the grant (though it is remitted) feel safe, nor corregidors who voted them authority to approve it. Many of the Council are threatened, and other officials. The President, Zapata, Vargas . . . have fled to escape such peril. If they all go, I shall follow them finally; but we know not where in Castile we might be safe. I have said I am content to be sacrificed and suffer for them and stand here firmly till all who are afraid have gone — for they would not let us go all together, and if I went first they would doubtless arrest those who remained.'

And with this rueful summary the good Cardinal surveys the failure of his mission: 'The affairs of this city had already reached a good stage, for last Monday [August 20, the day before the Medina conflagration] [2] I had pardoned them a slight outbreak which they had started and, after, they swore to abide and stand firm in Your Majesty's service. And in truth the security of this city seemed so considerable that we were in belief that many cities might thereby be reduced to obedience. But when there came to their knowledge the great and cruel destruction which the fire wrought in Medina, they rose in such wise that few of Your Majesty's servants who are here feel secure of their lives; and they who formerly obeyed us and were subjects now appear to command and hold us to obedience. All the city gates are guarded and here and elsewhere they open letters, except when by special grace and the intervention of friends they desist from doing so.'

To what end might the Cardinal Governor use his rapidly vanishing authority? He was certain that pardon and concession were the only possible measures. He repeatedly implored D. Carlos to grant him a free hand in pardoning; and above all not to persist in the proposal to send German troops, when Adrian could not raise money to pay those already in Spain.[3]

[1] Report of Aug. 31. Danv. I. 490. P. Martyr, also in Valladolid, describes the efforts at pacification in Epist. DCLXXXIV, Aug. 30.

[2] Adrian's report is of Aug. 24, Danv. I. 487.

[3] As to the Germans, letter of Aug. 12 (Danv. I. 479) and Aug. 31 (Danv. I.

The usefulness of Ronquillo and Fonseca was probably ended; the judge's severities had failed to terrorize, and the Captain-General had not got his cannon. Yet to dismiss them might discourage all others from undertaking for the Crown any unpopular service. 'They are so angry against Fonseca,' Adrian explained, 'that if they could get him they would sooner throw themselves upon him with their teeth than leave him an hour alive. This city came to demand that I remove him from the captain-generalcy and dismiss all the troops he has. . . . All of us here think Your Highness should recall Fonseca . . . or give authority here to do so, and appoint another Captain-General, unless we have decided to account the whole realm an enemy; and to allow those troops to be dismissed.' [1]

With this explanation and without awaiting permission the Cardinal dismissed the hanging judge and the burning general and the royal army under their orders.[2] He did not believe he could keep them in the field in that infuriated neighborhood nor raise money to pay them, for many of the regular revenues had been stopped by the Comunero towns and to many others they had been remitted in the vain hope of holding them loyal.[3] Fonseca and Ronquillo escaped to Portugal and thence to Flanders. Adrian wrote regrets and exculpations to Medina;[4] and waited. Córdoba and Sevilla wrote offering him refuge there, should he need it; but he feared they might go Comunero like Jaén.[5]

492); as to pardon, *passim*, in almost every letter; e.g., Aug. 24 (Danv. I. 486), Aug. 31 (Danv. I. 489, 490, 491).

[1] Letter of Aug. 24, Danv. I. 486.

[2] The order reached the army in Arévalo Aug. 29 (Danv. I. 504). The Constable thought dismissal of the troops a mistake (To D. Carlos, Sep. 30, Danv. II. 40).

[3] Mexía, 155.

[4] Mexía, 155 (followed by Sandoval, VI. iv). It seems incredible that, as implied in the letter from Medina to the Cardinal, he disavowed sending Fonseca to remove the artillery. Mexía, Sandoval, and Santa Cruz (I. 260) represent him as disavowing the destruction of the city. Alcocer (44) declares even that in Flanders D. Carlos rebuked Fonseca for the burning of Medina.

[5] Danv. I. 550. Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 9 (Danv. II. 18).

CHAPTER VIII

THE SANTA JUNTA

THE project of a congress of cities had seemed to hang fire through July, during the mood of reaction after the excesses of the June riots; but the determined cities were not balked by delays and refusals, and at the month's end a beginning was made — not, according to the plan of the moderates, in Burgos; nor in Valladolid, as Adrian desired, officially and under his eye; but, as Toledo proposed, in Ávila.

The city of the Junta was a medieval town with a mile-and-a-half circuit of fifty-foot granite wall counting eighty-six semicircular bastions or *cubos*, one of which, an immense sweep on a sixty-foot radius, constituted the apse wall of the cathedral. On the east side of the cathedral cloister a large chapel, about seventy feet by thirty, afforded an admirable hall of assembly.[1]

An opening session was held July 29, with deputies from but a few cities, under the presidency of Pedrolasso and the Dean of Ávila.[2]

The cities at first present were those which had already gone so far that they must go further. Almost a month dragged by before enough others were present to constitute a really representative assembly; and the congress might never have been more than a conference of the most rebellious, but for the burning of Medina. On August 24 Adrian

[1] The walls, intact to-day, with partial restoration, are the glory of Ávila, which is the Carcassonne of Spain. The city and the churches are fully discussed in a justly enthusiastic chapter in Street (Ed. King. I) chap. VIII. The request and the permission to use the chapel (Aug. 16, 1520) are printed in Danv. I. 553–54. Santa Cruz (I. 248) says the military strength of the city was part of the reason for choosing it. For the 'Hall of the Comuneros,' cf. illustration.

[2] Danvila's list of those in attendance (I. 445) is, from his own subsequent text, impossible. The cathedral chapter later withdrew permission for any of its members to enter officially in the Junta (Danv. I. 554). Santa Cruz, I. 251, followed by Sandoval, VI. xx, has an incredible story: that a cloth-shearer, seated on a small bench in the midst, indicated with a staff who might speak. It seems unlikely that the presidents would have acquiesced in such a provision, or that business would have progressed at all. The story may be a reflection of the actual exercise, by some such humble person, of function as sergeant-at-arms.

could report,[1] 'In the assembly which is actually in session at Ávila there are deputies from the cities of Toledo, Segovia, Salamanca, and Toro. Zamora sent deputies there also, and recalled them, on the insistence of the Count of Alva de Liste, and principally because the city of Burgos had written them that she would labor to have the assembly in this city [Valladolid] so that all might better be concerted in my presence.'

Burgos, though committed a month earlier to some assembly, was still, under the Constable's coaxing, holding out for such a congress as might, through the Cardinal's approval, gain a color of legality. 'On the 18th of this month,' continues the Cardinal's report, 'the city of Burgos, through the Constable, asked me to give safe-conduct to their deputies and to those of other cities which might desire to come here [i.e., Valladolid] to petition of Your Majesty what they say is in your royal service and to the good of the realm; and the judgment of all is that we ought in no wise to refuse, for doubtless they would go with the other rebels to Ávila and the whole realm would gather in that same city, where it is believed they would make worse provisions than those they would make if they came here.'

The moderates put themselves earnestly back of the proposal of an authorized congress in Valladolid and for the first three weeks of August it seemed feasible.[2] Burgos went ahead, urging other cities, and even persuading Zamora to recall powers issued to deputies to Ávila;[3] and on August 22 chose her own deputies.[4]

On the day of the Burgos election, however, arrived the news from Medina; and the whole situation was changed. In Valladolid some were wise enough to see and point out to the Cardinal Governor that he must take decisive action in the crisis: 'We are asking aid and succor from the grandees,' reported Adrian, upon first news of the disaster,[5] 'that they may help us by negotiations toward pacifying matters; and it seems to almost all that in so grave a need I ought not to

[1] Danv. I. 482.

[2] Peter Martyr, Epist. DCLXXXIII, Aug. 29, reports that the Count of Benavente tried to enlist the local pride of Valladolid. His letter of the next day (DCLXXXIV) reports the situation as gradually slipping out of hand.

[3] Burgos to Zamora, Aug. 1; to Valladolid, Aug. 12 (Danv. I. 512); Zamora explained her reasons, with much irritation, to those who expostulated against her inconsistency. (Letter to Valladolid, Aug. 27, Danv. I. 534.)

[4] Danv. I. 512. [5] Letter to Carlos, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 485.

Sala de los Comuneros

On the east side of the cloister which lies south of the nave of Ávila Cathedral is a fine fifteenth-century hall, thirty feet by seventy, lighted by two large windows to the east, the chapel of Cardinal Davila y Mujica, containing his tomb. At its south end is an altar; a wrought-iron reja shuts off fifteen feet of its north end, which constitutes a passage from the cloister to the sacristy. A bold moulding bearing an inscribed text circles the hall, arching in semicircles over the windows. Here the Santa Junta met, until its adjournment to Tordesillas. *Cf.* Street, I. 239.



CAPILLA DEL CARDINAL, CATHEDRAL, ÁVILA
The 'Sala de los Comuneros'

await orders from Your Majesty, in view of the peril there is in delay, but to summon all the cities and towns to assemble here at once to celebrate Cortes, promising to give them my help with Your Highness, and that what they ask, be it just and reasonable, will not be refused.'

His Eminence was facing a situation in which he might well act on such a mood of defiance as possessed him once after the June tempest, when he had written D. Carlos:[1] 'If Your Majesty thus sees fit to tie my hands in all matters, I propose to quit this charge and hand over the government. And if you still insist that this provision [concerning some despatches] be observed, I will see to it that it is done; but also that Your Majesty hands over to another the said government; and Your Majesty may believe that I will not suffer this flouting or affront, but will get out.' If now he proposed to strike out in defiance of instructions, well and good — provided he did not delay till his disobedience failed of the success which would alone excuse it. The city of the Governor offered him an occasion: on this same 24th of August it petitioned Cardinal and Council 'that they grant permission for holding the junta and interpose therefor their authority and decree, since it was undertaken for the pacification of these realms and this city.'[2] But Adrian was distracted by the riots and burnings in Valladolid on the days preceding; and, in the absence of certain members of the Council who had fled in terror, was reluctant to act.

The Ávila radicals meanwhile were losing no momentary advantage through misgivings. Zamora, which had been flattered as a loyal city and rewarded by remission of tax on August 10,[3] was besought to recommission deputies to Ávila,[4] which, after apologetic explanation on August 27,[5] she on the next day[6] agreed to do. Jaén was plied with solicitations from the Junta, August 20,[7] and, after Medina, August 27;[8] and appointed deputies on September 5.[9] At the end of August arrived the deputies who represented Soria, a city which had earlier agreed to the Junta in Val-

[1] Letter of July 6, Danv. I. 418.
[2] Records of Commune of Valladolid, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 507.
[3] Danv. I. 506. [4] Letter from Valladolid Aug. 26, Danv. I. 509.
[5] Letter to Valladolid, Aug. 27, Danv. I. 534.
[6] *Ibid.*, Aug. 28, Danv. I. 535. The deputies started on Sep. 5. Letter to Valladolid, Sep. ?, Danv. II. 117.
[7] Danv. I. 496, 549. [8] *Ibid.*, 500. [9] *Ibid.*, 543.

ladolid.[1] Quiet and conservative León agreed on August 30 to send representatives to Ávila.[2] The burning of Medina had overturned the delicate balance which the Constable had established in Burgos. The fat old bishop, so deeply compromised in that affair, fled for his life and the mob destroyed his palace.[3] 'The Burgalese are the most important merchants of all those dedicated to commerce, and merchandises from the remotest parts pass from them as from a fountain-head to the other cities. For they import goods from the distant nations of Asia, Europe, and Africa, and also from the islands on the confines of the ocean, beyond the zodiac. . . . The burning of Medina touched them in a vital spot, for they always have their merchandises there deposited, awaiting opportune time for sale.'[4] Overswayed by them, and perhaps gratifying old grudges against Fonseca, the Constable had to shut his eyes and allow the radicals temporarily to take the lead. On August 28 the city wrote offering concerted action with Valladolid, in which she invited Córdoba to join.[5] Valladolid scarcely needed the drastic recommendations from the Ávila Junta which were inspired by indignation at the burning of Medina, viz., that she send deputies, and arrest the President and such other members of the Council as had advised the Medina campaign.[6] On the day when Adrian was hesitating to summon a Cortes, Valladolid voted to send Ávila deputies.[7]

Adrian by royal writ on August 31 summoned the Ávila congress to Valladolid — a writ duly communicated to Ávila with safe-conduct for the deputies;[8] but it was too late — the Junta would scarcely grant audience to the

[1] Letter of Soria to Valladolid, Aug. 16, Danv. I. 541. Letter of Valladolid to Ávila Junta, undated, but, from its context, after Aug. 29. It is not quite clear whether the Soria deputies had arrived in Valladolid or in Ávila, Danv. I. 509.

[2] Letter to Zamora, Aug. 30, Danv. I. 536; II. 145.

[3] Maldonado, 126.

[4] *Ibid.* The Burgalese were even jeered for their commercialism; cf. Maldonado, 217.

[5] *Ibid.* Danvila's summary (I. 512) leaves it doubtful whether Burgos intended concerted action in Ávila or, as by her first desire, in Valladolid; but as the invitation to Córdoba was renewed after the cities had joined in Ávila, Burgos was apparently determined to share in the Santa Junta.

[6] Letters of Aug. 23 and 24, Danv. I. 498–99.

[7] Records of the Valladolid Commune, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 507. They were selected on Sep. 5 (Danv. II. 45) and reported at Tordesillas (Danv. II. 49).

[8] Danv. I. 509.

bearer.[1] The Santa Junta had already undertaken an independent career.

What would the Ávila congress prove to be, an impressive conference to draw resolutions and present them with mingled respect and threat to the Cardinal Governor? or essentially a Cortes, claiming authority yet without proposing fundamental change in the government of Castile? or even a sort of convention to reorganize the state? Doubtless all shades of intent were represented among the deputies; and chance and the conduct of the Valladolid administration would determine which group gained control. The instructions issued to their deputies by two of the chief cities[2] indicate the extent to which demands might go; but the deputies thus instructed would doubtless face that common dilemma of all convention deputies: the harmonizing of demands made under no restriction but desire, with the majority opinion as to what was feasible when hundreds of such desires sought a common fulfillment.

The Burgos deputies brought a programme which, though drawn at a time of immense public indignation, was much like the petitions of grievance of an ordinary Cortes, including, indeed, many of the familiar *capítulos*. Beyond these, certain demands reflected the acutest grievances of the time: that no office be given to foreigners, and that governors and bishops be native, and the bishops in residence; that His Majesty's interference in the election and commissioning of the Santiago deputies should not be repeated, but such elections and empowering should be quite free; that the deputies be quite free to consult their cities, and receive no rewards or favors. Of more direct political pertinence were the demands that Chièvres and the obnoxious Spaniards such as Mota be dismissed from the royal

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 9, Danv. II. 17. Santa Cruz (I. 252) says he was even forbidden to enter the city. Santa Cruz has correctly noted the delayed accession of Soria, Valladolid, Burgos, and León (I. 262). P. Martyr (Epist. DCLXXXV, Sep. 13) says the bearer was the Comendador Hinestrosa. The same curt denial of audience to the later emissaries of the Cardinal is recorded by Martyr (Epist. DCXCI) Oct. 3: 'missos a Cardinali duos Episcopos, Lucensem et Ovetensem, cum mandatis de concordia, inauditos neque admissos in oppidum remiserint.' The Junta captains realized the blunder and tried to explain to the Cardinal (Epist. DCXCI *ad fin.*). When it was later reported (P. Martyr, Epist. DCXCIII, Oct. 22) that Adrian would in person visit the Junta, the Comuneros imposed humiliating provisos.

[2] Danvila, *Poder Civil en España* (V. 200), gives those of Valladolid, summarized in Danv. I. 447 ff. Those of Burgos (Danv. I. 449 ff.) were drawn up evidently after the events of August 21.

household; and Fonseca and Ronquillo arrested; that the Junta cities organize a force to protect any city in need: and that a general pardon cover all the offenses of the recent disorders. The only items in any way operating toward constitutional change were two: that the cities might assemble annually to concert petitions to the King; and that special grants or *servicios* in Cortes be abandoned, the administration contenting itself with the established forms of taxation.[1]

To such a programme, could he transfer the Junta to Valladolid, the Cardinal Governor would probably in considerable measure agree. But the radicals in Ávila had much more far-reaching proposals.

The Valladolid deputies were commissioned to obtain the usual Cortes demands, often in their most exigent form: no offices must be sold or given to foreigners; the sales taxes must be restored to the sum at which they were commuted in the *encabezamiento* of Isabel's time; Chièvres must be proclaimed a public enemy. Other proposals amounted to essential reform of the state: that Cortes assemble every two or three years; that the towns elect their deputies (thus securing popular control, instead of the lot, which might result in the sending of Court sympathizers); that in Cortes consideration of redress should precede other business, and no Cortes terminate until redress were obtained; that no special grants or *servicios* be thereafter allowed (as Burgos also asked). The most radical suggestions in the Valladolid programme were these: that they make certain in regard to the Queen's illness, and replace her household; and that the Junta's acts have final authority, to be duly reported to the Queen for her approval, and enforced by the Junta cities.[2]

[1] Danv. I. 449 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, 447 ff.

CHAPTER IX

JUANA, BY THE GRACE OF GOD . . .

A FEELING long smouldering in Castile might be used by the Comuneros with great effect, the sympathy felt for Isabel's daughter, the Queen — for years the sport of the contest between Fernando and Felipe, and for years thereafter shut in Tordesillas by a self-imposed privacy of grief, and also, as was generally believed, by the cynical craft of the Flemings, who wished no considerations to hamper the full authority of D. Carlos which they exercised for their own profit. In Valladolid and again in Coruña, petition was made for more respectful treatment of Doña Juana. Much indignation was felt because, while she still lived, her son, against the protest of the royal council, assumed royal title, and when Emperor-elect placed his name before hers in royal writs.[1] The Communes which rose in the revolted cities took pains to speak in the name of 'The Queen, the King, and the Commune'; even the Constable in Burgos had been thus deferential.

Did Castile perchance owe her more than this nominal consideration? If, in her retirement, she felt a real interest and were slowly recovering capacity to exercise a real influence in public affairs, it would become of the greatest importance which party in the state had her confidence, or even the control of her person: the duel of Felipe and Fernando might be renewed, and Juana become a pawn in the struggle of the national party against the foreign court, as she had been of the national regent against the foreign king.

Fonseca, in the chagrin and despair of his fiasco in Medina, seemed to think he might accomplish something to offset that disaster by a counterstroke — the occupation of Tordesillas and the palace of the Queen. Immediately — even before dark on the day of the burning of Medina — he marched to Tordesillas, only to find the town, which sympathized with the Communes, risen to resist him.[2]

[1] Rodríguez Villa, 270; Sandoval, II. iv–x.

[2] Santa Cruz alone of the chroniclers records this (I. 256); but he is confirmed by references in Adrian's letters. P. Martyr also records it (Epist. DCLXXXI) and declares that the Marquis of Denia, at the insistence of the town, refused

Admission was not, however, refused to the President and certain members of the Council, who came on August 25 [1] to obtain from Juana signature of proclamations against the Comuneros. To the Councillors the Queen complained that for fifteen years she had not been treated with honesty or due respect. (It was in March, 1504, that she had first been put under restraint in la Mota castle in Medina.) 'The Marquis of Denia,' she added, turning to the gentleman who conducted her household, 'is the first to lie to me.' The Marquis knelt and with tears in his eyes explained that he had indeed deceived her, but only to spare her suffering — for example in the death of her father, which he now announced to her. 'Bishop, believe me,' returned the bewildered woman, 'all they tell me and all I see seems a dream.' Rojas recalled her to the critical business in hand: 'Lady, in your hands (after God) lies the cure of these realms.' And again the wary Queen balked at signing papers. She dismissed them with direction for further interview on the morrow, Sunday. At the opening of that meeting there was a pretty incident. Should the Councillors remain kneeling or sit? His Grace suggested: 'Lady, the Council should not remain thus.' So she ordered seats; and when they brought chairs she directed: 'Not chairs but a bench; for so they used in the life of my lady the Queen, and a chair for the Bishop.' After six hours of consultation it was agreed that they should return to Valladolid and draw the papers in consultation with the rest of the Council and she would sign.[2]

Meanwhile the failure of Fonseca was a challenge to Padilla's forces, even if they had not already planned a similar stroke.[3] Only three days after the Medina business Adrian wrote: [4] 'Report runs that they will come to this city (Val-

admission. A letter to the President of Aug. 23 shows there was a plan for transferring Juana to Arévalo.

[1] The date is not certain. The only record is Sandoval, VI. xxv, which states that the day following was Sunday. The Council had not time to finish their proposals before Padilla was in Tordesillas, which was Wednesday, Aug. 29. It seems unlikely that the Council's interview was so much earlier as Saturday, Aug. 18, before Medina was burned.

[2] Rodríguez Villa, 293 ff.

[3] So early as July 18 the corregidor of Salamanca wrote the Cardinal that he was informed from Ávila and Segovia that the Junta was desired mainly to concert a march on Tordesillas 'to take off our lady the Queen in order, through having her royal person in their hands, to give color to their business.' Danv. I. 433.

[4] To D. Carlos, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 483, 485.

ladolid) and make us flee, and thence go to Tordesillas to see what our lady the Queen may command of them.... D. Juan de Padilla with his army, they say, is now in Medina; and to-day or to-morrow will go to Tordesillas to take possession of our lady the Queen. Tordesillas refused to receive Fonseca and his troops. We are trying through the intercession of this city to prevent the said D. Juan from attempting anything so odious and so evil.' In his weekly report of August 31 he had to report that this visit had actually occurred:[1] 'On the 29th [Padilla] entered Tordesillas. They will take our lady the Queen, it is said, wherever they choose. The people of Tordesillas refused to receive Your Majesty's force; and now they allow the Toledans to enter. They have solicited the Queen many times to give directions in these tumults and outrages: Her Highness has answered them prudently in some respects, though she has mingled therewith certain things whereby one might easily see that Her Highness is not completely herself. But of that the populace takes whatever makes for their own case and the accomplishment of their designs, and refuses to consider or respect anything to the contrary.... Though they have tried in many ways to induce Her Highness to sign, they have never been able to accomplish it, nor is it believed they will. It is said the deputies assembled in Ávila propose, with the Queen's authority, to set up a governor or governors and detain and seize all the revenues....'

Padilla — as Ronquillo and Fonseca retired to Arévalo, preparatory to their advance on Medina — had followed, passing to the west, to keep his troops from plundering in the Fonseca villages and thus getting out of hand.[2] He entered Medina shortly after it was burned, and while there received three separate messages from Tordesillas, informing him of Fonseca's visit and asking him to come to the town; as, having secured the artillery which Fonseca had missed in Medina, he hastened to do.[3]

His conduct in the town, which he reached August 29,

[1] Danv. I. 490.

[2] Letter to Junta, Aug. 23, Danv. I. 497.

[3] Adrian to Carlos, Aug. 31, Danv. I. 490. Padilla to Junta, Aug. 27, enclosed in a letter of the Junta on Aug. 28, Danv. I. 502–04. Rodríguez Villa (307) quotes from Padilla's letter, misdating it Aug. 28. Padilla wrote to excuse his acting without Junta authority, on the ground of urgency: presumably he started the same day, Aug. 27. Mexía, 156–57. Alcocer (46), always favorable to Padilla, represents him as acting by Junta order.

was circumspect. Welcomed by the townspeople, he paraded and saluted before the palace, whence the Queen indicated that the captains should wait upon her. Elaborately witnessed and verified record was taken of the interview.[1] Padilla explained his mission; that the realm was in great disorder through misgovernment, in the absence of her son, and they were come to secure against certain tyrants her liberty, and that of the Infanta Catalina — at which latter reference the Queen was much moved. Certain cities, he explained, had formed a congress to serve and defend her; and it would be well to learn what she most desired and whether it were her wish that they serve her in Tordesillas. Juana gave clear assent.[2] The report with affidavits Padilla sent forthwith to Valladolid, expressing much satisfaction: the Queen 'was more open with us (*se estendió*) than anybody here has ever seen her in seven years. . . . We think we have done a good day's work, very serviceable . . . to the good of all the Communes, and laid good foundation for the peace and quiet and good governance of these realms.'[3]

[1] Mexía, whose account (156–57) corresponds so closely with this record (reproduced in Danv. I. 467–72) that it seems certain he used it, declares such records perjured fabrications. The temptation to circulate such is evident; but the record claims so much less than Sandoval reports that it seems genuine. The authority obtained, even if the record is true, is inconsiderable.

[2] There is no trace of Sandoval's report (VI. xxvi) that the Queen commissioned Padilla as Captain-General.

[3] Padilla to Valladolid, Aug. 30, Danv. I. 472. Peter Martyr (Epistola DCLXXXV, Sep. 13) records the whole episode and the grave consequence that might follow if the Queen consented to sign papers: 'recusat diplomati cuiquam imponere manum: quod si faceret, actum de nostri Caesaris esset auctoritate, vivente matre praesertim.' Further maneuvering to secure her signature he reports in Epist. DCXCI, Oct. 3.

CHAPTER X

THE KING SHALL DESIST . . .

'If at any time Our Lord in His mercy should restore her reason to the most Serene Queen Doña Juana his mother, the King shall desist from the governance of Castile; and all and wholly that shall be done which she commands, for to him they gave only title of King and control of the state, and to his mother remained whole and entire the right and dominion of the realms of Castile; and thus it was proclaimed with much solemnity by the King.' [1] Upon this point of honor the deputies of the Cortes of Valladolid had insisted in 1518. It was now a clear foundation of right if the Queen were really recovered. 'The servants and attendants of the Queen say publicly that her father and son have held her under tyrannical restraint and that she is as capable of government as she was at the age of fifteen and as the Queen Doña Isabel was.' [2] Should the Comunero leaders succeed in obtaining consistent directions from her, 'the whole realm,' Adrian warned his master, 'repudiating its obedience to Your Highness, will obey the orders of our lady the Queen. For already they say she can do as much as Your Highness, except sign her name (which they have not yet managed to have her do), since all that Your Majesty has done or does is through the hand of others, simply agreeing to and signing what they have decided; and this the Queen will be able to do.' [3]

That Her Majesty was really sane Adrian did not believe, nor that the Comunero leaders believed it either. 'The captains, who have been for several days in Tordesillas, see well that the Queen is not herself, as some have told me who heard so from the captains themselves; but all the same, if Her Highness through fear or flattery says or orders anything which suits their purpose or intent, they at once take a deposition thereof and spread report among the people

[1] Santa Cruz, I. 169.

[2] Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 4, Danv. II. 8. Almost identical statement in Adrian to D. Carlos, also Sep. 4, Danv. II. 10.

[3] *Ibid.* 10. It is interesting to speculate whether these letters of Sep. 4 extorted the concessions which the Court was, on Sep. 14, on the point of dispatching. Cf. Peter Martyr, Epist. DCXCII.

that Her Highness is capable of governing, as was the Queen Doña Isabel her mother, of glorious memory. I hear that in the Junta they are considering and disputing whether they should issue orders in the name of the Queen and Your Highness together, or only in the Queen's. Toledo, Madrid, Segovia, and what other cities I know not, say Your Majesty's name should be cancelled and that of the Queen only and the Communes substituted. Valladolid, Burgos, Soria, Toro, and other cities insist that said orders should be made out in the name of Her Highness and of Your Majesty; it is uncertain which side will prevail.'[1] Peter Martyr's gossip, on September 16, was that a majority out of thirteen cities voted to abolish Carlos's title, but over a minority so determined that they abandoned their purpose.[2]

Among the popular leaders there were not wanting some of delicacy sufficient to resent this exploiting of the pathetic sovereign. 'On the 12th of this month,' reported the Cardinal,[3] 'in a conversation with D. Pedro Girón, I told him of the authorization which the Communes are trying to secure, — namely, the commands of the Queen as of a person who is sane — and he told me as at other times that he should entirely detest such a course; and also, to satisfy his conscience therein, that so far as he could he would try to stop the business. He is assembling some troops for the defense of his person and that he may more freely and boldly speak out on this matter.'

Still, so long as all who approached Juana tactfully could obtain from her on almost any business a vague assent, it was essential that the Court party should not exploit her authority. To control her communications it was necessary either to seize the city or remove her from the city. Against removing her were opposed Juana's own hysterical resistance and a sympathetic public sentiment. Adrian sent secret assurances through her confessor that Fonseca's visit had no such purpose;[4] and Valladolid voiced a sentiment probably general in a message to its Junta deputies: 'We have already written you in other letters that it was quite right that the Communes of these realms and their armies,

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 23, Danv. II. 30.

[2] Letter summarized from R.A.H. MS. in Danv. II. 65. It is printed in the *Opus Epistolarum*, Epist. DCLXXXVIII.

[3] Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 14, Danv. II. 22.

[4] To D. Carlos, Sep. 14, Danv. II. 22.

without making any transfer of the person of our Lady the Queen without her wish, from the city where she is, should establish such security and guard of the royal person and household that the enemies of the welfare of these realms could not get possession of her.' [1]

For the Junta to forbid communication between the Queen and the Royal Council [2] was idle so long as access was had for the Court party through the permission of the Marquis of Denia and his wife, whom D. Carlos left as masters of his mother's household. Through her confessor Adrian was urging the Queen not to sign papers;[3] and what other channels of communication existed could only be surmised. Denia was attacked by both sides. The Queen's servants, disliking him, encouraged the Queen's dislike;[4] but the Infanta Catalina supported him and wrote a protest against removing him, to the city of Valladolid, which, among the Cortes cities demurred strongly to the plan.[5] The Vallisoletan deputies had fully to justify to their city the case against Denia: that, as her servants testify, he was tyrannical and negligent of her comfort; that he willingly contributed to the troops who went against Medina; that he corresponded with Fonseca and would have taken him into the town had not the town prevented; and that he kept Juana ignorant and thwarted the Comunero movement.[6] The Court party on the other hand held him responsible for Fonseca's failure to occupy Tordesillas, which might have prevented the disastrous results following upon the Comuneros' possessing Juana's royal person.[7]

[1] Letter to the captains, Sep. 2, Danv. II. 43. The captains protested (to Valladolid, Sep. 3, Danv. II. 44) they never proposed to remove the Queen, nor would do so without the approval of the Queen and of the realm. Burgos wrote Padilla, Sep. 1 (Danv. II. 103), to the same effect as Valladolid, with more anxious concern that all the royal provisions should continue. P. Martyr's letter of Oct. 22 (DCXCIII) records that, on a proposal to transfer Juana to Toledo, Valladolid invited her to come there.

[2] Deputy H. de Ulloa of Toro and D. Pedrolasso so urged. The Ávila Junta had already ordered the arrest of the Councillors responsible for the Medina affair. Danv. II. 51, 65.

[3] His own statement to D. Carlos, Sep. 14, Danv. II. 22. [4] Danv. II. 21.

[5] Adrian's report, Sep. 23, Danv. II. 29. The Infanta's letter, Danv. II. 60.

[6] Deputies to Valladolid, Danv. II. 53 (duplicated in II. 305). Danvila dates the document Sep. 11 on p. 52, and Oct. 2 on p. 304. The text gives only the day Tuesday: both Sep. 11 and Oct. 2 are Tuesdays; but the latter date is impossible, for the letter says: *We received to-day a letter in which you say, if the Marquis is not removed, not to agree to it.* Denia was removed Sep. 19 and reported so himself in Valladolid Sep. 20. (His own account in Danv. II. 70.)

[7] Santa Cruz, I. 256.

Toledo, and especially D. Pedrolasso, was determined, and influential; so after repeated summons, three deputies — of Segovia, Salamanca, and León — were sent to eject the Marquis, agents described as follows in Pedrolasso's letter to Padilla:[1] 'The Bachiller of Guadalajara, with whom he might talk more clearly than with the others, because he was a substantial person; the Comendador Almaraz, to whom it was well to pay much honor, because that was all he wanted; and Fray Pablo, who was rather empty but liked to have everything go through his hands.' Upon summons Denia agreed to follow an order from the Queen: but this, he reported, they would not ask, 'because the captains had already thrice asked Her Highness if she ordered them to remove me and Her Highness said no.'[2] Before a show of force Denia withdrew, September 19; and in Valladolid, 'at the time I knew the town council was in session, I went to report this business; for I knew they had not approved it, but many times opposed. And they were in fact grieved and said many good words thereabout. . . . Yesterday in Valladolid I received two letters from Your Majesty, one of August 24;[3] and therewith the despatch Your Majesty sent to the city of Tordesillas. I did not deliver it for they have not deserved it. If Your Majesty had given order to provide in time what I asked for the guard of Tordesillas, many insults would have been avoided which were there offered to our lady the Queen and Your Majesty and the Infanta . . . I shall go to Burgos to report all, for though in general they are associated with the other cities for the business of the realm, in regard to Your Majesty's service, they and Valladolid and other cities are favorable and were much opposed to my departure from Tordesillas.'

With the Queen thus quite at their disposal the new government, of Queen, King, and Communes, held in the Tordesillas palace on September 24, a solemn inaugural with a speech from the throne, in which the monarch explained her long absence from affairs in terms haunted with that note of plaintive inconsequence which marks all her utterances and communications. Twelve of the eighteen Cortes cities were represented, by deputies including the nobility, the clergy,

[1] Summarized in Danv. II. 65.

[2] Denia to D. Carlos, Sep. 22, Danv. II. 70.

[3] Evidently long delayed. For letter speed cf. p. 51, n. 1.

and the commons.[1] D. Pedrolasso kneeling and kissing her hand explained to Juana that he represented Toledo, the first and chief city which had taken steps for her service and the good of the realms; and that the deputies of the other cities were there present, asking to serve and obey her, and imploring her to exert herself to rule and govern the realm. After due presentation of all, Dr. Zúñiga, professor of Salamanca, proffered the loyalty of her subjects and their request that she would reign. They grieved, said the venerable doctor, 'for the evil and the great harm that these your realms have suffered and still suffer because of the ill governance there since God saw fit to take to himself your father the Catholic King, and after Your Highness's son our prince entered these Your Highness's realms with those his foreign people — which Your Highness knows better than none other. Which people treated these your realms so ill that, beside many and great wrongs they did there . . . they left us almost penniless.'

Doña Juana replied: 'After God saw fit to take to Himself my lady the Catholic Queen, I always obeyed and respected my lord the King, my father . . . and with him I had no concern that there might be any who would venture to do ill things. And when I learned how God chose to take him to Himself, I felt it sorely . . . ; and would he were alive, for his life was more necessary than mine. Since I had to learn it, I wish I had learned it earlier, to repair matters as much as I might. . . . And because I have always had ill companionship and they have told me falsehoods and lies and led me into deceptions; and because I should like to be in a position to undertake affairs so far as I was capable — still, since my lord the King placed me here (I know not whether through her who entered into the place of my lady the Queen [2] or through other considerations which His Highness knew of), I could not otherwise. And when I learned of the foreigners who entered and were in Castile, I grieved much thereat, and thought they were come to undertake matters for the good of my boys; and it was not so. And I am amazed that you did not take vengeance on them who

[1] Every Cortes city of New and Old Castile except Zamora was represented; and Sigüenza. The three Andalusian cities were absent, Jaén, Córdoba, Sevilla; and the two Cortes cities of the far South, Murcia and Granada. Sandoval, VI. xxx; Rodríguez Villa, 315 ff.; Mexía, 159.

[2] I.e., Germaine, second wife of D. Fernando.

had done evil. . . . If I did not interfere it was that they might neither there nor here do harm to my boys; and I cannot believe that they have gone, though I am told positively that they have. . . . And I am delighted that you should undertake to remedy things done ill . . . and so far as I can I will undertake it too, here and in any other place. And if here I cannot undertake much, it will be because I must take some time to quiet and strengthen my heart from the death of my lord the King; and when I have disposition thereto I will undertake it.'

Duly attested record of these events 'gave the greatest delight to the people, and they accounted it a miracle that the Queen, after so many years of confinement, so completely withdrawn from the business and governing of her realms that scarcely any one saw her, should now emerge in a time of such need, with so much intelligence and so clear judgment for the rule of these realms. They praised God that He had been thus merciful to Spain; though it is true that those were not lacking who said that these testimoni als were false and forged by members of the Junta; that the Queen had neither the intelligence to attend to these matters nor could be dealt with. And this was said not only in Valladolid but in many places.' [1]

[1] Sandoval, VI. xxxi: 'Pedro Mexía writes in agreement with this opinion, in treating of the matter: I write what I find in one who saw it and was not a Comunero nor friend of theirs.' Cf. Mexía, 157–58.

That this speech from the throne, like most others, was prepared by the leaders seems likely from the number of references which, though natural in their context, appear almost certainly calculated to appeal to popular resentments (e.g., the reference to Q. Germaine, and to her boys, a reminder of the regretted Infante Fernando). But there may be discovered also the sincere and pathetic note perceptible in Doña Juana's letter to de Vere of May, 1505. Cf. *supra*, pp. 13–14. Martyr (Epist. DCXCI) has a distorted rumor about this ceremony, and mentions the jousting arranged in celebration of it.

CHAPTER XI

THE RIVER GATE OF VALLADOLID

By disbanding the existing forces commanded by Fonseca, did the Crown government propose merely to acquiesce in the Comunero direction of the state? Adrian recognized that he was for the moment quite helpless. His own city it was utterly vain, in the first fury of indignation about Medina, to resist. 'Such was the revolt that occurred on the same day here in Valladolid that all agreed we could not refuse aught they might ask; and indeed they are in a position freely, in private and in public, to say what they please; and almost all the preachers — even in my presence — venture to say that the public has good ground for revolt, considering the destitution of the realm caused by the draining off of money, and because offices and benefices have been given to foreigners and none given to natives save by purchase. . . . Report runs that they will come with 1500 foot from Toledo and Madrid and other troops which they will have from Salamanca, Ávila, Segovia, and Toro: a total toward 7000, including horse and foot — to this city, and will chase us out; and hence go to Tordesillas and see what the Queen may direct. At present certainly it is not well to fight them; and even though we wished we could not, for lack of money. The advice of all is that we should summon the grandees to help us against the revolted towns.' [1]

Since therefore he was obliged to abandon coercion, the Cardinal, until the assembly of the grandees should place in his hands the power to threaten, might entreat. His negotiations depended, however, upon whatever confidence he might by his personal qualities have won among the Castilian leaders; upon whatever real authority to concede and pardon D. Carlos would entrust to him; and upon personal freedom from coercion, if any really remained to him in a city where he was virtually a prisoner.

His letter first announcing to the King the Medina disaster repeated, even more insistently than the long series preceding, the appeal for power. 'Things are going here much

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 484.

otherwise than Your Majesty might suppose; and I believe not even a large army would suffice to check or discipline the audacity of these rebels. Of one thing only I am rejoiced: they all generally love Your Majesty, and say they aim solely to work and remedy the grievances which have been done them by Your Highness or your Councillors. We are asking aid and succor from the grandees so that through negotiation they may help us toward pacification. . . . Though the rebel cities repudiate me as governor — because a foreigner — personally so far as I understand, they are well disposed; and I have never feared nor do I fear any danger. . . . It is very necessary that Your Highness give me authority to pardon wholly certain cities not very guilty; and maybe it will be necessary to forgive and pardon all, if we are not already to expect worse consequences. All seem to be of this opinion, for they see no remedy otherwise; and the party of the rebels increases continually and ours decreases.' [1]

How much even liberal clemency might gain was now dubious; but Adrian hoped perhaps to prevent the assemblage of an unauthorized junta of cities, or at least to moderate the resolutions there taken. With the close of August, abandoned by many of the Royal Council, he felt himself able to undertake little more. 'There is not a city that may be reduced to obedience save by granting remission of all the past. . . . Almost all the cities, and even Burgos, Valladolid, and Guadalajara, want to send deputies to that congress — which certainly I have no means, nor can find any, to prevent; unless Your Majesty allow and grant me authority to pardon all or some as we may see is best fitting. . . . As for the taxes and the [Coruña] grant and *cruzadas*, we have with great effort in some cities prevented them from stopping these; but ultimately all of them — those who purport to obey Your Majesty as well as the rest — will withhold them, unless by pardon of the past and by explicit agreements we may succeed in getting them not to sequestrate the money from said taxes, grant, and *cruzadas*.[2] . . . Many of the Council and other officials are threatened. The

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 486–88.

[2] This tax, originally, as its name implies, demanded for the war on the Moor (that 'crusade' did not for Spain become obsolete with the Middle Ages), had been diverted to all sorts of purposes, not without constant protest in Cortes *capítulos*. There was general reluctance to pay it unless for the purpose originally justifying it.

President, Zapata, Vargas, D. Alonso de Castilla, Vozmediano and his brother Suárez, and even the Comendador Mayor of Castile, and many others have fled to escape so grave a danger. If they all go I shall finally follow them; but we know not where in Castile we could be safe. I have said I am content to be sacrificed and suffer for them, and stand firm here until all who are afraid be gone; for they would not permit us to depart in a body, and if I went first they would doubtless seize those who staid. To all the grandees and wisest of the realm and to me it seems necessary to use clemency and to pardon what at another time could not be forgiven, in order that from the revolts there may not follow nor be committed things worse than those already done; and lest there be thereafter no remedy save with a great army and through war — the outcome of which is always uncertain. . . . As to what happens here and has to be provided for, I know not whose judgment to consult; for many of the Council have gone, and they who stay with me are so frightened that in whatever they undertake they seem more concerned to get their persons and property into safety than anything else.' [1]

Adrian's usefulness as Governor might seem pretty much to have expired, and he himself continued to urge that he be relieved and a native appointed in his place. Such a step he counselled in his own letters and by the personal messenger, Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, a gentleman of His Majesty's household, about to return from Castile to the Court, through whom the Cardinal felt confident of getting his ideas directly before the King without their being intercepted by the Court camarilla. By Lope and by letter the Governor presented a grave picture of the situation as the autumn began. 'Almost all the attendants and servants of the Queen say Her Highness has been outraged and detained by force for fourteen years in that castle as if she were not sane, though she has always been of sound sense and as intelligent as she was at the beginning of her marriage. By these servants, it is said, others have been stirred up and set on to place Her Highness in freedom and to have the government directed by her authority. If the business comes off thus, the end of my charge will soon come; and I do not see that we can hold any city to the royal obedience. If Your Majesty promptly grants authority to forgive and

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Aug. 31, Danv. I. 489 ff.

pardon everything, we should save one or two cities so that we might somewhere be secure.

'At the start Your Highness did not see fit to leave the money apportioned; and now, if these commands continue, none can be had. I am spending here the little I have and I cannot get paid what is owing me from the past year nor from what I loaned Your Highness in Barcelona, still less from what has been apportioned for the duration of the governorship. And since my presence here will be useless and superfluous, I shall assume Your Highness's permission, and go. . . . The chief Councillors are gone. There is no money — not even to pay the posts.' [1]

The Cardinal's letter of September 9 [2] remarks that no royal communications have come since August 20, and indicates the critical situation of the administration in Valladolid. 'The President came back here and it raised such a riot and the populace murmured so that, after the first warning served on me by this city, they sent me at seven o'clock to-day three deputies to tell me the grave peril in which he stands for his personal safety; and that I ought in no wise to permit him to go with me to vespers: all which I reported to the Council, and they were of opinion that we must bow to the storm, to avoid greater troubles. So the said President went off the same day between three and four, accompanied some distance from the city by the Count of Benavente and members of the Council.[3] Many feel we must quit this city, for it is chaos; because the Commune attempts in our presence high-handed undertakings without judicial procedure, destroying houses and seizing property of those who stood by Your Majesty's service. Sevilla and Córdoba, having heard of the disorders in this city, asked me and the Council to consent to go thither, offering us aid to reduce these realms to obedience to Your Majesty and pacify them. We should indeed like to be already in one of those cities; but I fear, as this plague has corrupted and infected Jaén and other places, it may attack those cities too.' A refuge no more acceptable the Cardinal indicated in a report five days later:[4] 'It is astounding that in all Old Castile there is

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 4, Danv. II. 9. Cf. instructions to Lope of the same date, Danv. II. 7.

[2] Danv. II. 17.

[3] Peter Martyr (Epist. DCLXXXV and DCLXXXVI, both of Sep. 13), in Valladolid, writes that the President, after a previous flight, had been induced to return, under pledge of security, by the popular leaders.

[4] To D. Carlos, Sep. 14, Danv. II. 20.

hardly a place where we may be safe and that does not join and stand with the other rebels. The grandees offer us their domains (*lugares*), . . . but, in everybody's judgment, if we should go to any lord's domain, the Communes would start a greater tumult; and it would not be honorable nor advantageous for Your Majesty, for it would look as if we had been expelled from your domain. . . . [The Councillors] say I should have in association with me some native of these realms for the government thereof; but I think it better and fitter that Your Highness, relieving me of this charge, should entrust it entirely to some native, so as thereby to satisfy wholly what the cities claim is a violation of the laws of the realm: that rule is in the control of foreigners.'

The experience of the President hinted to Adrian himself that he was not even free to leave his capital. He applied to the city for leave to go about the royal business. 'I spoke to the people of this city to permit us to go to the realm of Navarre to undertake the defense of that realm so that the French should not seize or enter it (especially since, with an eye on these realms, Your Highness omitted to send the 3000 Germans that Your Majesty had destined to the guard and preservation of the said realm). Your Highness will believe that it is not fitting that we should go secretly and *hospite insalutato*. . . . It is said they have consulted the Ávila Junta and are awaiting answer what they must do. Many say they will not let us go.' [1]

The answer from Ávila was an order of deposition. Adrian reported on September 23: [2] 'We hear from many that the Junta has written and ordered this city to forbid me and the Council from undertaking affairs of these realms. . . . As their orders are obeyed, it will be necessary and unavoidable to quit this place and governorship.' The formal summons was served on Council and Governor, September 21. 'I will stay here as long as my small means permit me to maintain myself; and when I have not enough to sustain myself and my household, I shall be obliged — within a few days — to go elsewhere, where I may spend less and raise a loan.' [3]

Three days after this writing all illusion of freedom vanished. 'On the 28th there entered this city Juan de Padilla

[1] Danv. II. 21.

[2] To D. Carlos, Sep. 23, Danv. II. 29.

[3] Danv. II. 31. Peter Martyr (Epist. DCXCI) reports the insolent presentation of the Junta ultimatum by the Dominican Friar, Alonso de Medina.

and Juan Bravo; Juan Zapata and Suero de Águila had entered two days before. And they have put in the said city 300 lances and 400 foot, with resolve taken to carry all the Councillors under arrest to Tordesillas.' This business they put through as Adrian reported in a postscript of the day following.[1] 'They were so diligent in seizing the Councillors that, though many had withdrawn, they took, after Dr. Beltrán, Doctors Palacios Rubios, Cabrero, and Tello. Yesterday, Sunday,[2] when I was in Nuestra Señora de Prado, they took them under public arrest and removed them from the city with trumpets and drums, and came to inform me, saying they proposed to arrest me too. Seeing this, that they might not suppose I was running away, I agreed to return to this city. For I prefer they should arrest me openly and before all rather than catch me as a fugitive. And so I have resolved at this very moment to leave, to test and see what they will choose to do; and, if they allow me to depart, to go to Medina de Rioseco.'[3]

'At this point,' Adrian's letter resumes in a further postscript, 'I mounted to depart. There came with me the Apostolic Nuncio and the Bishops of Lugo and Oviedo, and all those of the Inquisition, and some gentlemen and others of the Court living here. When I reached the gate at the bridge I found it shut; and I made there summons under many penalties to those that were guarding it, that they should open the gate for me; and they said they had not the key. Throughout this morning there was such uproar through the city that there gathered at the gate 3000 armed men, who came with D. Pedro Girón, Juan de Padilla, and Suero de Águila. D. Pedro Girón spoke with me, telling me in order to avoid riots not to depart but to stay in the city. So I was forced to return with those above mentioned; and here I am, rather imprisoned than free, and suffering to see all Spain going to her ruin.'

Mob tactics had improved in six months; the royal fugitive had escaped through that very gate in the preceding spring.[4]

[1] Letter of Sep. 30–Oct. 1, Danv. II. 236–37. Cf. Mexía, 168; P. Martyr, Epist. DCXCI.

[2] September 30, 1520.

[3] A town of the Admiral's twenty-seven miles northwest of Valladolid.

[4] Martyr heard that the Viceroy's bodyguard wanted to break through the gates and make a stand at the bridgehead to detain the mob. (Epist. DCXCI *ad fin.*)

CHAPTER XII

TRIUMVIRS

'CARDINAL ADRIAN, who was a saint, kept seeking possible means to remedy all these troubles by conciliation and gentleness, as charitableness required';[1] the method and the personality alike appropriate to the task of winning the confidence of an irritated people, provided its irritation did not pass to violence. D. Carlos's advisers had quite failed to see that two years of Flemish extortion, crowned by the Coruña jobbery and the defiant nomination of a foreigner as governor, would certainly goad irritation into violence. That the Cardinal accomplished little in appeasing Castilian society during the riotous June, that he had to bow entirely before the fury of wrath provoked by the burning of Medina, did not mean necessarily that his administration was quite discredited or incompetent. Still, if the issue, as seemed increasingly clear, must terminate in war, he was temperamentally unfitted, perhaps positively unwilling, to remain.

September 5 the King placed the government in a commission, a triumvirate in which he retained Adrian and added the Constable, whose influence might be expected to hold loyal his native Burgos, and the Admiral, an elderly noble who had at least the advantage of being retired from political life to his remote estates in the Eastern realms, to make his soul.[2] Both nobles were moderates inclined first to conciliation yet both as military men readier than Adrian to handle the possible outcome of war. The retention of the Cardinal saved the face of the government and secured for the new administration something of the confidence that the Cardinal's rectitude had already won. 'I think it would have given more satisfaction,' he wrote, 'if only natives of the realm had been nominated thereto. And, though I remain to serve Your Majesty as I desire, I could more easily have helped by counsel than carrying matters by force of

[1] Sandoval, V. li.

[2] The writ of appointment in *Documentos Inéditos*, cxii; Danv. II. 11; Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 81. Admiral to Junta, Nov., Danv. II. 550; to Sevilla, Nov. 28, Danv. II. 541. Admiral to Constable, July 23, 1521, Danv. IV. 284.

arms, and without my appearing to direct them.' [1] Common opinion was that the appointment was substantially an appeal to arms. 'The appointment of the Constable and Admiral as viceroys,' Lope reported, 'has still more exasperated the members of the Junta, for they suppose it to be in order to resist by force what they are doing.' [2]

The change at least partly answered the charge of unlawful foreign government; but it raised another legal question, whether the Crown could thus, without counsel or consent of Cortes, constitute a regency, determining at will the number and personnel of the administration. The contentious among the Comuneros at once repudiated the appointments; but the royal right was so clear that the Admiral agreed unhesitatingly to an appeal to legal authority to vindicate the rightfulness of his appointment.[3]

The peril of the plan was the probability of friction. Adrian had essential unselfishness and humility; he would subordinate any preferences or sensibilities to the interests of his master; but harmonious coöperation between two elderly grandees was most unlikely. Yet the whole outcome of the struggle might turn on the respective capacity of subordination shown by the leaders on the two sides.

The Cardinal accepted the disagreeable obligation at once. 'As far as I can see,' reported Lope, 'he is not offended at the selection.' [4]

The Constable also accepted, with demurring and upon certain conditions. 'When Your Majesty's letter and credentials were given to the Constable,' Lope's report continued, 'he replied to Pedro de Velasco and me that, though the affairs of the realm stood as we saw . . . he must indeed accept the commission though he should thereby lose life and property; for he felt he was obligated by the fact it was Your Majesty's command, and doing what his forbears had, serving loyally.

'As for coming here to join the Cardinal, it seemed to him not well, for that had happened in Burgos which he had written to Your Majesty, and Valladolid was in yet worse

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 30–Oct. 1, Danv. II. 235.

[2] Lope to D. Carlos, Sep. 30, Danv. II. 34.

[3] Admiral to Sevilla, Nov. 28, Danv. II. 546; Peter Martyr, Epist. DCXCI, Oct. 3.

[4] Report to D. Carlos, Sep. 23, Danv. II. 27. Lope delivered the Constable's commission on Sep. 19 (*ibid.*, 26).

state, and the men of the Junta very powerful; and to go there was to place himself in prison, as the Cardinal and Council were. He should go to Briviesca by the post road; and, since the business was going in such wise that it could not be thoroughly righted from there, he would summon all his kin, friends, and vassals, and send persons to Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Álava and wherever else he thought they purposed to serve Your Majesty; and would bring likewise the troops that came from Gelves (who are quartered in the district of Sepúlveda);[1] and strengthen himself as much as he might with horse and foot; and try to get into Burgos by an agreement or however he could. For if he were in Burgos, the Cardinal and Council might go there to provide what were fitting and Your Majesty might command. But he wished two conditions: that Your Majesty give command that they govern in accordance with the laws of the realm; and order provision of money for paying the troops, for of anything from the royal rents or other dues not a penny may be had, nor any one who will buy anything from Your Majesty or your estate; but, while Your Majesty was arranging for me to provide, he would do what he could and sell any of his estate if he could find any one willing to buy.'

A brief note which the Constable sent upon Lope's return to the Lowlands added, almost with the insistence of an ultimatum, request for full authority, including right to pardon. 'The credentials must be sent so that each of those whom Your Majesty has appointed may, in the region where he is, provide for all matters as fully as if your royal person were present. For, wherever I may be, Your Majesty will indeed believe that I shall not use them save as befits your service. . . . It must appear specifically in the credentials that I may pardon all the excesses committed against Your Majesty.'[2]

Formal notice reached the Admiral in Blanes on the Catalan coast toward the end of the month,[3] and he agreed to accept the task; but he proceeded so slowly to Castile as to give rise even in Adrian's mind to misgivings as to the wholeheartedness of his conduct. Upon notification of his appointment, he continued on his way into Valencia, with assurance that he would hasten thence into Castile. Almost a month later the Cardinal was anxiously awaiting him.

[1] For these troops cf. *infra*, p. 170.

[2] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 6, Danv. II. 241.

[3] J. González to D. Carlos, Sep. 25, Danv. II. 33.

'Immediately on arriving here,' wrote Adrian from Rioseco,[1] 'I despatched a post . . . to the Admiral to hasten his coming, though we have never had any news at all of him, save that just lately they reported he was in Zaragoza.' The Constable was on October 21 still awaiting news or replies to his despatches urging the Admiral to come;[2] but in postscript of that date he added: 'As I was just finishing this, a post arrived from the Admiral. What he writes me is that he was to leave Blanes the 15th of this month, and that he and the Countess were not well. I think he will be slower than we should want on the way, but in sickness one can do no more.' By October 23 the Admiral had got halfway across Cataluña;[3] but he did not reach Rioseco and his fellow governor till November 14.[4] And it then appeared that he would accept official responsibility only on conditions. 'The first time the said Admiral came to my lodgings,' wrote Adrian,[5] 'he told me in the presence of the Comendador Mayor, of Zapata, and of Vargas, that he in no wise ever accepted the charge of governorship save upon two preliminary conditions. The first is that he shall have reply from Your Majesty to letters which he says he wrote you from Cataluña about the said governorship. (He says he has letters from his agent who resides in that Court, who writes him they were twice read to Your Highness. . . .) The other condition is that he be given full authority — without any restriction — such as Your Majesty possesses, to bargain, pardon, punish, grant favors, and condemn, as may seem best to him and appear to Your Majesty's service.

'It seems to all of us here that he is impelled in this matter by reasonable motive, and that they who advised Your Highness to limit the governors' powers persuaded you to a thing useless and harmful to the realm.

'The same day I went after dinner to the Admiral's lodgings to visit the Countess; and, after, I withdrew there with him and talked with him privately, telling him how grievously I regretted that he was not willing, save on these conditions, to accept the charge of governor, for from delay

[1] To D. Carlos, Oct. 21, Danv. II. 264. He arrived in Rioseco Tuesday, Oct. 16, 7 A.M. (Letter to D. Carlos, Oct. 17, Danv. II. 260.)

[2] *Ibid.*, 269.

[3] Letter of that date from Cervera, Danv. II. 278; P. Martyr, Epist. DCXCVII.

[4] Adrian to D. Carlos, Nov. 16, Danv. II. 500.

[5] To D. Carlos, Nov. 16, Danv. II. 501.

much encouragement might be afforded the men of the Junta, and it would be very harmful and derogatory to Your Majesty's authority and to us of your party, and therefore there should be no halting or delay; that I am sure Your Majesty has answered him and the letters were perhaps lost on the way or seized; and offering to try to get Your Highness to allow him free and unlimited authority without any restrictions — which surely are not fitting at this time. Beside all this I told him how the Constable had done what was to his advantage, for all his domain had risen against him and he had no other means to pacify and repair it save by accepting the said governorship, recovering thereby the authority he had lost in Burgos and his domains. But he himself is nearer to the fire, and says he has no security but in this place; and he told me finally that he has nothing secure in his domains, and he might easily lose all if he should oppose the Communes — unless Your Majesty gives him large and formidable power both in money and men: which, he says, he has no hope of.' Even provisional acceptance the Admiral considered grudgingly. He repeatedly, Adrian recounted, 'made solemn oath (to God, the saints, and the four evangels) that, if through the necessity of these realms and out of respect for me he agreed to accept the government, and Your Majesty did not at once without these restrictions send him full and sufficient power to pardon and reward those who deserved — even though he had accepted the charge, he would renounce it and quit himself of it on the spot. And surely in the opinion of all, even of the Councillors, the restrictions Your Majesty imposed on us have been in large part the cause and foundation of this revolt. What the Communes charge and proclaim is that the counsels given Your Highness are malign, useless, and even childish. . . . I marvel much who could have counselled and induced Your Majesty to recall the power which was previously given us to pardon. The cities now — since they know or surmise that — perceiving they are without any hope of security, do very much worse than heretofore; and I think they may say, *Una salus victis*.' [1]

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Nov. 28, Danv. II. 516.

CHAPTER XIII

HOSPITE INSALUTATO

THE instructions which accompanied the appointment of the new viceroys prescribed a definite policy of reorganization: the three rulers jointly, or two in the absence or inability of the other, should govern by advice and with agreement of the Council, which should be reassembled; and all should reside in Valladolid or where else might seem wiser, keeping as near to Tordesillas as possible, whence the Comuneros were to be ejected. But a contingency not contemplated had occurred; after October 1 the Cardinal was a helpless prisoner, and the Admiral did not arrive till a month and a half later. No two of the governors were together, yet it was necessary that a supreme head be appointed; so D. Carlos wrote on October 17, on his way from Aix, a letter to the Constable, that he should summon and assemble the Council, and with them he alone should undertake the government of the realm until he joined the other viceroys.[1] The Constable acknowledged his appointment on October 29: 'The credentials have come safely; and were necessary, for, with the Cardinal in Medina de Rioseco and the Admiral in Cataluña, I have no authority to govern, though I have always assumed it, since the President and other Councillors are with me.'[2]

Adrian had, in fact, been long considering an attempt again to leave the mob-dominated capital. 'I have not left this city,' he explained to the King, 'because since the first of the month they forcibly detain me. . . . Many shrewd persons have advised me that they think I ought to stay here a few days to satisfy the town (which much desires that), in order that after, having gratified them thereby, what we desire may be more easily obtained.'[3] That desire was to escape from Valladolid; and an attempt on October 15 he thus reported to D. Carlos:[4] 'Considering the arrest

[1] Summarized in Danv. II. 262.

[2] To D. Carlos, Oct. 29, Danv. II. 288.

[3] Adrian to D. Carlos, Oct. 8, Danv. II. 252.

[4] The King ordered an attempt in a letter of Oct. 7 (Danv. II. 246); and the Constable knew about it (Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 15, Danv. II. 259). Adrian to D. Carlos, Oct. 17, Danv. II. 260.

and imprisonment which I and all the Councillors suffered in Valladolid, with no freedom to provide or accomplish anything touching Your Majesty's service, when the Councillors had, with my knowledge, escaped in various directions each as well as he could . . . I remained alone, for against my person there was not so grave danger. . . . Later they brought certain proposals of a bargain with me: that I should go to Tordesillas and remain there without taking part in any business; and that I might not write to Your Majesty without their first seeing it. I think they would have insisted even by force upon what I could not voluntarily agree to do. So I decided to get out in whatever way I could, and put it thus into effect.

'I got out last Monday, the 15th of this month at 9 at night, on foot, with only a chaplain with me, at a certain point which was arranged, but at great risk from the guard which the city maintains within and without; and came away with two mules I had provided therefor. To avoid difficulties I did not come directly here; I made a circuit of three leagues, so that that night I covered a distance of more then ten leagues; and got here at Medina de Rioseco yesterday, Tuesday, at 7 in the morning so tired that I could not write yesterday.' [1]

That Adrian may have felt humiliated to find his power, already divided, now suspended — though that measure was taken when the King supposed him still a prisoner, seems likely from his letter of the next month: [2] 'As to the suspension of my power and that of the Councillors until the other governor and I be united, that indeed has not appeared well here; and they are already saying that Your Majesty's councillors there direct the business of Spain as men who judge things seen afar off, and so very often measures come from there which do not advance Your Highness's service nor the public weal of your realms.'

By that measure, however, the Constable was now the ruling voice of the government; and Adrian repeated his requests to be relieved, which he asked Lope to press upon His Majesty.[3]

[1] A second version, with a few other details is in another letter of the Cardinal to D. Carlos, of Oct. 21, Danv. II 264. His escape was over the wall and his mount awaited him a bowshot away. Maldonado (126) says the escape was effected through tricking some sentinels and bribing others.

[2] To D. Carlos, Nov. 1, Danv. II. 473.

[3] Letters of Oct. 21 (Danv. II. 274) and Oct. 31 (Danv. II. 297).

To the Constable, therefore, the fugitive Councillors gravitated, to the great embarrassment of that grandee. The august body of counsel was indeed dispersed. Five had been arrested in Valladolid.[1] President Rojas, Archbishop of Granada, was perhaps most unpopular, probably because known as advisor of severity against Segovia; and in the storm of indignation over Medina, he had fled. In two weeks popular wrath had not cooled enough for Rojas to be safe in Valladolid, whence, after an attempted return, the Cardinal hurried him, on September 9. His Arch-Grace reported pathetically to his King on October 4,[2] that, still in fear of his life, he had escaped to the Constable's domain: 'He thinks I had best stay in the monastery of Oña, for that is in his domain. I will wait there to see what the governors do. . . . Of one thing I am eyewitness: in all these places where I have recently passed there is not a man dares mention Your Majesty's name.'

The Constable did not want the President, lest that official's unpopularity be added to the Viceroy's other difficulties. On October 4 he also reported to the King, from Briviesca: 'The President of the Council fled hither as soon as he learned of the Councillors in Valladolid. I did not want to have him in my company for the populace is so angry with him that that would anger them more. I am keeping him in the monastery of Oña, which is four leagues from here and ten from Burgos.' [3]

The Cardinal also, so soon as he escaped from Valladolid, equally feared that the fugitive Councillors might discredit him. 'Many good gentlemen are rejoiced at my escape from Valladolid, hoping they may more easily quiet affairs in these realms; but they are in the very greatest uneasiness and fear lest I shelter and receive the President, the Bishop of Burgos,[4] and Vargas, who are held in the greatest hatred; suspecting and believing that, with them with us, no good could be accomplished. Wherefore I am much perplexed, considering whether it better serves Your Majesty's interest to exclude them (which indeed they do not in my opinion

[1] Adrian's letter of Oct. 17 (Danv. II. 260) adds Licenciado Acuña to the four named in his postscript of Oct. 1. Cf. *supra*, p. 93.

[2] Danv. II. 267. Dated 'Half a league from Briviesca, a city of the Constable's.'

[3] To D. Carlos, Oct. 4, Danv. II. 240. Cf. Maldonado, 125.

[4] Juan de Fonseca, brother of the discredited Captain-General; but not a member of the Council.

deserve) or admit them in the Council — which too would involve great scandal and the people would show great offense thereat.' [1]

At the date of this writing six Councillors were with the Cardinal in Rioseco, including three of the Valladolid captives whom the Comuneros had the malicious astuteness to release; four with the embarrassed Constable; and Treasurer Vargas in Benavente, reduced, by his desperate efforts to raise money, to tertian fever.[2] The reluctant Constable, upon order from the King, summoned all the Councillors to join him.[3]

[1] To D. Carlos, Oct. 21, Danv. II. 265.

[2] Reports of Adrian and the Constable both of Oct. 21, Danv. II. 266, 269.

[3] Lope advised the order, Danv. II. 28. Cf. *supra*, p. 160.

CHAPTER XIV

TO HEAL THE WHOLE REALM

THE really representative Junta, assembled at Ávila after the Medina exasperation at the end of August, functioned there for three weeks. From the Queen, taken in Tordesillas on August 29, a request was promptly obtained that the Junta assemble there; as it did in the middle of September.[1] For two months and a half it was there in session. What was the record of these three months of Junta activity?

It fulfilled its original motive of formulating and transmitting to the absent monarch a joint petition of Cortes cities; it took over the responsibilities of military resistance begun in defense of Segovia; it organized a civil administration. The moderates tried to keep to the first business only;[2] but it was difficult, after the resort to resistance at Segovia and Medina, to stop short of developing an army; and equally difficult, after appeal to royal sanction in the person of Doña Juana, to avoid developing all the organization of a state, together with the consequent dispossession of the Royal Viceroys and Council.

The Toledans from the start probably considered going so far; the reluctant were persuaded by the ominous measures of the royalists. The King's appointment of two Spanish Viceroys was generally accounted as the appointment of generals. Should Constable and Admiral assemble the grandees and their military retainers, civil war between classes seemed inevitable. For arming, the nobles had sufficient personal motive in the revolts of their vassals; but the first indications of such a course created the liveliest alarm in the Junta. 'Though their cause for so doing were the justest in the world,' the Comunero congress protested, 'no diligence we could show would suffice to persuade the cities and Communes to abandon their suspicion that it was done

[1] Queen's summons, through Padilla, Sep. 1, Danv. II. 41. The Junta had decided to adjourn, Sep. 7, Danv. II. 48. The Cardinal heard they were in Tordesillas Sep. 13 (Danv. II. 21), as appears confirmed by a document cited but not printed by Danvila (II. 56); but Denia says explicitly (Danv. II. 70) that they all arrived Sep. 19. There was inaugural session on Sep. 24.

[2] Notably Burgos. Cf. their letter to Adrian, Oct. 6, Danv. II. 245.

against them.'[1] This distrust the Cardinal understood and feared to make himself the figurehead of a class; for that reason he was reluctant to seek refuge in the stronghold of any grandee, but on escaping from Valladolid he went to the Admiral's town of Rioseco, whither the grandees were gravitating, with their armed following. The Junta in turn was led inevitably from step to step in a programme of defiance.

Drafting the petitions was the work of a month. Different cities proposed their programmes, moderate and radical. Work upon a composite was begun by the middle of September;[2] and by October 8 had reduced sixty or seventy items to a final proposal, a copy of which the Constable obtained and sent to D. Carlos in his report of that date.[3] Burgos then submitted a moderate draft to the various cities, to replace the more radical programme, which was likely to be adopted.[4] By the middle of the month, as the Cardinal heard,[5] the Junta was discouraged, and inclined to petition. A text was adopted and a letter drafted,[6] October 20.

The different degrees of animosity in the Junta were expressed in the respectful though drastic list of *capítulos* and in the defiant letter of justification. This letter, with elaborate lip service of loyalty to the royal person, was a scathing and detailed indictment of royal rule in Spain, with defense of the Toledan petition; with explicit charge of bribery at Coruña; with blame upon Cardinal and Council for the programme of disciplining Segovia, and for the consequent burning of Medina; with justification for the assembling of the Junta, as approved by Doña Juana; and with defense of the removal of the Councillors and the Queen's household. The letter closed with request for the approval of all hitherto done, for removal of the governors, and for warrant for the

[1] Junta to Valladolid, Sep. 7, Danv. II. 51. Cf. Valladolid to Junta, Sep. 12, Danv. II. 58.

[2] Valladolid deputies to their city, Sep. 16, Danv. II. 55.

[3] Danv. II. 254.

[4] Danv. (II. 386) gives her letter, accompanying her *capítulos*, to Salamanca, which is practically identical with that which Sandoval gives (VII. v) as addressed to Valladolid. The letter to Salamanca aroused suspicions that it came from 'private parties' and did not represent Burgos opinion. Cf. Salamanca to Valladolid discussing the Burgos letter, Oct. 15, Danv. II. 408.

[5] To D. Carlos, Oct. 17, Danv. II. 261.

[6] Text, Santa Cruz, I. 293 ff.; Sandoval, VII. i. Letter, Santa Cruz, I. 282 ff.; Sandoval, VII. i.

Junta to take over the functions of the Council until His Majesty should make further provision in light of the petitions that accompanied the letter.

The petitions were in large part a repetition of demands constantly presented in Cortes, aimed at purity and economy of administration, the exclusion of foreign officials, and the making of D. Carlos into a proper Spanish king:

That the sovereign marry, and reside in Spain; that proper and native household be provided for Doña Juana; with austere reduction of Court expenses, sinecures, and pensions; with abolition of compulsory free lodging of the Court, save for the monarch and a household not exceeding sixty persons for periods not longer than six days;[1] and with discontinuance of any sale of positions in the Court or the administrative or judicial systems attached to it.

That natives only (writs of naturalization being forbidden) be appointed as Governors, Councillors, Judges, or Prelates; or serve as soldiers in defense of the royal person or the realm, or in command of Spanish fortresses. An aggressive corollary of this demand was another for the removal of the foreigners now serving, with explicit mention of Croy, who should be transferred by due ecclesiastical authority and replaced in the see of Toledo by a qualified and legal successor.

That corruption be removed by various restrictions as to salary and granting favors to the judiciary; that no payments be made to judges from property seized through their judgments; that all the shower of irregular favors bestowed since Isabel's death, in lands and mines, be cancelled, as well as all purchased titles of gentility; that no Indian slaves be given as Court favors; that bishops and prelates reside in their diocese, with *pro rata* forfeiture of income during absences; that no bulls or *cruzadas* be published without previous Cortes approval; that such money be spent only for the purpose proposed, and not extorted by excommunication or interdict; that no coin or bullion, or bread, leather, wool, or cattle be withdrawn from the realm; that currency be reformed; that the sales taxes and other taxes be commuted for the sums (*encabezamientos*) of the year 1494, as provided in Isabel's will.

[1] That the *Posadas* were exasperating for many features other than expense is indicated in Martyr's letter (DCLXXXVI): 'inde jacturas, damna, stupra, injuriasque ajunt exoriri hospitibus innumeras.'

Certain *capítulos* were aimed at cleaning up royal rule in accord with the other provisions demanded: that an accounting be had of the entire royal finances since the death of D. Fernando, before persons appointed jointly by sovereign and Cortes; that the favors granted at Coruña be annulled; and that the unfulfilled promises of Valladolid and Coruña be realized.

The drastic and exasperated items in the long list were demands for the annulment of the Coruña *servicio*; for the permanent removal of all members of the existing Council, followed by quadrennial inquest on the Council thereafter; the removal of Fonseca from all his captaincies, the annulment of Ronquillo's prosecutions, and the punishment of both for their conduct at Segovia and Medina. All the movement of protest and revolt should finally be countenanced and secured by royal approval of the Junta, its deposing of the Council and Juana's household, its recruiting of forces, and all they had done, its seizure and appropriation of royal income; and exemption from prosecution (even the tricky *pedimiento de parte*) [1] for all who had acted in Junta business.

Of graver and more permanent scope were the *capítulos* suggesting constitutional changes that would accomplish a substantial shift of power in the Castilian state; that the Governor be 'appointed and chosen to the satisfaction of the realm' (subject, apparently, to confirmation by the Cortes); that no royal corregidors be appointed save for cities which requested them; that the Crown restrict itself to income from existing forms of taxation and never again ask from the Cortes special legislative appropriations (*servicios*). The Cortes themselves should be reorganized, in view of the abuses and the royal aggression and meddling at Valladolid and Coruña: they should assemble every three years, without royal summons and even in the absence of the Sovereign; the selection of deputies should follow the custom of each city and should include one from the church chapter, one from the caballeros, and one from the commune, each selected by his estate and paid by his city (save the ecclesiastic, paid by the chapter). The Crown should not prescribe candidates or the powers to be issued to the deputies by the cities; nor make them any gift or payment, on pain of confiscation and death for the recipient. The Cortes

[1] This appears to be the chicane suggested in the governors' letters to the King.

should choose their own officers; and the deputies should be required to report to their cities after the Cortes. Upon these *capítulos* Mexía's horrified comment is: 'Blasphemy and notorious treason . . . a perpetual Commune and destruction of the royal power.' [1] The programme was indeed one which would write into the constitution of the state the angry determination, and in some details the method, of the great revolt, and subject the Spanish monarchy to the control of national public opinion so far as that existed and could be expressed through eighteen Cortes cities and the publicity brought to bear upon administration through a system of public inquest. Yet that the ultimate purpose of the Comunero movement thus formulated was essentially sound was the privately confessed conviction of the venerable and moderate courtier, Peter Martyr, who wrote to Gattinara on September 13: 'To tell the truth, my dear Grand Chancellor, if we weigh the matter without the passion which disturbs judgment, unhappy Castile is not so far from justice in her demands.' [2]

But this proposal of constitutional monarchy was to be presented to a young prince of absolutist traditions, who had thrown himself heart and soul into an Imperial career for which absolute power in more realms than any other monarch possessed would scarce suffice.

Three Junta deputies were appointed as messengers. The more challenging document, the letter, started first, October 21,[3] in the hands of Anton Vázquez of Ávila. His manifesto was doubtlessly intended chiefly for the public in Spain, where it was printed and circulated;[4] what reception the envoy expected in Worms it is difficult to imagine. The Constable wrote to D. Carlos to arrest him, 'a fellow of evil life' — and any other messengers, for the Junta had refused a hearing to the Cardinal's envoys.[5] Sánchez Zimbrón, regidor and deputy of Ávila, and Fray Pablo of León started later with the *capítulos*.

Only power could gain any sort of hearing for such a

[1] Mexía, 175.

[2] Epist. DCLXXXVI. He elsewhere (Epist. DCCI) expresses his agreement with the aim and his dissent from the method of the Comuneros.

[3] The day after it was drafted, Danv. II. 352.

[4] Mexía, 173.

[5] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 29, Danv. II. 292. The substance of the Junta demands was early communicated to the Grand Chancellor, in Martyr's letter of Sep. 13, DCLXXXVI.

programme: the development of power involved a military and a civil administration. The very grave responsibility of military organization must be entrusted to a captain-general. On the score of popularity Padilla had no rival. He had succeeded in the succor of Medina and the seizure of Tordesillas. But the very fact that he was thus completely committed to the Comunero movement induced the Junta to use the appointment for political effect, as an inducement to bind to their cause a distinguished grandee who had personal cause to resent the rule of the Flemish camarilla which was governing Spain in the name of D. Carlos. This was D. Pedro Girón, a nephew of the Constable himself,[1] 'a gentleman of elegance, liberal and courageous, and much liked everywhere in the kingdom,'[2] himself a victim of broken promises from the young sovereign and of public rebuff when he reminded D. Carlos of them.[3] He was commissioned October 11.[4] A first consequence was of sinister omen for the Comunero cause: Padilla in a pet of disappointment went off to Toledo with all the Toledan troops, leaving D. Pedro about 2000 men.[5] He set, however, briskly about his business. His uncle's report to the King said: 'He is assembling and taking over all the troops he can, and has sent friars and other folk through all the realm and Andalusia to preach his sect. I have done what seemed best to thwart and prevent the sermons. He wrote me a letter telling me he had accepted the charge the Santa Junta had given him; and, in view of the right and sacred purpose wherewith the men of the Junta were undertaking the good government of the realm, asked me not to accept office or hinder him in it. I answered him that I was sending his parents a post informing them what business he was undertaking, and I would reply to him when I got their answer.'[6]

Girón faced an enormously difficult task, the development of miscellaneous casual militia, half of it disgusted at

[1] Oldest son of J. Téllez Girón, second Conde de Urueña, and his wife Leonor, sister of the Constable. Mexía says his influential kin was a consideration in the selection (180).

[2] Santa Cruz, I. 334. [3] Cf. *supra*, pp. 63, 64.

[4] Junta writ, Oct. 11, Danv. II. 318; Junta writ, Oct. 13 (deposing all others), Danv. II. 314. It was announced in the churches of Valladolid, Oct. 11, with great public satisfaction, according to Sandoval, VII. xxi.

[5] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 21, Danv. II. 276. Alcocer (46), always friendly to Padilla, says he left because of his wife's illness.

[6] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 21, Danv. II. 271.

his appointment, into a force equal to far harder undertakings than the relief of a city already abandoned by the attacker, or the occupation of a town ready to throw open its gates. Padilla's volunteers had accepted the authority of the Ávila Junta; but they were reduced in number and disaffected at Girón's appointment. It was immensely desirable to obtain regular troops, which might be organized in units into which large proportions of volunteers could be introduced and disciplined.

On July 2, an armada of twenty-four ships had disembarked in Cartagena the expeditionary force that had served for three months in the recapture of the island of Gerba or 'los Gelves' on the Tripoli coast.[1] With them arrived D. Diego de Vera, the second in command of the expedition and generally reputed to be the savior of the perilous venture; a commander 'of so much experience in the artillery that every body in the realm concedes him primacy in that, and, should he consent to go to France or elsewhere, would be heartily welcomed.'[2] He was an Ávilan and had property and interests in the Junta city, and confessed to Comunero sympathies — considering even entering the service of the Junta.[3] The Captain at first held aloof, with rather apparent professional contempt, from the civil strife, and much disgusted Licenciado Leguizamo by his half-hearted attitude in the attempt to reduce Murcia to obedience.[4] The Cardinal then ordered him to conduct the relief of the mined and beleaguered fortress of Madrid; but de Vera reported it hopeless, without more infantry.[5] He had, in fact, almost committed himself to the Comunero cause, and gone off to Ávila.[6]

The Gelves veterans themselves were coaxed and bribed with solicitations by both parties. They were by far the most seasoned soldiers in the field, tough fellows, of skins blackened and eyes shriveled with the glare of African sum-

[1] Sandoval (III. 25) has a narrative, but the best account of this expedition is in Santa Cruz, I. 267 ff.

[2] The Cardinal's characterization, Jan. 4, Danv. III. 15.

[3] De Vera to Duke of Nájera, summarized in Danv. II. 526.

[4] Long and irritated report of Leguizamo, Aug. 5, Danv. I. 555.

[5] Adrian reports to D. Carlos, Aug. 31, de Vera's letter of Aug. 29, Danv. I. 494. He seems to have connived at Comunero seizure of the supplies he failed to throw into the fortress. Danv. IV. 119. Cf. p. 93.

[6] Danvila (II. 42) summarizes a letter of the Junta of Sep. 2, which asserts that de Vera had taken oath to them.

mer, who had seen clouds of Moors on the blazing plains of that island of death, and ambush, hunger, and sickness; and the uprooted bones of Spanish soldiers who had perished there in the disaster eighteen years before. A single company of them was worth a regiment of town levies, or even of the crack soldiery of such a grandee as the Count of Benavente. There was clamor for them to suppress the Valencia disorders; the Constable appealed for them to get him back into Burgos.[1] Meanwhile, until discharged, the soldiers were encamped at Sepúlveda, in a Guadarrama valley thirty miles northeast of Segovia.[2]

There the Emperor's special envoy visited them, urging them to accept the Cardinal's service in defense of Navarre; but his most persuasive argument, 4000 ducats of pay, was embargoed by the Comuneros in Valladolid.[3] The Junta also had its agent coaxing them; and D. Pedro Girón, so soon as he was appointed Captain-General, went in person to win them over, as the backbone of the army he was organizing.[4]

Parallel with the beginnings of a military organization proceeded the development of a civil government. The Junta refused to recognize the government of Adrian or of the later triumvirate of viceroys: it proposed to rule in the name of Juana; and logically notified the governors [5] not to act, and ordered the Council not to act until it should have been examined in inquest, for which they summoned it — and especially the treasurer — to appear, under safe-conduct, in Tordesillas. Since they refused, the Comuneros, who introduced troops into Valladolid on September 23 and sent their captains there on September 26 and 28,[6] arrested such members of the Council as they could catch on Sep-

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, July 13, Danv. I. 429. Lope to D. Carlos, Sep. 23, Danv. II. 26. The Constable even had some hoarded silver coined to pay their arrears of pay, as Martyr heard (Epist. DCXCV).

[2] Danv. II. 26.

[3] Lope to D. Carlos, Sep. 30, Danv. II. 34. Cf. Constable to D. Carlos, Sep. 30, Danv. II. 37; and II. 65.

[4] P. Martyr, Epist. DCXCI; Danv. II. 244. Cardinal to D. Carlos, Oct. 17, Danv. II. 261. Girón appears to have been in Sepúlveda between Oct. 16 and 28. Danv. II. 406–07. Martyr reported on Oct. 22 (Epist. DCXCIII) that part of the troops had gone to the Constable, part to Girón, won by the pay he offered. 'Cui adhaeserit illa moles armatorum,' he remarks, 'tutiorem videbit rem suam.'

[5] Writ was served in Valladolid, Sep. 21. Adrian to D. Carlos, Danv. II. 30, 31. Cf. also II. 68.

[6] Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 23 (Danv. II. 31); and Sep. 30 (Danv. II. 235).

tember 30;[1] and held the Cardinal virtual prisoner, until his escape on October 15.

Revenues had, from the beginning of the summer's troubles, in all the Comunero cities, been seized for the Commune, and the Junta authorized such seizure.[2] It proceeded also to appoint corregidors and obtain the royal seal.[3] The ceremonial inaugural of the government occurred in Doña Juana's presence, September 24, and was followed next day by the adoption in the palace of a solemn league and covenant,[4] and on the day thereafter by a manifesto [5] to the realm.

Their covenant, a 'union and perpetual brotherhood,' pledged every city to relieve any one oppressed, and to enforce the Junta decrees as law; giving promise never to ask or accept absolution from their oath so to do. Deputies of Burgos, León, Soria, Salamanca, Zamora, Cuenca, Madrid, Toro, Ávila, Segovia, Valladolid, and Toledo took their oath on Tuesday and the absentees of Toledo and Cuenca adhered on Wednesday. Jaén, Guadalajara, and Murcia were not signatories, nor the great southern cities, Córdoba, Sevilla, and Granada.

Their confederacy they justified to the realm in a manifesto:

> Since it is to all notorious that the root and origin whence emanated all the ills and injuries these realms have received was the defect of health of the Queen our Lady, which, with the tender age of the King our Lord, her son, gave cause and occasion that, with foreigners introduced into the governance of the said realms, they were thereby so mercilessly plundered and tyrannized . . . we, deputies of the realm, assembled by Divine Grace for the remedy of said injuries, determined that the first and justest step we could and should take was to go to the city of Tordesillas and present ourselves before our Queen and Lady for two purposes:
>
> First, that the Junta might be held in her royal palace, showing her the respect and obedience due her royal person; and give her so full an account of the said injuries and what was proposed for the remedy thereof as Her Highness deigned to receive.

[1] Danv. II. 236. Order therefor was passed in the Junta Sep. 25, Danv. II. 81.

[2] Madrid reports acting on such authority on Sep. 4, Danv. II. 129.

[3] Danv. II. 69, 74. The Constable was also having a seal made. Letter to D. Carlos, Danv. II. 269, 291 (Oct. 21 and 29).

[4] Danv. II. 76 ff. [5] *Ibid.*, 82 ff.

The other purpose was to undertake by every means possible for us the recovery of Her Highness, in which we are certain consists the remedy for the present difficulties; wherefor we sent summons for all the most distinguished and excellent physicians of the realms. And the absence of the Marquis and Marchioness of Denia for the present from this city seemed to us fitting, knowing that — since they did not, when in charge of the governance of her royal person and household, undertake to obtain her recovery — they would not in this matter be serviceable aids. And since the remedies which may by human courses be sought for so great an end can serve only to show our diligence and fidelity, unless we resort chiefly to the true remedy, which is God, upon previous consultations with religious persons of holy life, we ordered that generally, in all the cities and towns of these realms, solemn and devout processions be made and prayers for the said recovery of Her Highness. . . .[1]

And perceiving that the purpose wherefor we are here assembled — to repair the ills done in the realm, and to resist those which are daily undertaken anew — could not be fulfilled while power and force remain in the hand of the very authors and creators of the said ills, who are those who have hitherto been in the Royal Council and, unrepentant of what is done, following the nature of the Devil, were now anew devising with all their power to arm themselves, both by troops and by aid from the grandees, to carry further their diabolic design, we decreed . . . it necessary to supersede their authority, since it was a power of darkness, until Their Majesties, with approval of these realms, determine their guilt and provide Council and Governor . . . according to the law of the realm. . . .

. . . To all the realm it is known how in the time of the Catholic Sovereigns, D. Fernando and the Queen Doña Isabel (May they inherit glory!), many excellent provisions and worthy of memory were made and ordained in Cortes for the good of these realms — the which, and the laws and privileges and royal pragmatics have been broken by evil rule. . . . All this has resulted from the little care which the cities and communes have taken to provide remedy, for the observance of their welfare, . . . And because such is the will of the Queen our Lady; and Her Highness, grieving much for her realms and in discharge of her Royal conscience, indicated to us all this her desire; . . . and because we should fall again into the same difficulty, if provision were not made whereby that shall be observed which was ordered, considered, and discussed among us, we made a brotherhood and union of all the cities and provinces [sic], which was decreed by your deputies here present; and the same shall do such others as may come here.

[1] A request for physicians and rogations from the Junta to Zamora, of Oct. 20 is preserved. Danv. II. 349.

To this consistent sequence of acts opposition developed, of course, in the Junta, under the lead of Burgos, which tried to win over Valladolid as a balance against the Toledo radicals;[1] protesting that the Junta had been called to consider 'what ought to be done; and whatever it was just and well, it should ask His Majesty to order done. This the members of the Junta should do, and leave Her Majesty's government to those who held it by her son's order.'[2] 'The course followed in the matter of government which the Junta is pursuing seems to us here an innovation (*cosa muy nueva*), for it seems to be stretching out beyond the liberties wherefor it was summoned.'[3] But the Burgos deputies in Tordesillas found themselves reduced to almost helpless protest. 'This morning they voted in the Junta here that the gentlemen of the Council be superseded. We voted against it according to your instructions. . . . Every hour as we see it occur great innovations. . . . In this Junta there is no thought now of proceeding by petition, but to pass to action and to heal all the realm of the past harm from bad government; and they consider not the disadvantages which the measures taken thereto may involve. If our constituents in Burgos send again those instructions and require us not to exceed them, we will at once introduce them in writing in the Junta, make our appeal, and thereupon may return to Burgos, for here there will be nothing to do but be witness of what the others do. . . . It lies in your hands to decide which course seems to you best; though

[1] Valladolid seemed temporarily won over; it tied its deputies' hands, changed deputies on Oct. 25, and forbade use of troops save for the proper Junta purpose. Cf. letter of Valladolid to the Junta, Oct. 20 (Danv. II. 327) and Danv. II. 307. The Cardinal reported the better mood of the city in a letter to D. Carlos, Oct. 21 (Danv. II. 266): the same mood is reported in P. Martyr's letter (DCXCIII) of Oct. 22. Three weeks later Valladolid was won back to the Junta (Adrian to D. Carlos, Nov. 13, Danv. II. 483). The Constable's letter of Nov. 14 confirms this defection, which, he says, would not have happened if the Cardinal had joined him (Danv. II. 495). Martyr declares (Epist. DCXCV, Nov. 8) that Saravia and A. de Vera, rabid deputies, overrode the moderate J. de Herrera.

[2] Burgos to Valladolid, Sep. 1, Danv. II. 101. Cf. the Cardinal's report about the Burgos opposition, to D. Carlos, Oct. 21, Danv. II. 265. Burgos urged the same reasoning to Salamanca in a letter of Oct. 8, Danv. II. 386. Sandoval (VII. v) gives the same letter as addressed to Valladolid: it may well have been a circular.

[3] Burgos to Valladolid, Sep. 27, Danv. II. 89. The city continued to urge the same considerations on the Junta, Oct. 18. Danv. II. 324. After the Constable was received in Burgos the city denounced the Junta acts as treasonable. Burgos to Junta, Nov. 11, Danv. II. 369 ff. Duplicated at 566; also in Sandoval, VII. viii.

in matters thus far you have conformed, in public, with the Junta.'[1]

To an open break with the Junta the Constable had not been able to persuade his city; and it was among those who accepted the Solemn League of the Comuneros of September 25.[2]

[1] Deputies to Burgos, Sep. 21. Danv. II. 108. The Burgos deputy, Pedro Cartagena, was, according to Maldonado (134) the heart of the Moderate opposition, until frightened home by the threats of Padilla and Pedrolasso.

[2] Her name is in the document (Danv. II. 76) and her ratification Danvila prints (II. 113 ff.).

CHAPTER XV

COAXING A CITY

ADRIAN'S adversaries, in communication one to another, had characterized him thus:[1] 'We account the person of the Señor Cardinal as very saintly, to whom the recent disorders have appeared very ill, and he holds it desirable that some remedy be found for them all, and he is ready to lend a hand therein and mediate with our lord the King, in order that that may be realized and done which may be provided by the realm for the public good thereof.' This confidence the Cardinal strove to retain while in Valladolid and after his escape; and he accounted it his chief asset in his gently persistent negotiations to bring round to reason the Comunero city.

But this advantage was almost wholly nullified by the rooted distrust felt universally toward the government Adrian represented. There was no belief that D. Carlos would ever return to Spain. This general conviction Lope reported to the King:[2] 'There is nobody here who believes in Your Majesty's coming to these realms, soon or late; and this presumption gives wings to those men [the Comuneros] to fly farther than they ought. . . . It would be very well if Your Majesty sent persons to Andalusia, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Galicia to commandeer and despatch ships, and other demonstrations that might authenticate Your Majesty's coming, so they might account certain what they can now in no wise believe.' Not a report went from the Cardinal or the Constable that did not urge D. Carlos to come quickly; and both reiterated to the Castilians assurances that the King promised the promptest return. His promises to do so might be no better kept than others given with the solemnest oaths and already broken. Further, it was not even believed that their appeals and protests ever reached the King's ears.

Adrian had done his best, despite these disadvantages, to

[1] Valladolid to the Junta, Sep, 12. Danv. II. 57.

[2] Sep. 30, Danv. II. 35. The Cardinal reports the same to Lope, Nov. 13, Danv. II. 488.

keep Valladolid from following the extremists of Toledo, and to exercise, through the Valladolid town council and the deputies, some restraint on the Junta in Ávila and Tordesillas. On September 1 he warned the city that D. Pedro Girón was meditating a plot to enter Valladolid secretly and by a demonstration rouse the city for the Commune. Meanwhile he continued conferences with the Comunero captains and envoys of the Junta.[1] But at the month's end the city was in the hands of the rebels. Padilla and Comunero troops entered on September 28, and Adrian was virtually a captive. 'When Juan de Padilla and the other captains of Segovia, Madrid, Salamanca, and Ávila spoke with the Cardinal,' Lope reported,[2] 'I was myself present. What they said and he replied he will doubtless write. What I made out of their rhetoric is that, if he should not consent to stay here on their request (which they make of him) they will not permit him to depart; though they say they did not propose to resist his lordship but to serve him — all of them!'

During a humiliated month of waiting for a chance to escape, Adrian's resources for negotiating were still further reduced by the King's order of October 7 [3] depriving the governors of any power of pardon which their already very narrowly restricted credentials permitted. Against this move both the Constable and the Cardinal protested vehemently. They had almost from the moment of D. Carlos's departure incessantly implored him to grant full authority to pardon; and the answer, after dozens of weeks of royal reconsideration, was to take away what little had been at first allowed! Adrian's protest, however bitter his feelings, was courteous: 'The suspension which Your Highness orders in regard to the power you granted us to pardon does not seem to me fitting at this time; and I think that those who advised you thereto would not care to share the tremendous burden I carry.' [4] 'Just as at the beginning,' Lope

[1] With Girón on Sep. 12 (Danv. II. 22); with Junta messengers about Sep. 19 (Danv. II. 67).

[2] To D. Carlos, Sep. 31, Danv. II. 35. Martyr's letter of Oct. 3 (Epist. DCXCI) reports the meeting also, recording the sweet reasonableness of the Cardinal and the arrogance of the Friar Alonso de Medina, who accompanied the Captains.

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 21, Danv. II. 270. Cf. *supra*, p. 159; *infra*, p. 184.

[4] Adrian to D. Carlos, Oct. 21, Danv. II. 266.

was commissioned to explain, 'he made the mistake of not granting at once authority to remit, in regard to the *servicio* and the *encabezamientos*, until the affairs of these realms were ruined, so now he has made the mistake of taking from us the aforesaid power. And it much befits His Highness's service that, in spite of what he has written about this, he should grant the said power to pardon and to summon Cortes, to the Constable and the Admiral, for, for myself, not only do I not desire it but I shall account it a grace if His Highness will relieve me of my charge.' [1]

The next royal communication subjected Adrian to yet another humiliation: he had scarcely recovered his freedom when he found all his authority suspended by the King's writ of October 17, subordinating him to the Constable, who was now sole governor.

Nothing augured better for the ultimate success of the royal administration in Castile than the good-humored fidelity with which the Cardinal resumed from Rioseco his negotiations with Valladolid, by letter and messenger.[2] The city was reminded of the compliment paid her by the King's visit and the locating there of the Cardinal's government. Only the most friendly — almost apologetic — regret appeared in Adrian's references to his own departure, effected secretly, he explained, in order to prevent bloody outbreak. The Cardinal expressed his appreciation of the action of Valladolid in recalling on October 25 [3] the credentials of her deputies at the Junta because it was exceeding its proper mission. He suggested that the Junta was proposing to remove and bully the Queen, against which he hoped Valladolid would protest. Two significant paragraphs appeared both in his letter and in Santillán's communication: 'Certain gentlemen of distinction fail to resist the extremities and excesses which the deputies in the Tordesillas Junta commit (usurpingly, and against the loyalty they owe to the right and supremacy of the Crown, and committing many other offenses against justice and reason) because, so it is said, they fear and suspect that, without such extreme means, His Majesty will neglect to set right the wrongs done

[1] Adrian to Lope, Oct. 31, Danv. II. 297.

[2] D. Gómez de Santillán of Granada. A letter of Oct. 23 is elaborated in instructions to Santillán of Oct. 26, Danv. II. 282, duplicated in II. 361. He delivered his message to a session of the Valladolid council of Oct. 27.

[3] For the date cf. Danv. II. 307.

and to provide form and law assuring that similar things shall not be done henceforth. . . . Since His Majesty is of generous and royal mind and heart, they should believe that he will much more readily grant everything reasonable by means of supplication than by injuries. And I am sure and venture to promise that, if that noble city will take a stand in prohibiting usurpation of the royal authority and the committing of other injuries against Their Highnesses and in prejudice of the honor of the realm (as it is able to do), His Highness will not only redress grievances but even consent to grant everything for which he may be justly and reasonably petitioned and supplicated.' Santillán reported hopefully, and Adrian wrote again approving the limitation of powers of the deputies of Valladolid in the Junta. 'Seeing you thus so well disposed, I am and will be eagerly active (*delantero*) (please God our Lord) for the weal of these realms, and especially of that city, as you have always known me, and now more than ever. I am this moment writing to His Majesty all that is needful, giving him to understand that matters past in that city were not through the wish of the good men thereof, nor even of the body public, but of a few private individuals, against whom justice has been and is being done with full determination and diligence.' [1] From day to day Adrian reiterated assurances — in particular that the troops which the government was gathering were assembled with no intent 'to proceed against any portion of these realms, . . . but to secure the repose and proper guard of the Queen.' [2]

The symptoms of repentance which the Cardinal was thus eager to encourage in Valladolid had from the beginning marked the course of the city. Outbursts like that which attempted to restrain D. Carlos and that which did stop Adrian were followed by periods of apologetic regret in which the conservative leaders were able to recover influence.

Valladolid had come round, not among the first, to participating in the Santa Junta; but repeatedly exercised protesting control over her deputies. Even to the Comunero captains, in the days following the Medina affair, the city ventured to suggest that they should not move the Queen, or undertake punishment for Medina save on direction from

[1] Adrian to Valladolid, Oct. 29, Danv. II. 294.
[2] *Ibid.*, Oct. 30, Danv. II. 295.

the Junta.[1] As soon as her deputies began to sit in Tordesillas the city instructed them not to interfere with the Queen's household, and to refer back to the city their action on critical issues.[2] The city referred to the Junta the request of the Cardinal for formal permission for the Council to leave Valladolid to join its President, and for him to proceed to the defense of Navarre. Valladolid advised against granting the request, expressing along with this advice, her respect for the Cardinal: she feared, however, that the request was really a pretext for the escape of the frightened Councillors.[3] The Junta acted as the city advised.

To the great Solemn League and Covenant, which bound the Junta cities to mutual support and obedience to the Junta's decisions, Valladolid adhered — as indeed did all the cities save those of the South, which had no deputies there.[4]

Of the revulsion of feeling in the city after the Cardinal's escape, His Eminence wrote thus:[5] 'The Corregidor of Valladolid has written me that, after my departure, there was much regret in that city that they had not treated me better, and with more respect and obedience for Your Highness's Royal commands; and he thinks they are already better disposed. And because D. Juan de Mendoza[6] (son of the Cardinal D. Pedro Gonzales) was there trying to incite sedition and revolts, in favor of the Junta, they expelled and exiled him; and he says they have even begun to start inquest against Saravia[7] for certain properties D. Pedro Girón entrusted to him (marten skins, silver pieces, and some hundreds of ducats); and he says they have determined not to receive D. Pedro nor allow him to enter in the city. . . . The Corregidor writes me also that Valladolid is disposed not to obey the Junta save in what properly touches and concerns redress of grievances.'

[1] Valladolid to the Captains, Sept. 2, Danv. II. 43.

[2] These instructions, not extant, may be inferred from the deputies' letter of protest, justifying the removal of Denia, explaining the impossibility of allowing deputies to delay their vote until they communicated with their cities, and urging, in general, that deputies are a hindrance unless trusted by their constituency. On the date of the deputies' letter cf. *supra*, p. 145, n. 6.

[3] Valladolid to the Junta, Sept. 12, Danv. II. 56.

[4] Sep. 25 and following. Danv. II. 76 ff.

[5] Adrian to Carlos, Oct. 21, Danv. II. 265. The Corregidor may be supposed to represent unduly optimistic opinion.

[6] Third bastard son of Queen Isabel's Archbishop of Toledo. He served as a captain of the Comunero forces. Cf. Mexía, 193; Danv. IV. 228.

[7] Deputy of Valladolid in the Junta.

CHAPTER XVI

THE INK AND PAPER WE ARE GIVING THEM

THE Constable's commission as Viceroy of the realm reached him when he was a fugitive from his own city. He had been quite aware, throughout the summer, that some explosion might ruin his attempt to coax Burgos into at least provisional acceptance of the rule of Cardinal and Council. The treacherous element in his position was his determination, well known to Comunero leaders, to turn occasion so far as it was possible to royal advantage. The troops raised in the city he proposed to put under command of his young son the Count of Haro;[1] but the city suspected that a force they intended to send for the support of Segovia or the avenging of Medina del Campo would not be used very vigorously for such purposes by the Count.[2] They were further suspicious of a force of 400 men-at-arms the Constable maintained personally and secretly, and summoned him to reduce his guard to 20, to which he reluctantly agreed.[3] Early in September the Constable's life was repeatedly threatened and he and his spirited wife, who had spoken her mind freely, were besieged two days in their Casa del Cordón.[4] Not a man of his own house, the grandee declared, whether in Burgos or without, dared support him, for fear their homes would be burned, 'as they would have if they had joined me.' The cathedral chapter prevented the mob from storming his house only by bearing the Host in procession, with psalms and lighted candles, into the great granite entrance of the Casa. To avoid fatalities the Constable agreed to leave Burgos with all his household.[5]

[1] Mexía, 161.

[2] Sandoval, who (VII. iii) takes over Mexía's text, states this reason, which Mexía only implies.

[3] Sandoval (*ibid.*) is the only authority for this.

[4] Mexía, 161–62, repeated by Sandoval, VII. iii. Cf. Constable's own account to D. Carlos, Sep. 30 (Danv. II. 37, duplicated at II. 92). The date of the riot was Sep. 8, 'the day of our Lady of September' (Mexía); i.e., Nativity of the Virgin. Cf. Cardinal to D. Carlos, Sep. 14, Danv. II. 20 Maldonado, 144. Cantón Salazar *Casa del Cordón*, xxxiv, ff. For the Casa see illustration facing p. 26, and note.

[5] Peter Martyr (Epist. DCLXXXVII) gives a brief account. Maldonado (141–53) narrates with much picturesque detail these riotous days, of which

The tenacious old aristocrat, however, withdrawing to his estate in Briviesca, turned at once to the recovery of his revolted villages,[1] and to the larger business of negotiating a loan from the King of Portugal, of collecting troops in Navarre, and of securing for his master's cause some of the troops returned from the Gelves expedition.[2] Not his least promising step was an understanding with the Duke of Nájera, Viceroy of Navarre, 'that we would drop certain animosities that have usually existed between our houses, and agree to stand firmly in Your Majesty's service.'[3]

The next month the Constable received his commission as Governor.[4] He was still negotiating hopefully with his following in Burgos, where a section of public opinion was showing reluctance to go all the way with the Tordesillas Junta.[5] To the hesitating city he saw the need of offering full pardon; and he pointed out to the young monarch the impossibility of executing his uncompromising orders and the urgency of allowing governors on the spot complete authority to pardon. He presumed even to offer Burgos and the rest of the realm concession of their principal political demands: concerning withdrawal of money from the kingdom, the appointment of foreigners to office, the cancelling of the Coruña grants.[6]

The Constable was relieved to see the approaches of Bishop Acuña rejected in Burgos;[7] but he could reach no agreement with the city himself, and hoped for no more than that

he says he was an eye-witness. He admits that the violence on the day of the Nativity was precipitated by the Constable, who, in argument with a deputy in the town council, 'blind with rage at seeing the man's impudence, smote him, adding some well-deserved insults.'

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, Sep. 30, Danv. II. 37. Peter Martyr, Epist. DCLXXXVIII, Sep. 16.

[2] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 8, Danv. II. 254. Mexía, 172.

[3] *Ibid.*, Sep. 30, Danv. II. 37. Maldonado, 164.

[4] Apparently Oct. 1; summary in Danv. II. 238.

[5] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 4, Danv. II. 239.

[6] *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, Danv. II. 243. Salvá (137), summarized in Danv. II. 244. Martyr, Epist. DCXCV, Nov. 8.

[7] The Bishop's intrigues were hindered by the circumstance that he was then disabled by a kick from a horse, by the interception of his letters, and by the dissuasions of his half-brother Diego Osorio's wife, with which lady he corresponded. The details of the matter are in Maldonado (173–76), usually well informed about Burgos events. The enthusiasm of the town was dampened by circulation of a report that Acuña had a dead list of 200 citizens marked for slaughter.

Burgos would hold off from the Junta [1] and continue to refuse, as it had just done, a free hand to the Burgos deputies there. On October 10, however, he obtained unofficially from the city the terms upon which it would return to obedience. His immediate reply was to advise them to be content with the laws and pragmaticas of the realm: 'which I did in order not to break the thread of negociations which I am carrying on with them.' To the sovereign, however, he advised prompt and complete concession: 'I count it of great import to recover Burgos, in whatever fashion, and so it appears to Your Majesty's other servants also. I account it a good bargain to secure it with paper and ink, since there is otherwise at the moment no effective means, unless Your Highness order the constituting of a great army . . . I beseech Your Majesty, the moment this post arrives, to have the said stipulated concessions (*capítulos*) examined by the councillors who reside with Your Majesty; and though some things therein seem grievous to concede, send me them signed and sworn to — with sufficient authority for me to grant them in Your Highness's name, and to pardon, in fact and right, as Your Majesty can. Send me the same for all other parts of the realm in disobedience, so there will be no need, because this is inadequate, to send again for further power. Feel no repugnance at paper, ink, oath, or pledge. . . . Once returned to your realms and having reduced them to obedience, Your Highness may do as he pleases and restore them to due order. Or, if Your Majesty see not fit, decide to come or send a great army, that we may do at will what we wish: for without that no good thing can be accomplished.

'Your Majesty should know that the sufferings the Dean my nephew has endured, and Dr. Zumel and other persons I have in Burgos conducting this business,[2] are beyond belief; for not a day passes (especially when the Bishop of Zamora had arrived there) but they expect to be torn to bits. Since these towns are so changeable, as Your Majesty knows, and it might be that Burgos would demand other things besides those stipulated, I think Your Highness should order these granted; and besides send me the authority I ask, for it might yet chance that I could reach

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 8, Danv. II. 254.

[2] Maldonado (177 ff.) notes that the Constable organized systematic bribery of the popular leaders — business which Zumel doubtless handled expertly.

an arrangement with them whereby I should not concede them as much as Your Majesty will grant, and could keep in reserve the concessions Your Highness sends me, and, if they will yield none of them, then reveal and use them. . . . Your Majesty may well believe that . . . though I have the concessions here, signed, no one shall know but I, nor will I use them save in great need.' [1]

When the same advances were made officially from Burgos, the Constable, though yet without authority to do so, and against the demurrer of members of the Council, promised the stipulated concessions. 'I am certain,' he explained in a letter to D. Carlos, on October 21,[2] 'if Your Majesty were here and saw the condition in which the affairs of the realm stand as we here see it, you would grant and concede it [i.e., what Burgos asked], despite the letter which Your Majesty ordered written to all the Viceroys, of October 7, whereby you wrote ordering us not to use the powers and instructions you had sent touching these matters but to concern ourselves only with governing the realm: whereat I and the said President and members of the Council were astounded, for if Your Majesty had matters before your eyes there, as we have here, it is to be believed you would send no such order; and whoever counselled you to the contrary, he is not therein, it seems to me, a good servant to you.'

So concerned was the Viceroy that on this same day he despatched another earnest note to the Imperial boy. 'In the business I have in hand, the disposal Your Majesty orders will be observed; but the truth is that, as we are 400 leagues from Your Majesty, when our reports arrive there, things are already different; and when Your Majesty's commands arrive here, the nature of the business as little permits observance of the letter. So, if Your Highness is satisfied of the intent wherewith I serve you, Your Majesty must stand by what I and the Admiral and the Cardinal may do. . . . When Your Majesty sent the revocation of the powers regarding the pardon of these cities, it must have been because it seemed to those of your Council who are there that, with the certain assurance of your felicitous return, that alone sufficed to sustain here the interests of your service — leaving Your Highness to do after arrival what he pleased. In truth, most mighty Lord, Your Majesty is

[1] To D. Carlos, Oct. 10, Danv. II. 256–58. [2] Danv. II. 269 ff.

mistaken, for that command you sent was suited rather for the time when you were about to sail for here than for the time when you start out to Germany.' [1]

On October 25,[2] the Constable put the unauthorized business formally through, not without humiliation, for the Burgos representatives insisted suspiciously on a promise written in the Constable's autograph.[3] He justified his step thus to his young master:[4] 'If I exceeded the command Your Majesty sent, it was to dissociate Burgos from the Junta people and alienate them from her. For that end alone, everything they wanted ought to be granted and conceded; how much more, since upon Burgos depend all the mountain districts and Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa and Álava and vassal villages and other cities and towns, within the province and without, which share her opinion. Were it not done were completely to lose the realm . . . Your Majesty must believe that these your realms are in such state that there is need of pardon and liberties, and a great army in order that the voice of your service may continue in them. If some of the revolted cities will not agree to what Burgos has done . . . Your Majesty will have time to punish, pardon, or do what you desire. It is enough that, with the ink and paper we are giving them, they be reduced to your service. . . . I beseech as insistently as I can, that, though some of the concessions seem to you serious (as indeed they are), you have them confirmed, and approve the writ which I made and order it sent to me; for . . . if certain cities will not agree to it (as I expect) there will then be juster occasion for punishment. . . . I gave my sons, D. Juan de Tovar and D. Bernaldino de Velasco, as hostages, and the fortress of Villalpando and Vilhorado; and I would have given the Duchess my wife, and my other sons, and all else I have, so important is the affair. For indeed if Burgos is withdrawn from the Junta, their party is profoundly shaken.'

Further to make his conduct palatable, the Viceroy pointed out the cautious caveats which he had at the time duly and legally entered:[5] that, though His Majesty should

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 21, Danv. II. 276.
[2] Dated document in Danv. II. 390.
[3] Salvá, 142, quoted in Danv. II. 390.
[4] Letter of Oct. 29 (Danv. II. 288) from Briviesca.
[5] The deposition is in Danv. II. 390–91.

not confirm the concessions, he need not nor would not therefore oppose his service but remain free to serve him; and that, if the cities continued for ten days to disobey the royal governors, the pardon and concessions would apply only to Burgos. 'And the said Señor Constable said likewise that if His Majesty granted the concessions most substantial for the good of the realm, the said Señor Constable should remain free of all the rest stipulated in the said writ.'

Upon these terms the Constable reëntered his city on November 1:[1] even then arrows were shot from the crowd at the viceregal party.

The Viceroy's beseeching appeals of October 21 should reach Flanders in a dozen days; but D. Carlos left for Germany at the end of the month, and communication thence was slow and uncertain.[2] Half of November passed and no word came. The Constable had constantly before him the experience of Adrian in Valladolid, and his own days of siege in Burgos. 'They tell me,' he wrote D. Carlos,[3] 'the Cardinal and the Councillors who are with him have written you not to grant the Burgos concessions. I don't think they are willing to give me any thanks for the service I render and have rendered you; for it is clear that since I undertook to accept what Your Majesty directed me to, they have raised their heads. And if so, they have no proper motive in the business nor desire your service, but are looking to have repeated the affront in Valladolid.' The Cardinal, at least, understood his difficulties. 'The Constable is in Burgos,' he wrote to the King,[4] 'and dares not leave, for the risk of a turnover in which that city might do the same as Valladolid. The Council members with him fear they may arrest them as they did those who staid with me. . . .' The Constable himself confessed to the King:[5] 'I dare not de-

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, Nov. 3, Danv. II. 476. Mexía, 179. Maldonado, 180. Peter Martyr, Epist. DCXCV, Nov. 8; Epist. DCXCVII, Nov. 30 (*pridie Calendas Novembris* apparently misprinted for *Decembris*); the text speaks of *Octobris praeteriti*.

[2] For communication with Flanders, cf. *supra*, p. 51, n. 1. With Germany a quick post might communicate in ten days. A letter of D. Carlos of Nov. 13, in Cologne, acknowledges letters from Burgos of Nov. 3 (Constable to D. Carlos, Nov. 30, Sandoval, VIII. vii); and that letter of the King appears to have reached Burgos Nov. 22. Cf. *infra*, p. 189, n. 3. D. Carlos had not on May 18 heard of the victory of Villalar on April 23; a delay attributed to seizure of the posts in France. Danv. IV. 228.

[3] Letter of Nov. 14, Danv. II. 496.

[4] Nov. 16, Danv. II. 503. Cf. also Adrian's letter of Nov. 28, Danv. II. 516.

[5] Nov. 15, Danv. II. 573.

part from here; for, if I went, all believe this city would not be very secure; and, if it were lost, Your Majesty would hold nothing secure from the Sierra Morena to the sea. In view of that and through knowing in truth the ruin of this your kingdom, I agreed — and without command from Your Highness — to approve the stipulations which I sent you.[1] . . . I did it to separate this city from the Junta, and because I knew the Junta could not consent or agree to it — as was the fact. So the liberties stood only for this city and her province; and they apply no longer than until Your Majesty may come to these realms. Would to God, my Lord, that those who have written you not to grant may find other remedies such as befit your service, for I see none.'

At the month's end [2] the Viceroy received a royal letter written from Cologne on November 13, acknowledging the Constable's appeals of October 21 and November 3: His Majesty, since he had not reached a determination what should be answered and provided in the matters the Viceroy had written of, ordered no reply made to them! Burgos was not likely to be much reassured by the Imperial note of the same date,[3] thanking the city for receiving the Governor and promising in the particular matters on which they had written him, to make provision wherewith the city would be content. The old Viceroy returned an outburst of protest: [4] 'I am amazed to see how little diligence Your Highness orders devoted to what concerns these your realms and the pacification of them; for neither with money, nor troops, nor artillery has Your Majesty assisted me, and less with paper and ink. I am in the greatest difficulty on account of the danger in this city, for the period is about to end within which confirmation of the concessions was to come,[5] and they do not. To help the need of Rioseco, in which they got involved without any cause,[6] I sent all the troops I had here, and remained alone in a city as large as this, which —

[1] Danvila's text (II. 573) *acordeys syn* is impossible: I read *accorde y ssyn mandamiento de vra. a.*

[2] Nov. 22; answered in letter of Constable to D. Carlos, Nov. 30, Sandoval, VIII. vii. Cf. p. 189, n. 3.

[3] Danv. II. 564, note 3.

[4] Constable to D. Carlos, Nov. 30, Sandoval, VIII. vii.

[5] Sandoval, VIII. xvii and xxvi (xxvii) says the term did expire and the city extended it. Cf. Valladolid to Cuenca, Jan. 8, Danv. III. 162.

[6] Comunero troops under D. Pedro Girón threatened Rioseco on Nov. 28 Cf. *infra*, p. 200.

it is a miracle that it has not risen. If Your Majesty does not wish to lose this city and her province, which is the largest in all Spain, those six things must be despatched at once: the sales tax, the Cortes grant, quartering the Court, offices and benefices, money, and pardon. All this must come for this city and its provinces: which is of very little harm, for the quartering of the Court did not occur in the province (viz. Guipúzcoa, Álava, and Vizcaya) and the other scattered lands where the privilege exists, for the King never entered them save in passing. The matter of sales tax is also of little harm, for they are not paid in Vizcaya nor Guipúzcoa, for they have been commuted in perpetuity. The matter of pardon concerns only this city, for in the province there was no offense. The matter of offices and benefices is law of the realm, which is obligatory upon Your Highness, and you have always so ordered, and it befits your service. But in the matter of pardon, Your Highness should note that you must say that you pardon everything done against Your Highness or against any other private persons: for this does not prevent execution of justice if there should be *parte quejosa*.[1] And it would be very well if these concessions came for all the kingdom, for they are not things which Your Highness should not, on petition, concede; and in the matter of pardon Your Majesty can except such persons and places as you please. It is very necessary that it should come thus for all the realm, for this city says she will not otherwise accept it, since she boasts she is head of the realm. I beseech Your Majesty that it may come by the first post, for delay involves infinite harm to Your Highness's service; and if matters were pacified here I could proceed further against the people of the Junta and apply force there so that they should see themselves hard pressed; and your royal standard would sally from this city with all her troops and those of her province, whose number is enough to destroy the enemy. . . . I gave Your Majesty's letter to Burgos: and the fact that no confirmation has come has thrown them into such tumult that they are now more violent than should be.'

[1] Seemingly the chicane which shrewd persons had already indicated to the Cardinal (*supra*, pp. 124, n. 6., 167, n.), whereby proceedings for recovery of damage might be instituted by injured private parties and the criminal aspects of the case thus reopened.

For the panic roused in Segovia when the widow of Melón demanded redress, in spite of the royal pardon cf. Danv. IV. 233.

Winter wore on and the delicate matter was yet undetermined.[1] 'I am the most wretched man in the world,' the Viceroy fumed, 'to see myself tied here in this city and unable to make myself into a hundred to serve Your Majesty; for I have a strong suspicion that in the matter of the army there is trouble which would cease were I present, and I know very certainly that if I leave here—if indeed I could—everything here would go to pieces and be lost, and the harm would spread to Tordesillas. So, in failing to despatch the matter of the concessions to this city, everything here is in the acutest danger. . . . Since Your Majesty sees how it befits your service, and no other purpose moves me, it should be unnecessary to beseech Your Majesty with such insistency for what you should have sent without my asking.'

By Christmas the Constable was reduced to an angry desperation and wrote:[2] 'So many days are gone since I saw a letter of Your Majesty that I know not what to say to myself save to believe you have forgotten us and care little for the labors which we your servants here endure. . . . For 33 days to-day[3] I have seen no letter from Your Majesty; and I console myself with the fact that the estates Your Majesty possesses yonder must be so great a concern that, compared with them, the matter here need be held of slight consequence, and, as of small consequence, Your Majesty takes small account of it.'

But an important military event had meanwhile much altered the Constable's position.

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, Dec. 13, Danv. II. 649.

[2] Dec. 25, Danv. II. 672.

[3] I.e., no letter since that of D. Carlos of Nov. 13, in Cologne, which was received Nov. 22, apparently.

CHAPTER XVII

CONJURING A CONGRESS

THOUGH escaped from duress, the Cardinal voluntarily withdrew into an attitude of counsel and reserve.[1] The Constable, sole Governor *pro tem*, had as his task to win over Burgos, the head of the realm. To the Admiral fell chiefly the negotiations with the Junta: 'since he was acute and very well read and well spoken, he believed he might do more with his wisdom than the men of the Junta with their malice.' [2]

His first difficulty was that in his own party a powerful group believed negotiations useless. These, obstinate officials or young hot-heads, he had resolutely to ignore — in full knowledge, however, that the King himself seemed little disposed to support negotiation either by granting power or fulfilling promises. To ignore the aggressive Royalists required all the Admiral's combination of deliberateness and pertinacity, sustained by his faith that the Comunero movement was an expression of reasonable indignation, ready to listen to reason.

Sufficient deliberateness the old dignitary had already shown; he reached Adrian's headquarters, his own city of Rioseco, only by November 14, and he refused to accept the governorship save on conditions. This latter scruple, which he took pains to publish, doubtless — since the Comuneros declared the appointments illegal — gave him a better ground for negotiation,[3] to which he tenaciously devoted himself. Besides repeated letters,[4] he sought first direct

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Dec. 4, Danv. II. 625.

[2] Santa Cruz, I, 359.

[3] So he alleges in a letter to Sevilla, Nov. 22, Danv. II. 542.

[4] The Admiral's letters are voluble and full of rhetorical questions. He says he had in his home more than 1000 sheets of a correspondence with Jiménez (Danv. II. 548).

The Constable even ventured to joke, in letters to D. Carlos, about the Admiral's copious correspondence. Cf. Danv. IV. 375. The Admiral's report of Aug. 27, 1521 (Danv. IV. 385) begins: 'This shall be brief; for what is fitting for the cure of the evils of these realms has been so many times said and has availed so little that the sensiblest thing to do is for us to forget it, as His Majesty forgets it.' The report continues for six closely printed pages of small type. Martyr calls one of the Admiral's communications — perhaps with a shade of amuse-

communication with the leaders in Valladolid, of which he was a citizen, asking to be received there. Within a few leagues of the city he applied for an interview; his request was courteously acknowledged by D. Pedro Girón, who referred it to the city.[1] The interview then refused, the Admiral requested again, in a letter of November, from Rioseco. He much desired to appear before the whole Junta; 'but this interview,' he explained in a letter to Sevilla,[2] 'they refused, for they never let me talk with them at all, for they made me talk with those who are in the worst opinion and most evil intent, and others more enlightened as to their error they never let me see; nor was D. Pedro-lasso, Toledo deputy, ever willing to see me.' The Junta sent, however, to the Admiral's stronghold of Torrelobatón,[3] three deputies, Quiñones, Esquivel, and Fray Pablo of León, who asked for the Admiral's statement but declared they had no power to act. In a second interview they stated the Junta's case.[4]

The policy of the Admiral was to keep the Junta to its function as a congress of petition for redress of grievance, without, or at least before, resort to arms; and he began all

ment — 'epistolam . . . dicendi copia pollentem et sententiis utilibus refertam.' (Epist. DCXCVII.)

Of this period we have two letters to Valladolid, Oct. 19 (Danv. II. 334); and Oct. 23 (Danv. II. 278). (This is the same letter which Sandoval (VII. xv) says is of Oct. 22, though his text reads Oct. 20.)

We have an exchange of letters between the Admiral and the Junta: Admiral to Junta, undated (Santa Cruz, I. 338), before reaching Castile and resembling in phrase and matter the letters of October to Valladolid. The letter of the Admiral in Danv. II. 344, which he calls of Oct. 20, has no date at all. It is probably of Nov. 18; reference to an interview 'yesterday,' to the Admiral's going a considerable way for interview with private parties, and to the deputies' being but three steps from the place, seems applicable to the Torrelobatón conference of Nov. 17. The letter is answered in almost complete detail in the Junta letter of Nov. 22 (Danv. II. 531). A letter or summons of the Admiral to the Junta, undated, giving an exposition of the Admiral's self-sacrificing public service, and a report of the Torrelobatón conference (Danv. II. 547). (This duplicates, with the addition of a long paragraph, the letter Danvila prints at II. 336. It is in the first version placed, by evident error, in October; but in the second in November. Gross errors of copying or printing may be checked by comparing these texts.) Junta to Admiral, Nov. 22, Danv. II. 531. Admiral to Junta, Danv. II. 534.

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, giving Admiral's own account. Danv. II. 501.

[2] Nov. 28, Danv. II. 542. Martyr reports (Epist. DCCIV) that Girón held off lest he make himself suspect. The Admiral, with a small unarmed escort, was refused admission to Tordesillas.

[3] The Admiral went there Nov. 16 (Danv. II. 501). The interview occurred Nov. 17 (Danv. II. 513), or perhaps both days.

[4] A simple declaration of the Junta position is given also in their letter to Valladolid, of Oct. 6, Danv. II. 310.

discussion with frank concession that there were grave grievances.[1] These, he urged, arose from bad counsel given to the young King by those unacquainted with the customs of Spanish government; but, though unfortunate for the realm, the bad government was really creditable to the monarch who, though this was unusual with his age, had acted on counsel. A congress of petition was exactly right: 'If you will, from the hand of your King you will obtain what befits you; for he will feel your wrongs, since you are members of his person, and will not desire your destruction, since that is his own. He will be benign to pardon and liberal in satisfaction. Begin forthwith to follow advice offered with such love; and believe that in the governorship to which I am appointed I have no consideration save for the general good of all; and I would not for my life undertake what the King directs without assurance of what is fitting for us all (for I could not and would not think of deceiving you) and without belief that what you desire is fitting.' [2]

Protest the Admiral added to appeal, in discussion of the Queen's condition and the baseness of exploiting it. He charged further that the programme of the radicals was really revolution and not reform, and their trick, to compromise the others in guilt so that they could not go back. 'They desire to get you in the water up to the eyes, believing that for your own security you must come round to what they want. . . . They are persuading you that in the name of the Queen our Lady you may yourselves rule and take the realm from her son. That is a false proposition, for, if she be unwilling or unable to govern, there is no law of the realm which says the communes shall have charge of supplying this deficiency.' D. Carlos must ultimately succeed, and this device can be but temporary. Further, either success or failure in arms would create a dilemma, and the outcome doubtless escape the control of the present leaders: 'I assure you they did not get you into the dance for you to be leaders of it throughout.'

To appeal and protest the Admiral added prophecy — of foreign disaster, and political and economic ruin. The infidel, he has heard, is already preparing to recapture footing in Rhodes and Italy, seeing Spain weak. 'Do you not

[1] Letters to Valladolid, Oct. 19 and Oct. 23, Danv. II. 334, 278.

[2] Admiral to Valladolid, Oct. 23, Danv. II. 280.

remember that with the blood of the dead — our sons, fathers, and kin — and with private wealth Spain is so increased, esteemed, praised, and feared by Italians, Moors, Turks, and other races? Can it then be true that you will bring it about that what was won with so much praise of yours will be with so much dishonor lost, alienated, and destroyed?... If the business continues, taxes will increase; and, in default of that, need will involve you in dissensions. The farmer who does not sow and the official who does not work must seek wherewith to live: hence will arise robbing and murdering on the highways, and no security in the strong places [*lugares*]; and after being the most peaceful realm in the world, it will now become the most lost, ruined, and dishonored among all the nations.' [1]

To all his argument the Viceroy added a searching reminder that the Tordesillas Junta did not represent all the realm, nor even perhaps its own cities. 'Andalusia has kept apart from the business; and Galicia and Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa and Asturias and Granada, Navarre — none of these cities are going your road.' [2]

In reply the deputies at Torrelobatón contended that, since the evils were manifest, and the King provided no redress and the grandees made no move to obtain it, the cities perforce organized to require it. If those evils arose from ill counsel, the Royal Council should be investigated, 'for they have ruled so long without [our] knowing their lives; and their properties manifest their offenses, for with 100,000 maravedis of salary they amassed so many cuentos of income: for that reason they [the Comuneros] had suspended, not removed, them.' [3]

The deputies further contended that the appointment of the governors was not legal. The Admiral, to be sure, had demurred at accepting; [4] but the Constable had accepted, and, with the Council, was organizing an army and upon them clearly rested the blame for the appeal to force. To this the Admiral's countercharge was that the Communes had countenanced killing and destruction in the June mobs, and encouraged revolt of vassals. As to the legality of the

[1] Danv. II. 279 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, II. 346.

[3] *Ibid.*, II. 551. The *cuento* is a million maravedis.

[4] His refusal he urged upon the Comuneros as evidence of his wish to deal with them only as a friendly fellow-citizen. Cf. Martyr's account of the Admiral's requests for interviews (Epist. DCCIV, Dec. 5).

governors' appointments he was quite willing to submit the matter to legal investigation and act according to findings: indeed he had himself not accepted, in order to see first if the laws forbade!

In reply the Junta deputies sought to justify the destructive wrath of their cities. 'Your Grace knows the intolerable grievances of these realms; and the guilty cause thereof was the men of the evil council which our Lord the King had. And after His Majesty departed, not merely by bad counsel but by devilish acts, they destroyed these realms; and the Señor Cardinal shared in it; and one of those who in these realms continued in his offer to support these good works was the Señor Constable: and, after, they received and sheltered those who destroyed the kingdom, and restored them to the Council to complete the ruin of these realms. The cities, perceiving this — judge, Your Grace, what peace and repose may be in them, if they see themselves subjected to those who have done them so many ills and wrongs, and whom, by their acts and by favoring those who do them, they account, for just and true cause, their enemies. What would it suffice for the city of Segovia to keep repose, if it is they (and their supporters) who said that they must lay her waste and leave there four pillars as memorial of her ruin? . . . And Medina, for the cruelty they used with her, and the other cities, by example of these?' [1]

To the Admiral's happy confidence of redress the Junta answered by a suggestion of studied irony. 'All our good and hope we have, after God, in His Majesty. Of him we have hope that he will graciously provide remedy . . . and we believe Your Grace is certain thereof, since you have offered it to us. But we should like much to know when and in what writ or letter Your Grace learned His Majesty's will, for that would be for us great good and rejoicing, for we should account it certain that His Highness has departed from the evil counsel he has hitherto held.' [2] To this suggestion the Admiral returned assured but vague answer: [3] 'Assuredly, gentlemen, if the trust you say you have in our Lord the King will cast out distrust from your company, I shall rest quite secure of the remedy, since, sirs, as I have said to you, I can show it you signed by His Highness.' [4]

[1] Junta to Admiral, Nov. 22, Danv. II. 532. [2] Danv. II. 533.

[3] Admiral to Junta, Nov. 22, Danv. II. 538.

[4] It seems more than doubtful that D. Carlos gave to the Admiral any more

To the charge that they represented but part of the realm the Junta pointed out that they were deputies of fourteen out of eighteen Cortes cities; and asserted that the unrepresented were restrained by oppression. They had, however, little effective reply to the Admiral's point that the position of the Southern cities was too clear to indicate oppression: from Córdoba, for example, came offer to the authorities of considerable military forces.

The most specific results of the discussion were demands made by the Junta deputies in Torrelobatón and counter-demands by the Admiral: on the one hand, that the Governors decline to exercise their illegal function; and, on the other hand, that the Comuneros dismiss their troops. 'I am offering you,' urged the grandee, 'on behalf of His Majesty, not only confirmation of privileges but new favors; and, once your troops were disbanded, we would all consider remedies (since every one's interest lies there), and in assurance that no troops should ever be assembled against your graces [1] or the realm, the S[r] Count of Benevente, and the S[r] Marquis of Astorga, and the S[r] Count of Alva, and the S[r] Count of Luna, and I would give security as complete as they might demand; and we will examine the laws touching the matter of the S[r] Constable and the Rev. S[r] Cardinal, and if they forbade their rule, together, they and I, would petition our Lord the King for remedy.' [2]

The deputies represented the impossibility of reorganizing forces if the troops were once disbanded, and declared they would do nothing save on previous condition that the Constable refuse to act as Governor.[3] The Admiral urged that such refusal was possible to the Constable before accepting but not optional after acceptance. The deputies added a demand that the Councillors leave Rioseco; and the Admiral agreed; 'if that was what prevented agreement upon further progress, they should at once go' — with the reminder, however, that not the Councillors' consent but the King's must ultimately be obtained for a settlement.

explicit encouragement or promise than to the Constable, whose correspondence shows how vainly he sought such support from his king.

[1] The Junta. [2] Danv. II. 341.

[3] Adrian reported to D. Carlos, Nov. 20 (Danv. II. 514) that the Junta made a proposal of mutual disarming, which the Admiral accepted. Either he was misinformed or the proposal somehow failed of fulfillment. Adrian says they did not believe the proposal sincere.

The Admiral's conclusion from the succession of letters and interviews was that the Junta did not represent reasonable, but extreme and treasonable resistance, as he angrily explained in a long letter sent to Sevilla to be circulated in Andalusia.[1] 'That your worships may see their intentions I inform you that when I went to confer with them I asked what they wanted. They said, the liberty of the realm. I said to them, Give me in writing all that is fitting for the realm and I will grant it completely. They were never willing to, for the truth is they were bound straight to make themselves kings. And thereof be assured, for the President of the Valladolid Audiencia has been here [2] to see if he could bring us to an agreement; and when I asked him, What do the others demand? they say [3] they would be satisfied if the Council were removed and D. Pedrolasso Governor of the realm, and they will accept no other settlement.'

Despairing of conciliation, the Admiral was ready to accept the governorship and to resort to force.[4]

That so conciliatory a statement as the Admiral's of the Royalist position and so hopeful continuance of negotiation exasperated many in his following of grandees is clear. The military men, especially the Count of Benavente,[5] were of course impatient; and finally it seemed clear even to the pacific that the possibilities of negotiation were exhausted, until some military event should give one side or the other an advantage from which they could force some degree of agreement. By the end of November, according to the confidential report of Lope Hurtado,[6] 'many of the grandees and caballeros here would go and offer battle; and, if there were unfavorable position for attack, go to Tordesillas or Valladolid, which are without troops, and they would come up in succor and battle could be joined there. This the Cardinal desires and the Comendador Mayor and Licenciado Zapata and the other members of the Council here; for it is accounted certain that we have an advantage over them, and shameful that we remain here besieged; for the enemy

[1] Nov. 28, Danv. II. 541.

[2] Rioseco. Lope was very uneasy as to the results of this conciliatory visit. Report to D. Carlos, Nov. 29, Danv. II. 523.

[3] *Sic: dicen que.* Perhaps misreading for *dice que*, 'he says.'

[4] Martyr (Epist. DCCIV, Dec. 5) has a picturesque account of the Admiral's arrival at this conclusion.

[5] Cf. Danv. II. 772. [6] Lope to D. Carlos, Nov. 29, Danv. II. 522.

proclaims that fact, and their party daily gain spirit and troops, and ours weakens and will have fewer troops, for it appears there will not be money to pay so large a force. The Admiral does not approve, for he says they would come here,[1] and in losing this place much would be lost. Would to God it had been lost before, for there is no hope that from here any good will be accomplished; for, though the Admiral seeks Your Majesty's service and works for it, he does not desire the harm which our enemies deserve. At the same time that he serves Your Majesty, he would like to satisfy the Communes. No good can be accomplished with two purposes. So I fear some compromise must be reached with them which, by what I see, will be ill. When I spoke to him in your behalf about the governorship he told me he would not take it save with the powers I have written you. . . . His own brothers are desperate. . . . The Cardinal and the Councillors are desperate not to see the determination they desire in the man who should have it.'

The Admiral's entire course incurred the condign wrath of the flouted official world as represented in the Council, now gradually reassembling. 'Your Majesty is informed how the Admiral has not accepted the powers as governor which Your Highness ordered sent him; but on the other hand does certain things as Governor and concerns himself in others and is angry if they are not done as he wishes. Certain Councillors know him very well and often heard that he has an animosity against the President and the Councillors, and says things to their discredit, saying they should be removed from the Council because they are suspected by the realm: and he shows it by certain concessions he offered the Junta and promised Your Highness would confirm. . . . If the Admiral has not lost his anger at the judgment the Council gave in the matter of the countship of Rivadeo. . . . he ought not to retain it till now nor use it in such a time, for what was then done was justice.' [2]

Even the Cardinal, so much more willing and sympathetic than the stiff Councillors and the impatient soldiers, felt that the possibilities of compromise were exhausted. 'The Admiral with his great prudence and kindliness . . . chose to conduct further parley with the said persons of the

[1] Rioseco.

[2] Council to D. Carlos, Dec. 18, from Burgos, Danv. II. 664. A similar disgusted letter from Alarcón to Secretary Cobos, Jan. 20, 1521, Danv. III. 53.

Junta, offering them many things, which they always refused.' [1] On the day after His Eminence dictated these words, however, the first considerable conflict of arms altered all the elements of the bargaining.

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Dec. 4, Danv. II. 625.

CHAPTER XVIII

TORDESILLAS

THE skeptical welcomed the failure of negotiations, for the field was thus left clear for a trial of arms.

Maneuvers continued through a fortnight of early winter, over a vast rectangle of the Castilian plain, some twenty miles wide along its base, the Douro, and extending lengthwise twenty-five miles to the northwest. The northern corner of this field was Rioseco, the Royalist base; the eastern corner, Valladolid, the Comunero base; the southern, Tordesillas; and the western, Villagarcia.

The Royalist forces were not considerable in comparison with the Comuneros, before they were increased by the troops sent by the Constable, under the command of his son the Count of Haro, who was made Captain-General.[1] In Rioseco were already assembled not more than 300 heavy and 300 lighter cavalry, with 450 jinetes, very lightly armed horse used chiefly for scouting and skirmishing; and 3500 foot of the Royal army.[2] To these were added, with the arrival of Haro, not more than 500 heavy [3] and 400 light horse, with 2500 foot [4] of the Royal army; and upward of a dozen pieces of field artillery. To this solid nucleus of disciplined power other grandees, many driven from their cities, brought a confused and indeterminate reënforcement of their

[1] He received 8 ducats a day, a salary the Cardinal refused to increase; but it was advanced by the Admiral and the Constable to 20. When it came to actual payment the Count agreed to 15. Cf. Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 18, 1521, Danv. IV. 480.

[2] Mexía's figures (p. 192), accepted by Sandoval (VIII. iii): probably rather too large. The Constable, likely to be pretty well informed, wrote D. Carlos, Nov. 30 (Sandoval himself gives the letter, VIII. vii): '900 horse; 2000 foot; 19 pieces, 13 very good.'

[3] Mexía's figure (194); Sandoval (VIII. iii) says 300; Santa Cruz (I. 358) names a total of 800 horse. The Comendador Mayor (to D. Carlos, Dec. 6, Danv. II. 635) says: '700 lances and 2000 foot.' The Constable was planning, on Nov. 15 (letter to D. Carlos, Danv. II. 573) to send 700 horse, 2500 foot, 13 or 14 pieces.

[4] Mexía's figure (194); adopted by Sandoval (VIII. iii); Santa Cruz gives 3000 (I. 358); P. Martyr's estimate (Epist. DCCIX, Dec. 27): 3000 foot; 700 heavy cavalry (cataphracti).

own troops, raising the total force to some 2100 horse and 6000 Royal foot, with other armed vassals.[1]

Assembled under the command of D. Pedro Girón, the Comuneros had 10,000 foot;[2] and 400 heavy horse,[3] with 500 jinetes; and 13 pieces of artillery.[4] They had to maintain in Tordesillas, where were the Queen and many Junta deputies, garrison sufficient to man its walls. Hernando de Porras was there in command of Acuña's 400 clerics,[5] who 'through regard for their order would not march with the rabble of the troops,'[6] and of other horse and foot.[7]

The movements, at a time when neither party saw a clear policy to pursue, were marchings and countermarchings, challenges declined, and raids of plunder and bravado. The campaign could become significant only if alert leadership should espy and use a chance for a signal stroke. For such a feat Haro had the advantage of a force of cavalry perhaps double that of the Junta.

Girón advanced and was established by November 24[8] in three villages southwest of Rioseco, his artillery and foot

[1] Lope comments on the insubordination of the grandees' troops. Adrian to Constable, Dec. 12, Danv. II. 642.

For total numbers, Mexía, 191; confirmed by estimate of the Cardinal, who was in Rioseco: 2000 lances; 6000 foot (letter to D. Carlos, Dec. 4, Danv. II. 624). Vargas, in a sensible report of Dec. 7 (Danv. II. 718) estimates: Royal horse, 2200; Royal foot, 6500. The Admiral's statement to Sevilla, Nov. 28 (Danv. II. 543), matches the Cardinal's if his number includes Haro's force; but he goes on to speak of Haro's numbers as to be added. He was writing for effect.

[2] Mexía, 192; Santa Cruz, I. 358.

[3] Mexía, 192; Santa Cruz gives but 200 horse (I. 358).

[4] Santa Cruz, I. 358. The Comendador says (letter to D. Carlos, Dec. 1, Danv. II. 632), 2 culverins, 6 or 7 falconets, and other smaller pieces. The estimates of the total Comunero forces naturally vary much. The two most significant differ, as their difference in date may partly explain: the Constable wrote D. Carlos, Nov. 30 (Sandoval VIII. vii) '700 lances; 3000 foot; 9 pieces of artillery, including 4 heavy pieces'; the Comendador told the Emperor, Dec. 6 (Danv. II. 635), 800 lances and 8 or 9000 foot. Sandoval's figures for all the arms are detailed, but differ from the earlier authorities: 650 lances and 2000 foot (VIII. i), and differ from his later improbable statement of '17,000 foot with a good number of horse and much artillery' (VIII. ii). Maldonado's estimate — that of a contemporary — approximates that of the chroniclers: 10,000 foot; 1000 horse (193).

[5] Santa Cruz, I. 368. Mexía (180) calls them 'Mass clerks.' The Admiral heard there were 300 (Admiral to Sevilla, Nov. 28, Danv. II. 544).

[6] Sandoval, VIII. iii.

[7] Mexía, 191. Contemporary report in Burgos (Maldonado's; p. 203 ff.) estimated 200 horse and 500 foot, besides the townsfolk.

[8] Mexía's date, Nov. 27, is clearly wrong. Sandoval's '22 or 23' (VIII. ii) is supported by the Captain's letter of Nov. 24 (in Sandoval VIII. ii). Girón wrote from Villabrájima on Nov. 23 (Danv. II. 562).

TORDESILLAS: VIEW ACROSS THE BRIDGE

The turret, which is a part of the Alderete Chapel, is a portion of the older palace buildings. Tradition, of course, calls it Doña Juana's tower.

TORDESILLAS: FRAGMENT OF THE OLD FORTIFICATION ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE TOWN

within some five miles of the town, with which there were occasional skirmishes;[1] but his challenge to a pitched battle on Saint Andrew's Day (November 30) was declined, for Haro and his reënforcements did not reach Rioseco until the very afternoon of the day, November 28, when the challenge was offered.[2]

Not having forced an encounter which perhaps he but half-heartedly desired, Girón ventured, Sunday, December 2, on a provocative raid upon Villalpando, a village a few leagues to the northwest, which was the property of the Constable, and which surrendered without resistance. The immediate purpose was perhaps foraging;[3] but the move was explained by the Commander as part of the winter campaign: the town would afford housing for the troops and a safe vantage-point for raiding convoys or even for attack upon Rioseco. The impetuous and insubordinate Acuña denounced the plan as certain to deliver the Governors from their present acute risk and to encourage desertion from the disappointed Comunero ranks;[4] and was further exasperated because Girón forbade the sacking of the town.

The march had in fact involved a graver risk than that indicated by the Bishop. On Monday Haro moved into the villages Girón quitted, overcoming the slight resistance of Villagarcia, which alone was held by a garrison.[5] The next day he determined, in the face of much dissent,[6] upon a

[1] E.g., Acuña's. Sandoval, VIII. iii. Peter Martyr has an amused account of the Bishop of Oviedo, who, reciting the hours on a mule in the outskirts of the city, was so frightened by the scream of a cannonball from Acuña's artillery that he fell from his mount. (Epist. DCCVII, Dec. 12. It is odd that, writing to the Nuncio in Rioseco at this date he makes no mention of the capture of Tordesillas on Dec. 5.) The Count of Benavente's life was also imperiled (Martyr, Epist. DCCIX). The alarm inspired by Girón's raid in Rioseco is noted by Maldonado (200).

[2] Santa Cruz, I. 359.

[3] P. Martyr (Epist. DCCIX, Dec. 27): Ad Villalpandum . . . frumentariae rei uberrimum . . . commeatuum viam profecti.

[4] Maldonado, 200. His phrase is significant: that 'Acuña . . . openly declared it was a subterfuge to delay the victory so that the viceroys might escape their immediate peril,' etc. Of course this can be scarcely more than hearsay, though perhaps from well-informed sources.

[5] Comendador Mayor to D. Carlos, Dec. 6, Danv. II. 634. Maldonado, 201–02.

[6] His father had suggested the venture (Constable to D. Carlos, Dec. 4, Danv. II. 622); the Cardinal approved and publicly urged it (letters of Dec. 4, Danv. II. 626; and Dec. 6, Danv. II. 643); but the grandees were selfishly inclined to a policy of protecting the various towns in their patrimonies (Danv. II. 627), and the Admiral feared to expose Rioseco. (Haro to Constable, Danv. II. 576.) Sandoval, VIII. viii *ad fin.* Lope reported the alignment of opinions to D.

venturesome move. Leaving Rioseco but scantly guarded, he withdrew to the east until at nightfall his troops occupied posts halfway on the road from Rioseco to Tordesillas. Thence he might dash upon the river town with a half day's time for the desperate attempt to storm the place before Girón could arrive or even send up any considerable succor. A prolonged resistance there, however, might considerably weaken the Royalists, who might on the day following be caught between the returning army of Girón and a sally of the Comuneros in Valladolid.

Girón was promptly informed of the Royalist move and dispatched light horse and a company of musketeers to strengthen the defense.[1] Should the town be taken by sudden assault he would fail almost inevitably to recover custody of the Queen, even if he recovered the place. It might be better to undertake himself a dash on Rioseco, where he might capture the Cardinal.[2] Such a capture, however, would not seriously disorganize the government; and the Queen was a vastly more important object, the source of whatever color of legality the Comuneros could claim for their acts. The probably prolonged resistance of the town would enable him to arrive and distract, or with help from Valladolid, rout the assaulters.

An early start on Wednesday morning, Dec. 5,[3] brought Haro's forces to the walls of the surprised town, early in the afternoon.[4] His summons was, after probably artful delay,[5] declined. Every measure was taken for the fiercest attack. Light horse were thrown out on the Villalpando road; men at arms were dismounted to join in the assault; [6] while field

Carlos, Nov. 29 (Danv. II. 522) and remarked the unimportance of Rioseco.

[1] 'The same night' that Haro camped on the Tordesillas road, i.e., Dec. 4. (Mexía, 196.)

[2] Lively fears of such a move were entertained in Rioseco. Adrian to D. Carlos, Dec. 6, Danv. II. 643.

[3] A letter of the Admiral reporting the capture (Danv. II. 630) is dated Dec. 4; but, as Danvila notes, other documents — e.g., Haro's two notes on the very day (Danv. II. 678) — establish Wednesday, Dec. 5. Curiously Santa Cruz (II. 369) expressly dates it: 'Tuesday night, the 4 of December, day of Saint Barbara' (which is Dec. 4).

[4] Mexía says two (197). The Comendador says (letter to D. Carlos, Dec. 6, Danv. II. 635) one o'clock; as does Gómez de Santillán (letter to D. Carlos, Dec. 9, Danv. II. 696). The hour from one to two seems to have been consumed in negotiation.

[5] So believed G. de Santillán (letter to D. Carlos, Dec. 9) Danv. II. 696.

[6] Haro says this was his own requirement. Danv. III. 42; Maldonado, 204 ff.

pieces attempted to breach the walls, the soldiers were allowed a slight rest from their forced march, but some of the most heavily armed did not put off their panoplies for a space of twenty hours.[1] Further to incite an irresistible fury of attack, proclamation was made permitting the soldiers to sack the town.[2] "A first, vain assault . . . was upon the strongest stretch of wall, from the Valladolid gate to the western gate, where level ground lent hope of success.[3] Shifting the point of attack accomplished no more; and the fatalities were mounting into the hundreds when, in the waning daylight[4] an expert scout noted an opening in the south walls that had been walled in but weakly because the point was defended by the steep declivity of the river bank. Four falconets were spared from the bombardment elsewhere maintained; these, supported at intervals by attack of troops with picks, opened almost at nightfall a narrow gap, through which soldiers in small numbers fought their way against a resistance much weakened by the distraction maintained at other portions of the walls. To the uproar of trumpets, drums, and artillery were now added, at sight of the assaulters' bannerets on the wall, shrill screams of 'Victory! Victory!' and the roar of flames in buildings near the breach. An hour later, in darkness, troops effected entrance near the bridge; and a practicable gap was battered in the wall.[5] The entering grandees just succeeded in heading off the Toledo deputy who was about to carry off the Queen over the Douro bridge; so nearly did he succeed that it was possible for him to escape himself, though he ignominiously left the royal

[1] The Admiral says (to D. Carlos, Dec. 4 (read 5), Danv. II. 630) he and other old men endured this strain.

[2] In reports (Admiral to Sevilla, Danv. II. 685; and to Adrian, Danv. II. 631; Lope to D. Carlos, Dec. 10, Danv. II. 688) much apology was made for the sack; but warning, it was urged, was given in the summons. Santa Cruz says the artillerers and soldiers declared there would be no victory that day unless the town was given to sack (I. 369). The entire place, save the Palace and the Santa Clara monastery, was looted (Comunero account. Danv. II. 701).

[3] A few portions of the wall, of thin brick laid in heavy courses of mortar, as in Coca and Mota, still stand. Cf. illustration facing p. 200.

[4] 'Very near sundown.' Comendador. Danv. II. 635.

[5] The Constable's account (summarized in Danv. II. 701) says entrance was effected at nine, the combat lasting six hours. Mexía, whose vivid narrative is taken over entire by Sandoval (VIII. viii), says the struggle lasted from 2 till 7 (p. 201). The Admiral's first letter says five, his second says eight hours (Danv. II. 630, 631). Haro, presumably the best informed, says: 'Combat began at three and was won by ten at night.' (Communicated by the Constable to D. Carlos, Dec. 7, Danv. II. 721.) Maldonado's narrative (203–08) confirms Mexía's in almost every detail.

lady in the victors' hands. While the grandees wasted time on a meaningless interview with Doña Juana, Haro spent the night restoring the walls and keeping the troops, disorganized by plundering,[1] to their important responsibilities of guard. His position was far from secure; and efficient cooperation of Girón with the leaders in Valladolid might yet make him pay dearly for his exploit: he was twenty-five miles from his base, cut off by a larger but less efficient force, in a battered town only nineteen miles from his enemies' base.[2]

[1] Lope (letter to D. Carlos, Dec. 11, Danv. II. 688) says even the Infanta's mule was stolen. Maldonado declares it was two o'clock before Haro had the situation wholly in hand.

[2] Sandoval (VIII. ix) reports that the Valladolid leaders angrily but vainly proposed to Girón a concerted attack as a means of retrieving his mistake.

CHAPTER XIX

ET RESPICIENS RETRO

COÖPERATION among the Comunero captains had become increasingly difficult, and was now in an amazing way abandoned. Though he knew Tuesday night Haro's intent and promptly despatched a relief of mobile troops, Girón's return was so slow that he had in all Wednesday's march only reached Villagarcia, a distance approximately equal to that which Haro's force had covered by two o'clock.[1] His difficulty seemingly was that instead of an army he had a band of wholly disorganized plunderers laden with the booty of Villalpando.[2] Without further attempt to relieve the situation at Tordesillas, he returned to his base and encamped in villages a few miles to the northwest of the city.[3] Thence, reënforcements from other Comunero cities might still enable him to turn the tables: if he failed of the Queen, Rioseco and the Cardinal were still a possible prize.[4]

But the disaster had confirmed in the minds of the Comunero leaders a long-growing suspicion. Among the first objections to Girón had been his close kinship with Royalist leaders. He was nephew to the Constable; and though irritation in regard to the dukedom of Medina Sidonia had alienated him from the Court, his sympathies must inevitably remain largely with the grandees. For the sake of his prestige and possible influence among that class he had been preferred over the really popular Padilla. The disappointed Toledans suspected Girón, and in the critical days of November threatened so much trouble that the

[1] Mexía, 202.

[2] Sandoval (VIII. ix) has a vivid picture of the train of looters who straggled into Valladolid to sell their plunder — among them two cavalrymen driving 1000 head of cattle. Some of the most enriched deserted entirely. Cf. Sandoval, VIII. x.

[3] The Comendador (letter to the Constable, Dec. 8, Danv. II. 636) suggests that Girón feared even for the security of Valladolid. Sandoval has an account (VIII. ix) that Girón said he had heard that the Royalists with the Queen were headed for Burgos, and he was trying to intercept them. The war committee of the Junta had such a report, and imply that their movements were concerted to intercept them. (War Committee to Junta, Dec. 6, Danv. II. 702.)

[4] Adrian to D. Carlos, Dec. 10, Danv. II. 645, 646. The Cardinal remarks uneasily: 'We are ill provided with troops and arms, and besides the townsmen are very Comunero.' For their hostility cf. also Santa Cruz, I. 347. Maldonado believed a dash on Rioseco would have carried it (208).

Comunero leaders sequestrated D. Pedrolasso in Valladolid.[1] Immediately on Girón's move to Villalpando, the Toledan grandee voiced his alarm.[2] Through the latter weeks of the month, it was suspiciously noted, Girón had been eager to confer with the conciliatory Admiral.[3]

After Tordesillas there were of course prompt charges of treachery. It was maliciously noted that in raiding the Constable's town of Villalpando, which surrendered without resistance, Girón occupied his uncle's estate and protected his property.[4] The commander's reception in Valladolid was angry and mistrustful;[5] he was not allowed to introduce his troops,[6] and was told that he 'had been sent to Rioseco to fight the caballeros, not to Villalpando to eat fatted goose.'[7] His move to Villalpando was declared deliberately treacherous, with the intent of permitting the capture of Tordesillas.[8] Girón was publicly called a traitor and new troops were unwilling to serve with him.[9]

The general's usefulness was clearly ended. He was entrusted with the command of an attempt to recover Simancas, which the Royalists had taken and made the base of raids even up to the walls of Valladolid;[10] but the affair was bungled,[11] and he did not return to the city, but withdrew to an estate of his father's to the east. In a letter to Valladolid of December 15[12] he closed his connection with the Comunero army.

[1] Statement, without documents, in Danv. II. 564.

[2] In a letter from Villalpando, to J. de Ayala, which was captured in Tordesillas, and is reported to D. Carlos by Lope Hurtado, Dec. 10. Danv. II. 689. Cf. p. 208.

[3] Danv. II. 501, 514.

[4] Mexía, 196; Sandoval, VIII. viii. (It will be remembered that the Comuneros already held the fortress, in pledge from the Constable. Cf. p. 185.) Girón later urged this point upon the Constable: cf. Constable to D. Carlos, Sep. 8, 1522, Danv. IV. 467.

[5] Mexía, 203. Comendador to D. Carlos, Dec. 9, Danv. II. 639; repeated in letter of Haro to D. Carlos, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 43.

[6] Lope to D. Carlos, Dec. 10, Danv. II. 688. [7] Santa Cruz, I. 369.

[8] Mexía (207) says persons assured him they knew this to be true and were willing to prove it. Exactly this charge is reported in P. Martyr's letter (DCCIX) of Dec. 27. Maldonado, 208.

[9] Comendador to D. Carlos, Dec. 12, Danv. II. 647; Sandoval, VIII. ix.

[10] The exasperation of these raids is pictured by P. Martyr (Epist. DCCIX, Dec. 27), who was in Valladolid.

[11] Through no fault of Girón, Mexía says (206). Maldonado (209) charges that Girón made mere pretense of attack.

[12] Confusingly quoted in Danv. II. 699. This was known to Adrian in Rioseco the next day. (To D. Carlos, Dec. 16, Danv. II. 662.)

That the fury of his former supporters might finally drive him into the Royalist camp was a clear and grim possibility; and Girón approached the Admiral to discover whether pardon would be obtained and absolution from his oath to the Commune.[1] Such pardon the Cardinal at once and with reiteration recommended to D. Carlos; but individual pardon proved as difficult to obtain from the King as general power to pardon, and weeks and months passed without response to the request. The Admiral was in March still repeating demand for certain written pardons, 'likewise that of D. Pedro Girón, who is desperate and, we are much afraid, may go back and join them.'[2] The grandee meanwhile refrained from breaking with the Comunero leaders. Valladolid assured him on January 7 of her trust, declaring they were certain of his integrity, 'though simple and ignorant persons have chosen to say otherwise';[3] and he continued to send friendly letters, with important military information and advice, even through April.[4]

That Girón found his position increasingly ambiguous seems clear. In every movement of angry protest, the extremists are likely to go to such length that the more conservative, who were at first the center of the affair, find themselves separated from their companions by a wider gap than that which parts them from their enemies. Girón deplored the rejection of conciliation in the Guevara mission,

[1] This the Admiral wrote to Adrian, who reported it to D. Carlos, Dec. 23: 'Hitherto he has not declared himself nor decided to serve Your Highness with person and troops; but, as I understand from the Admiral's letter, he is willing to return to Your Majesty's service with the said troops (which are some 300 excellent lances), provided Your Highness will pardon him what he has hitherto done, and raise and annul the oath he swore to the Communes never to oppose them.' Danv. II. 669. The Constable heard merely that Girón was negotiating with the Admiral — 'who does not now communicate with me.' (To D. Carlos, Jan. 2, Danv. III. 9.) Vargas wrote D. Carlos that Girón had come over with three or four hundred lances (to D. Carlos, Dec. 17, clearly so dated, not 18, as Danvila entitles it, II. 695); but this was not true. Vargas heard this in Burgos.

[2] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Dec. 23, Danv. II. 669; Jan. 4, Danv. III. 11; Admiral to A. de Bursa, March 16, Danv. III. 416.

[3] Valladolid to Girón, Jan. 7, Danv. III. 122.

[4] Valladolid to Girón, Feb. 5, Danv. III. 303; Girón to Junta, April 4, Danv. III. 613. A letter of Girón to the Junta of April 20 is listed but lost (Danv. III. 615). Sandoval has an obscure but interesting paragraph (IX. viii *ad fin.*) implying that Girón would have consented to resume command. This passage states that Girón sent on March 26 friendly information about events in Zaragoza. (The authenticity of this material is by no means discredited by the considerations indicated in Danv. III. 432.)

and in the negotiations after the capture of Tordesillas.[1] He had indignantly disapproved the Comunero plan of exploiting the helpless Queen. He was plied with entreaties from the conciliatory Admiral [2] and Cardinal, to avoid the violences and excesses which would preclude agreement. That his troops were clamorous for raids that should provide them 'fatted goose' seems beyond question; and when he took them to Villalpando to satisfy them he may have but half regretted the notion that the radicals in Tordesillas might lose the Queen, of whom, to his feeling, they were making so shabby a use.

NOTE

The affair of Girón is the puzzle of the whole Comunero story, and requires an extended note.

Danvila (III. 612) says Girón's course was dishonest: 'Whereas he had on the one hand quit the Comuneros and asked mercy of the Emperor, which was quickly granted, with command that he fight in Orán against the Moors, he continued on good terms with the Valladolid Junta.' Danvila's own documentation proves abundantly that mercy was not quickly granted. When his friendly letters to the Junta were written, the Court had for more than three months refused to issue any pardon. (The letters of March, implying pardon, which Danvila prints as of 1521, are almost certainly of 1524. Cf. p. 355, n. 4.) In this matter Girón was guilty of so much dishonesty as is involved in continuing friendly communication with the Comuneros after making unanswered application for reconciliation with their opponents.

Whether or not Girón refused a proper coöperation with the authorities in Tordesillas, and left them to defend themselves, perhaps with no considerable alarm or regret at the possibility that they might lose Doña Juana, is arguable. That this refusal of coöperation was by treacherous agreement with the Royalists, under promise of pardon and reward for his treachery, is the real gravamen of the case against him. Upon this there are two significant pieces of contemporary evidence. The statement of a contemporary chronicler as careful as Mexía in general is — that persons who knew Girón's guilt offered to prove it to him — seems to me serious but clearly not conclusive. Somewhat more serious is the suspicion of D. Pedrolasso; but our document does not reveal exactly what his suspicion was nor the grounds for it. This document the reader should have:

Lope Hurtado is reporting to D. Carlos on Dec. 10 the capture

[1] Santa Cruz, I. 367; Guevara, *Epístolas Familiares*, lxxvi; cf. Danv. III. 117; Santillan to Adrian, Dec. 9, Danv. II. 698. For Guevara, cf. *infra*, p. 212.

[2] Cf. Maldonado, 197–98.

of Tordesillas. 'Asimsimo se tomo la noche que entramos una carta de don pº laso que escribia de Villalpando / a juan de Ayala abisandole de la uenida del exercito aqui. en que dize que tiene mal contentamiento de don pedro giron. y que estan mal concertados. y que no tienen dineros / espero en dios que cada dia les ira peor porque dize que todas las cibdades estan muy sospechosas de don pedro. e aun que cada dia le llaman traydor.'

'There was likewise captured, the night we entered, a letter of D. Pedrolasso which he wrote from Villalpando to Juan de Ayala, informing him of the coming of the army here; in which he says he is very ill content with D. Pedro Girón; and that there is much dissension; and they have no money. I hope in God things will daily go worse with them, for he says all the cities are very suspicious of D. Pedro, and even daily call him a traitor.' (Danv. II. 689. It will be noted that in the Spanish it is ambiguous whether the dissension is between Girón and Lasso only or among the Comuneros generally: presumably the 'they' who are short of money are all the leaders.) The letter is dated in Tordesillas.

The suspicions implied in this letter are the more significant because D. Pedrolasso was writing before the capture of Tordesillas, and he had not himself been an opponent of the appointment of Girón. (Cf. p. 223.)

Far more sinister is the appearance of two paragraphs in letters of the Admiral, a year later. These (Danv. V. 223, 227) are undated; but reference to Adrian as Pope shows them to be subsequent to mid-January, 1522. Danvila takes no notice of their bearing on the case of Girón. The paragraphs are so important that the reader should have them entire:

'Paresciose mui bien la ganancia que ubo en lo de D. Pº giron en la salida de Villalpando que qᵈº nossotros olvidadas nuestras cassas por servicio de V. M. fuimos a tomar a Tordesillas pues si queriamos defender nuestras cassas con vuestra gente como os dicen no dexaramos mill e quatrocientas lanças i doce o trece mill Infantes en medio de nuestra tierra i nos fueramos a tomar a Tordesillas i librar a la Reina nuestra Sª y a la Sª Infanta de poder de Tiranos que os qierian quitar el Reino que estuvieramos con la gente defendiendo nuestras cassas i tornando a lo de D. Pedro Girón digo que el Papa i io le escrivimos que no saliese luego y que templasse lo que pudiesse i assi qᵈº fuimos a Tordesillas i quedo perdido lo. nuestro el se vino a esta Villa que si no mirara lo que tocaua al servicio de V. M. tomara a Medina de Rioseco i a mi muger i todos nuestros estados i con aquello se acabara todo i quedaramos perdidos en Tordesillas i no quedara cossa por levantar en todo el Reino i porque no lo hiço assi le llamauan traidor i le quisieron matar quando aqui vino a esta Villa con la gente.'

'The advantage there was in the matter of D. Pedro Girón appeared clearly in the departure from Villalpando; for when, for-

getting our homes to serve Your Majesty, we went to capture Tordesillas, if we had chosen to defend our homes by means of your troops, as they report to you (?), we would not have left 1400 lances and 12 or 13,000 foot in the midst of our territory, and gone off to take Tordesillas and deliver our lady the Queen and the lady Infanta from the power of tyrants who wanted to take the realm from you; for we would have staid with the troops defending our homes. And returning to the matter of D. Pedro Girón, I say the Pope and I wrote him not to march out at once, and to exercise all the restraint he could. And so when we went to Tordesillas and our property remained abandoned, he came to this city;[1] and, if he had not considered what concerned Your Majesty's service, he would have seized Medina de Rioseco and my wife and all our estates; and with that all would have been over, and we should have remained ruined in Tordesillas, and in all the realm there would not have been left any portion yet to be roused in revolt (?). And because he did not do so they called him traitor and wanted to kill him when he came to this city[1] with the troops.' (Danv. V. 226.)

'V. M. sabe lo que io trabaxe de sacar a don Pedro Xiron de la junta porque la autoridad que les daba i su persona parecia que fundaba mas sus males. el sabio por nuestro mandado i con mi intercesion del io recibo buenas obras que me quemaran a Medina si no lo estorbara i acabaran de destruir mi tierra i visto el bien que hacia, el Papa e yo le escrivimos que no se desmarrase dellos del todo. el hiço lo que V. A. mando i yo trabaxe en Flandes se tubo por buena negociacion como lo era justo seria que V. M. diesse ia fin en esto i le perdonasse. . . .'

'Your Majesty knows the effort I made to get D. Pedro Girón away from the Junta; because the authority which his person lent them seemed to afford more foundation for their ill courses. He became reasonable at our urging and through my intercession. I myself have been well treated by him; for they would have burned my Medina if he had not prevented it, and would have completed the ruin of my territory. And, seeing the good he was accomplishing, the Pope and I wrote him not to cut loose from them entirely. He did what Your Highness ordered and I labored for. In Flanders it was accounted a good bargain; as it was. It would be just that Your Majesty should now at last complete the business and pardon him.' (This understanding of the passage involves deleting '*i*' in the first sentence, and conjecturing 'became' with *sabio*. Danv. V. 232.)

In judging these passages it is to be remembered that the Admiral is stressing, as far as the facts possibly can admit, the degree to which Girón committed himself to assisting the Royal cause; for he is urging pardon on the ground that Girón deserved

[1] The context shows this is Valladolid.

pardon by abandoning the Comuneros in a manner which much assisted their defeat. It is therefore notable that he nowhere asserts an agreement or promise of Girón to connive or coöperate in the Tordesillas campaign — still less any promise to betray fortresses, armed forces, or Comunero leaders. The first passage clearly implies that Girón, from consideration for Royal interests, refrained from an effective following up of the situation after Tordesillas was taken; but this motive is merely attributed to him. Similarly, this passage asserts that Adrian and the Admiral urged Girón not to return promptly from Villalpando, but does not assert that they so requested as part of a treacherous plan to surprise Tordesillas — still less that Girón understood and agreed to that plan. The second passage likewise asserts that both urged Girón to remain in communication with the Comunero leaders; but does not assert that he used that connection for betraying their secrets. Mere prudence, whether they had urged such a course upon him or not, would have made Girón keep on terms with the Comuneros so long as the King refused any promise of security.

In judging these passages, also, one must keep in mind that Adrian's statement at the time (letter of Dec. 23, already quoted — p. 207, n. 1.) was that Girón had not declared himself nor decided to serve the King with person or troops. This is essentially the statement of P. Martyr, which is contemporary, but of course well-informed, hearsay rather than inside knowledge such as the Admiral may be supposed to have: 'Don Petrus Girón publicis vocibus *Proditor* ab eis appellatur, quod Villalpandum, Rivoseco derelicto, tetenderit, quo locus daretur Proceribus impetendi Tordesillas. Is videns Juncteros jam esse in particularis oppidi potestate, sineque consilio atque viribus, regi secessit ab eis; atque sic paulatim deseruntur.' 'D. Pedro Girón is in their public utterances declared a traitor because he abandoned Rioseco and went off to Villalpando, whereby opportunity might be opened to the grandees to make a dash at Tordesillas. He, seeing the Comuneros already under the thumb of a single city (i.e., Valladolid) and without resources or policy, has come over from them to the King; and as a consequence they are gradually being deserted.' (Epist. DCCIX, Dec. 27.) Note that it is not Martyr but the 'public utterances' which charge the guilty march and motive.

Further contemporary hearsay, from a writer the rest of whose narrative is notably well supported, is Maldonado's (198–99):

To the Admiral's letters 'Girón replied ambiguously, taking pains to say nothing which was not in opposition to the nobles, in order not to arouse in the popular party the slightest suspicion that he was not following the party determinedly or that he perhaps desired to gratify the viceroys; and [on the other hand] he was afraid that he might be entirely precluded from a return to

the party of the nobility and the king, should there occur any reverse, which, from the levity and folly of the popular party, was anticipated; and he would have been glad if he had not presented himself, among traitors and tricksters, upon a stage wholly controlled by rage and folly. But the *pundonor* prevented him from withdrawing. Wherefore he began to promise that he would not refuse, in favor of the nobles, any terms of peace that might be at his disposal, and to hold out hopes that the nobility should not be exposed to peril so long as he was in the lead of the popular party.'

The directest accusal from any contemporary is the notorious passage from the *Familiar Letters* of Guevara, which he appends as a narrative note to the Address to the Comuneros in the Villabrájima conference: 'D. P. Girón and D. P. Laso much regretted the foul words used to me [and] the ill reply which their consorts made to me; for in truth they much desired to return to the King's service and that the peace of the realm might be restored. D. P. Girón came to me on my way, when I was returning; and there we discussed such and so delicate matters that from our discussion it was determined that he should withdraw his encampment toward Villalpando and that the Governors should march to Tordesillas: and so it was; and so it happened that by that expedition our lady the Queen was freed and the men of the Junta captured.' [1]

Guevara's vain desire to present himself as crucially influential might easily lead him to suppose that this conversation, even if it was actually quite ambiguous or non-committal, amounted to an understanding or agreement upon such conduct as Girón later pursued. The very untrustworthy character of the letters is discussed in the examination of the sources (*infra*, p. 364).

These considerations may fairly be urged, I think, in defense of Girón. Yet most readers will probably feel, as do I, that his case rests under a cloud of sinister ambiguity. The passages are at least compatible with the hypothesis that Girón understood the probable consequences of his conduct and had tacit if not explicit agreement with the Governors.

A much better case can be made for the contention that Girón's course was dictated by changes in his convictions and not by offer of reward. That seems almost proved by the fact, which the rest of the story will establish, that he received at the King's hands only the harshest treatment and no reward at all.

There remains Sandoval's extraordinary story (VIII. vi) that the Comunero disaster was due not to Girón's treachery but to his being duped: The Admiral's wife arranged in Villabrájima a

[1] *Epístolas familiares*, 252 (Edition Madrid, 1673); the same paragraph appeared in the first edition, 1539.

Upon this statement two observations may be made. It was first published in 1539 when the assertion of such complicity would not injure Girón's position, if indeed it did not tend to enhance it. Was Girón then living, to deny or confirm? I have not been able to establish the date of Girón's death.

secret interview of Admiral, Benavente, Girón, Acuña, and herself; whereat terms of agreement very favorable to the Comuneros were drawn and accepted by the grandees, who ordered the standard raised in Rioseco for Queen, King, and Commune — all deceitfully, to throw off the Comunero forces so that the Royalists might attack Tordesillas. This story has so many earmarks of legend that one would not give it a second thought but for the fact that it seems to be a warning example of the way contemporary guess may be embroidered into later assertion: Peter Martyr indeed wrote (Epist. DCCIX, Dec. 27. Note this date long subsequent to the capture of Tordesillas.) 'Almirantis uxor, Modicae Comitissa, it reditque frequens a Proceribus ad Juncteros; quid operetur non intelligimus. Credimus persuasuram, Almirantis nomine, Don Petro Gironi ut Junteros decipiat.' This is clearly a suggestion that Girón shall deceive, not be deceived; and it must, if there be any truth behind Martyr's guess, refer to the negotiations of the Admiral to bring over Girón while he was still on nominally good terms with the Comunero leaders. It is, however, the only basis I can find for Sandoval's extravagant suggestion, which, of course, is wholly at variance with the rest of his account of the affair Girón.

CHAPTER XX

CONSOLIDATION OF VICTORY

THE Royalist success enabled the party of aggression to move in closer on the Comunero base. Tordesillas, was proved, by their own difficult experience, defensible with proper guard. The Queen was there and in the Royal monastery of Santa Clara the body of King Felipe, from whom she would not be separated. It was a more significant center for the government than the Admiral's town of Rioseco; besides, the Royal commission directed the viceroys to make it their capital. Further in fulfillment of that commission, the Councillors went to join their President in Burgos, to the relief of the Admiral and the chagrin of the Constable.[1] After due repair of the defenses, henceforth entrusted to the Count of Haro, the Admiral, who now accepted the governorship,[2] and the Cardinal entered Tordesillas,[3] which became thereafter a second capital, with Burgos, of the Royalist organization. It was strengthened by thorough garrisoning of outlying strongholds which were the property of the grandees.[4] The Comuneros had been frightened away, by the capture of Tordesillas, from their siege of Alaejos, nineteen miles to the west. Torrelobatón, eleven miles to the north, was manned and supplied: with Rioseco it commanded the Burgos communications. The little granite fortress of Simancas on the Valladolid road, within seven miles of that city, was captured by a dexterous coup, and held against attempt at recovery.[5] Into the Count of Benavente's stronghold of Portillo, a dozen miles to the southeast of Valladolid across the Comunero line of communication through Medina del Campo with the South, extra garrison was thrown.

[1] A proclamation of the Council, in large part a blast against the Admiral, is dated Burgos, Dec. 18 (Danv. II. 664).

[2] Jan. 3, Adrian to D. Carlos. Jan. 4, Danv. III. 14.

[3] Cardinal arrived Dec. 26. To D. Carlos, Jan. 2, Danv. III. ii.

[4] For the disposal of forces cf. Danv. II. 682, and a similar report of Haro, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 44.

[5] Royalist cavalry from Simancas scoured the roads and made it difficult for the city to graze cattle or cut wood in its forest. Cf. Danv. IV. 56.

The military advantage at once affected even more seriously the political situation.

The Constable's policy of dealing with Burgos as with a type of opposition essentially different from that of the Junta showed signs of succeeding. A strong party in the venerable city had stood for tenacious petition, and insistence, within obedience, upon legal right. That this course would obtain anything substantial from the court of D. Carlos all the really Comunero leaders had ceased to believe; but influential classes as indignant as the Comuneros against the abuses in the Royal administration, might be kept from rebellion, could they find a position of loyalty which was also a position of protest and legal independence. The desperate individual might, like Girón, come to feel the remedy resorted to worse than the disease: Burgos showed a better way, whereby the realm might hope not only for order but for right.

Soon after the Constable completed his bargain with Burgos, that city had offered to the realm the compromise negotiated through him, and urged the Junta to restrict itself to joint petition with Burgos, and to leave government to the legal governors.[1] The concessions to be asked in joint petition, as formulated by October 22, were submitted, a programme including the Constable's six *capítulos* (though remission of the Coruña *servicio* seems taken for granted), with others added, such as the punishment of Ronquillo and Fonseca, and the assured return of His Majesty in two years.[2] The Junta declined;[3] and was followed promptly by Toledo and Segovia,[4] and later other Comunero cities, Ávila, Salamanca, León. Burgos, however, remained quiet, despite the solicitations of Acuña and his drastic programme (including the hanging of Zumel), for his agent in Burgos was arrested.[5]

The Comunero leaders probably could not know that the Constable's letters reiterated open suggestions to D. Carlos that he might really evade his promises; that persons and places might be excepted in the pardon; and that legal technicality might attack persons promised the Royal

[1] Sandoval, VII. v. Burgos to Valladolid, Oct. 8. [2] *Ibid.*, vi.

[3] Junta to Burgos, early Nov., is in Sandoval, VII. vii. A reply of Burgos, Nov. 11, is in Sandoval, VII. viii, and Danv. II. 566.

[4] Constable to D. Carlos, Nov. 3, Danv. II. 475.

[5] *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, Danv. II. 493.

mercy; that the concessions would be temporary, subject to overthrow on the King's return — that, in short, the sovereign and his governor were paying for their submission nothing but 'ink and paper.' It was, however, of public note that the Constable in his caveat declared he would consider the bargain fulfilled, *if the most important stipulations were conceded.* Resistance, it would appear, was expected to surrender all the advantage of its position and the monarch was to fulfill such portion of his promise as he saw fit.

What His Majesty promised to fulfill was revealed December 26:[1] pardon, remission of the Coruña grant, and free market (suspension, i.e., of the sales tax)[2] one day in each week. No reply was given as to the already broken promise which even the Constable agreed was law of the land, about appointing foreigners, nor as to draining money from the realm, nor quartering an extravagant Court on the citizens. To the Governor the result was most mortifying: 'I received a letter from Your Majesty whereby Your Majesty informs me it does not befit your honor to grant what this city asks. Indeed, most powerful Lord, I think it was a more honest thing for your authority to grant it than to complete the ruin of these realms. And it is well Your Highness should know that through my entering this city I got power and money to assemble the troops and artillery which the Count of Haro led, whence resulted the recovery of Tordesillas: God grant that what was gained by my coming here be not lost by my going out. I perceive that, with Burgos and her province in your service, the Communes are able to assemble more troops than your servants: then, if this is withdrawn from your service, I believe the Junta people will be much more able than now. I have lost a considerable part of my estate: God grant that along with the rest that remains to me there be not lost what estate Your Majesty has in Spain. I cannot believe but that Pedro de Campo and Pedro de Velasco may yet bring the stipulations granted.'[3]

Though the Constable should maintain, could Burgos agree that 'the principal items of his promise' were ful-

[1] Sandoval, VIII. xxvi (xxvii).

[2] The things are perhaps different. Adrian (to D. Carlos, Jan. 4, Danv. III. 14) speaks of Jaén as having two privileges: one, not paying alcabalas; the other, free market.

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, Dec. 26, Danv. II. 674.

filled? Further the city grievously noted that the concessions were made to Burgos only, who had declared that she, as head of the realm, would not accept if granted to herself alone.[1]

[1] Sandoval, VIII. xxvi (xxvii), does not note this; but Santa Cruz (I. 357) says it was the ground of Burgos's rising against the Governor.

BOOK III

Gamblers' Chances

BOOK III

GAMBLERS' CHANCES

CHAPTER I

'PADILLA, SAVIOUR OF CASTILE'

A MONTH of the profoundest depression among the Comuneros followed upon the disastrous loss of the Queen and Tordesillas. To that, grandee leadership — a general who was nephew to the Constable — had brought them. Out of it they might be redeemed by a leader who could bring considerable reënforcements and inspire a fresh and general enthusiasm. Popular hope centered, immediately after the disaster, upon Juan de Padilla, who was summoned from Toledo,[1] and, advancing by way of Ávila,[2] reached Valladolid December 31,[3] bringing forces estimated at 15,000 to 17,000 foot; about 100 lances; and a dozen pieces of artillery.[4] Enthusiasm for the new leadership brought swarms of recruits, probably of dubious motive and more dubious military value: some thousand drawn from the disorganized base at Valladolid, and 1500 from various cities of Old Castile.[5]

Brisk military Royalists pointed out that he should never have been allowed to get through the road, threatened by Royal posts, from Medina del Campo to the Comunero capital.[6] Haro's projected concentration against him from Simancas and Portillo he thwarted by a feint or feigned

[1] Comendador to D. Carlos, Dec. 12, Danv. II. 647; Admiral to Constable, Dec. 21, Danv. II. 655. Cardinal to D. Carlos, Dec. 23, Danv. II. 669.

[2] Padilla to Valladolid, Dec. 18, from Ávila, Danv. II. 775. He was in Medina on Dec. 24. Danv. II. 740.

[3] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Danv. III. 14. Santa Cruz (I. 423) says March 13! His chronology is notably erratic.

[4] The Constable's estimate (letter to D. Carlos, Jan. 2, Danv. III. 9) corresponds closely with the Cardinal's (letter to D. Carlos, Jan. 4, Danv. III. 14).

[5] Haro to D. Carlos, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 45.

[6] Alarcón to Cobos, Jan. 20, Danv. III. 52. Council to D. Carlos, Jan. 18, Danv. III. 138. Troops and supply trains were likely to be intercepted at the crossing of the Douro: cf. Barrientos's plea for escort, Jan. 24, Danv. III. 128. Cf. also Sandoval, VIII. xxxv.

rumors of a dash at Tordesillas,[1] and entered Valladolid in triumph. 'So extreme was the love and repute in which Juan de Padilla was generally held in all the towns that what I can here write,' records Santa Cruz, 'is very little compared with what I myself then saw. For clerics would quit their churches to follow him, women and girls go from village to village to see him, peasants would go with their carts and mules to serve him without pay, soldiers and squires would fight without any wage under his banner, villages where he passed supplied food to him and his troops liberally; when he went through the streets everybody stationed themselves at doors and windows showering on him a thousand blessings; in the churches public prayers were rendered that God should guide him; and he accounted himself fortunate who had most seen and served him.'[2]

Yet probably a mediocre man; perhaps a selfish man. Santa Cruz's judgment was this: 'Padilla was a gentleman from the middle class, of vigorous health, neither acute nor enterprising, but moderate and good natured; and in fact his chief merit was to have fallen into popular favor.'[3] He had shown little capacity for subordination. His seizure of Tordesillas in August had marked him, he believed, for the captain-generalcy; and the political appointment, of Girón, so offended Padilla that he withdrew with all his troops to Toledo.[4] He was playing for a big prize, if the young King should spend his reign abroad and be forced to concede considerable Comunero demands, namely, the office of chief military and political honor and influence in the realm, the grandmastership of Santiago, already held by D. Carlos.[5] 'Juan de Padilla,' the Cardinal noted in cipher,[6] 'is trying to get for himself the mastership of Santiago, and that of Calatrava for his brother [i.e., brother-in-law, F. de Mendoza, brother of Padilla's wife]: the which I know from a

[1] Mexía, 208; taken over by Sandoval, VIII. xiii. P. Martyr, Epist. DCCXII.

[2] Santa Cruz, I. 421. On Padilla's popularity and influence, cf. also P. Martyr, Epist. DCCX, Jan. 17.

[3] I. 421. 'Caballero de mediano estado, bien complexionado, no agudo ni entremetido, sin manso y bien acondicionado.'

[4] Cardinal's report, Oct. 17 (Danv. II. 261), and *supra*, p. 168.

[5] The Catholic Sovereigns insisted that the grandmasterships should rest with the Crown, as the chief condition of keeping the arrogant baronage in subordination. Cf. Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, Part I, Chap. VI. Adrian had had difficulty in keeping Calatrava for the Crown (Danv. I. 480).

[6] To D. Carlos, Jan. 8 (the date given in the title; not 'xiij' as in the text), Danv. III. 24.

certain source.' That steps had been taken to obtain papal bulls cancelling the royal tenure is clear from a sworn statement of the Comendador of the order of Santiago, reporting that he was offered in October, 1520, a knight-commandery of 200,000 maravedis as bribe for supporting the Padilla candidacy.[1]

An office much more immediately attainable was the captain-generalcy of the Comunero forces; but for this there was a formidable conservative candidate, D. Pedrolasso. Supreme command would be accorded to Padilla only if he should achieve some notable success, at least comparable with the performance of the raiding Bishop, Acuña. His immediate position was thus summarized by the astute old observer, Peter Martyr: 'That young Toledan, raised by the foolish populace (to their ruin and his own) has been received here as in a triumph. The townsmen will have him direct everything at will. The national Junta dissents. Swarms of boys hail him with songs and call him liberator of his country wherever he goes. Girón and Lasso, the only men of judgment among them all, they call traitors because both considered the Junta proposals foolish. I am sorry for Padilla, who, I venture to predict, will soon fall. Though of small wisdom, he is beginning to know how vain are popular enthusiasms: perceiving it from the examples of his colleagues. To-day they call by the foul name of traitors those whom they recently obeyed, respected, and idolized.' [2]

Further, some military stroke must soon vindicate his prestige, if Padilla did not wish to see his recruits melt away. Tordesillas would be too desperately guarded. The Royalist force at Simancas was a constant thorn in the flesh. Rioseco, with the possible capture of a Governor, was tempting but probably foolhardy. To snatch the Admiral's stronghold of Torrelobatón would cut athwart the communications of the Royalist capital at Tordesillas and their military base at Rioseco. Even a dash at Burgos was not a piece of audacity unbelievable of the Comunero mood at the moment; and the city was then seething with resentment at the rejection of their *capítulos*.[3]

[1] Deposition of Jan. 14, Danv. III. 30–31: summarized also pp. 190–91. The Cardinal had heard of the business in November. Letter to D. Carlos, Nov. 13, Danv. II. 488. The Constable refers to it in a letter to D. Carlos, March 28, Danv. III. 441.

[2] Epist. DCCX, Jan. 17.

[3] All these possibilities are contemplated by Royalist writers: Haro, Danv.

The marchings and countermarchings of the first weeks of January were focussed into attack by the raid of a Royalist captain on Ampudia, a town of the Comunero Count of Salvatierra, 'a very populous and honored town with a fine fortress,' [1] ten miles to the northeast of Rioseco, on the road through Palencia to Burgos. D. Francés de Beamonte [2] had been detailed by Royalist command to follow up the raiding maneuvers of Bishop Acuña, with a force of about 600 foot and 150 lances. As he was passing Ampudia, January 16, the townsfolk jeered and fired on him, and he turned to storm the place; but the town surrendered, and Beamonte put in garrison in the stronghold seventy men. Padilla, notified in Valladolid, at once joined Acuña [3] and started in pursuit, with a couple of hundred of men-at-arms and some three thousand foot. Beamonte had just time to withdraw from Ampudia to Mormejón, a mile or so out, where he shut himself in the town walls and maintained resistance from nightfall till midnight, when he slipped away in the darkness to Rioseco. With daylight, Mormejón was forced by threat of burning [4] to pay 1500 ducats, and Padilla recovered Ampudia, the little garrison being allowed to withdraw with arms and mounts. Shortage of munitions and supply forbade for the Comunero captain any more sustained campaign.[5]

III. 19. For the date of this letter, cf. *infra*, p. 246, note. Cardinal, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 34; Haro, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 45. The threat against Burgos was made by Acuña: Jiménez to D. Carlos, Jan. 24, Danv. III. 174.

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 4, Danv. III. 16.

[2] Captain of the troops returned from the Gelves expedition. Danv. III. 156.

[3] Mexía (followed by Sandoval, VIII. xvi) calls the whole feat Acuña's. The Constable's account credits Mormejón to Acuña and Ampudia to Padilla. Danv. III. 146.

[4] Sandoval's account (VIII. xvi) pictures Padilla humanely withstanding the clamors of his troops for pillage. Guevara's letter (p. 221) probably provides some of the embroidery of Sandoval's account.

[5] Lope Hurtado's report, Jan. 22 (Danv. III. 62), and Vargas's of the same date (Danv. III. 67) differ somewhat as to totals of troops and ransom. Jiménez's, of Jan 24 (Danv. III. 76; duplicated at III. 174), is slighter. Vargas says Beamonte's raid was unauthorized: cf. also exculpatory letters cited in Danv. III. 76. The Admiral wrote, March 16, to defend Beamonte against censures at the Royal Court, but admits that he exceeded orders in taking Ampudia. Danv. III. 417. Mexía (210) says the raid was ordered. Maldonado, 222. The Constable's report, Jan. 25 (Danv. III. 146), and the Cardinal's (Danv. III. 58) are the more official. Danvila misdates the Cardinal's letter as of Jan. 22, probably misreading 'xvij' as 'xxij.' The letter is clearly of Jan. 17: 'Padilla took Ampudia yesterday.' The capture was accomplished the afternoon and night of Jan. 16 and early morning of Jan. 17.

CHAPTER II

THE HEAD OF THE REALM

'MANY will have written Your Majesty,' the Constable's son wrote from Tordesillas in warning to D. Carlos,[1] 'that this business was finished when this place was taken. I say just what I wrote when this town was taken, that the troubles of these realms can be cured only by Your Majesty's coming. Since all Your Highness's army spends and all the rebels take is at Your Majesty's cost, greater evils flow from these disorders than Your Highness can imagine. . . . Though the larger authority which those rebels had has been taken away by the deliverance of Our Lady the Queen, the indignation which filled the towns at the sacking of this place is so great that nothing will suffice to root it out.' Burgos in January, consequently, was as restless as in the early winter; and the Constable renewed his efforts, burdened with the universal odium of the Council, which accompanied him, and with the discredit which followed from his failure to obtain Royal sanction for the promised *capítulos*. His position was becoming a mockery among the Comunero cities: 'You know the Sr. Constable in Burgos promised certain *capítulos* of rather small importance; and from date to date when they were to be delivered he has not delivered them, and already three dates have passed which the city allowed him for their delivery. They never are delivered, that Your Worships may see that these gentlemen have no purpose of righting this realm in any matter whatsoever.'[2] The Constable saw his city trembling in the balance and his own life, with that of his sons, held as hostages, in peril for the price 'of a couple more *capítulos*.'[3] 'Since so much doubt has arisen as to confirmation of the concessions I requested of Your Majesty, I sustain and continue the repose of this city wholly by spending much money and fair words and — speaking with reverence for Your Majesty — telling many lies.'[4]

[1] Jan. 16, Danv. III. 46.
[2] Valladolid to Cuenca, Jan. 8, Danv. III. 162.
[3] Constable to D. Carlos, Jan. 11, summarized, Danv. III. 25.
[4] *Ibid.*, Jan. 2, Danv. III. 9.

By the middle of the month the Governor had reached the limit of his conscience or of the city's credulity, and the situation came to a head upon receipt of reiterated refusal from the King. 'I received three letters from Your Majesty of January 1, touching on the Burgos *capítulos*,' the Constable replied.[1] 'I have been through a terrific storm here. What I regret most is that Your Majesty loses more by what you give this city than what the city asks. Affairs in these your realms stand in such state that God grant Your Majesty may not (later) fail to repair, with whatever effort, what now might be repaired with little. The President and Councillors agreed that we must try to reach some compromise or agreement with this city, that they may confer with the other rebel cities as to what is to be done in the light of Your Majesty's reply; for they say they are the head of Castile and as such must reach agreement with the rest. For this purpose a term of fifteen days was set.'[2]

The first steps in renewed bargaining were reported by Treasurer Vargas. 'Since the people of this city were not satisfied with what Your Majesty sent them, and neither the resources of troops nor the time were propitious for the exercise of force, we made much effort to submit matters to negotiation and to stave off the outbreak which was fully prepared. Through the Constable's skill and with much bargaining and some money this was accomplished. The compromise was that this city write the rebel cities to be content with what was granted to her — I mean, pardon — and to observe the laws Your Majesty sent; and if they would be content therewith this city would request and obtain it for them. We agreed to this because it is of certain knowledge that no city can accept it. So this city wrote by special messengers to all the rebel cities good letters in Your Majesty's cause. . . . Already we have news that in certain places[3] they received the Burgos embassy very ill, and in Valladolid even, it is said, publicly burned the Burgos letter.

[1] To D. Carlos, Jan. 21, Danv. III. 54. For further comment on granting the *capítulos*, cf. Councillor Polanco and Treasurer Vargas, *for* (Danv. III. 51, 66); and Bishop Fonseca of Burgos, *against* (Danv. III. 134). His Grace of Burgos found it safer to be in Astorga.

[2] Constable to D. Carlos, Jan. 21, Danv. III. 54. The fifteen days expired on Monday, Jan. 21 (Danv. III. 140.)

[3] In Toledo the Burgos letter, as the Admiral heard, overthrew a proposal to negotiate with him. Long letter of instructions, undated but probably (from its reference to destruction of Cigales) Feb. 10. Danv. III. 255. Cf. *infra*, p. 247, n. 2, 307, n. 6.

Meanwhile the situation in this city clears steadily, with gain in territory and public favor. I hope in God that, from the offense they will feel at the ill reply the other cities will make to their letters, the business here will improve. . . . It is true that, since the people here, though pardoned, do not feel in all points secure, they make tremendous difficulty about handing over the fortress, which appears to them their security, without which they might be punished.' [1]

But in postscript to this very letter the Treasurer had to report the outbreak that for three days kept the city in civil war. 'A local deputy, a barber, not worth two *reals*, roused the town; and since it was not a plot of the city but of a few evil persons to overturn it, without any principal persons to direct them, they were very confused.' [2] Of the whole affair the Constable himself made a detailed and spirited report.[3] 'Monday, January 21, at two hours after noon, there was a rumpus between two local deputies, with consequence that the city rose and armed; and perforce we who are here armed and disposed ourselves. The troops I have here came at once to the square before my palace, and D. Juan de Luna, Captain of the Palace Guard, and horse and foot of Your Majesty's guard, and many other gentlemen who are here and principal persons of the city. We formed our ranks for combat. While the Count of Aguilar was posted on guard at the bridge between the market and my palace, D. Juan de Luna and the Palace Guard with him, certain of the Com-

[1] Vargas to D. Carlos, Jan. 22, Danv. III. 65.

[2] Vargas to D. Carlos, Jan. 22; postscript undated (Danv. III. 68). Martyr (Epist. DCCXII) refers to the outbreak ('x calendas *Januarii*' being clearly a misprint for *Februarii*).

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, Jan. 25, Danv. III. 148 ff. Vargas's report (Danv. III. 68 ff.) runs so close to the Admiral's that they would appear to have been drawn up together. Pero Ximénez (who may be the Constable's *alcaide* (warden) of p. 149) reported also on Jan. 24, declaring that he had word that Acuña and Salvatierra were to meet at Burgos on Jan. 23, that the fortress and three gates were held by their friends, and that communication of this news to the Constable determined him to the final firm stand. (Danv. III. 76.) Danvila (III. 142) summarizes a letter of Jan. 25 of Dr. Beltrán of the Council, who accepted the staff as Corregidor and removed the chains hung across the streets throughout the city, and who was threatened with death in the midnight negotiations before the fortress. Cf. Danv. III. 151. Martyr's letter of Feb. 13 notes the solicitations of Acuña and Salvatierra (Epist. DCCXII).

Mexía's account (211–13) is taken over in large part, verbatim, by Sandoval (VIII. xvii). Santa Cruz has but a sentence (I. 455), reporting nothing of the rising, and declaring that the Constable got the fortress by gifts and promises to the warden! His source is perhaps Maldonado, who says that the Constable coaxed and bribed the warden and most of the popular leaders, and by a show of violence seized the alcázar, which he repaired and stocked.

mune standing on the other side shot a volley of arrows at him and struck a halberd in his hand near the blade, and the arrow passed through and struck him in the breast, on his gorget,[1] and, had it not struck the halberd, would have killed him. A harquebuseer of ours, standing near the Count, shot the bowman and killed him. The rest withdrew and dared not remain in any part of the market.

'Considering this, and the harm that might increase, through sack, if we entered the town; and because friars and others came to beseech me that the town desired peace and all were in their houses, I restrained myself and ordered the troops not to leave the square; and thus the affair quieted down, although the troops stood under arms all night, and certain gates were seized.

'That night, in view of our need, of the considerable succor they expected and the little I had, and considering that, if it came to combat, though God should give us as we desired the victory, it could be only with many fatalities and plunder of the city, and in that case we could not gain what we wanted (which was to restore it to Your Majesty's service), for we should make them enemies forever; and considering likewise that without the fortress or the possibility of carrying it, we could maintain ourselves here but a few days, I decided to try to assemble the sections the next morning, Tuesday, and send them a summons . . . in which I offered them all Your Highness offered, and greater liberties in regard to quartering the Court . . . for the situation was so angry and violent that it was impossible to quiet or subdue them without some soothing. . . . Since they had considerable succor, both from the Count of Salvatierra, who was in Oña, ten leagues distant, with 2000 men, and from the Bishop of Zamora and Juan de Padilla, who were in Ampudia . . . and might come within an hour to reënforce them, and I should have been forced out in disgrace, I felt I made a good bargain by this concession of Quartering the Court. . . .

'Tuesday morning I ordered the troops under arms to demand of the city that it decide to accept the graces Your Majesty extended to them and that this be forthwith — for

[1] Vargas's account notes that it was a gorget of mail. Such an incident is a reminder that the bolt of the crossbow continued to be a terrible missile, long after the appearance of the bullet. It will be remembered that the famous English pamphlet discussion on the relative power of harquebuseers and of bowmen, between Sir John Smyth and Sir Roger Williams, is of the year 1590.

private parties had that day sent post after the Bishop of Zamora and the Count of Salvatierra to come in succor — so that, before reënforcement arrive, what we had to do should be finished. The troops assembled promptly and I went with them to the square. Thence I began negotiating with the city, my ranks ordered and the artillery ready to discharge,[1] with my troops, gentlemen and distinguished private parties with town troops and their servants, and the President, Councillors, and Court officials and other foreigners here on business, — all under arms, 1500 combatants determined to serve Your Majesty as if the cause were each his own.

'When the city saw my determination they all, save two sections[2] . . . answered they were disposed to take advantage of the graces Your Majesty proferred, together with the said exemption [i.e., of Quartering the Court], and they would hand over to me the insignia of justice and the fortress. They at once delivered the staves, and asked that I go alone to receive the fortress and that no troops pass thither, so that no damage be done in the city. So I went with a few gentlemen . . . and as I was going up through the Santisteban quarter,[3] they reported that they were firing from the fortress and would let no one pass. I halted and sent up certain city deputies and other persons to summon the warden; and they started dilatory negotiations with me. Since it was late and night near, and the warden held off, and I had sent the sub-chanter, who had not returned with reply, I sent order for the troops and artillery to march. They came promptly and many came to me from the town to beg me to desist; that the fortress would surrender. Though the delay was considerable and the troops could not contain themselves, the bargain was completed and the fortress delivered. This was about nine at night; and since it was so late and they would surrender only if the warden remained, I was obliged to say I was satisfied. I sent the Counts of Nieva and of Chinchón to take his oath of obedience; and with that, and leaving there the Royal standard, I returned to my residence, with all the gentlemen, thor-

[1] I conjecture this meaning, emending *a punto abria* to *a punta abierta.*'

[2] Danvila (III. 140) gives a conciliatory summons of the Constable addressed on Tuesday, Jan. 22, to the recalcitrant section (*vezindad*) of Santiago.

[3] San Esteban still exists, some five minutes walk down the steep slope from the ruins of the Castillo on the crest. Street (Ed. King), I. 54.

oughly wearied, for we had been armed since morning, and several even had not put off their armor since the previous day.

'Wednesday morning I went to visit the fortress and removed the warden who was there and the troops he had and substituted Lezamo, Your Majesty's captain, with 100 men of his company.

'To me and to all it seems a good job; for, with the city in obedience to you as it now is, and the office of *justicia* and the fortress in Your Majesty's hands, we shall begin to handle the rest.'

CHAPTER III

EPISCOPAL DISCIPLINE

In Zamora the truculent bishop had at first no clear advantage in his duel with his rival, the Royalist Count of Alva de Liste.[1] The Count was able, even when Zamora was angriest over the burning of Medina, to persuade the city to listen to Burgos and recall the deputies from Ávila; but the delicate balance turned again and deputies were recommissioned, and the Junta at once assigned troops 'to the Sr. Bishop of Zamora, that he may go and straighten out that city, which, contrary to the wish of its Commune, the Count holds in subjection.'[2] Zamora resented the compulsion,[3] and declared that none but the King ever held their city in subjection;[4] but persuaded the Count and Prior to depart,[5] and in the same breath reminded Acuña that 'it is the office of prelates to pacify peoples and not exhaust them or give occasion for the death of human beings.'[6] The fortress remained with the Royal commander; but Acuña felt secure enough, in the absence of his rivals, to recruit an army from his bishopric — 500 light horse, 500 heavy horse, and 1000 foot, including 400 clerics[7] — and join the Comunero army.

With this personal following Acuña began a career of spectacular raiding about the north rim of Castile, aiming at rousing the capital cities, and, in default of that, levying tribute, capturing Royalist officials, and demolishing Royalist strongholds.

Burgos seemed possible prize early in October, when the Constable had been forced into exile at Briviesca. Acuña had in the town an agent, deputy in the Town Council, who

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Sep. 14, Danv. II. 20. The Junta summons exiling the Count, Aug. 31, Danv. I. 505, 509.

[2] Junta Captains to Valladolid, Sep. 7, Danv. II. 48.

[3] Letters of Sep., summarized in Danv. II. 18.

[4] Letter to Captains, Sep. 11, Danv. II. 119.

[5] Alva de Liste joined the Constable, Oct. 3 (Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 4, Danv. II. 240). The Prior began a military career later significant; cf. p. 330. The Zamoran situation was so ambiguous that the Admiral believed in December that the city might be won back. Danv. II. 658.

[6] Letter of Sep. 11, summarized in Danv. II. 120.

[7] Danv. II. 122, source not clearly indicated. The Cardinal, Nov. 13 (Danv. II. 482) reports 500 lances, 1000 foot, 300 clerics.

was to open a gate and admit the Bishop; but through a seized letter the deputy was detected and lodged in the fortress, and the city authorized the Constable to recruit troops to defend her neutrality.[1]

At the end of the same month the indefatigable cleric attempted in like manner to stampede Valladolid and arrest the Council. The detected agents were a bonnet-maker and a barber, whom the town, determined to maintain its neutrality and at the moment in a mood of conciliation, convicted and executed — the wretched barber captured in an attempt at flight and brought back at nightfall with fife and drum, to be hanged by the light of fifty torches. Other suspected accomplices were ignored, 'for they would have found a great part of the townspeople involved in the same guilt.' [2]

Attempts upon Rioseco were a part of the larger campaign of D. Pedro Girón, with whom Acuña coöperated. With the disastrous loss of Tordesillas the Bishop withdrew to Toro,[3] and after the desertion of Girón was welcomed in Valladolid, where he put a fiery enthusiasm into reorganizing and heartening the Comunero party.[4] With the authorization of a self-constituted Revolutionary Committee there, the 'Cortes of Valladolid,' he started to carry fire and sword through northern Castile, intercepting posts and 'committing a thousand violences in those towns. They pay and deliver to him all the income of sales-tax, servicio, and *cruzada*. We have no troops,' the Cardinal reported, 'to send against him, for all are needed to guard this town [Tordesillas], Simancas, and Torrelobatón. We are trying to keep our troops from all disorders and robberies, and, so, many of them desert because they are not allowed to scour the country.' [5] 'It is a pitiful thing,' continues Adrian, 'to see the condition of these realms, for there is none who may go about securely, but whether he go accompanied or alone,

[1] Constable's account, Oct. 8, Danv. II. 253; supplemented by his letter of Nov. 14, Danv. II. 493. Maldonado, 173 ff. Cf. *supra*, p. 215.

[2] Cardinal's report, Nov. 1, Danv. II. 470.

[3] Vargas to D. Carlos, Dec. 13, Danv. II. 693.

[4] Cardinal's report, Dec. 23, Danv. II. 669.

[5] Report of Jan. 8, Danv. III. 23. The date 'xiij' is probably a misreading of 'viij'; the title reads 8 and the text pretty clearly refers to 'yesterday' as the 7th. Acuña clearly got all the taxes: Constable, Feb. 2, Danv. III. 200; Admiral, Jan. 23, Danv. III. 73. The latter date is doubtful: the text has 'xij,' but refers to the capture of Ampudia, which occurred Jan. 16.

cannot escape being robbed; and already they say robbing goes on here as in the time of the King Enrique.' [1]

In exercise of his 'Cortes' authority Acuña seized Palencia on Christmas Day and organized Comunero control.[2] In the stronghold of Fuentes de Valdepero three miles north of Palencia, Dr. Tello of the Royal Council and his wife had taken refuge with his son-in-law, doubtless supposing his 8000 or 10,000 gold ducats safe in that notable fortress. But the Bishop stormed town and stronghold, seized the treasure, and carried off Councillor and wife in irons to Valladolid, where they endured harsh confinement.[3]

Lesser victims were forced to surrender lesser booty. On Magaz Acuña wreaked his chagrin at discovering from intercepted letters that the Constable had quelled the January risings in Burgos. From the fortress of Magaz, the chief royal place between Burgos and Valladolid, which, however, he managed to hold for the King, García Ruiz de la Mota had to witness the total gutting of the town by the Bishop's marauders, who swooped upon the place in the darkness two hours before dawn, January 23, 'and did not leave in it so much as a spit.' [4] 'To the peasants they left not the value of a maravedi nor a head of cattle. The Bishop went to the church and seized the crosses and all the ornaments, even the cloak wherewith Our Lady was clothed.' [5]

'At present,' wrote Adrian on January 4,[6] 'he is in Valladolid and has brought from Palencia 4000 ducats which, they say, he collected from the Royal rents. Your Highness must believe that in the matter of revenue and in doing

[1] Cardinal's report, Feb. 6, Danv. III. 205. For the disorder in the reign of Enrique IV, brother of Isabel, cf. Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, Part I, Chap. III.

[2] Danv. II. 714–16, 773; III. 9, 12.

[3] Cardinal, Jan. 8, Danv. III. 23; Constable, Jan. 25, Danv. III. 145; Cardinal, Feb. 6, Danv. III. 205. The treasure is here estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 ducats, 'including jewels and money.' Santa Cruz (I. 422) says Acuña got admission to the fortress by the blackest treachery; but the other accounts narrate a battle. Maldonado, 211. Impressive ruins of the fortress are extant.

[4] On Magaz: Constable to D. Carlos, Jan. 25, Danv. III. 148; Feb. 2, Danv. III. 200. Baedeker says the ruins of the castle still exist. Mota is the Burgos deputy whose house was destroyed by mobs. On the siege: Ruiz to Constable, Jan. 24, Danv. III. 169; Jan. 25, Danv. III. 170. Constable to D. Carlos, Feb. 2, Danv. III. 200. For a Comunero account of Ruiz's raids, cf. Danv. III. 336 (Feb. 17).

[5] A captain, the Admiral heard (Danv. III. 386), beheaded at the high altar a man who had revealed to others that the captain had seized the cross from it.

[6] Danv. III. 12.

every other evil thing, the said Bishop's diligence is more than that of the six principal gentlemen for the weal and service of Your Highness. Still, despite these disorders, we are informed by certain persons and friends, the said Bishop would return to Your Majesty's service if Your Highness would by letter pardon him whatever he have hitherto done to the disservice of Your Highness and harm of these realms. And if this Bishop and D. Pedro Girón should obtain pardon and return to Your Majesty's service they would tremendously reduce the power of our enemies and discourage them.'

But a less vague and less humiliating reward diverted Acuña from his career in Old Castile. On January 6, Croy, the boy Archbishop of Toledo, was injured by a fall from his horse in the Emperor's train at Worms, and died on the following day.[1] The news was rumored in Burgos, January 24, and confirmed the next day, and known in Tordesillas and Toledo, January 26.[2] Acuña left within a month to seize the now vacant see.[3]

[1] The death was concealed for a few days, in order to secure advantage at Rome: a circumstance which accounts for the mistaken date, Jan. 11, on the Toledo chapterhouse portrait. Cf. Poschmann in Boletín R.A.H., Tomo LXXV, Cuad. II–IV, p. 257.

[2] Ximénez to D. Carlos, Jan. 24, Danv. III. 78. He and the Constable urge the Emperor to withhold a new appointment, as a lever in Spanish politics. Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 26, Danv. III. 84; Poschmann, 259; Constable to D. Carlos, Jan. 25, Danv. III. 152.

[3] Of Acuña's career in Castile Mexía (210) has a few words. Santa Cruz (I. 422–23) gives many details — e.g., that the Palencia clergy rendered to Acuña 'the honors and obedience they paid their prelate': which may be the authority for Sandoval's statement that Acuña made himself Bishop of Palencia. Sandoval's elaborate account (VIII. xii, xiv, xvi–xvii) is not to be verified in contemporary documents.

Acuña was reported in Valladolid up to Feb. 22 (Constable to D. Carlos, Feb. 22, Danv. III. 229), but had gone South by Feb. 25 (Haro to Constable, Feb. 25, Danv. III. 235).

CHAPTER IV

RAMBLA, FEBRUARY, 1521

THE cities of the South had not been drawn into the first fury of the Comunero movement. They had experienced less than had the northern cities the victimizing of the plundering Flemish *camarilla*. The proposal of a junta they had at the dissuasion of the Cardinal declined, thus withholding five [1] from the full list of eighteen Cortes cities; but the indignation that inflamed all Spain at the destruction of Medina del Campo swept Jaén into the revolt early in September and stirred the others to a degree which alarmed Adrian.

Three weeks after the burning of Medina sparks from that conflagration burst into flame in the provinces of the south. Jaén, on the northern slope of the Granadan mountains and more sensitive to disturbance from Castile than were the Vega and coast cities, still dominated by fear of the Moor, joined the Comunero movement and appointed deputies to the Junta on September 5.[2] News thereof did not reach the Marquis of Mondéjar, Count of Tendilla, who was Captain-General of Granada, till he was halfway on his errand of suppressing another revolt, in Baza. Against this little town he marshaled his Alhambra guards and the gentlemen of Granada, and armed some 1500 old and new Chrsitians of the realm; and reënforcements hurried in from Úbeda, Baeza, even from Cádiz. Resistance was brief and punishment exemplary. 'Of the guilty who were wounded I seized,' he reported to D. Carlos on September 11,[3] 'as many as I could. Among these happened to be taken the Captain of their Brotherhood. . . . Him I had beheaded; two others of the guiltiest, hanged; five others, lashed. I leveled six houses of the absent who were most compromised. . . . With this I thought their rascality was punished, for they saw I had as prisoners fifty others whom I might condemn also. That the town might not remain deserted and destroyed, I pardoned, in Your Highness's name, all the rest.'

Far more alarming was an outbreak in the city of the

[1] Murcia, Jaén, Córdoba, Sevilla, Granada.
[2] Cf. *supra*, p. 135. [3] Danv. II. 165.

Indies. The city through which passed all the commerce and administration of the western empire was clearly of immense importance, not merely as the head of the southern realm, all of whose cities would follow her as Castile followed Burgos, but also as the port of entry for wealth daily increasing beyond imagination.[1]

D. Juan de Figueroa, hot-head brother of the absent Duke of Arcos, D. Rodrigo Ponce de León, 'knowing the fame Juan de Padilla had won as captain-general of Toledo, fancied he might do as much, be hailed Captain-General of Sevilla, shout "Live the King and the Commune!" take the justicia, and eject both Dukes.'[2] In preparation for his attempt, the city was first to be infuriated into a heresy hunt. 'Saturday last (Sep. 15) while in the afternoon session of court,' reported the presiding judge,[3] 'certain gentlemen who were proposing to present petition that none under indictment (*notados de infamia*) by the Holy Inquisition might enter the town meeting, told me to go to the house of Perafán de Ribera, for it was very important. Going there I found assembled persons who told me that, since I was laboring so much for the peace of the city they would inform me that in the house of a clothes dealer named Francisco de Baeza were fifty grenades filled with pitch[4] to be

[1] Medina Sidonia (Danv. II. 189); Mexía, 165. Cortés was in these very months organizing the siege of Mexico City. His first remittance of gold started in May, 1522. Cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 502.

The situation in Sevilla was confused. The Duke of Medina Sidonia, greatest grandee of the South, was D. Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, whose brother, D. Juan Alonso de Guzmán, later duke, managed his affairs, 'through the natural inability of the Duke D. Alonso, his brother' (Mexía, 164). Sandoval (VI. xv) says the Duke was a minor in the tutelage of his mother; but Martyr wrote (Epist. DCXCVI, Nov. 8) that the Duke was feeble and foolish: 'De viro ejus (i.e., the Duchess) nulla mentio; est morioni similis penitus iners.' Again (Epist. DCCXIX, April 20): 'Sidonium ducem dico, intelligo uxorem ejus, Catholici Fernandi Regis neptem ex archiepiscopo Cæsar-Augustano filio, ergo Cæsaris amitam, quae regium animum redolet, mariti est illa maritus, quod inter egregios queat moriones ille Dux numerari.' (The Duchess's father was the Archbishop of Zaragoza, bastard of King Fernando; therefore cousin, not aunt of D. Carlos.) The Duke's brother-in-law, Captain Benavides, seems to have taken the lead.

The Alcalde Vergara was Royalist, and backed by the Governors. The Asistente (title equivalent, in Sevilla and a few other cities, to Corregidor) was Sancho Martínez de Leyva, who attempted to steer a course of almost impossible neutrality. Cf. Medina Sidonia's long indictment of his conduct, Danv. II. 175–80.

[2] Dr. de la Gama to D. Carlos, Sep. 20, Danv. II. 193.

[3] Dr. de la Gama to the Cardinal, Sep. 17, Danv. II. 184.

[4] An *alcancía* was a clay ball filled with inflammable matter, to be thrown as a grenade. The same word meant a small clay pot with a slot, for banking coin.

HOUSE TRADITIONALLY ASSIGNED TO THE MALDONADO FAMILY IN SALAMANCA

thrown into the houses of the Christians. There was present (one) Villariz (?) who said the Inquisitors had told him so. Thence I went at once, with a justice . . . to the old clothes market to search the house. This Francisco de Baeza has not been in the city for many days for I exiled him to Orán, where he is completing his exile. We searched two houses, of other persons named de Baeza, and in one were found two clay pots with money and nothing else. I informed the gentlemen and went to learn the truth from the Inquisitors; and the Inquisitor Torquemada [1] told us that he had never said or heard any such thing. The whole business was circulated to make occasion for an outbreak.'

The attempt followed Sunday afternoon. The young revolutionary assembled a miscellaneous force, ill-armed, and from the calle de la Sierpe invaded the Square of San Francisco, proclaiming the Commune. He was soon outnumbered by a force promptly mustered from the house of Medina Sidonia, and the Square might have seen a massacre had not clerics patched up a compromise, and Figueroa was diverted to the Alcázar, a beautiful but slightly fortified structure. The resistance of the warden was overcome by a few shots from the artillery which the young grandee had, and the building remained that night in his hands. Through Monday morning, September 17, the reassembled forces of Medina Sidonia overcame the resistance in the Alcázar, where D. Juan was captured, wounded. The succor upon which he counted did not appear till the afternoon, when the walls were found duly manned and the attempt at rescue was seen to be hopeless.[2]

'That day,' concluded Judge de la Gama, 'after I left the town hall to deliver writs and talk matters over, they told me that near the Carmona gate, in certain tanneries which are built up against the wall and near certain houses where the Duke of Arcos' treasurer lives, ruinous openings had been made wherethrough troops were to be introduced. I went there at once and searched all the houses and tanneries.

[1] Not the famous Tomás de Torquemada, who died in 1498. The Inquisitors on April 26 declared that the Comuneros were in large part new converts and others under suspicion of the Holy Office. There is no evidence that this was true outside of Granada and Andalusia. Danv. III. 705.

[2] Danvila prints the accounts of de la Gama (II. 184, and 192), of Medina Sidonia (II. 187), and of the warden of the Alcázar (II. 191), with matter summarized from other sources (II. 180 ff.). Mexía's account (162) is taken over almost verbatim in Sandoval, VI. xv. A few details in Admiral to D. Carlos, Jan. 23, Danv. III. 75.

And it was all nothing; for neither could there be seen nor did there exist any preparation or disposition for that purpose. So, as those of one party had sent me to search the clothes dealer's house for fire grenades and I found only two clay banks with coin, so the Duke of Medina's people had me search the ruins.' [1]

The authorities treated the affair as a boyish escapade. Figueroa was cared for in the house of the Archbishop [2] and later allowed to escape.[3] The Duke of Arcos declared he had no complicity in the matter. It was generally agreed that there was no substantial Comunero spirit in the city: 'I have always written you,' the Judge repeated to the Cardinal,[4] 'that I have no fear the Commune will stir unless the caballeros put them up to it.' And the Duke pointed out to Adrian: 'Your Reverend Lordship should note especially that no clerk (*oficial*) or blacksmith started this Commune, as they did elsewhere, but a person of rank and abilities (*calidad y mana*).' [5]

The Sevillan outbreak stirred the princes of the South to consider their dangers. These great lords, proprietors of immense *latifundia*, distrusted even more than the Castilian grandees any movement likely to result in questioning of authority or investigating of vested interests. They were Royalist in their own interest, almost monarchs themselves, who communicated with D. Carlos much as sovereign to sovereign. 'Say to His Majesty,' Medina Sidonia directed his envoy, 'the Duchess and I beseech His Highness, that when, in good hour, he see fit to come to these his realms, he be pleased to disembark in our city of San Lucar de Barrameda, which is an excellent port near this city [i.e., Sevilla]. For that and for his escort His Majesty may use our person and house with 8000 foot and 1500 lances thoroughly equipped and much artillery and other gear of war, which, if he come this way, His Majesty might find very useful for

[1] Dr. de la Gama to D. Carlos, Sep. 20, Danv. II. 194.

[2] This was the venerable Diego de Deza, the protector of Columbus. Danv. II. 182.

[3] He joined the Comuneros and was commissioned as Captain-General of Palencia (Danv. III. 617; Mexía, 193). He made money loans, repaid Jan. 18 (Junta minutes, Danv. III. 100 and *passim*). Martinets of course wholly disapproved the lenient handling of the matter: cf. the disgusted I-told-you-so of the Marquis of Denia, Feb. 21 (Danv. III. 227).

[4] Dr. de la Gama to Cardinal, Sep. 17, Danv. II. 186.

[5] Medina Sidonia to Adrian, Sep. 18, Danv. II. 190.

any punishment he may choose to inflict on those who have opposed his service.' [1] The Marquis of Mondéjar reminded his fellow grandees: 'The gentlemen of Castile have for the most part small estates and run no such risk as will those of our Andalusia, who hold vast towns, if we do not here remedy in time those Comunero risings. Further, you should note two considerations very important in this matter: the first touches the honor of the cities of our realms of Andalusia and Granada, which are of such importance as not to be ruled or commanded by those of Castile . . . ; the second is to realize how much this concerns the security of this realm of Granada, which, on the one hand, has the sea-coast and the Moor beyond, and on the other a population newly converted. If the towns of Andalusia, whence must come aid and succor, are at war, it would mean the immense peril and ruin of Granada.' [2]

A specific proposal accompanied the Granadan warning, that the southern cities unite for concerted action. For such coöperation Córdoba was ready, having, in alarm at the first signs of usurpation and exercise of power by the Junta, written her neighbor cities, suggesting correspondence.[3] Sevilla accordingly took the initiative of sending negotiators to organize a southern Confederacy, permission for which was requested on October 24 from the Governors.[4] This the Cardinal had already essentially conceded.[5]

The proposals lagged, however. Organized obedience which the Governors were offering any price to buy in the north might insist on a few concessions in the south. There was in the southern cities real distress, even though the caution of the Governors had in many cases omitted to collect taxes. Ecclesiastical revenues in Andalusia duly passed into Treasurer Vargas's coffers, to be paid out for the emergencies of Burgos! Nothing was collected in Córdoba. The Marquis of Mondéjar collected in Granada and spent all his revenues for the military necessities of his frontier realm. Nobody of course paid any of the Coruña *servicio*.[6] But the

[1] Undated instructions, probably of January or February, 1521: there is clear allusion to the Rambla confederacy. Danv. II. 199 (where it is clearly out of place).

[2] Mondéjar to the gentlemen of Andalusia, Oct. 13, Danv. II. 457.

[3] Danv. II. 455. [4] *Ibid.*

[5] Cardinal to Sevilla, Oct. 5, Danv. II. 461; III. 365.

[6] Admiral, Credentials to A. de Bursa, March 16, Danv. III. 418.

city of the Indies was already beginning to feel the inflation of prices resulting from the importation of overseas gold. Bread was reported as increasingly costly and no meat to be had, nor fish, because the fisher folk were in such extreme poverty and so many of them had been captured by the Moors.[1] With the continued rise in the price of grain the city petitioned earnestly for remission of the duties on Sicilian wheat;[2] and bread riots finally developed, with arrests and forced delivery of the arrested from jail, a situation which provoked the entry of both Dukes — with the best of professions — into the city.[3] The south began to discuss and present petitions quite in the Castilian manner.[4]

The Royalist success at Tordesillas in December opportunely heartened the loyal cities, dampened Comunero enthusiasms, and impressed the wavering. Córdoba at once pressed the proposal of a southern confederacy. Some difficulty of formal approval had hitherto restrained the city of the Mosque, but plans now matured rapidly; Rambla was named for the convention, appointed for January 20.[5] The revolted city of Jaén, though it had at last obtained the surrender of its fortress, offered submission to the Cardinal, on condition of pardon and confirmation of certain *capítulos*, and was invited to the Rambla congress.[6]

With the audacities of Acuña, however, in the new year, and the impressive accumulation of forces under Padilla, Comunero hopes rose; and again the control of Sevilla, with all Andalusia and the proposed Royalist confederation, trembled in the balance.

[1] Report of C. of Osorno, Oct. 14, Danv. II. 462.

[2] Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 15, Danv. III. 412. Royal writ of March 29 permitted this (Danv. III. 533); but want was acute still, in April. Danv. III. 701.

[3] Admiral, cipher credentials to A. de Bursa, March 19, Danv. III. 426. Constable to D. Carlos, March 28, Danv. III. 439; and again March 28, Danv. III. 442. Drought had ruined the early spring crops. Danv. III. 541, 546, 570.

[4] Danv. III. 13, 88.

[5] Córdoba to Sevilla, Dec. 10, Danv. II. 757. Asistente of Sevilla to D. Carlos, Dec. 27, Danv. II. 769. The Córdoban cavil was that permission had not been granted by the Governors, a writ of approval was sent to Córdoba from Rioseco on Nov. 25. Danv. III. 365.

[6] Mondéjar to D. Carlos, Nov. 25, Danv. II. 606. Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 4, Danv. III. 13. Representatives had been negotiating for concessions in November. Danv. II. 604; III. 176. Jaén was still Comunero when the Rambla conference began, Feb. 1. Danv. III. 340; cf. Danv. III. 178.

Besides the suspicions attaching to him in the September affair, the Duke of Arcos was suspected of designs against Xerez, as a step for mastering Cádiz, and on the insistence of his rivals, the Governors issued writ exiling him from Sevilla;[1] but before the writ could be served he slipped into the city, Friday night, February 1. Saturday he presented himself to the Asistente, declaring he had come to terminate the partisan abuses of the rival Duke. In the face of the Royal writ of exile he was forced to agree that he would acquiesce in any arrangement of the Asistente's, provided it was equitable to both interests. His partisans meanwhile, assembling without, had battered in the Osario gate near the Duke's palace, which had by the city's orders been walled up, and with shouts of '*León! León!*' had planted their blue banner on the tower of the gate. Thereupon a considerable train of Arcos followers had entered the city, including fugitives of the September rising, the whole faction, within and without, amounting to some thousand horse and three times as many foot. Meanwhile the Medina party had assembled a force of some 2500 men in the tumultuous city, offering help to the authorities and insisting that Arcos should be expelled. De Leyva, who distrusted equally the proffered help of both Dukes, found trustworthy support only in D. Juan de Velasco, who was in Sevilla in command of the galleys, and who occupied the Square of San Francisco with a small force of 400 harquebuseers and halbardiers with six cannon and the Royal standard, all of them displaying the showiest brocades and adornments of military costume. Beneath this gay show went on a precarious bargaining, embassies shifting from the Duke of Arcos to the Duchess of Medina Sidonia all day long through streets so stifled and excited that passage could scarcely be forced, wherein an angry word might at any moment pre-

[1] Asistente de Leyva's report, Feb. 6 and 9, Danv. III. 345 ff. Dr. de la Gama was to serve it; but de Leyva's report and the Admiral's (Danv. III. 245) and Arcos's defense to the Constable (Feb. 6, Danv. III. 356) agree that the writ had not been served. The charge of Medina Sidonia rests mainly on the assumption that the Duke's entering Sevilla was against the Royal order; but his own narrative (to Cardinal, Feb. 4, Danv. III. 360) shows that de Leyva had shown Medina Sidonia the writ but had not yet served it on Arcos. The Constable issued the writ. The Duke of Arcos professed astonishment when confronted with it, claiming to have a letter of approval from the Cardinal.

The charge about Cádiz is in Medina Sidonia's letter, misplaced in Danv. II. 199 ff. It is undated, but refers to the Rambla conference (which opened January 31) and appears to be written in Sevilla, before, therefore, the Duke's withdrawal by the agreement of Feb. 3.

cipitate massacre and destruction. The rival parties were coaxed into signing in the upper room of the Osario gate, at 3 in the afternoon, a compromise which required each to leave the city till D. Carlos should return.[1]

The gorgeous captain of the galleys escorted out of the city at nightfall the Duke and Duchess of Medina Sidonia and the Duke's brother, whom he entertained for the night on his ship, 'and found himself in considerable difficulty in getting the Duchess aboard, because since her fall into the river she fears to go upon bridge or boat. It was evidently about midnight and they were at the river shore. D. Juan de Velasco had a fictitious call to arms sounded, and with the terror which was suggested to the Duchess from every source she was persuaded to enter the galley.' [2]

The Asistente escorted Arcos out of the city and returned to keep anxious rounds of the walls and gates, for the Duke's partisans still remained encamped outside the Osario gate. The embarked Duchess was not the only person whose nerves were unstrung by that anxious day. The risk of an outbreak was appalling, and the effect upon Spanish public opinion unimaginable if bloody street affrays, followed by looting and burning, had made a second Medina of the city which was, even more than Medina, a nerve center of the economic life of the nation. So inadequate was serious representation of the gravity of affairs that even official grandees reported with a nervous facetiousness. 'Since D. García de Padilla will give Your Majesty serious report of affairs,' wrote D. Juan de Velasco, 'I will tell Your Highness by way of joke what happened. The fatalities in the battles to-day, date of this writing, were 1 small fly, overwhelmed in the river where I am posted.' [3]

Alarms were not even now wholly past. While the Asistente was the next morning taking over and remanning his gates a frantic messenger reported that news had reached

[1] The paper, dated 3 P.M., Sunday, Feb. 3, was signed by the Duchess of Medina Sidonia and the Duke's brother, Juan Alonso, and by the Duke of Arcos. The signature of the Duke of Medina Sidonia was obtained in his lodgings (*casa-morada*). Penalty for violation was 100,000 gold ducats. Danv. III. 354 summarizes it.

[2] Asistente's report, Danv. III. 349.

[3] There is, I take it, a joking allusion to the Duchess: *con las batallas se ha muerto hoy dia de la fecha desta j* [not *y*] *mosquita es ahogada en este Rio en que ahora estoy*. Report of Velasco to D. Carlos, Feb. 7, Danv. III. 353. The joking manner, which was perhaps characteristic, appears also in Velasco's letter of Feb. 6, Danv. III. 354.

the Arcos faction that the Medina Sidonia people had set upon them; and the Duke was returning in hot haste. De Leyva dashed to investigate and found the house of Medina armed; the Duke had been removed from the galley and his followers were carrying him off, alarmed by the converse of the rumor that had terrified the party of Arcos. The Asistente stumbled upon the Judge of the Chancelry and a couple of justices, and therewith awed the one party to withdraw, while Velasco turned back the rivals. The reassured Duke of Arcos, from the first stage of his voluntary exile wrote to His Majesty indicating that, knowing they would in Flanders report things contrary to what happened, he would describe the affair at length to the Duke of Alva, from whom His Majesty might learn at what value to rate his services and how worthy they were of reward. He informed His Majesty that he had pacified Sevilla in such wise as, he hoped in God, would be an example to all the rest of the realm.[1]

A Sevillan gentleman who had helped to stave off an outbreak when young Figueroa's band filled the Square of San Francisco in September was now able to report a greater feat of diplomacy: after a couple of weeks of maneuvering by Francisco de Alcázar, 'a notable matchmaker,' the rival Dukes had been brought together at Coria and there effected a complete reconciliation.[2]

The congress of a dozen southern towns was meanwhile in session in Rambla. Its first act, January 31, was to write the Comunero cities urging return to their original right purpose of a congress to consider grievance, not to usurp authority.[3] Córdoba submitted a programme of support of the Gov-

[1] Summarized in Danv. III. 355. His father, the Marquis of Villena, wrote in the same vein, Danv. III. 207; undated but after Feb. 22.

[2] On Feb. 26. Letter of D. Garcí Tello, summarized in Danv. III. 364; cf. Danv. II. 185.

The February days in Sevilla form, as Danvila notes, one of the most fully documented episodes of the *Comunidades*. Beside a paragraph of the Constable (III. 316), there is the official report of the Asistente (III. 345) and of the galley captain (III. 352). Danvila summarizes (III. 353–59) the Arcos versions, and gives the terms of the compromise. Letters in the name of Medina Sidonia (III. 359, 364) give that side. Two other documents misplaced by Danvila concern the same episode: the Medina Sidonia Instruction in II. 199 is of Jan. 31 to Feb. 3 (cf. *supra*, p. 242, n. 1.); and the Medina Sidonia credentials in II. 763, there undated, are the document mentioned in III. 363 as of Feb. 15. The Admiral's comments are in Danv. III. 245.

[3] This letter and much matter about the Rambla movement and period are in *Documentos Inéditos*, cxii.

ernors and resistance to the Comuneros. Organization of a military force of some 800 horse and 4000 foot to resist rebellion or Moor was outlined; and items of a confederacy promptly framed and signed (February 6).[1]

Even after the congress had, with their approval, begun, the Governors felt uneasy about the consequences. 'Andalusia,' the Admiral reported to the King, 'has assembled at Rambla and we know not to what end. If we had authority to hold Cortes and they declared themselves deputies, on the plea that we desired to discuss the welfare of the realm, the cities which acknowledge [you] as sovereign and the provinces would be pacified, in view of the fact that we showed willingness to discuss the general interest. Since that is not the case and these revolutionary folk tell them we desire not the good but the ruin of the realm, they believe them. This makes me fear lest from this junta some harm develop; and if Andalusia rise the whole realm is lost.'[2] The *capítulos* proposed to the congress to be addressed to the King were substantial, covering most of the traditional grievances considered in the Ávila Junta or the Tordesillas conference. Among them, complete independence of the cities in future Cortes, and granting of *servicio* only by unanimous vote would undoubtedly seem to the monarch an immense and impossible concession.[3]

Reassuring consequences appeared, however. The Rambla convention was promptly signed in the Andalusian cities; and Jaén was persuaded into conformity with her fellow towns.[4] Murcia, though not in the Rambla congress, saw the trend of events and moved for reconciliation.[5] 'Though, when the junta was proposed,' the Constable ad-

[1] *Doc. Inéd*, cxii. 77; Danv. III. 341, 364 (the adoption here dated Feb. 8), Mexía, 215.

[2] Admiral, Credentials to A. de Bursa, Danv. III. 253. Reference to proposals in Burgos shows it is before Feb. 16; reference to the recent sack of Cigales, which occurred between Feb. 7–11, dates it more precisely.

The Court felt as suspicious as the Governors; D. Carlos refused approval till Sep. 26, and then accorded only grudging and partial acceptance. (D. Carlos to Córdoba, summarized in Danv. IV. 519.)

[3] *Doc. Inéd.* cxii. 94. All were refused in the letter of Sep. 26.

[4] Córdoba signed Feb. 14; Jaén soon after. *Doc. Inéd.* cxii. 92; Danv. III. 545. It is difficult to understand the Admiral's statement in a letter of March 19 (Danv. III. 426) that Córdoba is holding off and refuses to sign. He says Córdoba balks because Fray Pablo declares D. Carlos is never coming back.

[5] Danv. III. 371. D. Carlos answered Feb. 21. But apparently Murcia's terms were not met; cf. Danv. III. 533.

mitted,[1] 'it was suspected from what happened with the Ávila Junta, that it was with no good intent, it turned out in such fashion as to tender Your Majesty very notable service.'

[1] To D. Carlos, Feb. 25, Danv. III. 236.

CHAPTER V

TORRELOBATÓN

THE glory of the Ampudia raid could suffice Padilla for little more than a month. Fluctuating and miscellaneous recruitments increased his force so that by the month's end [1] he had 3000 to 3500 foot — almost double the infantry disposable at his arrival; and Valladolid would put at his command for operations in the neighborhood 1000 to 1500 more. His weak arm, the cavalry, had been increased almost fivefold, to 500 lances. He had practically all the Royal artillery. Eight hundred men coming from Segovia, the Constable hoped, might be intercepted on their march by young D. Hernando de Fonseca, at Coca; but they took a wide circuit to the east through Cuellar.[2] Some 600, under Juan Bravo, reached Valladolid on February 3: 'excellent troops, and no peasants among them; but insufficiently armed and without cavalry.' [3] Three hundred foot and 800 lances from Salamanca, and a similar force from Ávila, Haro hoped to intercept; but the Admiral forbade the attempt; and Padilla advanced with a considerable escort to ensure their arrival.[4] So considerable a concentration of troops must soon be followed by a signal stroke. The Royalists drew in their remoter posts; [5] Tordesillas and Simancas completed further anxious repair of their fortifications; and repairs were discussed for Lobatón.[6] So inferior were the Royal numbers, especially in infantry, that they were determined upon a final defense only of Simancas, Lobatón, and Tordesillas.[7] Would Padilla attempt any of these essential positions, and if so, which?

[1] Estimate of Haro in letter of week of Jan. 27, Danv. III. 19. The Constable's estimate on Jan. 29 almost coincides: 5000 foot, 600 lances. Danv. III. 154, 229.

[2] Danv. III. 155, 202. Fonseca, after the Medina business, had supplied and strengthened Coca and left his son to defend it. Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 29, Danv. II. 290.

[3] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 6, Danv. III. 205.

[4] Haro, Feb. 3, Danv. III. 202.

[5] E.g., Portillo. Haro, week of Feb. 17, Danv. III. 19. Mutilated and undated; but reference to destruction of Cigales (c. Feb. 10) and to 'last Sunday — 7th' implies Sunday, Feb. 17.

[6] Haro, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 45. The need of repairs had early been noted. Admiral to Constable, Dec. 21, Danv. II. 655.

[7] Admiral, Jan. 26, Danv. III. 79.

After Ampudia he had returned to his base, and concentrated along the line from Valladolid to Cigales, eight miles to the north.[1] That town he destroyed, especially the orchards and buildings of the Count of Benavente.[2] Monday afternoon, February 18, the entire artillery and its supply lumbered out of Valladolid: 6 heavy cannon, one cast for Jiménez, nicknamed *Saint Francis*, 5 falconets; 70 barrels of powder; 500 cannon balls, and 30 stone balls; three wains of pikes, shovels, mattocks, and torches; nine wains of scaling ladders and mantelets.[3] Two Ávila and three Valladolid infantry companies escorted them.[4] The Comendador Mayor and the Count of Alva de Liste hurried to Simancas to conduct the defense, joined by a band of young nobles anxious to be in the encounter.[5] Haro, in command in the field, repeatedly visited and examined the fortifications. 'What I make of the campaign,' the Constable's diagnosis ran, 'is this: the rebel captains dare not attack Simancas for they see it is well guarded; and they are not attacking elsewhere, because, though they gained the whole realm, they will lose Valladolid unless they get possession of Simancas. The Simancans are certain they are marching against them — and I believe so too, in order to satisfy Valladolid.' [6]

The snail's pace of a siege train left it for many days uncertain whether the blow was aimed at Simancas southward or Lobatón westward. On midmorning of Friday, February 22, the garrison of the granite fortress descried the Comunero army on the brink of the chalk cliffs that encircle Lobatón. Royal troops were at once summoned in from Simancas and further, Arévalo, Portillo, even Coca; and began to arrive on Friday and Saturday.[7]

[1] Cardinal, Jan. 26, Danv. III. 84.

[2] Danv. III. 215–19, 231, 244. Cigales was destroyed between Feb. 7 and 11. Cf. p. 307, n. 6. Sandoval (VIII. xiv) adds a picturesque note. Martyr also has some details of the destruction. Epist. DCCXIII *ad fin.*

[3] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 21, Danv. III. 218; Maldonado, 226 ff.

[4] Minutes of the Junta, Feb. 18, Danv. III. 284.

[5] Vozmediano, Feb. 23, Danv. III. 233; Denia, Feb. 21; Danv. III. 225. Constable, Feb. 22, Danv. III. 230.

[6] Constable to D. Carlos, Feb. 22, Danv. III. 230.

[7] Though Haro's hurried report to his father on Feb. 25 (Danv. III. 234) says Thursday, and his report to D. Carlos on Feb. 28 (Danv. III. 260) says Thursday, the 21st, the siege seems to have started on Friday, Feb. 22. Pedrolasso's letter of March 4 (Danv. III. 510) makes it clear that word first reached Tordesillas on Feb. 22: it is inconceivable that a post should not reach Tordesillas the same day. The Cardinal's report of Feb. 27 (Danv. III. 238) says siege

The Comunero strategy, now evident, was simply expounded in a report of Padilla to Toledo:[1] 'It was many times discussed by other gentlemen and by me, what should be the first attempt. Everyone's wish directed them to Tordesillas and Simancas. But the principles of war precluded Tordesillas, for whoever undertook that, without this place (i.e., Lobatón) on our side, would enter into a trap; for the camp would have to be near Simancas and this place and Zamora de S. Juan, which dominate all the roads to Tordesillas on this side of the river; so we the besiegers (of Tordesillas) should have been more besieged than the besieged in Simancas.

'For two considerations the attempt was not made: principally because (Tordesillas) is one of the most formidable places in the realm by reason of the many outworks it has, for it is entirely encircled by bastions and traverses that connect with one another. Everyone thought the first enterprise undertaken ought not to be the most difficult. Then there was a very considerable difficulty in an encampment before Simancas, which was that, in a position so near Valladolid, we could not hold one third of our troops in camp at night time. Since something must be done and since this place (Torrelobatón) was gateway to all other projects and the most important point in this neighborhood save two, no consideration was given to the question whether the Sr. Admiral deserved it.'[2]

The numbers which Padilla was able to throw into the assault on Torrelabatón were 6000 foot and 500 lances.[3] The Royalists had 500 men-at-arms ready on Friday, and soon concentrated a force of 1000 horse; but none of infantry.[4] In the fortress was D. García Osorio with 100 horse and 600 foot.[5]

began the 22d. Further, the most detailed report of all, Padilla's of March 2 (Danv. III. 505 ff.) states that he left Valladolid the 16th (which he miscalls Sunday), stayed in Zaratán five days (i.e., 17–21), left at midnight, saw the dawn two leagues from Lobatón, and arrived at ten (i.e., Friday, Feb. 22). Mexía (221) gives exactly this date.

[1] Padilla to Toledo, March 2, Danv. III. 505.

[2] It will be remembered that Lobatón was the Admiral's town and he had been the most conciliatory of all the governors.

[3] Haro's report to D. Carlos, Feb. 28 (Danv. III. 261); his first estimate, to his father, Feb. 25 (Danv. III. 235), was 5000 or 6000 foot and 700 lances. The Cardinal's figures are 6000 and 800 (Danv. III. 238). Padilla's report does not state his own numbers (Danv. III. 505).

[4] Cardinal, Feb. 27, Danv. III. 238.

[5] Adrian's term, *lanzas*, implies heavy horse; Padilla's word, *escuderos*, implies

The town was enclosed by formidable defenses, a rampart and wall. 'The disposal of the place,' according to Padilla's judgment, 'is such that . . . for defense no city in all Castile is better . . . .Wherever the wall was weak, the very best repairs possible had been effected, in places 8 feet, in others 7 feet (thick); but in the portion where the breach was made, as we found after we entered, there were three points of repair work, of 8, of 6, and of 5 feet. Capping the defense works were the splendidest gabions ever seen, especially prepared and in repair. Diego de Vera, who put the place in condition, said those gentlemen had better give up the realm if Torrelobatón were taken.' [1] The fortress in the place was formidable, but surrounded by the town and without a traverse.[2]

The trumpeter sent to summon the place Friday noon was met with a shower of arrows. The impatience of the troops clamored for an immediate assault. 'It seemed good to some of the gentlemen,' the Comunero captain reported, 'to attempt that afternoon a coup de main, we had such a supply of ladders. The Mormejón and Ampudia troops were very half-hearted,[3] for from their 1500 ducats[4] we had spent 1000, and 500 were paid to the Gelves troops, and from the fortress (ransom) nothing was left. For that reason, accordingly they were rather lukewarm and peevish. We knew the town must be carried by force and that there were bound in that case to be excesses. We gave free hand to the troops to do as they pleased, and so the fight began and was at many points very fierce. It was our misfortune that the ladders did not reach. Many got up on them as far as they could and fell back badly handled. Most of the ladders were broken by showers of stones, and some of our troops

a mounted but lighter-armed attendant upon the panoplied man-at-arms. Mexía (221) calls them *ginetes*.

[1] The text of Padilla's letter, one of the most important in Danvila (III. 505), is unhappily very corrupt and confusing. I cannot puzzle out certain details as to the rampart and wall. P. Martyr (Epist. DCCXIV, March 4) calls Lobatón castle 'una quae inexpugnabilis videbatur.' It had resisted a siege by King Juan.

[2] Haro to Constable, Feb. 24, Danv. III. 235. Admiral, Feb. 26, Danv. III. 320. Cf. Frontispiece and note.

[3] This reading is obtained only by heroic emendation of the unintelligible 'Estaua mui floja de ostigada de Torre de Mormojon yde Ampudia' into *Estaba muy flojeada la gente de*, etc.

[4] It will be remembered that this sum was bullied out of Mormejón for having sheltered Beamonte. Cf. *supra*, p. 225.

wounded and some killed. . . . No further attempt was made that afternoon.

'Next day we moved the artillery down against the point that appeared weakest . . . and bombarded awhile, from dawn till noon, and accomplished little because the wall [1] was blind, and in the afternoon they half killed our artillerer. One of our troops, while they were placing a piece, touched it off in the midst of all our men and the recoil half killed the artillerer and the powder burned some who were standing before it. Besides, the building where we placed the artillerer collapsed and the bombardment at that point of the walls was suspended.

'Next day the battering was directed lower, against the curtain, which was what they most feared; and it accomplished considerable results, for it began at dawn and by about 11 there were breaches, though not very wide. The assault began in confusion; for the Valladolid troops attacked on one side and ours at once on another; and we pressed them hard till nightfall, and the fight never relaxed but as some fell back others rushed up to the assault. They made a very good defense indeed, for there were within some 80 esquires of the Marquis of Astorga and many good troops and 450 infantry. With night they began to mine near the (place of) bombardment, and the mine was finished, ready to charge the powder.' [2]

On Saturday, first day of bombardment, Royalist troops from Tordesillas reconnoitered the besieging army but were too inferior for organized attack.[3] On Sunday the Count of Haro, commanding 800 heavy horse, made an attempt to throw reënforcements into the place.[4] He reached Lobatón in the late afternoon and reconnoitered the position from a neighboring hill slope. The cavaliers brought on a useless skirmish with the harquebuseers; but Padilla did not leave his camp. From Tordesillas there was failure to supply ladders, no agreement as to signals with the besieged, dis-

[1] *Muro*, apparently stonework, rising from and different from the rampart.

[2] Padilla to Toledo, March 2, Danv. III. 507–08.

[3] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 23, Danv. III. 223. Martyr says the Admiral himself viewed the bombardment, in helpless distress. (Epist. DCCXIV.)

[4] Haro to D. Carlos, Feb. 28, Danv. III. 261; to Constable, Feb. 25, Danv. III. 234. It was a soldier's opinion that 100 men would delay capture of the fortress, till the Royalists could assemble a force to besiege the besiegers (Comendador, March 10, Danv. III. 474). The hundred men, with ladders, were ready when countermanded, according to Maldonado, 226.

agreement as to succor to be introduced, and counterorders from the Admiral. Haro withdrew, postponing the attempt till Monday.

'Next morning [i.e., Monday, Feb. 25] about 9,' Padilla's narrative continues, 'the fight was resumed at many points and one was carried. . . . Our troops entered and sacked, without any possibility of stopping them, everything but the churches.

'So your lordships may believe it was the stiffest and most determined affair that has been seen in many a day. The fortress after that was much weakened; though it held a few defenders whereby it might choose to defend itself against us, and the artillery could inflict no damage. It surrendered [Wednesday, Feb. 27] on terms of (retaining) half the property.

'I forgot to say that all the days we were fighting, the enemy remained within harquebus shot, and our cavalry in the field facing them off — they with all the troops they could draw from garrison, probably more than 600 lances and many musketeers.' [1]

'It cannot be denied,' remarked the Count of Miranda in a chagrined footnote to Haro's report,[2] 'that, considering who has taken Torre — and from whom, and how, and toward what end they took it, there could be no greater affront.'

The victory must redound to the immense prestige of Padilla: his first success in a siege — the beginning of a series, would it be, reducing Simancas, Rioseco, and finally Tordesillas? In Tordesillas many would acclaim and aid him; the Cardinal dismissed all the able-bodied who were suspected of disaffection and the capital was already as a city under siege.[3] Torre seemed a link in the tightening chain of posts forged about the doomed Royal capital: Toro, Zamora, Salamanca, Medina, Valladolid, Ávila, Segovia.[4] The victory, too, was Padilla's own; for Acuña was gone

[1] Danv. III. 508–09. Alcocer correctly notes that the whole operation occupied six days (p. 48).

[2] Haro to Constable, Feb. 25, Danv. III. 235. It is curious that Santa Cruz treats it as negligible, with but incidental mention (I. 424).

[3] These gloomy anticipations appear in the reports of the Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 27 (Danv. III. 239); of the Admiral to the Constable, Feb. 26 (Danv. III. 320); and of Peter Martyr (Epist. DCCXIV), who, however, believed Tordesillas would make formidable resistance.

[4] This is Mexía's picture (224).

already to Toledo.[1] Success had now consecrated two Comunero generals, the crozier and the sword. Further, the victory strengthened the war party among the Comuneros against the negotiators and the compromisers.

Conversely the victory discredited the Royalist commander: 'negligent' the kindly Cardinal judged him.[2] Haro himself blamed the Admiral's failure of organization and supply, and meddling from a distance.[3] Evidently friction or defective coördination in Tordesillas was to blame: 'quarrels betwen grandees and gentlemen,' the Cardinal called it.[4]

The chief end toward which the blow was struck was undoubtedly the cutting off of Tordesillas, which, by the Cardinal's and the Constable's own admission, derived supply chiefly from and through Torrelobatón.[5] The capture was an appalling challenge if Comunero leadership should prove able to develop it — if there should follow from it more than Comunero jubilation; or Señor Alonzo de la Serna's four yards of Courtray for a cape, the reward of bringing the news; or the plunder snatched from gutted churches and stripped images; or the captured gold coin which had been frantically but vainly smuggled for security into graves.[6]

[1] Constable, Feb. 27, Danv. III. 241.

[2] Cardinal, Feb. 27, Danv. III. 239.

[3] Note the tone of his report to his father, Feb. 25 (Danv. III. 234), and the formal charges in his report to D. Carlos, Feb. 28 (Danv. III. 260).

[4] Danv. III. 239. Cf. also Vargas's letter summarized in Danv. III. 243.

[5] *Ibid.*, 238; 241. Martyr makes the same point (Epist. DCCXIV).

[6] *Ibid.*, 286; Sandoval, III. xlvi.

CHAPTER VI

BEATI PACIFICI

THE Royalist mood had, of course, been stiffened by their success at Tordesillas. The Admiral accepted his governorship on January 3, and his patience with negotiation began to wear thin.[1] However, the capture of Tordesillas might be expected to make the Junta more open to negotiation; and the grandees were still in such alarm that they would not be intransigent. 'The grandees,' noted Adrian a couple of weeks after the Tordesillas campaign,[2] 'are exceedingly suspicious and fearful lest their estates rise against them. They wish to serve Your Majesty and at the same time make sure of their estates; and if they cannot attain all they would rather by compromise with the towns retain their estates than endanger them by serving Your Majesty.' Acceptable mediators might bring the parties to compromise. Two persons of the greatest influence undertook mediation, the King of Portugal and the Papal Nuncio.

A decisive interference of the Portuguese Crown could well turn the balanced scale of affairs in Castile. Portuguese alliance had before been almost decisive in Castilian civil division: living men recalled the months of war by which the great Isabel had, in the face of Portuguese intervention, to secure her crown.[3] The Comuneros early therefore appealed to King Manoel.[4] The price they offered, as Mexía heard it, was a marriage of the Prince of Portugal, later King João, with the Infanta Catalina, then, with her mother, in Comunero hands.[5] The Royalists, however, could dangle a far

[1] The venerable Councillor Polanco reports a conference between Cardinal and Admiral on Jan. 16 in which the latter declared that further delay was too costly and a final decision at arms desirable. Polanco to D. Carlos, Jan. 17, Danv. III. 50. Cf. also Danv. III. 14.

[2] To D. Carlos, Dec. 23, Danv. II. 670. In other letters he sketches the same condition: on Dec. 20 (Danv. II. 667), on Jan. 16 (Danv. III. 32); as does also Sec. Zuazola on Jan. 22 (Danv. III. 71).

[3] Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, Part I, Chap. VI.

[4] Mexía, 173. Santa Cruz (I. 329–33) gives a letter, undated but written when the Junta was in Tordesillas, outlining a general justification of the Comunero movement and accrediting a representative who should form an alliance with the Portuguese King. Sandoval (VII. xiii) gives a much fuller letter, dated, Oct. 24, of identical import, accrediting the Dean of Ávila.

[5] Mexía, 1730.

more dazzling prize, a marriage between an Infanta of Portugal and D. Carlos himself.[1] Portuguese favor was worth much courting, yet was offered without solicitation. Amid the tornado of abuse showered upon the government at the burning of Medina, Adrian had the comfort of Portuguese offers. On August 24 he reported, in the same letter that informed D. Carlos of the conflagration: 'I know the King of Portugal has been urged to help and support the rebels, and, I am certainly informed, has refused and clearly told them his will and intent to favor Your Highness, and that these revolts have much displeased him. He much desires to aid Your Highness as his own brother. His people in residence here have offered me every assistance, both money and troops. But this malady, I perceive, will not be healed by force of arms but by some other, gentler medicine. To all the wisest of the realm the best remedy for such a cure appears to be that Your Majesty should marry the Sra Infanta of Portugal.' [2]

So little did the young monarch seem to appreciate the opportuneness of this friendliness that Adrian had, in letter after letter, to urge D. Carlos to acknowledge it. 'It were well,' he wrote, 'that Your Highness order letters written to the King and Queen of Portugal expressing especial thanks; for by their favor and through a certain awe which, as Your Majesty knows, is held of them in these realms, these [Junta] deputies may abstain and refrain from worse things. Besides, it seems to the Councillors here with me that Your Majesty should order letters written to the said King and Queen which, in reply to the many lies the Junta people have by a special messenger written them to Your Majesty's detriment, may answer sharply and with much reprehension, informing them of the truth. And . . . it will be not merely useful but almost necessary that, in thanking for the great benevolence they show and the help they offer, Your Majesty also by his letters get the King to write you and us how many troops, foot and horse, and how much money we may

[1] The financial and military advantages of the match are indicated by Adrian (Aug. 24, Danv. I. 486); Constable (Sep. 30, Danv. II. 39); Lope (to Cardinal, Nov. 13, Danv. II. 487); Haro (Jan. 16, Danv. III. 46).

For a supreme piece of audacious lying see the Emperor's statement of the whole situation in Spain in his letter to the King of Portugal, Feb. 21 (Danv. III. 373).

[2] Danv. I. 486. The Cardinal reports further Portuguese offers on Sep. 14, Danv. II. 23.

count on, should it be necessary. And since the common voice of all the realm desires Your Majesty's marriage to the Sra Infanta of Portugal . . . this marriage would help much toward advancing and establishing Your Majesty's affairs — or at least hold out to him the hope of the marriage.' [1]

For the moment, the Imperial Court was so busied with the German situation that it ignored, in a manner almost insulting, communications with Portugal. The Portuguese Sovereigns are amazed, the Cardinal protested, 'that Your Majesty does not write them of conditions in these realms, which affect them as if they were their own; and they say they would readily undertake to procure the peace and repose of them, if Your Majesty directed them thereto. All the grandees . . . remark of Your Majesty's secretaries, how in such a crisis they omit to remind Your Majesty — they apparently do so to save the ink and paper.' [2]

The energetic Constable, however, made insistent representations to the Court of Lisbon. October 6 he asked for a loan, which was promptly accorded; [3] and on this promise, of 50,000 ducats, he at once raised 12,000 from Genovese bankers, a sum urgently needed in his precarious dealings with the capital, which was still suspiciously awaiting Royal confirmation of the promised concessions.[4] The Admiral showed an interest in the anticipated gold; but the official people, so soon as a half payment, 25,000 ducats, was reported due at the Medina fair, took steps to get it into official hands. 'In my judgment,' suggested the Comendador Mayor to the Constable, 'it should not be delivered to the Admiral, for I do not know whether it would be spent responsibly (*ordenadamente*), because of the many importunities that would be made to him, from which he could not defend himself — nor the Sr Conde de Haro, for the same reason. But I would order here [Tordesillas] a competent official from Licenciado Vargas, to whom I would order it paid.' [5] The insatiable treasury person named forthwith

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Nov. 16, Danv. II. 504. Title dates it 16, but the text gives 'xvij.' His letter of Nov. 13 similarly stresses Portuguese influence. Danv. II. 485. The King did not write, as advised, till Feb. 21.

[2] *Ibid.*, Jan. 4, Danv. III. 14.

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 8, Danv. II. 254. To D. Carlos, Oct. 29, Danv. II. 288. P. Martyr knows of the loan in his letter (DCC) of Nov. 26.

[4] Vozmediano to D. Carlos, Nov. 28, Danv. II. 580. Constable to D. Carlos, Nov. 3, Danv. II. 477.

[5] Dec. 8, Danv. II. 637. Admiral, Dec. 19, Danv. II. 653.

urged repeated application for further loan. 'Since the King of Portugal so willingly loaned to the Constable those 50,000 ducats and offered further all he had . . . Your Majesty should send and ask that he loan 100,000 more; for from his willingness it is believed he would do so.' [1]

That the King of Portugal should undertake some sort of intercession between D. Carlos and his Spanish subjects was suggested in communications from the Comuneros themselves; [2] but they received only the curtest discouragement. Offers of Portuguese help were again pressed upon the administration in Spain. 'The ambassador of the King of Portugal,' Vargas's report continued, 'spoke with me in Rioseco and told me his master had levied horse and foot from all his realm, in order, if any request came from Your Majesty, to come with them all.' [3]

The Crown of Portugal, evidently, could not be an impartial mediator. Greater disinterestedness might perhaps be expected from the Nuncio, proposed by the old courtier Peter Martyr as a mediator.[4] First report pictured the Nuncio as pro-Comunero; but the Cardinal found him sympathetic; [5] and the Portuguese Ambassador joined him in Valladolid to offer their services: 'If need be,' the Cardinal hoped, 'to disillusion them,' for the arrival of Padilla had inspired an immense recovery of confidence.[6] The Ambassador was commissioned to warn them that his master was disposed to support the Royalists.[7] Even so obviously partisan an approach to negotiation seemed to some of the Court party reprehensible: 'It does not befit our lord the

[1] Vargas to D. Carlos, Dec. 4, Danv. II. 719.

[2] The Constable, writing Nov. 30 (Sandoval, VIII. vii), says the King had reported to him such an appeal, and his refusal.

[3] Vargas to D. Carlos, Dec. 4, Danv. II. 719 (the text date 'iiij' is right, not the title date, 7). The Constable, Dec. 4 (Danv. II. 623), and the Count of Haro, Feb. 21–23 (Danv. II. 682), urged the same continued borrowing. The Admiral finally (Feb. 21) applied for a loan of 50,000, on the security of his fortresses near the Portuguese border (Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 21, Danv. III. 221.)

[4] Martyr, Epist. DCCIX, Dec. 27. Martyr was later ordered out of Valladolid for it (Epist. DCCXVIII). Nuncio to Cardinal, Danv. III. 125.

[5] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 4, Danv. III. 15; March 12, Danv. III. 396.

[6] *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, Danv. III. 24; Jan. 16, Danv. III. 39. Valladolid hesitated to admit them (Danv. III. 104, 108, 109, 110, 124). Salamanca was suspicious and skeptical, but saw the need of courtesy toward the proposals (Danv. III. 164.)

[7] Polanco to D. Carlos, Jan. 17, Danv. III. 50. (The title dates 18; but the text says *ayer el dieciseis.*)

King, in prestige or in right; for the party plundered cannot consider compromise.' [1]

The Junta named, to meet the Nuncio, D. Pedrolasso and five more; others were named later, and it was required that all the negotiations be communicated to Juan de Padilla.[2] Further all the deputies bound themselves to have no individual communication with the mediators save by special permission of the Junta.[3]

Through the Nuncio a list of more than a hundred concessions (*capítulos*) was submitted to the Cardinal. 'The Admiral and I,' he wrote to D. Carlos, 'with the Nuncio's agreement, wrote the Junta people to send us Fray Alonso de Medina [4] or others, so that we might all together agree upon what should be asked of Your Majesty.' The Comunero leaders evidently feared to trust the issues to a small group; or were willfully delaying the business, in secret hopes of a military success from Padilla's maturing preparations. 'They answered that we should first note in the margin of the concessions what we considered unjust and what should be moderated; and after they had seen it, perhaps they would send us one or two persons to confer. . . . I wrote the Nuncio that the discussion and examination of the concessions should be accomplished as a matter of common deliberation by persons thereto deputed on behalf of Your Highness and of the Comuneros. . . . If they did not wish to discuss with us, he should break with them at once and return. And it is already clear that they introduce these delays to detain the

[1] Secretary Zuazola, Jan. 22, Danv. III. 71.

[2] Danv. III. 97, 101, Jan. 5 and 25. It is interesting that one of those added was an *enragé*, Deputy Diego de Guzmán of Salamanca, intended probably to offset the too conciliatory members. Cf. Sandoval, VIII. xlvii, on Guzmán.

[3] *Ibid.*, 98. That the Nuncio had in fact counted on private and individual intrigue seems implied by his disgust at this provision: cf. his report to Adrian below.

Some light is shed upon the Comunero suspiciousness by P. Martyr's account in Epist. DCCX, Jan. 17, to the Grand Chancellor: the Comuneros asked what authority the Nuncio had to act as the Pope's official mediator; Martyr advised him to fake credentials from the Cardinal Medici, and the Comuneros accepted these. 'Literas se habere a Cardinali Medices qui Pontificatum gubernat mentitur. Eas enim ex meo consilio confinxit, ostenditque. *Placere* inquiunt Juncteri. Veraene sint an fictae, nil curant.' Such was the diplomacy of an Apostolic Nuncio, at the advice of the Prior of the Metropolitan Church of Granada!

[4] This Dominican Comunero appears as propagandist of the Junta in Danv. II. 30, 264, 328–32, 351, 470, 474; III. 216; IV. 96; V. 246. He constantly roused Valladolid and was accounted a radical. P. Martyr has sharp words about him (Epist. DCXCI, DCXCVI). He seems to have been fit comrade of his brother Dominican, Pablo of León.

Nuncio, because by detaining him they gain prestige with the cities that have deputed them, and it may appear that the Pope and the King of Portugal are disposed to favor them and account what they do as a matter just and founded in some reason.' [1]

The Governors were scarcely more willing than the Comuneros to commit themselves to parleys that should produce definite results. 'The General [of the Dominicans] and the Ambassador,' Adrian wrote reassuringly on January 30 to his master, 'have no commission from here to get or ask the Junta to send us persons to confer about concessions and see which are just and which not. None the less they believe they [i.e., the Comuneros] would be willing to send to some place between here and Valladolid three persons, and that from here three others be sent on behalf of Your Majesty for the same matter. This measure does not seem to us fitting for the honor, prestige, or service of Your Majesty, for two reasons: (1) when the Nuncio and Ambassador were both in Valladolid, they [i.e., the Comuneros] asked us, privately, to issue safe conduct for certain persons to confer with us; and (2) if there were here three persons of abilities and suited to the business, we should much need them here, and if we sent persons of no abilities they would accomplish no results from it. . . . If we agree to send the three persons, it will not be to conclude any agreement [*tomar concierto alguno*] but merely to discuss and confer about the concessions, which are just and which not.' [2]

The Nuncio suggested further that while negotiations went on offensive military movements should cease on both sides.[3] The Portuguese Ambassador and Loaysa, the Father-General of the Dominicans, tried to obtain Comunero assent, and reported to Adrian that at the voting, January 27, nine out of eleven votes in the Junta were favorable; but that Padilla and Alonso de Vera roused the city, with representation that their party awaited considerable recruits and the Royalists had very few, and that they had much excellent artillery and the Royalists little or none.[4] The city,

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 26, Danv. III. 82–83. The sentence *habiamos enviado* should read *habian nos enviado*. The Nuncio's letter is in Danv. III. 124; it reports, in the verbal communications of the Comuneros, the same shade of arrogance and exasperation which appears in Adrian's version.

[2] *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, Danv. III. 88.

[3] Nuncio to Cardinal and Admiral, Jan. 23, Danv. III. 124.

[4] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 30, Danv. III. 87. For Comunero suspicion of the Ambassador, cf. *infra*, p. 295, n. 2.

which was much more radical than the general Junta, had indeed brought pressure which changed an acceptance in the morning into a refusal in the afternoon. The city commune and the section meetings of the town accompanied their resolutions of refusal with a summons for Acuña, the most determined opponent of compromise.[1]

The proposal of truce in addition to conference, at a time when Comunero hopes were running high, seemed an indication that the mediators were of pronouncedly Royalist complexion, and brought their attempt to an angry close with the end of the month. 'The Apostolic Nuncio,' Adrian reported on February 6, 'has returned from that city, and much exasperated with it; for not only was he robbed there, but he was also, he says, maltreated in word and deed, as if he had gone to treat with Turks. They took oath that no one could speak to him, whether Junta deputies or of the city. When he was leaving — with their permission — they, under pretext that he was taking out money for the grandees, seized his packmules, opened his boxes, seized his person and would not allow him to go, and exacted of him an affidavit that he was not taking money, gold or silver, from the city. The populace rose twice, declaring they would kill him, that he was a traitor and had gone to deceive them with a pretense of peace. . . . The Ambassador also ran great risk of being insulted.'[2]

[1] The Junta records are in Danvila III. 102. It continued to discuss the *capítulos* and admitted Ambassador, Nuncio, and the Father-General to the discussions. Segovia was one of the voices for granting truce (Danv. III. 106 n.). Of the same date (Jan. 27) there is the brief but significant note in the minutes of the Commune of Valladolid that truce was refused and their refusal reported to the general Junta (Danv. III. 106). The section meetings petitioned the Commune to expel Nuncio and Ambassador (Danv. III. 110). In refusal of truce the Comuneros persisted, though according safe-conduct to negotiators (Constable, Feb. 22, Danv. III. 229).

[2] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 6, Danv. III. 204. A poor messenger was beaten and robbed, and variously molested; cf. P. Martyr, Epist. DCCX, Jan. 17.

For the fate of a pro-Comunero attempt at conciliation, by the Bishop of Cuenca, President of the Valladolid Chancery, cf. P. Martyr's letter of Dec. 11 (DCCV).

It is to be noted that Martyr, in Valladolid, believed the Comuneros really desired negotiation; the Portuguese Ambassador bedeviled the situation by joining the Nuncio, uninvited. The seized mules were two extra beasts that the Ambassador was smuggling out, as he departed with the Nuncio, loaded with other persons' property. The Nuncio went into a red rage at the two days' delay and the affront, and, in a vituperative fury, dissuaded the grandees from continuing. (Epist. DCCXII, Feb. 13: to Grand Chancellor.)

CHAPTER VII

MODERATION FROM TOLEDO!

WITH or without truce, however, the uneasiness of the Royalists through January — harassed by Acuña's career of raids and awaiting Padilla's blow — was such that they dared not wholly break off bargaining. After all, the leader of the Comunero party of negotiation was a moderate, of whom Cardinal and Admiral had the best hopes. D. Pedrolasso had stood, in Toledo, with the moderates, not the extremists, and had backed the appointment of Girón as captain-general against the popular idol Padilla, at the risk of the destruction of his houses by the Toledan mob.[1] He had saved the Corregidor there, in the days of mid-April.[2] Even in the present moment of exasperation D. Pedro had not lost patriotism in partisanship: he reported to the Nuncio the intrigues of French spies who sought to conquer Navarre with the connivance of the Comuneros.[3]

He had, on the other hand, held the more prudent part of Comunero confidence: he had not been compromised by participation in Girón's interviews with the Royalists in November; and then indeed consistently declined to meet the Admiral.[4] On the morrow of the Tordesillas disaster his great name authenticated the assembling of the disrupted Junta in Valladolid: 'I have come hither to serve the interests of this city, which is in all regards so forward that she needs bridle rather than spurs. She is giving to the affair all her troops and whatever else is most needed. Your lordships should start at once and come here to carry on your Junta in due order and with my great authority. . . . Now is the time to see what we are good for: in time of prosperity every one of us knew how to conduct the business.' [5]

If now Valladolid, become a city of *enragés*, and trusting

[1] So Adrian reports to D. Carlos, Oct. 17, Danv. II. 261.

[2] Cf. *supra*, p. 87.

[3] Cipher paragraph in letter of Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 6, Danv. III. 204. This service, apparently, is accounted unto him for righteousness in the writ of security of the Viceroys, of Aug. 28, 1521 (Danv. IV. 175): 'Most of the time you were in the said Junta you informed my Viceroys and Governors of things befitting my service.'

[4] Danv. II. 542.

[5] Pedrolasso to the Junta deputies, Dec. 7, Danv. II. 704.

in a victory of their Toledan captain, discouraged and thwarted negotiation, Toledo might be the voice of astuteness, bridle rather than spur, insisting that victory itself could be only a means to adjustment.[1]

Before negotiators met, D. Pedro began suggesting compromises. Of these the Cardinal made report to D. Carlos as follows: 'Yesterday night [January 15] the Bishop of the Audiencia came from Valladolid to the Admiral and to me [in Tordesillas] with a letter from the General of the Preaching Order [i.e., the Dominicans] urging us to consent to the release from prison of the Junta deputies here confined; for thereby he hoped he could secure peace. Among other matters he had commission from D. Pedrolasso that, if we were willing to promise and attempt to get Your Majesty to confirm the concessions within a certain time — with the condition that, if you did not confirm, we would give over the government and no further take part in government affairs — on these conditions agreement might be reached. Thereto the Bishop himself said that the Catholic King and Queen Dña Isabel of glorious memory, when they began to rule, promised much more to the realm in certain Cortes held in Madrigal; [in cipher] *and afterward within a few years took it all back in other Cortes at Toledo.*'[2]

Other Toledans, perhaps at D. Pedro's suggestion, got into communication with the Admiral at an opportune moment of discouragement. 'The Admiral, it is said, fears that the realm is lost. He told me,' Adrian wrote, 'on the 13th, when the four deputies from Toledo came, that, if they were willing to turn to concord and ask pardon for all the realm, he would grant it . . . and sign it with his own hand, pledging all he has and turning over his fortresses — ignoring the restrictions and taking into account only the main authority given to him — even though I would neither concede nor sign.'[3]

From the desperate Governor the Toledans found enough encouragement to attempt an extension of their effort. The Admiral reported on January 26: 'Toledo has consulted with the cities [presumably the Junta deputies] about com-

[1] It is to be noted that the Constable was at this time addressing individual appeal to Toledo. Toledan Deputies to their city, Feb. 21, Danv. III. 327.

[2] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 40. This letter, it is practically certain, fell into the hands of the Junta. Cf. p. 295, n. 2.

[3] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 40.

ing for concerted discussions and asking us that there be no recruiting. If they would agree to that it would be well; but as the vote involves many, who agree to it at night but on the morrow it is not executed, I account any agreement doubtful.' [1]

To the Toledan solicitation was added the mediation of yet another cleric, the Franciscan Fray Francisco de los Angeles [2] and the Junta was coaxed into deputing negotiators, to meet others from Tordesillas, in the Monastery of Santo Tomás outside that town.[3] The Governors named the venerable Councillor, Licenciado Polanco and D. Bernardino Pimentel.[4] The Comuneros named were moderates and convinced advocates of accommodation, D. Pedrolasso and the Segovia deputy, the Bachiller de Guadalajara,[5] a selection so exasperating to extremist opinion that mediator and negotiators were maltreated by the Valladolid mob. A letter of the Toledan deputy Pedro de Ayala, in Valladolid February 21,[6] recorded a lively picture of the

[1] Credentials of Admiral to A. de Bursa, Jan. 26, Danv. III. 80. The date is in the title; none in the text.

[2] Danvila unaccountably calls him (III. 412 and *passim*) General of the Dominican Order. Cf. Sandoval, VIII. xxxvi and xxxviii. Mexía (221) says, 'los generales de Santo Domingo y San Francisco' shared in mediation: unless the second name is a misprint for Fray Francisco, I do not know who is meant. Cf. also Santa Cruz, I. 428; Peter Martyr, Epist. DCCXVIII; Alonso-Getino, in *Ciencia Tomista*, lxix. 367.

[3] Padilla's letter of Feb. 15, Danv. III. 327. Minutes of the Junta, Feb. 15, Danv. III. 283. The necessary safe-conduct, signed by the Admiral (*not* the Constable as Danvila's text says) on Feb. 16, was accepted in the Junta, Feb. 17; and deputies named forthwith (Danv. III. 284). Pay was duly appropriated, 5 ducats daily for D. Pedro; 3 for the Bachiller (Danv. III. 285). The original term of 8 days was on Feb. 28 extended 6 days more (Danv. III. 286).

[4] Santa Cruz (I. 428) calls Polanco one of the oldest members of the Council. From this attempt, as at all other steps toward adjustment, there was on the Royalist side also contemptuous dissent: cf. Denia to D. Carlos, Feb. 21, Danv. III. 225.

Pimentel was named, on the insistence of the Cardinal (Admiral, credentials for A. de Bursa, March 16, Danv. III. 416). He had been named Junta deputy by Valladolid in a moment of anti-radical misgiving (Danv. II. 307).

[5] The voice of Segovia had been for some time for moderation: Peter Martyr's letter (DCCXVIII) narrates the matter. Cf. Danv. III. 469.

[6] Danv. III. 304. The title 'en Tordesillas' seems a careless error: the text gives no place, and all the details of the letter point to Valladolid. Danvila adds the astounding statement that Ayala was Padilla's father; but nothing in the letter indicates any kinship. His father's name was Pedro López de Padilla (Santa Cruz, I. 220). Alcocer, *passim*. Sandoval so names him (IX. v) and says he was living in extreme age in Toledo: this is the name in the Admiral's message there printed, which speaks of the father as an old friend. Juan's brother, Gutierre López de Padilla, mentions the father's death in a letter to D. Carlos, Dec. 1, Danv. IV. 675.

excited days. The whole siege train of the Comunero army, it will be remembered, had moved out of the city on Monday, February 18; rumor ran that it was going against Lobatón. Opinion ran high against any negotiating that might compromise the anticipated victory. 'Last night the friar (Francisco de los Angeles) came . . . and at the gate was much maltreated and they seized his letters. We had to assemble the Junta, at ten o'clock at night, and sent after them and they brought them; and we prepared the message for the gentlemen named, who were to go. With the Valladolid deputy present, we voted, in order that there might be no slip the next morning — for the baser sort show no friendly disposition toward Sr. D. Pedrolasso or the Bachiller de Guadalajara — that they should start on their journey the next morning, and we would show their message to the city and send it along after them with their servants and packmules. Today, Thursday, they [i.e., the representatives of the Junta] went to present the message to the city; and they were very greatly indignant that Sr. D. Pedrolasso had started off without informing the whole city — in spite of the fact that he had asked permission and spoken of it in the city. But they said he should have told all the sections; and such was the tumult that they plundered all his horses and mules and all he had, and beat and maltreated his servants, speaking to them at the same time many ugly and insulting words. Apparently even the Junta of the city has much regretted what happened. Today we are in great danger here, and we undergo great labors and know not what to do; for we are constrained on the one hand by the fact that they will not let us depart, and, on the other, we should like to go every one of us to his own country were it not that the whole business of the realm is on the point of complete ruin. . . . I think the ill-treatment we suffer should be presented at length to this city of Valladolid, and how they visit no punishment on them for any outbreak, and in their presence daily they tell us they are bound to kill us. I swear I would rather be one of the deputies under arrest in Tordesillas than be in Valladolid, for I should not have such alarms as I have; since the Gentleman who came from there with the troops involves us in all the trouble he can, to disrupt the Junta.[1] I know not what profit would come to him:

[1] This sentence seems to allude to Padilla, an impossible understanding if the letter were itself addressed to him, as Danvila's text and title state.

in my judgment he is lost, if we go. I am so angry that I have forgotten all I wanted to relate.

'Thursday, February 21, ten o'clock at night. D. Pedrolasso's servants have just now come, with all the effort and admonition I have spent in the city today! — to tell me that they have little by little recovered all D. Pedrolasso's property. If we have better luck tomorrow, please God, we will send it to him. The city Junta sent to tell me they were willing to write him asking pardon for what occurred; and our Junta [i.e., the national] will do likewise, begging him not to abandon the business on account of what happened, though he would have better reason to turn Moor than to undertake the business, since they give him such good pay for it. I believe no more ungrateful thing has been done in Castile than this to him, who no more deserves it than an angel. For as I live I never since I was born knew a man of a disposition more upright and wholly for the common good, — if the cobblers don't make him lose whatever devotion a man may have thereto!

'As to peace, I repeat there is as much good will thereto among good men on one side as on the other.' [1]

[1] 'Pedro de Ayala to D. Juan his son, dated in Tordesillas,' is Danvila's caption (III. 304). It is certainly written from Valladolid and is not dated in Tordesillas.

A letter essentially the same, of the same date, is sent by P. de Ayala and P. Ortega, Toledo deputies, to their city (Danv. III. 327). A postscript reports that their negotiators were well received. The movements of the conferees may be traced and checked by many references: Danv. II. 683 (really of Feb., 1521); Danv. III. 219, 222, 230, 234.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GRAY FRIAR AND A BLACK

THE anger of Valladolid, so likely by some repeated outrage to break up the conferences, the Franciscan peace-maker tried to soothe — but in vain. 'Fray Francisco de los Angeles has come today from Valladolid and tells me,' wrote Adrian, 'that, however much he tried yesterday to persuade that city and all the Junta members to peace, and to assure them that Your Highness's coming will beyond doubt occur by the time indicated, he could not at all make them believe, and they are now more obdurate than ever.' [1]

This uncompromising mood was of course confirmed by the news of Padilla's success at Torrelobatón, the influence of which on the negotiations was thus recorded in D. Pedrolasso's report [2] to his city:

Illustrious and Magnificent Gentlemen:

It seems reasonable that, since your worships were informed of my arrival here, you be informed also of what has been accomplished since I came, though that is so slight, compared with my desire, that I am in no wise satisfied: not in regard to the Sr. Cardinal or the Sr. Admiral; for in truth I could not justly deny that you will find them so well justified in regard to what touches the good of the realm as none other will exceed them. But in Valladolid there are so many fabricators of stories [? *historiadores*] to prevent peace that we need most exceeding patience who are undertaking it. This perversity and turbulence is not in the decent sort [*la gente de bien*] but in certain rioters and persons whom it suits not that there be peace; for, besides being held in little account if there were peace, they have certain private parties or animosities, or debts they owe, and other matters of the sort, which as things now are may be ignored. With one another they refer to all this as 'the public welfare.' This is the matter which most in the world troubles me; and so, as the principal hindrance to the good we are undertaking, it is set here first, that your worships, well informed of all, may provide in what wise seems to you most fitting.

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 23, Danv. III. 223.

[2] Danv. III. 510–13, March 4. The concluding paragraphs are quoted below, p. 273.

The day I arrived here[1] the Sr. Admiral came and the very next day desired that we begin to examine and consider the *capítulos*, together with the Bachiller de Guadalajara, Segovia deputy, who is an intelligent and well educated person. With the Sr. Admiral came the Licenciado Polanco. While we were considering our mission a post came to the Sr. Admiral from Torrelobatón, informing him that the army of the realm was besieging it. He read us the letter and said it seemed to him an outrageous business, with things as they were, to besiege a stronghold. We answered him that our coming had been without acceptance of truce; and although we regretted much what was going on, we were not in position to remedy it. He told us that since that was the case, he intended to go and remedy it. So he did and our business stopped.

Afterward, the whole time the Torrelobatón affair lasted, which was three or four days, we did not see the Sr. Admiral, who, noting that we had come with a time limitation, sent us, that it might not with all our trouble go off vainly, D. Beltrán de la Cueva, son of the Duke of Alburquerque, and Licenciado Ploanco to confer and discuss the general *capítulos* for the public weal: which was done that day and the next following. And indeed in the case of almost all the *capítulos* they were found justified substantially, the intent of the petition being indicated with some of them. Since all were aimed at Their Majesties' service we differed about very few.

After that, Torrelobatón was taken; and, with the Admiral's wrath, there was no chance of discussion of that or any other matter. Seeing this, I agreed to go to the army (for all the rest of the deputies had come from Valladolid with the troops) to protest to them and to the captains how little I could accomplish so long as they continued fighting; to discover also what equipment they had to continue fighting; and if it were inadequate, the truce which they (the Royalists) must make perforce would be in accordance with our preference. This seemed the case to all those gentlemen without a single exception save the deputy of Salamanca, named Diego de Guzmán; and, though he did not much approve, his captain, Francisco Maldonado, nonetheless voted that it should be done. Having found things there in proper condition (*buen aparejo*) I came back here, and all the deputies went to Valladolid. Here we negotiated with those gentlemen that they would approve granting of truce, while the public weal was under discussion, to see if some agreement might be reached. All approved, and the Admiral, for all his wrath, was the first; and they were glad to grant it for a period of twenty days.

I informed the gentlemen of the Junta in Valladolid.

[1] D. Pedrolasso arrived in Tordesillas while the Cardinal was writing the letter dated Feb. 21 (Danv. III. 222). News that Padilla was at Torrelobatón would seem therefore to have reached Tordesillas on Feb. 22.

The Junta was already considering this very matter, of accepting or refusing truce; for it had just received from its captain-general the following report,[1] which eloquently stated that critical issue.

Very Magnificent Gentlemen

The great lack of time I have had since I came here has made me write so briefly and so infrequently to your worships, whom rightly we have never had any other obligation than to serve and satisfy in every regard; for in general and in particular we owe your worships the honors, lives, and property we retain, since two or three times already they have been secured to us by your hand and with your aid and assistance.

This last, be assured, accomplished a turn for the better of the realm; for on my faith as a gentleman, I believe this town would not have been taken if your worships' troops had not come, for they made an attempt to relieve it. I will say no more upon matters so great as those of your worships, for I have no skill to set them in the scale they deserve. Since I account myself a devotee to anything that touches your interest, and as servant to that extent of your worships, I have thought fit to give a very full account of certain considerations which have impelled me to the steps which have been taken and of those which impel me to steps which with God's help I mean with my small powers to labor for.[2]

Thus: your worships know already that I have been spoken to by many citizens on the matter of peace or truce. Though my desires then were no less than now, seeing that any peace made on the basis of previous efforts, — our common cause not having attained any advantage, — would be a result to be accepted only at a time of failure, I wanted our common cause to gain an advantage, — but quite as much also that that might be done which befitted the good of the realm.[3] For these reasons, which seemed to me very important, I remained silent whenever proposals were made in the matter of peace: whence followed to me certain disadvantages, which I wish clearly to state to your worships: namely, the charge that, because of the offices (I held) I wished no mediation, and many persons accounted me excessively turbulent; and not only was this matter circulated by some in that (your) very noble city, but it spread to my city, which wrote me certain representations thereabout. All this was unable to make me to waver and

[1] Danv. III. 307, Feb. 28.

[2] I emend the last sentence to read: *y los que me mueben a las que con aiuda de Dios pienso trauajar.*

[3] The original sentence is as incoherent and I am not sure of the meaning: *aunque por mi no se deseaua entonces menos que aora, visto que toda paz que sobre los trauajos pasados se hiciese sin hauer reciuido el vien comun algun Bien, seria cosa, por tomarse en tiempo de quiebra, y [yo?] desseaua que las cosas comunes se levantasen, pero que mas ygualmente lo que tocase al vien del Reino se pudiese fazer.*

negotiate for peace but rather to accomplish somewhat in service of the common good. To which end I went out with those gentlemen, unembarrassed by all those stumblings and hindrances which, as your worships know, attended our departure; I went forth with intent to die and wreck myself [*reventar*] to accomplish something whereby the common cause might be encouraged, and, that accomplished with God's aid, to labor for peace, for the reasons which I will here state:

(1) with the common cause strengthened, as I have said, adjustment might be attained which should be equal;

(2) the other is that clearly the will of my city desired this, and often so wrote me with much insistence; and I went forth with that determination.

God, I think, was pleased to satisfy our wishes, by giving us, out of His mercy, the victory over (this) place, which, had his mercy failed, would have been very dubious. Though I see this very great good which He has wrought us by His hand, I see the evils which reveal themselves to our experience without being able to remedy or oppose them, which are of necessity inseparable from war. Whoever thinks to wage war without them thinks madness: which, though familiar to those who wage war, are none the less appalling to those who fear God. For, where the poor are not spared neither may the rich be spared; women are left in abject misery, children cry from hunger; nor are sacred things spared; and all these are as inevitable as war and can not be separated from it.

I think that with all these considerations combined, — that is reason to compel us all to seek out every possible course that is not similar to this [i.e., war], to attain the common good; for this course I should wish to follow only when the others were already closed beyond any hope of following them. And though all who have right concern for public affairs are under obligation to make that effort, I am under obligation to make supreme effort; for if evils increase, — which God forbid! — and good be deferred, God and the world would with much reason lay the blame upon me and account me as a person issued from Hell, because I had been one of the beginners of this business.

For these reasons, both general and individual with me, I beseech your worships, as pivot of the kingdom and city whence are expected all the good laws the realm must have, that you labor for peace. If brief truce be necessary for that, consent thereto that you may keep God pleased and content with the favors He accords us, and the world satisfied, seeing that all justification stands on our side: that let every one labor to obtain, so that none be left to our enemies. If during this brief time, — eight days at the very most, — some good result be accomplished, we will give thanks to God. If on their side their forces disperse, on ours they will as-

semble in double number, to die and never rest in the prosecution of our undertaking. In that, if those gentlemen will not suffer us to proceed by an open course, I choose to proceed all my life by the roughest and hardest in the world.

Your worships should not suppose that the period of truce is harmful to us, for we have need of it, for sharpening pikes and other necessary matters which it is not fitting to state here.

I have set forth to your worships the desire of my city, and mine, as to my confessor. I beseech you to write to me at once what is yours. . . .

In the truce the most equal conditions possible will be required, and the most advantageous to us.

I will not dwell on matters which I omit, for the nobleness and right will which your noble city has and has had will supply my omissions.

Let me have reply at once, — today in any case, for they are watching me with scrutiny, to condemn me, if this be denied, as turbulent and disobedient to my city, under which sentence your worships surely cannot account it to your advantage that I stand.

May Our Lord protect the very magnificent persons of your worships and increase your estate. From the army at Torrelobatón, Thursday, February 28, 1521.

Gentlemen, your worships' servant
JUAN DE PADILLA

With what warrant could the intransigent oppose such a recommendation of their own Captain-General?[1] Toledo insisting on truce and negotiation, Padilla himself talking peace; were the fury and distrust of the capital mere war mania and blindness? Yet what was the value of Torrelobatón save as the beginning of a conclusive campaign which should permit the dictation, not the negotiation, of terms? Did Padilla's success mean only that they had matched the Royalist success of Tordesillas; did it reveal merely a deadlocked balance of power, of which compromise could be the only outcome? The Royalists were stunned by their defeat: from what troubled knowledge of concealed risk or unconfessed weakness could the Comunero captains and congress be persuaded to truce, instead of smashing ahead to the full development of their promising triumph?

The section meetings (*cuadrillas*) of Valladolid had no doubts. They were daily busy with the poignant and harass-

[1] Padilla wrote to Valladolid in the interests of peace on the day of the Junta session. Padilla to Toledo, March 2, Danv. III. 507.

ing details which make men realize they are at war: they checked enthusiastic captains, marching off with the siege train to Lobatón, lest they take all the troops and leave the city stripped; provided laborers and material to repair the Fuentes bridge; hurried up belated companies; haggled over salaries and records; named captains and got their hands on a couple of falconets to keep Simancas uneasy; posted guard of ten musketeers on the Douro bridge; quartered ten men-at-arms of the regulars of the Gelves expedition upon one Simón Centurion, who must supply food and drink to men and horses until such time as he consented to make a loan the realm asked of him;[1] ordered returned all the books and a seized mule, which the Portuguese ambassador had been conveying away for Sr. Councillor Polanco; commissioned a justice to determine, in conjunction with one from the Junta, what had been plundered from D. Pedrolasso — gold, silver, jewels, and other property; and to report findings in the matter of an esquire of Diego de Mendoza's company of Gelves troops, whose horse certain persons had killed.[2] On the impatient ears of excited captains, of laborers on the Fuentes bridge whose labor was needed in their neglected fields, of harquebuseers shivering on the Douro bridge, of squeezed Simón Centurion, and of the horseless squire-at-arms, pleas for patience fell coldly: they were in a fight and had better finish it. The *cuadrillas* voted down the truce in their session of March 1.[3]

On the next day, busied in the routine of their task, providing quarters for harquebuseers in the tanyards, stiffening the backbone of wavering small towns, issuing fifteen hundred pikes for Palencia, the matter of truce was proposed to them again: the schoolmaster and Captain P. de Tovar speaking *for*, Canon Santander y Rojas, *against;* the Licenciados Zapata, Damián, Bernaldino, *pro;* the Bachillers Vega and Alcalá and the Dr. San Pedro, *contra;* Juan de Vega and Licenciado Morales, *pro;* the Canon finally holding the assembly to a second refusal, which Alonso de Vera was to communicate to the Junta of the realm.[4]

[1] For similar extortion of loan, cf. minutes of Feb. 12. The deputies balked at this case because the victim was a Canon. Danv. III. 292.

[2] Danv. III. 292 (Feb. 18, 19); 293 (Feb. 21, 22, 24).

[3] *Ibid.*, 383, without references. This may be a reference by error for the session of the next day.

[4] *Ibid.*, 458, March 2. Minutes of the Cuadrillas of Valladolid.

A majority similarly minded dominated the Junta of the city.[1]

On the same fevered Saturday the Junta of the realm debated the issue. The pacific efforts of the Franciscan mediator, Fray Francisco de los Angeles, seemed on the point of success when the discussion became exasperated to fury by the dramatic appearance of the Dominican Fray Pablo, deputy of León.[2]

That unfortunate messenger had indeed returned, despite the vigilance of Royal wardens in the frontier fortresses. Warned in Bruges by the Bishop of Córdoba that they should be hanged, Zimbrón and Fray Pablo had turned back without attempting to reach the King. The captain of the Irún fortress reported on February 21 that Lope Hurtado had encountered them five leagues from Bordeaux; but even with this warning he was unable to intercept them. In ten days [3] they were in Valladolid,[4] where, in the convent of San Pablo, the deputies were debating. The compromisers were urging that D. Carlos was about to return. Formal assurances had arrived, dated February 21.[5] D. Carlos was to reach Castile some time in September. The Black Friar had been near to the Imperial Court, perilously near; he did not believe the King would return at all.[6] 'Fray Pablo says that His Highness will not come in any part of September,' the Admiral commented in sarcastic wrath. 'If so, His Majesty may continue to enjoy that country: return will be unnecessary; he will have nothing to return to. He will have nearer at hand other conquests, less difficult to accomplish.'[7]

Further, the Dominican deputy had no longer faith in any

[1] Danv. III. 456, March 2. Minutes of the Junta of Valladolid.

[2] Sandoval's dramatic picture of the opportune arrival of F. Pablo looks at first like an embroidery upon fact; but it is quite clear that Fray Pablo did actually appear at this point and led the opposition (Sandoval, VIII. xlvii). Cardinal's letter, March 7 (Danv. III. 393); Polanco's, March 12 (Danv. III. 408); Peter Martyr's, March 15 (DCCXVIII); the Admiral's, March 16 (Danv. III. 415, 416). For this interesting Friar, cf. *infra*, p. 303.

[3] The Junta minutes of March 3 record permission for Zimbrón, who had 'returned from Flanders exhausted and had been a long time absent from his home,' to return for a brief rest to Ávila (Danv. III. 449). The messengers appear to have arrived on the critical Saturday, March 2; as Sandoval's narrative represents.

[4] D. Pedrolasso's report of March 4, Danv. III. 513. Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 7, says Córdoba saw them in Louvain (Danv. III. 393).

[5] Councillor Polanco to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 408.

[6] Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 7, Danv. III. 393.

[7] Credentials to A. de Bursa, March 16, Danv. III. 416.

policy of petition. Experience of rebuff and rebuke, even of exile to Gibraltar, in Holy Week of the previous spring, might have faded from D. Pedrolasso's memory; but Fray Pablo had freshly in recollection the imprisonment and threat of death that awaited the messenger who reached Germany, and the similar fate from which he had himself fled. Petition again to this monarch, represented as 'benign to pardon and liberal in satisfaction'? As a matter of fact D. Carlos, the Black Friar reported, was determined to respect no promise of pardon which his governors might issue, no matter how many writs of confirmation His Majesty might send.[1]

[1] Sandoval, VIII. xlvii.

CHAPTER IX

QUOS JUPITER VULT PERDERE

BUT a brief truce 'eight days at most,' as urged by their Captain-General, to give the negotiators at least the chance to formulate something which should represent both sides of Spanish opinion? Petitions from the Junta alone the King might very naturally ignore: to a joint petition from the Comuneros and his own Governors he would find it difficult to refuse a hearing. For a truce of eight days a majority was obtained, in the teeth of the Black Friar's opposition — 'granted for the respect and service of the Sr. King of Portugal.' León, Toro, Ávila, Murcia, Segovia, Toledo, and Madrid voted for; the extremist cities, Valladolid and Salamanca against.[1] The armies were to remain fixed at the points occupied when the truce was adopted.

The next steps of the peacemakers were to secure extension of the truce and agreement upon petitions. To accomplish the former of these was the purpose of D. Pedrolasso's report [2] to Toledo on Monday. The first proposals of truce from negotiators and deputies, his narrative stated, involved in Valladolid such consequences 'that they were on the point of quitting the place. Finally all the sections submitted to whatever the Junta determined; and truce was granted for the short period which Your Worships will see. . . . Though no other good should follow from it than this: that for this period there be prevented so many deaths and robberies and assault on the highway, it will be great gain, — the whole affair being between Christians, subjects of one sovereign, who seek all the same end, and with quarrels de-

[1] Junta minutes, March 2, Danv. III. 448. Truce ran from Sunday 3 through Sunday 10. Haro speaks of it as six days, because two days had already elapsed when formalities were completed. Cf. Haro to D. Carlos, March 4 (Danv. III. 392) and Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 7 (Danv. III. 393). The text is appended to the Cardinal's letter and a version shorter by a sentence is in the Junta minutes. Cf. also Polanco to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 406. Attempt was made to reopen the question on March 4. Truce was revoted, with the addition then of reference to the King of Portugal. Danv. III. 450. Martyr declared (Epist. DCCXVIII, March 15) that truce was conceded only because Padilla wrote from Torrelobatón that he needed the time for preparations. Cf. *supra*, p. 269.

[2] For the earlier paragraphs of D. Pedrolasso's report cf. *supra*, p. 265. Danv. III. 512.

clare that we desire the service of the Emperor, and destroy his realms, on both sides.

'I have already, gentlemen, told you why there are outbreaks in Valladolid. If Valladolid, or whoever rules it, chooses to consent, there is no reason why we should consent; for our very distinguished city (Toledo) was the first to move in this the common good — which all of us have so ready in our profession and so remote in our performance. If your worships consider it, how little the business now has akin to what it was at the start! And will have still less while things go on (thus), — so many already are the evils, robberies, deaths, conferences which reach no agreement but to avenge the harm each inflicts on the other and has inflicted, and leave the general good quite forgotten — for no one remembers that. And it will be worse than all this, if our lord the King's arrival overtake us in the condition we are now in; all the more since what has been begun will be forgotten and every one will look to save his own head if he can. . . .

'Your worships should write to the general Junta and to Valladolid and your deputies and Sr. Juan de Padilla, your Captain-General, that he take steps to extend the truce till finally all the concessions are agreed upon, and we have communicated them to all the cities. If we can attain the end we desire without arms, let us all lay them down; and if all do not realize that we took them up with just cause and in defense of our liberties, if your worships write this and send me your letters, though other cities do not approve, they will all come round when they see Toledo desires it.'

Meanwhile the second step of the peacemakers, agreement upon *capítulos*, was brought at least within sight before the truce expired. The progress in discussing the petitions was thus reported to the monarch by the Royalist negotiator: 'Upon examination some of them seemed consonant with the laws of these realms, and others good and beneficial; but some had to be struck out because they contained new and grave matters, and others because they could not be requested with the respect which is due to Your Majesty. Those only were to be communicated to the Constable and the Council which were the most reasonable, in order that with their approval all together should beseech Your Majesty to order them granted.' [1]

[1] The approved petitions were sent to the Constable before the truce expired

'We really,' the Cardinal Governor was able to report, 'had carried through the negotiations to reasonable conclusions of concord, and agreed upon the petitions which we were, with the Communes, to address to Your Majesty, eliminating the unjust, and others which could not decently be addressed to Your Highness.' [1]

The programme of reform which thus secured the approval of the Cardinal Governor and the Royalist conferee, as well as of the Comunero negotiators, compares interestingly with the petitions of the Junta, drafted at Tordesillas in September.

The hundred *capítulos* [2] include some seventy essentially — in some cases almost identically — like those framed by the Junta in September. These repeat the demands:

That the King marry and reside in Spain; effect economies in the Royal household; and reform the organization and personnel of the Queen's household.

That governors appointed in the King's absence be of native birth and approved abilities, and empowered to fill offices and redress grievances. The Junta demand, amounting to a constitutional revolution, that they be selected with the approval of Cortes (*puestos y elegidos a contentamiento del Reino*) is omitted.

That the compulsory lodging of the Court (*Posadas*) be reformed in accordance with the laws of D. Fernando the Catholic. The *capítulos* on this topic add minute provisions as to beds, sheets, and bolsters, not included in the Junta petitions.

That no Royal dues in arrears beyond ten years be collected; that the Coruña *servicio* be abandoned, and no new one collected save for necessity clearly demonstrated to the realm; that no rewards be paid from the *servicio*. For the Junta demand that sales taxes be commuted at the rates of 1494 as provided in Doña Isabel's will is substituted a restoration to the rates of the time when His Highness entered these realms. Other details concerning the distribution of taxation were added.

(Archbishop of Granada to D. Carlos, March 10, Danv. III. 485); but the Constable had not answered, two days after its expiration (Polanco to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 406).

[1] Letter to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 398.

[2] Danv. III. 262–77 numbers 99; but there is a 23 bis. Some misprints — e.g., *dias* for *dineros* in 88 — may be corrected by comparing with the text of the Junta *capítulos* in Sandoval or Santa Cruz.

That Cortes deputies be selected according to the usage in each city, without nomination of candidates or dictation of powers by the Crown; that discussion be wholly unhampered and, when desired, without the presence of the Royal president; that deputies accept no Royal rewards, under severe penalties (though the death penalty demanded by the exasperated Junta is omitted), and receive salary only from their cities, and give in person within forty days official accounting to their cities.

That gold or silver plate or coin may not be withdrawn from the realm; with other regulations as to the coinage.

That minute control be enforced over manufacture and sale of wool and cloth, and export of bread.

That the present and subsequent Royal Councils submit to quadrennial inquest; with other extensive reforms aimed to accomplish a purification of Council and courts. This inquest is made more palatable than in the Junta proposal by providing that the King appoint the inquisitor! The Junta petitions are struck out which require removal of the present Council, which stipulate that all Councillors and judicial officers be native, and which abolish the officer of corregidor.[1]

That preaching of bulls and *cruzadas* be permitted only for just, true, and necessary causes, and spent for the purposes proposed; with many other provisions to check ecclesiastical abuses. (The effective point of the provision framed by the Junta, that this necessity be determined in Cortes, is omitted.)

That the Sevillan monopoly of the Indies commerce continue, and no Indian slaves be given as rewards. The humanitarian comment of the Junta is omitted; but an item is added restricting participation in Indies trade to natives of Spain.

That Royal grant of favors be thoroughly reformed and restricted; with prohibition of pluralism and sale of offices. The severe penalties prescribed in the Junta petitions are omitted, as well as the drastic Junta demand that all favors made since Queen Isabel's death be revoked.

That treasury officials, past and future, undergo *residencias* or inquests. The Junta petitions added to the in-

[1] The Junta itself had found it very useful to appoint corregidors, and had done so in many cities. Cf. Council to D. Carlos, March 26, summarized in Danv. III. 488.

Subsidiary Buildings of the Church of San Pablo Valladolid

San Pablo was frequently the place of Cortes meetings. In the present building, however, much remodelled in the seventeenth century, devastated by the French occupation, and again remodelled, it is difficult to indicate any actual scenes of remote historical events. My drawing shows subsidiary buildings, evidently dislocated by repair, with shifted buttresses and other alterations.

SUBSIDIARY BUILDINGS OF THE CHURCH OF SAN PABLO
VALLADOLID

nocuous Royal inquisitor associates appointed by the Cortes.

That letters of naturalization be abolished.

That bishops and prelates be native and reside in their bishoprics the larger part of each year or forfeit their incomes *pro rata*. This is to be addressed as a request to his Holiness. The Junta provision was that, if the King failed to obtain the request, the realm might seize the ecclesiastical revenues of absentees.

That tenancies of Royal castles and fortresses be entrusted only to natives and not to grandees even if native.

That all redress of grievance promised at Valladolid and Coruña be fulfilled.

That the King grant general pardon (with such exception as His Majesty specified), and bring no suit to recover taxes collected by the Communes.

The Junta demand that Ronquillo and Fonseca be punished was dropped, as well as the impossible request that the King approve and legitimize all the acts of the Junta.

That the honest pursuit of such a program of reforms would mean an immense increase of probity and efficiency, together with a sharp limitation upon the irresponsibility, of the Royal rule seems clear: it would effectually prevent recurrence of such scandals as the Flemish plunder, of a foreign boy as non-resident archbishop of Toledo, of the corruption and intimidation at Coruña. A governor and a Councillor could subscribe to it. Archbishops did not like it. His Grace of Granada, in Burgos, wrote to D. Carlos: 'The Cardinal and the Admiral, in the midst of the perils and troubles they write you of, sent us here another load of petitions. Many of these make a good appearance; but the upshot of them, under false appearance, is to take from Your Majesty power over all his realms. And the worst is that traitors should be pardoned, together with many other evils which might be listed from these *capítulos;* and they require that governors and grandees pledge themselves as defenders of their evil.' [1]

D. Pedrolasso submitted the set of petitions to the Comunero captains in Torrelobatón and got the approval of Padilla though not of the extremists.[2] The eight days of truce expired without the Constable's signifying his assent. In any case extension of truce was essential to complete the

[1] Archbishop of Granada to D. Carlos, March 10, Danv. III. 485.

[2] Peter Martyr, Epist. DCCXVIII, March 15. Cf. Danv. III. 469.

attempt at peace by negotiation. A request therefor, from the grandees, backed by the negotiators, by Fray Francisco, and the Portuguese ambassador, was submitted to the Junta deputies, meeting with the Comunero captains in Zaratán on March 10.[1]

While the peacemakers, however, had been working to bring negotiations nearer to acceptance, the extremer persons of each side had worked to thwart it. The punctilious and embittered Council in the nervous days of mid-February had formulated, in a public proclamation, in Burgos, their defiance of the whole Comunero movement as treason, subject to the direst penalties *lesæ majestatis*.[2] This denunciation, with the names of the Junta deputies and the chief Comunero leaders, some unknown person posted in the square of Valladolid, before the truce had expired,[3] a challenge 'which most inflamed the minds of all the Commune.' The Junta retorted, March 7, by instituting similar proceedings against and proclamation of the 'enemies of the realm' from the Admiral and the Constable (but not the Cardinal) down, conducted by the Black Friar, deputy of León.[4]

In the same angry mood the Junta met the proposals for extension of truce. At the Zaratán conference León, Zamora, Segovia, and the captains Bravo of Segovia, Zapata of Madrid, and Francisco Maldonado of Salamanca voted to grant three days. Salamanca, Valladolid, Ávila, Toro, and the Ávila Captain P. de Barrientos, and Juan de

[1] The Comendador Mayor in Simancas met the Gray Friar and the ambassador returning from the conference to Tordesillas, Sunday afternoon, March 10. (Report to D. Carlos, Danv. III. 474. Mention of 'to-day, Sunday,' verifies the title date, March 10, rather than the subscription date 'xi de marzo.') After speech with them he happened upon D. Pedrolasso, also on the road to Tordesillas. The Junta record of March 10 is on a separate sheet, recording session in Zaratán (Danv. III. 451).

[2] On Feb. 16 (Danv. III. 231), the day before Valladolid appointed the Tordesillas conferees. Sandoval (IX. ii) gives the formidable document, which he obtained from the grandson of Gallo, the Council secretary. It is dated Feb. 16. Santa Cruz (I. 376–99) gives it with all the names. The two texts offer mutual correction of egregious blunders in the printing. The Admiral saw the grievous consequences likely to follow (III. 250). He had long been staving off something of the sort. Cf. P. Martyr, Epist. DCCIV, Dec. 5; Maldonado, 253.

[3] The exact date is not certain. Cf. Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 398.

[4] Junta minutes, March 7, Danv. III. 470. The public formality was solemnly carried out March 17 (Danv. III. 470, ascribed to Junta minutes; but without references). Sandoval (IX. vi) pictures the ceremony. P. Martyr, Epist. DCCXIX, April 20.

Padilla voted against — the Captain-General declaring his suspicion that the Royalists asked truce as a means of provoking desertion from the Comunero army.[1] Extension of truce was refused. Probably the exasperations of resumed warfare would wreck further attempts at joint petition, which had been worked out by the negotiators as a hopeful compromise.

The humane Cardinal expressed his chagrin at this failure, in a report to his absent master: 'There might perhaps have been truce for the period necessary to obtain Your Majesty's decision, both sides dismissing their forces, whereby it was believed we might attain peace till Your Majesty's return. All this has been prevented because the Constable and the Councillors proclaimed and sentenced as traitors the Junta members and the leaders of the Communes. As a consequence they are now, it is said, so excited and wrathy that they are willing neither to listen to truce nor to present petitions, — save all the petitions in precisely the form they drafted.'[2]

The Royalist negotiator was more resigned. 'The conference did this good,' Councillor Polanco reported; 'the cities, both loyal and rebel, may see that just and reasonable petitions are here recognised as such; and all may return to the service of Your Majesty, and if they do not, the more clearly may their wicked rebellion and obstinacy be recognised.'[3]

On the Valladolid–Tordesillas road, near the fortress of Simancas, the Comendador, commanding that Royalist outpost, encountered late on that critical Sunday afternoon of spring the Comunero negotiator. 'I happened, upon the highway, on D. Pedrolasso, who was going to Tordesillas, and we had courteous converse. I did not choose to interrogate him or carry our conversation further. Gentlemen who were on the road with me escorted him a short space conversing with him; and told me he said he had perceived

[1] Junta minutes, March 10, Danv. III. 451. The vote is puzzling: where was Toledo? Did León vote in defiance of Deputy Fray Pablo? The town itself was earnestly Comunero and wrote on March 17 to the Junta protesting against negotiation. (Sandoval, IX. xii.) As a military matter, truce was probably settled rather by preference of the Captain-General than as an issue of civil policy.

[2] Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 398; confirmed by Polanco to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 406.

[3] Polanco to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 407.

that the Junta people were mad, and he had taken his farewell of them, and was going to say farewell to the gentlemen in Tordesillas and go home. I think either he is going back to negotiate or that he was afraid to return to Valladolid (which I count more likely).'[1]

The next day both Comunero negotiators wrote to the Junta the result of their conferences and asked the Junta to appoint a messenger to convey to the negotiators their further will.[2] The Junta at once relieved the Bachiller from the negotiations and appointed a substitute to confer with D. Pedro, whom also they paid on March 14 and relieved.[3]

[1] Comendador de Vega, March 10, Danv. III. 474. The *lacunæ* in the text may almost certainly be supplied in the sense given in the translation. The Comendador had no use for negotiations: cf. Danv. III. 228.

[2] Danv. III. 467, summarized.

[3] *Ibid.*, 451, 452, 453, Junta minutes. The negotiators' letter implies that they asked to be relieved. Polanco's phrase implies dismissal: '*Vinose D. Pedrolasso y el Bachiller de Guadalajara despedido de su junt*[*a*].' Danv. III. 406.

CHAPTER X

PEDROLASSO

How great an opportunity, how reasonable a hope of just compromise and an end to outrage and war had been lost by the collapse of negotiation, which filled with wrath and bitterness the heart of the returning grandee? If the petitions had been accepted, and forwarded to the young King? Perhaps at the very moment of Pedrolasso's humiliated entry, with the nightfall, into Tordesillas, the Imperial youth was dictating the reply to the Marquis of Denia which was summarized in cipher on the reverse of the Marquis's letter of February 21: 'The business of negotiation has never seemed to me good, because done, as you say, in prejudice to Our Royal authority. Therefore, as you will see, I have always written that, since my arrival must be soon, it be abandoned till then.' [1]

But might the monarch's preference have been overridden by a joint recommendation pressed upon him by his angry subjects and all three governors? Consent so extorted would have had dubious value. The governors had themselves, and more than once, given him sinister hints of evasion or deception. 'Tell His Majesty,' the Admiral directed his messenger, 'that glory goes with mercy and it is well that a prince be merciful; but it is well he should come with armed forces. . . . And I remind him that nothing he signs, since done under compulsion, has validity in law. . . .Though he sign, he is not obligated to what he does under compulsion.' [2] The Constable reported: 'We are in the course of negotiating with the cities . . . and since, in all, excesses greater or less occurred, the first offer made to them is pardon, for that is to Your Majesty's advantage. . . . Your Majesty may believe that, though we pardon much of what has occurred, there will remain plenty upon which to satisfy your wrath.' [3] Even the conscientious Cardinal repeated to his Royal master a bishop's reminder that Kings take back when

[1] Danv. III. 229.

[2] Admiral's credentials to A. de Bursa, March 28, Danv. III. 437.

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, March 4, Danv. III. 479.

they can what they granted when they could not otherwise.[1]

'To take his farewell of the Royalist negotiators, as he had done of the Junta deputies, and go home,' D. Pedrolasso had declared to be his determination, on the Tordesillas road, Sunday March 10. 'A plague on both your houses!' But could he withdraw wholly from the struggle, either safely or honorably? If he believed the Comuneros to have rejected reasonable compromise, were not his hands clean of them, and was there not obligation to support the party which still listened to compromise?

His relations with the Junta had been growing increasingly strained. He had, to be sure, rallied the scattered deputies after the loss of Tordesillas; but as the Junta began to function in Valladolid under the feverish stimulus of that city of *enragés*, Pedrolasso's own city had become uneasy about the more radical courses favored by certain of her own deputies and had considered recall of her extremists — even of Padilla;[2] and with this misgiving D. Pedro heartily sympathized.[3] His course aroused the lively suspicions of the capital city, in which even his safety was imperilled;[4] and as early as January 14 he requested to be paid and discharged, in view of the fact that he had resigned from his deputyship for Toledo, and declined to appear again in the Junta as deputy. The other deputies insisted that he continue with the performance of Junta business and issued to him formal authority to do so, directing that he exercise it under penalty of loss of all his property and of perpetual exile from the realm, no matter if he alleged that his city ordered otherwise.[5] D. Pedro replied that he understood their direction and would give them an answer. Four days later he reasserted his determination to be a free citizen, attending the Junta as servant of the realm and of the gentlemen deputies.[6] In this ambiguous capacity he was allowed to continue. 'As a native of these realms and citizen of Toledo' he joined in the effort of the deputies who organized to protest against the plundering and stealing by the

[1] Cf. *supra*, p. 261. Cf. also Adrian's cipher postscript to his report of Feb. 21 (Danv. III. 224) urging a general pardon and subsequent discovery of reasons for excepting conspicuous offenders.

[2] Letter of Valladolid to Toledo protesting against such recall, Jan. 7, Danv. III. 121.

[3] Cf. Peter Martyr's letter, p. 223.

[4] Cf. p. 263.

[5] Junta minutes, Danv. III. 99.

[6] *Ibid.*, 101.

Comunero troops.[1] With the policy of negotiation he was conspicuously identified and was appointed as Comunero representative in the negotiations which had now come to an ineffectual close.

That close was to mark not a close in D. Pedro's career, but an immediate and revolutionary reversal: he not only abandoned the Comunero movement but threw himself into active labor for the party of the governors. 'D. Pedrolasso left the Junta,' wrote the Admiral on March 19,[2] 'and is in a village near Valladolid, bringing over troops, both horse and foot, and I think he will bring over the greater part. He is bringing over their deputies, and so is the Bachiller de Guadalajara, who is going to Segovia to see if he can revolutionize the city.' The governors realized the importance of obtaining for him certified pardon. They had not yet obtained it for D. Pedro Girón — 'who is desperate,' the Admiral protested, 'and we fear much lest he go back to them; and if so all who are to be pardoned will be alarmed, and this distrust will ruin everything . . . I beseech His Majesty to concede D. Pedro Girón's affair, and D. Pedrolasso's, and the others.'[3] The Admiral proposed in the meanwhile to assume responsibility and himself sign writs of pardon. 'Yesterday night,' the Cardinal wrote on March 15,[4] 'the Admiral sent me several writs signed in Your Majesty's name whereby Your Majesty pardons D. Pedrolasso and other individuals for whatever they have hitherto done in disservice of Your Majesty, in view of the fact that they have returned to obedience to Your Majesty. I was not willing to sign them because I have no authority to, and Your Majesty has ordered and forbidden us to conclude an agreement in this or any other matter without consulting you. Some say I want to ruin the realm and Your Majesty; but, in spite of that, I will not deceive D. Pedrolasso nor others; for they would hereafter say I am and have been treacherous with them and deceptive.'

An angry charge of treachery was of course instantly raised by the Comuneros: First Zumel, the shabby trickster

[1] Junta minutes, Jan. 27, Danv. III. 102.

[2] Cipher credentials to A. de Bursa, Danv. III. 427. The troops were the very efficient Gelves veterans. Danv. III. 436. The Junta ordered his arrest on March 17. Danv. III. 453.

[3] Credentials to A. de Bursa, March 16, Danv. III. 416.

[4] Letter to D. Carlos, Danv. III. 411.

who paraded his resistance at the Cortes of Valladolid in order to raise the price that bought him off; then Girón, a pretender and bungler if not also a traitor in the Tordesillas campaign; now Pedrolasso! Spite and jealous chagrin because Padilla and not he led the Comunero forces were the motives commonly alleged. When the Comunero forces were increasing and all had hopes of a success, there were lively rivalries for the military command. 'Last week there were differences about captains-general,' the Constable heard the story on February 22, 'because the Junta people wanted it to be D. Pedrolasso, and the people of Valladolid, Juan de Padilla — in such wise that the people rose in tumult and to pacify them they said that Juan de Padilla was captain-general. After, they chose three captains: the Bishop of Zamora; Gonzalo de Guzmán, son of Ramiro Núñez de Guzmán; and Diego de Guzmán of Salamanca — though Juan de Padilla continues always in superiority over them all.' [1]

Of this outcome Padilla made a report to his city which showed that the situation was at least outwardly courteous enough to spare sensibilities. 'There was,' he said, 'long discussion as to the kind of army control, among us captains here. Although [2] my judgment was always that the army be commanded by the city captains on a basis of equality, as has been done formerly with success, the vote of all the gentlemen captains was that for this campaign we should choose one person as chief: which in my opinion was always offensive to everybody and hard to put through. Still, in spite of my conviction, in order to conform with the other gentlemen, I agreed to the appointment. They bade me speak first; and I said I thought Señor D. Pedrolasso, since he was citizen of that your city and experienced in affairs, would handle the critical situation very well. This I said because I thought entrusting the campaign to him would very much assist public interests and satisfy my private ones. When I said that, all the gentlemen captains united in the same judgment, and the gentlemen deputies just the same; but Señor D. Pedrolasso would not consent at all to accept it. Afterward certain people of this city [i.e., Valladolid] circulated misreports of the matter; and therefore those gentlemen were driven to the conclusion that they must

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, Feb. 22, Danv. III. 230.

[2] Reading *aunque* for *porque*.

agree to my first judgment, and they decided to name three who should with the captains direct the army: the Señor Bishop of Zamora, the Señor Diego de Guzmán, and the Señor Gonzalo de Guzmán, deputies of Salamanca and León.' [1]

That there were other and graver topics of dissent than a personal chagrin is clear also,[2] dissent as to the aims of the Comunero resistance, and the open hostility of the Comunero extremists, who suspected that Pedrolasso was treacherous. Any individual conference with the Governors, independently of the Junta, the Comuneros, not without some warrant,[3] accounted treachery; and perhaps their greatest fear was this: that individuals of prestige, like D. Pedro, should negotiate terms for themselves, and the rank and file thereupon dissolve in a sauve-qui-peut. Of that much treason D. Pedro had been guilty.[4] The Governors had early tried to spare and conciliate him; [5] and readily entertained

[1] Padilla to Toledo, Feb. 15, Danv. III. 326. The Junta minutes indicate discussion of the matter on Feb. 9 and 10. Five ducats daily pay was voted, Feb. 10, for the Guzmáns when they 'took the field with the army.' (Danv. III. 280.) Clear reference to the three as captains appears on Feb. 18. Danv. III. 284.

Valladolid had written Toledo on Jan. 7 reporting a general demand for Padilla as Captain-General, and urging Toledo to press the office upon him: 'For Sr. Juan de Padilla is so prudent (*es tan medido que*) that without your command he would not bring himself to what we have mentioned.' Danv. III. 121.

Sandoval (VIII. xl) gives an account, due, he says, to Ortiz, who was present in Valladolid, to the effect that the naming of Pedrolasso was a malicious scheme, at which Padilla connived, to provoke Valladolid to a terrifying demonstration against Pedrolasso; which indeed occurred, but Pedrolasso refused to flee, though he declined the generalcy. Another writer 'of Valladolid,' also present at the time, gave another account, which Sandoval records (VIII. xli); 'for history has this difficulty, that in hardly a single fact do the persons who saw it agree, in relating how it happened.' This account asserts the sincerity of Padilla and agrees with his report to Toledo: it adds that Acuña and Padilla attempted vainly to quiet a mob of 2000, and that the primacy of Padilla was forced on the Junta by this demonstration. From this date, says this account, D. Pedro began to withdraw from the Communes.

That the affair was tumultuous seems certain from Martyr's account of the riots. (Epist. DCCXIII, March 2(?). He was in the city then.)

[2] Maldonado (209–10) attributes Pedrolasso's defection to distrust of Padilla's judgment, 'or perhaps because he wanted himself to take the lead in the war,' and because he began to be shocked by Padilla's radical ideas. Alcocer, (48) entirely pro-Padilla, attributes only jealous chagrin, and declares that, from Padilla's appointment, Pedrolasso nourished secret animosity and 'offered to inform the Governors of all the Junta did and ordered.'

[3] They were formally pledged not to deal individually with the Nuncio and the Portuguese ambassador. Cf. p. 257.

[4] Other Toledan deputies also; cf. p. 295, n. 2. From Adrian's letter of Jan. 16 (almost certainly intercepted) the Junta knew this fact.

[5] This course the Cardinal had urged so far back as August: 'Whatever provision is made in this matter, let it be without prejudice to D. Pedrolasso, who

proposals for winning over Toledo, under his guidance, as the Constable had won over Burgos, by promise of the concessions that had earlier been accounted by the Junta as essential and sufficient. In January secret communication was in progress. The Toledan terms were stiff. 'We had hoped,' the Cardinal reported ruefully, 'that, with the loss of Tordesillas and the very basis of their wrong courses — which they gave color to by asserting that they should pursue them by command of Our Lady the Queen — they would depart and refrain from this tumult and revolt . . . but it clearly appears that they are going, as desperate men, to extremes. They propose by force of arms not only to try to bring Your Highness to grant what they have asked in their letters, but even further and worse things — to be sovereigns of the realm, as, from the copy of the items which D. Pedrolasso demands . . . Your Majesty will see.' [1]

D. Pedro in fact demanded quite as a very magnificent gentleman and grandee of the realm: a long account of dues in arrears from various offices he held, such as his tenancy of Gibraltar and other fortresses; repairs in these places; restoration of plunder taken in the Comunero campaigns; complete pardon; habits of the military orders for his two sons; and, in order to perform his promises, corregidorship of Toledo and captaincy of the realm of Toledo, with possession of the city's alcázar and gates. D. Pedro stressed his favor with the Gelves troops, who if paid would doubtless join him, and his influence in Medina, Toro, Murcia, even Salamanca and Zamora, with its bishop! [2]

That D. Pedro was prepared to close a bargain with only these personal advantages stipulated, and without thought of the interests or security or demands of the Comunero revolt seems inconsistent with the rest of D. Pedro's conduct;

is a good caballero and a very good servant of Your Majesty.' (To D. Carlos, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 488.) D. Pedro's service in sheltering the corregidor is doubtless intended: the Cardinal recalls it also in his writ of security issued to D. Pedro, Aug. 28, 1521 (Danv. IV. 174). How much the appointment of a protégé of D. Pedro, recommended by Adrian on Sep. 14, may mean, we cannot know (Danv. II. 24). That D. Pedro responded with notable acts of friendliness in matters not compromising any just Comunero demands seems indicated by his warning the Governors of French intrigue, in February. Cf. *supra*, p. 260.

[1] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 8 (the title date, which is correct), Danv. III. 23.

[2] The documents in the case are two: cipher entrusted by the Admiral to A. de Bursa, *Agreement with D. pero Laso whereby he is to bring over Toledo to obedience to the King*, Jan. 7 (Danv. III. 21–22), so mutilated that it is scarcely of value except for supplementing the other, which is well preserved, *Capítulos de D. Pero Laso de las Cosas que pidió*, undated (Danv. IV. 170 ff.).

and equally inconsistent with the item in one draft of the bargain: 'Confirmation of the *capítulos* which go' (with this?); and with Sandoval's report: 'he drew up *capítulos* to accord with his city's desire, and certain others concerning himself personally.'[1]

That his demands were not even in part conceded is admitted in the narrative that represents his conduct in the worst light.[2] His public negotiations, authorized by the Junta, at Tordesillas, seem to have been conducted in entire good faith to the Comunero interests.

NOTE

Sandoval (VIII. xxxvi-xli) dates D. Pedro's intent of quitting the Comuneros even earlier than Jan. 5; beginning with secret advances through the Dominican General, Loaysa, and Alonso Ortiz, Toledan deputy. What Loaysa communicated to the Cardinal has been already stated (*supra*, p. 261): it was merely an indication that a conclusive pledge from the Governors to work for the *capítulos* would be sufficient basis for accord. (Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 40.) Adrian makes no suggestion of anything like buying off D. Pedrolasso. Sandoval's account pictures these first advances as inconclusive: with the terms reached by these intermediaries 'D. Pedro was little content, for they asked of him more than he could perform, and so he remained undetermined.' (Sandoval, VIII. xxxviii.) The mission of Fray Francisco de los Angeles was, as Sandoval understood it, really a renewal of the secret bargaining. He adds an improbable account of an almost detected attempt to smuggle in to D. Pedro a signed copy of the concessions which were the price of his treason, and relates how another copy was placed in D. Pedro's hands. It seems hard to believe that the Cardinal would have signed such a document, or that the Admiral would have done so and no trace of it have appeared in the correspondence of the Governors. D. Pedro, according to Sandoval, continued to pursue his aim at the Tordesillas conference, under truce, March 2–10.

It is notable that the contemporary chroniclers, Mexía and Santa Cruz, suggest no treachery, and indicate that D. Pedro determined to quit the Comuneros only when they refused extension of truce to advance the Tordesillas compromise. Mexía, 225–27; Santa Cruz, I. 429.

Danvila prints two documents (III. 210–13) as proof that D.

[1] The item is in the mutilated draft (Danv. III. 22). If no *lacuna* follows the item it may mean the '*capítulos* which are on their way' (*los capítulos que van*). Pedrolasso's demands alone would scarcely make the Comuneros 'sovereigns of the realm,' as the Cardinal puts it. Sandoval's account is in VIII. xxxvi.

[2] Sandoval, VIII. xxxvi–xli.

Pedro, 'to return to the Emperor's service, said nothing of municipal liberties or the welfare of the realm but purely and simply what suited him in pursuit of his private interests.' In neither text is the year date given. The first is entitled: 'Original Letter of D. Pero Laso of Castile to the Emperor, dated in the Camp at Manzanares, Feb. 10, 1521.' (It is not indicated, in this case or in others, whether the titles Danvila prints are taken from the Archive indexes, or endorsements on the documents, or his own annotation.) The text gives only the month date: *a diez dias de Febrero.* Now the Junta minutes (Danv. III. 280) show that D. Pedro voted in the Junta at Valladolid on Feb. 10, 1521. There is no indication that he left Valladolid and Tordesillas that month: he conferred with the Nuncio in Valladolid in the first week of February (Danv. III. 204); he voted in the Junta Feb. 10 and 17; and was thereafter busy with the Tordesillas conference. The letter consequently would appear to be of Feb. 10 *of some other year.* Since it mentions 'the Very Rev. Cardinal of Tortosa' it can scarcely be of 1522, for on Jan. 9, 1522, the Cardinal became Pope Adrian VI. Since it begins 'Imperial Majesty' it must be subsequent to June 1519, when D. Carlos was elected. I think the letter is of 1520. On Feb. 12, 1520, D. Carlos reëntered Castile from the Eastern realms. In February 1520 D. Pedro was organizing the Toledan mission in Toledo (cf. *supra*, p. 55); he was consequently near Manzanares, which is about 75 miles southeast of Toledo. The letter says: 'The Cardinal is writing His Majesty' [1] of an event in Toledo which permits the granting to D. Pedro of a favor which he asks. He claims extensive knowledge of conditions in this realm (i.e. Toledo); and if His Majesty will but make use of his knowledge D. Pedro offers to put himself in jail and His Majesty may order his head cut off if the advice offered is not confirmed by the event. D. Pedro offers his advice because of his suspicion that His Majesty is deceived by the judgments offered him by certain members of the Council. There is no syllable referring to the Junta or to petitions or to pardon or any part of the Comunero revolt. It seems to me more compatible with the situation of 1520 than with that of 1521.

What Danvila offers as explanation of this letter is a writ, with date neither of month or year, giving D. Pedro a favorable judgment in a dispute about his property near Salamanca which had been injured by the building of a sluice — 'which is by you petitioned and requested of me as a grace in payment of your services.' I can discover nothing connecting this in any way with the Comunero period or the preceding letter.

[1] During D. Carlos's stay in Spain, Feb. 1520 is the only time when Adrian was not at Court. The Cardinal was then attempting to quiet Valencia. Cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire,* III. 46 ff.

CHAPTER XI

A SMART AND MUSICAL GENTLEMAN

A FIGURE scarcely less picturesque than Bishop Acuña, who was the nightmare of the other Governors, haunted the distracted mind of the Constable in his long maneuvering with Burgos. This was D. Pedro de Ayala, Count of Salvatierra,[1] of ancient family and 'the most important personage in the whole mountain country,'[2] a man reported to be 'of a terrible temper and very proud' — so choleric that upon a suspected affront 'blood burst from his nose and mouth, out of mere wrath, and caused him an illness that imperilled his life.'[3] The gentleman was known in his own day to be 'lively and of musical accomplishment, but of no very sound judgment'; he was living apart from his wife, whom he had alienated by his fierce temper and evil living.[4] The Count was quite the sort of person to attach himself selfishly and provisionally to any movement promising revision of the existing order. His importance warranted the Junta in appointing him, November 26, Captain-General for the three Basque provinces, Guipúzcoa, Álava, and Vizcaya.[5] He began, quite in the Acuñan manner, to scour the country, of which even the loyal towns, enormously jealous of their independence, refused coöperation with Burgos, in spite of the Royal order submitting the entire district to the control of the Constable. The Count's possessions, scattered through Castile, offered tempting opportunities of punishment, and the Cardinal suggested Ampudia as possible prize.[6] The Constable vainly plied Tordesillas with requests for troops to halt the Count's band of a thousand raiders.[7] Substantial grandees of the district, however, began to organize resistance, in particular the Duke of Nájera,

[1] Not to be confused with the Toledo deputy, Pedro de Ayala.

[2] Constable to D. Carlos, March 17, Danv. III. 422. The same estimate in Maldonado, 213.

[3] Sandoval, VIII. xxiv (xxv).

[4] Santa Cruz, I. 455; Sandoval, VIII. xix (xx).

[5] Danv. II. 600. The Constable informed D. Carlos, Nov. 30 (Sandoval, VIII. vii), and tried to intercept the commission.

[6] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 4, Danv. III. 16. Cf. *supra*, p. 224.

[7] Constable to D. Carlos, Jan. 21, Danv. III. 55.

from Navarre. Yet more effective, to control such a free lance, was the glamour of success. He was hovering near Burgos, where he was to join Acuña for a coup-de-main, with 2000 troops from his own lands and the Districts (*Merindades*) of northeastern Castile, when he learned of the Constable's triumph in the January days there. 'The city,' the Constable narrates, 'summoned him to dismiss his troops and go home and abide in service to Your Majesty. . . . The Count answered he was content, if pardoned — he and the rest — for all they had done since St. Michael's Day in September. . . . This is a good bargain; for it is a great blow to the Junta to have 2000 men active in their name, and lose them. . . . If by chance the Count of Salvatierra returns to his sins we now have means here to punish him.' [1]

The Constable, thus freed of his acutest annoyance, could set about developing his success and turning it to the assistance of the other governors, hard pressed by Acuña's raiding and the growing threat of Padilla's organization. The general pardon was proclaimed in Burgos with all ceremony on January 23 and 25, and was followed by all the other items that had persuaded the city to peace.[2] A precarious peace it even now was, but secure if no solicitations or tumult in the Districts encouraged the subdued minority to rise.[3] There, defiance was constantly possible. 'I sent for a company of artillery at Fuenterrabía, which they got as far as the port of Santander on the way hither; and a gentleman of the Campo District, Gómez de Oyos, because his son-in-law is cousin of the Bishop of Zamora, has roused the country and, not to risk my artillery, I had to order it back to Bilbao to come thence hither, though this will be laborious on account of the rivers and the very bad roads. I accounted it a settled matter that in gaining the fortress here we gained all the province; yet as things stand with us we are as little certain of the old and the native of the land as of those who never beheld it; for those we supposed most pacified rise from under our feet with the cry 'The Commune!' [4]

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, Jan. 29, Danv. III. 153. The Constable and Council revoked, on Jan. 25, the penalties proclaimed against the Count. (Danv. III. 181.) Maldonado (212) assigns only 1400 soldiers to Salvatierra; and gives gossipy details about the communications of the city with the Count.

[2] Danv. III. 312.

[3] Cf. the Cardinal's uneasy note in cipher, Feb. 27, Danv. III. 240.

[4] Constable to D. Carlos, Feb. 22, Danv. III. 230.

With this somewhat nervous confidence the Constable set about collecting money; infantry troops, in which the Royal forces were signally deficient; artillery, almost all of which the Comuneros had seized in Medina del Campo or elsewhere; and powder. His early borrowing from the Portuguese King and repeated drafts on his own wealth had long since been used. Success or failure in all these ends — and probably in the whole struggle with the Comuneros — rested in the attitude of the Duke of Nájera, Viceroy of Navarre, whose family had ancient feud with the Constable's. If the two grandees could sink their rivalries Burgos at least was probably saved for the Royal cause. The Duke offered at Christmas to come with a considerable force;[1] but Nájera's assistance involved a grave risk: the probability that, if he came from Navarre, that province, still coveted by the French claimants whom King Fernando had expelled when he annexed the border province to Castile, might be seized by the French. It was known on February 6 that a gentleman of King François's household had been in Valladolid secretly for more than a fortnight offering the Junta 800 heavy cavalry — the arm in which they could not match the grandees — if the Comuneros would connive at a French invasion.[2] 'I am in the greatest hesitation,' the Constable confessed,[3] 'for if I write him to come and there is a rising in Navarre, Your Majesty will attach some blame to me; and if I bid him not to come, and the business here goes wrong, it might be concluded, from certain animosities and resentments existing between our houses, that I choose not to bring him.'

Nájera got together 2000 foot and 400 lances and some heavy cannon and field pieces and was to start for Burgos, February 27;[4] but his was largely a personal following, and on the appointed day it appeared too risky for the Viceroy to leave, and his troops, though the Constable had already advanced 11,000 ducats of their pay, lingered with their leader.[5] Many of them were induced in March to follow the Duke's son, D. Manrique de Lara, into Castile.[6] The Con-

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, Dec. 25, Danv. II. 673.

[2] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 6, Danv. III. 204. On this risk cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 98–99; Boissonade, *Réunion de la Navarre à la Castile*, 543 ff.

[3] To D. Carlos, Feb. 2, Danv. III. 199.

[4] Constable to D. Carlos, Feb. 22, Danv. III. 231; Feb. 25, Danv. III. 236.

[5] *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, Danv. III. 242. [6] *Ibid.*, March 12, Danv. III. 401.

stable's task resolved itself more and more into obtaining artillery. 'I am making all the haste I can to get out of here,' he reported in Burgos at the month's end.[1] 'If the artillery I expect from Fuenterrabía were come, I should have started without awaiting the Duke.' The artillery train, thwarted first in Guipúzcoa, and frightened back from Santander, had started from Bilbao,[2] when all advance was halted by the truce which Padilla, Pedrolasso, and the Admiral persuaded the Junta to accept, on condition that neither troops nor artillery should move while it ran, March 3–10.

Eight days of inactivity — to be followed perhaps by extension of truce till messengers could carry petitions to Worms and be rebuffed by their young monarch, distractedly struggling with the Lutheran revolt — were hugely unpalatable to raiding captains. News reached the astonished Constable on March 4[3] that Salvatierra was working to thwart the passage of the artillery: 'with our men trying to get it through and them trying to get possession of it, it may be disabled. Everything possible is being done to get it through. The Council secretary, Anton Gallo, went to the Count of Salvatierra in behalf of the Council to make stiff remonstrance; but he refused to see or hear him. When he [i.e. Salvatierra] left Oña we believed it was in immediate service of Your Majesty; but the Bishop of Zamora has so much influence with him that he forces him to do as bid.'

The fate of the cannon was settled before the truce expired. 'The Count of Salvatierra — like a loyal servant of Your Majesty,' wrote the sarcastic Constable, 'with troops from the Districts and his own lands — perhaps 5000, attacked [the artillery train].[4] Martín Ruiz de Avendaño and my nephew D. Francisco de Velasco, who were escort-

[1] To D. Carlos, Feb. 25, Danv. III. 236.

[2] Cf. *supra*, p. 290, and Danv. III. 478.

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, March 4, Danv. III. 478. The Count's intent appears in letters of March 3, Danv. III. 491.

[4] The date is apparently March 9. He passed immediately to Vittoria, where his appearance is noted in the town records of March 10 (Danv. III. 491). The news reached Burgos March 10 (Archbishop of Granada to D. Carlos, March 10, Danv. III. 486). Any attempt to move cannon on this date would be a breach of truce. Padilla had suspected (letter of Feb. 15, Danv. III. 326): 'they want to get through artillery which they have already embarked and are trying out ports to land it'; and the truce was worded to prevent movement of artillery. But there is no evidence to prove that the artillery was actually being moved when Salvatierra attacked.

ing it, when they saw they could not defend it, took the last recourse and destroyed it, that your enemies may not profit of it. . . . No one knows why the Count has done a thing so much to Your Majesty's disservice.' [1]

Salvatierra's treacherous desertion involved also a breach of truce; but the Comuneros declared that his attack was a reprisal for a previous breach of truce by the Royalists. They had in fact accounted as a prime consideration in accepting truce the arrival of a convoy of powder. 'It seemed to us well,' the Cardinal noted in cipher,[2] 'to accept the truce in order that within those few days we might make some very necessary repairs in the outworks of this city, and also the powder may be brought here which the King of Portugal has sent, which is now in Benavente.' But the truce forbade any movement of troops, horse or foot, or artillery.[3] The Comuneros declared this transport of powder a violation of the terms and sallied from Villalpando to seize it from the grandee who was escorting it.[4] Though hostili-

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 400. Cf. also III. 421; III. 398; III. 486. The Constable proclaimed the traitor in Burgos, March 11, Danv. III. 491.

Danvila notes (III. 182) two letters of Salvatierra of Jan. 27, the coincidence of which on the same date, he implies, shows treacherous intent at that early date. All depends on which letter was written first, a detail not indicated in Danvila and presumably not discoverable from the documents. One letter, which it is reasonable enough to suppose the earlier, addressed to the town council of his native Salvatierra, relates the attack on his town of Ampudia and warns them to be armed and ready for war, alleging as his sole motive the Ampudia affair. (Ampudia was raided by Beamonte and rescued by Padilla on Jan. 16–17. Cf. *supra*, 224.) The Count's agreement with the Constable was reached on some date between Jan. 25 and Jan. 29. (Constable's report, Jan. 29, Danv. III. 153.) It is possible that news of the Ampudia raid reached him after this agreement and provoked in the irascible Count the first letter of Jan. 27 and the determination to repudiate his agreement. The Constable's writ of Jan. 25, suspending all the pains and penalties proclaimed against the Count, may have then reached Salvatierra and reassured him of the Constable's good faith, and inspired the second letter of Jan. 27, promising to fulfill his agreement by dismissing on the next day the troops he had in Oña. This promise, the Constable's report of Jan. 29 asserts, was performed.

[2] To D. Carlos, March 7, in Tordesillas, Danv. III. 393.

[3] The item that travelers and persons in civilian costume (*en habito de paz*) should pass unmolested on the roads perhaps implies that soldiers must not move about on any military business.

[4] Haro's report to D. Carlos, March 13, Danv. III. 409. Mexía (228) notes the Comunero charge in regard to this violation of truce; and says the Comuneros retorted by raids on parties from Simancas, whither, apparently, some of the powder was bound. The messenger whose pay is recorded in the Junta minutes of March 9 (Danv. III. 451) probably carried the Junta's approval for Salvatierra's attack, as reprisal for the alleged earlier breach of truce. The Cardinal and the Admiral made counterprotest to Valladolid on March 11 (Danv. III. 467). Cf. also Danv. III. 487.

ties were thus angrily resumed, Nájera, now the only Royalist in possession of a park of artillery, dared not leave Navarre so long as Salvatierra was raiding. The Constable, denied artillery from the Imperial armies,[1] must perforce await the outcome of Nájera's struggle with the Count. D. Manrique pursued and harried the Count's excursions, and tried to recover villages which the Count stampeded for the revolt.[2] Carrión went Comunero and became headquarters of another raider, 'D. Juan de Mendoza, son of the Cardinal D. Pedro Gonzalo, of pious memory,' Queen Isabel's archbishop of Toledo.[3] Further menace was the presence of Jean d'Albret on the border of Navarre, ready to attempt recovery of his father's kingdom.[4] Salvatierra finally concentrated his effort on a siege of Medina de Pomar, about which he collected a force of 4000 men.[5] To relieve the siege the Constable detailed the Count of Salinas and the Dean of Burgos; and ordered Manrique to pacify the Districts on whatsoever terms, and join the forces assembling in Burgos, where accordingly the Navarrese reënforcements arrived, April 2.[6] There the local levies assembled to the number of some 1100.[7] Such artillery as he could collect from Navarre and Castile the Constable started lumbering on its way from Burgos on April 7 and followed immediately with his assembled forces.[8]

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, March 28, Danv. III. 439.

[2] Danv. III. 421–25, 441.

[3] Carrión had early accepted the Constable. (Nov. 14, Danv. II. 497.) Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 21, Danv. III. 430. His raids are briefly sketched in Sandoval, IX. xii. Cf. *supra*, p. 180.

[4] Admiral, credentials to A. de Bursa, March 28, Danv. III. 437. Enclosure in Girón to Junta, April 4, Danv. III. 614.

[5] Salvatierra to Valladolid, March 29, Danv. III. 494.

[6] Constable to D. Carlos, March 28, Danv. III. 441; April 5, Danv. III. 561.

[7] Danv. III. 487–88; Salvá, *Burgos en las Comunidades*, *passim*.

[8] Denia, April 9, Danv. III. 578. Haro to D. Carlos, April 9, Danv. III. 575. The town of Aranda warned the Junta on April 9 that the Constable had started (Danv. III. 653). Danvila (III. 731) says he left April 8; he cites (III. 645) a letter 'mentioned in the Diplomatic Correspondence,' in which the Constable states that he left April 8. The letter of the same date and place Danvila has already printed (III. 583), but it does not certainly indicate April 8.

CHAPTER XII

GREAT AND JUST QUARREL

A JUNCTION of all the Royalist forces, with the three Governors united, must precipitate a decisive trial of strength with the Comunero forces in Castile. 'All the gentlemen,' ran the Cardinal's cipher memorandum to the King, 'are fully determined to take the field and give battle to the enemy; and should I desire to prevent it I could not, for my judgment has opposed to it that of all those gentlemen, who say clearly that, with the good and just quarrel they support, they are resolved to risk life and estate and entrust the victory to God.' [1]

Adrian's conscience estimated with less assurance the triumphant justice of their cause. His letters to D. Carlos noted, usually in cipher, the shabby selfishness of the grandees, and did not shrink from laying upon his young Royal master the initial blame for the whole sorry business.[2]

[1] Feb. 27, Danv. III. 240.

[2] What appears the most searching indictment of the Royal cause is the letter by Adrian, reported by Peter Martyr (March 2, Epist. DCCXIII), which, he says, the Comuneros intercepted and read publicly in Valladolid. He summarized it for the Grand Chancellor, on the chance that the Cardinal had not written in duplicate. So severe are the phrases which Martyr gives that one suspects it to be a Comunero forgery. 'Evidently,' says Danvila (III. 381), 'this letter is no part of the Simancas collection'; but careful comparison shows it to be a version, somewhat garbled and exaggerated either by the Comuneros or in Martyr's recollection and reporting, of an extant letter. It speaks of possession of Ampudia, which was in Royalist hands only a day, January 16 (cf. p. 224). Danvila prints (III. 31) Adrian's letter of that date. Martyr notes that the letter read in Valladolid contained cipher passages which the Comuneros did not decipher. Four paragraphs in the January 16 letter are in code, and record most frankly the greed of the grandees, the tepidness of Haro, the shortage of powder, the danger in Burgos; and one code sentence records the dishonest suggestion of the Bishop (cf. p. 261). All the items Martyr mentions are represented by at least phrases in the printed letter. A few items in Martyr's version look like guesses at the drift of the cipher passages. Several passages in Martyr's version, including a list of proper names, are duplicated by Adrian's letter. It may of course be true that the duplicate which the Comuneros got hold of varied in some respects from the letter in the Simancas archives. It seems strange that Martyr should not note some of the damaging items, not in cipher, in Adrian's letter, if these were in the captured duplicate and were read in Valladolid. If we could be certain that the letters were alike, a significant inference would follow: that the Junta authorities knew that Pedrolasso was privately suggesting compromises with the governors. Martyr's letter is of March 2. (The date, 'vii nonas Martii,' is presumably misprinted, perhaps for 'vi nonas.' The former would be written *Kalendis* = March 1;

And as they reviewed the morale of the Royalist party none of the Governors could feel much assurance. From Worms came only obstinate refusal to approve concessions or extend power. 'It is all very well to say *temporize with them — and no compromises!* as if we had any basis for temporizing!' exclaimed the harassed Admiral. 'His Majesty seems to think that, when they outnumber us in troops as much as they please, by commanding money for pay, and we commanding neither security in our troops nor in ourselves . . . nor money nor powder nor arms . . . how can we temporize?' So little did the monarch appear to sympathize with the difficulty of the viceroys that they doubted if all their reports and appeals were allowed to get by the camarilla of Flemings to the master's attention. 'I am blamed,' the mild Adrian protested early in his correspondence,[1] 'because I have not for some time sent to Your Highness some gentleman who should make verbal report of all that has occurred and of the state of these realms. It is not believed that the letters written about it are read to Your Highness.' The Admiral and the Constable consequently employed personal agents, commissioned to make certain that their messages reached the Royal ear. 'I don't understand,' noted the Admiral in a long commission to his messenger,[2] 'how, when a just prince, a boy so spirited and humane, hears such outrageous things (as happen here), not one concerns him or gives him pause. What account can he give to God for permitting such troubles and not relieving them? Is that Royal authority? It is abandoning it entirely, and honor and soul — an infamy among Christian princes — for Moors would not tolerate it! Say this to His Highness as I say it, and read these instructions before everyone, so there may be witnesses that I am not sycophant but truthful and do tell him, as in duty bound, the truth.'

With dubious support or cynical neglect behind them, the regents found as little that was helpful or encouraging before them in Castile. The Royal Council, a punctilious squad of martinets, embittered by the popular contempt and wrath,

the latter = March 2.) If the publishing of the Cardinal's letter was near that date the motive was probably to discredit the whole attempt at negotiation; but it is singular that the passage about Pedrolasso was not read, or at least Martyr did not record it. The Comuneros might learn also from Adrian's letter that the Portuguese ambassador as intermediary would really work for the Crown. Adrian often sent his letters in duplicate. Cf. Danv. IV. 27.

[1] Aug. 30, Danv. I. 491. [2] Jan. 31–Feb. 16, Danv. III. 247.

and little soothed by the evident desire of the viceroys to elude any share in their odium, by their rancorous pursuit of formalities exasperated a situation already furious. Their proclamation of the Comuneros as traitors was timed precisely to destroy any chance of pacific adjustment. The Admiral closes an angry and sarcastic indictment of this vindictive and pedantic blunder with the sentences: 'They chose in Burgos a moment beautifully timed for this! viz., when the enemy's ranks were swelled and ours weak. It were well His Highness determined the reason why this mistake started at so inopportune a moment, and he will thus learn whether private animosities were at work and made his service forgotten. For this, you will explain, the Constable is not to blame, but those who counselled him to error.' [1] 'I should defer to them,' the Viceroy concluded, 'did I not perceive that it was their counsel which destroyed the realm.' [2]

Further, the governors had to work with a personnel recruited by favoritism and venality. The direct representatives of Royal power in the cities, the Corregidors, were badly chosen: 'it is public knowledge that one of the main things which caused these revolts was the bad appointment of many unsuitable persons for corregidorships. . . . Since I am not restricted in authority to tell the truth,' the mild Cardinal spoke out, 'two things I beseech you to hear from me: (1) Your Majesty has profited very little from choosing that persons of these realms should journey to Flanders, supporting the French inns, to buy the offices of the realms; and, though I might enlarge on this at length, I desist, from respect. (2) Meanwhile, Your Majesty will not be well served, whether for military matters or for other business, until captaincies and fortresses are entrusted to appointees who serve in person, and but one person is appointed to one office.' [3]

But what of the aristocracy of Castile, the baronage and gentry, who held no office but were the wealth and potential power of the kingdom, whose ancestors had rallied to the defense of twenty generations of kings? Notable loyalty was

[1] Admiral, credentials to Diego Hurtado, Jan. 31–Feb. 16, Danv. III. 251.

[2] *Ibid.*, 256. The Council discovered some omissions in its first proclamation and was about to publish a supplement proclaiming others, when the Constable halted them! Danv. III. 488.

[3] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 16, Danv. III. 39.

not extinct; from the Constable and Admiral, who were sacrificing comfort and at least immediate profit for a difficult duty, down to the Duchess of Briviesca, who offered to sell her lapdogs for the Royal treasury.[1] Many sold their plate [2] and the invaluable Treasurer Vargas exhausted his amazing bag of tricks: 'he serves as usual in the Council of Justice and War, and in the Treasury; and however great the demands helps me so well that we collect money where there isn't any.' [3]

Unhappily such ability and devotion were exceptions. 'When we were in Santiago,' Adrian reminded D. Carlos,[4] 'I told Your Highness you had lost the affection of all these realms; and you did not believe.[5] I see now by experience that few or none serve from willingness but almost all through interest, so they may not lose what the Crown gives. If it were not evident to the grandees that the intent of the Communes is a desire that all that has been alienated from the Crown may be finally restored to it — so that they may thereby be free from *servicio* and pay low sales tax (as in the time of the Queen Dña Isabel, of glorious memory) — I believe it true they would all have settled with the Communes and left Your Majesty's party.[6] . . . Many are so fearful lest their lands rise against them for the Communes that they dare not bring aid and succor, even at Your Majesty's charge.' [7]

The expense, in fact, of all the troops maintained by the grandees was to be met by the King while those troops were about the King's business; and the pay was required in advance.[8] Even so, the troops paid from the Royal treasury

[1] Lope to D. Carlos, Sep. 23, Danv. II. 27. The Admiral stated (April 15, Danv. III. 605) that he had lost 12,000 ducats of income since entering Castile.

[2] Danv. III. 47, 399.

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, Jan. 21, Danv. III. 56.

[4] Jan. 16; cipher, Danv. III. 34. Cf. in the same letter, 32; and Danv. III. 71; 411.

[5] The Admiral's statement was yet more unsparing: 'His Majesty does not return to recover the affection with which he was received, which he lost because he chose to lose it.' Danv. III. 257.

[6] This judgment is confirmed by P. Martyr (Epist. DCXCI, Oct. 3, 1520).

[7] Exactly the same understanding of the situation was expressed by Martyr on Nov. 8 (Epist. DCXCV): 'Castellani proceres ex hac populari seditione jugulum vident paratum; in eos namque scabiem hanc scalpendam esse Juncterii blaterant ut ad Coronam eorum terras ablatas reducant. Hoc veriti expergiscuntur qui alias his motibus gaudebant, sperantes inde lucrum, uti ex turbido flumine piscatores.'

[8] Danv. III. 52, 220.

were directed mainly to defense of private estates. 'Every one of the grandees now,' Adrian recorded in cipher on February 21,[1] 'wishes to guard his own property, and they squander forces in protection of their own lands. So they are few who really have whole-hearted zeal and intent for Your Majesty's service and the public weal.' Further, the grandees maintained insistent suit for damages, to be paid out of the treasury of the realm, for all the destruction of property in the Comunero struggle. These enormous claims the Council of course, and even the Constable and Admiral, were disposed to validate; but Adrian, while advising all possible liberality, demurred, noting that the entire revenues of two years would not meet the indemnity.[2]

The King's government, in short, was by its own servants cheated, exploited, and bullied. In his weekly report of February 6[3] Adrian had to relate a scandal touching the family of the Constable: 'An immense fraud has just been detected in the number of troops we were paying in Simancas — 850 foot. Yesterday there was a review and there proved to be 300 less. However, when they went there to pay them and took money for all the 850, the troops would not suffer the balance due us to remain, though in actual number they were less, but took it by force.' The following in cipher: 'For all this the Count of Oñate,[4] who is captain there, is greatly to blame: he inflicts no punishment for it and brings none to justice, though he was deputed thereto by the Count of Haro — more through kinship and friendship between them than for any determination he has — just as the Count of Haro was appointed by the Constable, in his office. But already we are quietly undertaking to find some pretext to send the Count of Oñate to the Constable, and name some worthy gentleman to take charge in Simancas, which is so vital. I have already written Your Majesty how well it would be to change the Captain-General, and that the Count of Haro is not adequate.'

Another protégé of the Constable was an even less edifying figure, the Burgos alcalde, Dr. Juan Zumel. The suspi-

[1] Danv. III. 220. An even severer indictment, with a revealing record of grandee quarreling is in Adrian's letter of Dec. 4 (II. 624). Nerves were then tense over Tordesillas.

[2] Feb. 21, Danv. III. 221. Cf. Danv. III. 410. [3] Danv. III. 206.

[4] Oñate was a son of the Constable (Danv. II. 292); helped in rescuing the Cardinal from Valladolid (Danv. II. 259, 292); was among the first into Tordesillas (Danv. II. 635), and was at once thrown into Simancas (Danv. II. 637).

cious collapse of their deputy's resistance to Royal pretensions in the Cortes of Valladolid — bought off, in fact, by a bribe of two hundred ducats [1] — was remembered in Burgos; and when the Comuneros got possession and expelled the Constable in September they seized all Zumel's property.[2] But the tenacious politician remained in the city intriguing for the Constable, at the risk of his life, especially when there was prospect that Acuña would attempt a *coup-de-main*, in which, it was reported, Zumel was to be beheaded.[3] Once restored to his city, the Constable began to importune the King to reward his useful protégé. Zumel ingratiated himself with Treasurer Vargas by advancing loans for 15,000 ducats.[4] The man's effrontery reached the pitch of writing to Valladolid, where his wife and a son were living, asking permission for their departure and suggesting that he deserved this and other favor for defending popular rights, at cost of civil penalties and at risk of life, in the Cortes of Valladolid, where other deputies had taken bribes! [5] The Comunero capital made prompt reply; January 31 his house and property in that city were seized and auctioned and a week later his deposits in the Cathedral sacristy were confiscated by the Junta, despite the protest of deputy Alonso de Guadalajara, who was trying to hold to the difficult course of legal justice even to enemies. Zumel's losses in Burgos and Valladolid were rated at 4000 ducats.[6] This person the Constable made a captain in the great assembling of forces in February, and insistently urged upon D. Carlos as a suitable appointment to the Royal Council![7]

If the King's service was cheated and exploited by its Oñates and Zumels, it was bullied by grandees of the type of the Count of Benavente. This gentleman, owner of towns and vast estates scattered over Leon and Castile and commander of some of the finest soldiery of Spain,[8] was D. Alonso Pimentel, fifth Count of Benavente, married to a

[1] Danv. III. 483. Cf. *supra*, p. 42.

[2] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Sep. 14, Danv. II. 20.

[3] Danv. II. 257, 494. This is Acuña's visit in October, 1520, when the Constable was at Briviesca. Even unintelligible references to Zumel look sinister; cf. Danv. II. 464.

[4] Vargas to D. Carlos, Dec. 13, Danv. II. 694.

[5] Danvila (III. 302) unfortunately only summarizes this astonishing letter and gives neither date nor reference.

[6] Danv. III. 200, 280, 316. [7] *Ibid.*, II. 478; III. 8, 57, 489, 721.

[8] *Ibid.*, II. 522; P. Martyr, Epist. DCXCV, *ad fin.* (Oct. 22, 1520).

daughter of the Constable's older brother, who had preceded him as Constable.[1] He was a native of Valladolid, had a palace there, and succeeded in maintaining friendly relations with his city through many months of the Comunero struggle.[2] With the Comunero movement he had some sympathetic contacts through a son of his sister, D. Pedro Maldonado y Pimentel, captain of the Salamanca Commune. Benavente protected the Cardinal and afforded refuge for him and the Council when scattered by the Revolution;[3] and he joined the group of grandees who rallied to Adrian's support when the Governor escaped from Valladolid.[4] His sympathy with the Junta protest was alienated by the usurpations of the Junta and he was profoundly alarmed by the first popular risings against the Castilian peerage.[5] He was touchy, involved in quarrels with his cousin, the Comendador Aguilera, the invaluable envoy between Castile and the Court,[6] and with the Admiral, with whom, however, he was intimate and influential.[7] Benavente was at the capture of Tordesillas, where he fought afoot, and his banner was the first seen on the assaulted battlements.[8] After this success he withdrew, with many of the grandees, angry at finding his services ignored and determined to avert risings in his estates.[9] He resented the accumulated and uncompensated losses which he suffered by Comunero raids. His Valladolid property was sequestrated and stripped.[10] On his town of Cigales, where he had given refuge to the hated Council, the army of Padilla — though admitted, by the Count's direction, on promise of order [11] — wreaked its wrath by gutting Benavente's palace and demolishing all the town gates. He was furious at the useless raid of Beamonte which entailed the ransoming of his town of Mormejón;[12] and took redress into his own hands, demanding the confiscation of all properties of his feudatories who were in rebellion, and collecting for himself *servicio* and *cruzada* in all his territories.[13] A *douceur* of 1500 ducats and liberal promises in the middle of March failed to pacify him.[14] With the increasing menace of Padilla's forces

[1] Danv. VI. 162. [2] *Ibid.*, II. 465 (duplicated at 361).
[3] *Ibid.*, 18, 22. [4] *Ibid.*, 465, 472, 701. [5] *Ibid.*, 561; 45, 229 (Dueñas).
[6] *Ibid.*, 773; III. 645, 667. [7] *Ibid.*, 640, 772. [8] *Ibid.*, 773; III. 42.
[9] *Ibid.*, 655. [10] *Ibid.*, 716; III. 110, 448.
[11] *Ibid.*, III. 39, 231, 281–82, 290. [12] *Ibid.*, 58, 63. [13] *Ibid.*, 221–22.
[14] Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 15, cipher, Danv. III. 410.

in February, he returned, with demand that he be paid in advance to Tordesillas;[1] but in a few weeks lost his patience and peevishly threatened to quit.[2] At last a word of recognition from his King soothed his resentments,[3] and Benavente awaited the junction of the Burgos forces with those in Rioseco.

Back of the destructive popular explosions which infuriated Benavente there was an anger that had some righteousness along with its savagery, a conviction among Comuneros also that they supported a great and just quarrel. That conviction inspired a devotedness which extorted the admiration of enemies. 'It is marvelous to see in them,' Adrian exclaimed,[4] 'so much devotion and the sufferings they endure in the name of the liberty they hope for. And to sustain themselves in that they levy many dues and new taxes and other obligations which they would be unwilling to bear if for Your Majesty's service. In Segovia, it is reported, they take the chalices and crosses from the Church coffers, which the clergy, secular and regular, give over very willingly.' A citizen of Tordesillas appeared in the Junta[5] to indicate that he owned in that city some substantial structures, overhanging the river, near the bridge, whence damage might be inflicted upon the army of the realm; and he petitioned that the first cannon aimed in siege of that town might demolish his buildings, so that they should not be traitors to the realm. Many of the deputies contributed their wealth as well as their time and effort.[6] The clergy, save the prelates, in immense numbers, supported, worked for, preached for, even fought for the Comunero cause, which was formidable because inspired by something of humanitarian and even religious fervor. 'There are plenty of preachers,' reported the scandalized Adrian,[7] 'who privately and publicly urge and warn the people, saying that all these things are necessary for the preservation of Castile. . . . Just now, on the day of the Magdalen,[8] in this city of Valladolid, a friar of the Preaching Order,[9] after preaching splendidly in the church of the Magdalen and stirring and moving the people to devotion even unto tears, publicly asserted that the rebel towns have done

[1] Feb. 16, Danv. III. 82, 215, 220, 225.
[2] Danv. III. 399, 404, 430. [3] March 28, Danv. III. 445.
[4] Jan. 26, Danv. III. 82. [5] Jan. 10, Danv. III. 98.
[6] Danv. III. 99. [7] To D. Carlos, July 24, Danv. I. 438.
[8] July 22. [9] The Dominicans.

well for the defense and preservation of their rights and the realm's; and ought not to be punished for what they have undertaken but praised for it, for they did what befits the interest of King and realm; and it is of these realms that Your Majesty is true sovereign and proprietor, and you have bought with money the Empire, which ought not to pass nor be transmitted to your heirs; and Your Majesty has reduced the realm to the poverty in which it stands, and your followers have enriched themselves excessively. . . . The friar is under arrest in the monastery of San Pablo and we shall see he is punished as his guilt and pertinacity [deserve]; but the offense is so universal that it will scarcely be righted nor will it suffice that one or two be punished.' After Medina was burned criticism was yet franker. Amid the uproar in Valladolid, 'almost all the preachers, even in my presence, dare to assert that the people have much reason for revolt, in view of the poverty of the realm caused by the withdrawal of its wealth; and offices and benefices have been given to foreigners, not filled by natives of these realms but put up for sale.' [1] At the month's end the Cardinal noted ruefully: 'The friar who preached the sermon the day of the Magdalen remained confined a few days, and in that time so many others offended that it was not possible to inflict any further punishment on him. He was later released; for, had we to punish him, we must needs have punished many others, and the times do not permit or afford opportunity for that.' [2]

Of religious or charitable motives in the revolt, of the determination to take from the weak and unprivileged something of the burden of oppression, a striking embodiment was Fray Pablo, the Dominican deputy from León.[3] He was a man of liberal education and wide contacts with the world. He was in 1505 professor in the greater schools in Paris, and began next year in Burgos a career of organizing and preaching. As Prior of the Dominican monastery in León, in the punning words of a contemporary, 'he roared like a Lion and gave forth roarings in the mountains of Leon and Asturias, that all should repent.' He founded a house of Dominicans in Oviedo. He threw himself heart and soul into the Comunero movement; and the Comuneros used him for delicate

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Aug. 24, Danv. I. 483.

[2] *Ibid.*, Aug. 31, Danv. I. 493.

[3] Cf. the essay of the Dominican Friar Luis Alonso-Getino: *Un Comunero Intelectual*, in La Ciencia Tomista, No. LXIX, Mayo-junio, 1921.

missions: to investigate the household of Queen Juana and arrange the dismissal of the Marquis of Denia; to carry to D. Carlos the challenging petitions of the Junta. He wrote in 1520 his *Guia del Cielo*, which, in the form of a commentary on the *Summa*, touches upon war, pauperism, mendicancy, nepotism, simony: an honest and original voice in Spain of the sixteenth century, denouncing the vast multiplications of technical 'justice,' the selfish development of monopolies, the contempt for the useful labor of farmer and shepherd, and the oppression of the poor: 'all this is the guilt of princes and prelates who perceive it and apply no remedy.'

Scarcely less religious was the feeling of those who, through the Comunero protest, expressed the desire of a people to restrict arbitrary power, and, even more, to provide that the agents even of absolutism should be appropriate and honestly appointed, and held to some accountability. Responsible government was a popular and municipal ideal, the hope and necessity of the great towns everywhere — not of the great lords. The Governors' rash charge to Valladolid, that the aristocracy represented the loyalty of the realm, brought an impressive retort:

> Because we surely know that what the realm is attempting and doing is for the interest of Their Majesties, we are determined to follow this party and not that of the caballeros, which, as is equally clear to us, is to Their harm. The fidelity and loyalty due to the King consist in obedience to the royal person, paying him his temporal due and laying down life, when need be. These two things the realm has always kept and observed, and the grandees opposed. Who seized the King D. Juan II but the grandees; who delivered and enabled him to reign but his cities? His son, D. Enrique, the grandees deposed, and set up another king in Ávila; and the cities restored to him his sceptre and royal seat. Your Lordships well know that the grandees brought into Castile the King of Portugal, to prevent the reign of the sovereigns, D. Fernando and Dña Isabel, of glorious memory; the cities defeated and expelled him and enabled the native kings to reign in peace. If Your Lordships will consider wealth, you will see clearly the towns are they who enrich the King; the grandees, they who have impoverished him and the realm and their vassals. Sales taxes are the King's, and other Royal rents, and the towns pay them; who have taken them from Their Majesties, but the grandees? Consider how few towns yet remain of the King's: from here to Santiago, one hundred leagues, he has but three places. The grandees, reducing him to necessity and serving him but for their own inter-

ests, have taken from him the greater part of his realms. Hence Their Majesties have not the temporal dues which are owed them, but their Governors are forced to levy and impose new tributes and exactions that Their Majesties may be properly sustained. This the towns and the realm oppose, not to take away Their Majesties' dues but to increase them and restore them to that lordship where they belong. Your Lordships will perceive by experience in the present affair that the grandees who have assembled troops in this pretended service will cost Their Majesties such a sum of ducats as the rest of the realm will scarcely suffice to pay them. You will see that the towns, serving loyally and aiming at increase of the Royal estate and Crown, will be content if Their Majesties will but perceive that they seek not their own advantage but solely the common good of their King and country. Which then of these two parties, Your Lordships, deserves to be called loyal? [1]

Yet, did the Comunero leaders see a grave danger which lurked in arraignment of the aristocracy? The Comunero movement was a protest against absentee Kingship controlled by a foreign camarilla, and squandering the wealth of the realm on foreign ventures, administered through agents whom they could hold to no accountability. If from this aim they were diverted into an attack on the social abuses inherent in the aristocratic structure of Castilian society, the Comunero leaders might find themselves directing, not a national resistance, but a class war — and soon not directing but swept along by the tumult of the blind and the base passions released in class warfare. Armed support of a programme of political reform might be manageable and fruitful; indicting an aristocracy and encouraging its vassals to rise must certainly prove unmanageable, must unite all the grandees in defense of their class, alienate the few who were in the Comunero organization, and end fruitlessly in anarchy.

A small group of the Junta leaders promptly perceived this risk and began within their own ranks a heroic resistance, a struggle to keep the quarrel great and just.

The burning of Medina was likely to provoke destructive reprisals, and the far-sighted in the Junta were on the alert to check them. In those tense days the Cardinal had attempted a diversion by an appeal to nationalism: The King had proposed to send for the defense of Navarre in his ab-

[1] Valladolid to the Cardinal and Admiral, Jan. 30, Danv. III. 92. (Slightly condensed. *Contarán* clearly should read *costarán*.)

sence three or four thousand German mercenaries. This Adrian had opposed [1] as likely to alarm Castilian sentiment; but he asked in return that he be allowed to withdraw honorably from Valladolid, and recruit troops and go to the menaced province. The Comuneros thought it was a ruse of the Councillors to collect forces; but they perceived the obligation which their refusal implied, viz., that the Comunero authorities themselves undertake both defense and the preservation of order. Valladolid urged upon the Ávila Junta 'that Your Lordships give no occasions for unjust risings against the grandees, and provide promptly that they be recompensed for those already occurred, that every one may understand the intent with which these realms have taken action, i.e., to do justice, not to approve violence, robbery, nor any tyranny. Thus will be removed the occasion which the grandees have for summoning their troops and houses to defend their lands.' [2]

That such an obligation existed had been revealed by a revolt in the small town of Dueñas, twenty miles up the Pisuerga valley from Valladolid. The Count and Countess of Buendía, lords of the town, were in the fortress, Sunday night, September 2, when the town rose, under the lead of two brothers Niño, organized a Commune, seized the revenues, sharked up a military force, and seized and expelled the Count.[3] Valladolid acted at once, disavowing the revolt and restoring the Count; and the Junta sent a justice of inquest.[4]

The policy thus clearly initiated was held to through the fall. Girón was strictly ordered, in the Rioseco campaign 'for the present to interfere in no way on the estates of the grandees — except the Constable and the Count of Alva de Liste, who have been declared enemies of the realm.' [5]

The enforcement of such an order was of course wholly in the hands of the military, who were constantly under the most trying temptation to connive at looting. A prompt

[1] Danv. I. 479, 492. [2] Valladolid to Junta, Sep. 12, Danv. II. 58.

[3] Danv. II. 146. The Count's appeal to D. Carlos (148). Protest of the Adelantado of Galicia to the Junta, Sep. 8 (149).

[4] The Count's letter of thanks, Sep. 9, Danv. II. 151. Simultaneous revolts on the estates of the Count of Chinchón, encouraged from Segovia, were doubtless among those referred to in the Valladolid letter. Danv. II. 97. Cf. Junta to Burgos, Sep. 20, Danv. II. 107.

[5] Instructions of the Junta, Nov. 18, Danv. II. 528; also in Sandoval, VII. xxiii.

and dire punishment was visited, in the judgment of those who did not believe in the simpler explanation of treachery, upon Girón's failure to restrict plundering. He was lured by prospect of a raid — within his orders, since it was upon a place of the Constable's — into a march too far west, which opened the road for the Royalist dash at Tordesillas. This he might have cut off or turned into defeat had not his army dissolved into a rout loaded down with loot.[1]

In Girón's instructions the ominous words, 'For the present,' marked the rising desire to foment rebellion as a weapon against the Royalist aristocracy. The matter was complicated by the desire of troops, in both armies, often in long arrears of pay, to recoup themselves by depredations. 'We try,' the Cardinal assured his master, 'not to have our troops perpetrate disorders and robbery; and as a consequence many desert, because they are not allowed to scour the country.'[2] Then the victims in turn resort to looting. 'In Valladolid . . . in default of the Royal revenues which they have seized,' Adrian heard, 'they rob and sack the property of those servants of Your Highness who are exiled from the town and thereby pay . . . the troops they have recruited. So the unhappy righteous go about in desperation, the rest insistently demanding that we permit them to rob and satisfy their losses.'[3]

In the Junta the leaders for restraint were D. Pedrolasso and the Bachiller Alonso de Guadalajara, of Segovia. When the assembly had to function in the sinister atmosphere of Valladolid, D. Pedro was devoted especially to the business of negotiation, and the Bachiller, supported sometimes by the Guadalajara deputies, stood out, in furious sessions of the Junta, for civil control of the soldiery. No one demurred to the disciplining of an obscure gilder and a roadmender who would not disgorge certain silks stolen from a church;[4] but it was against opposition that the Bachiller carried orders — even addressed to the redoubtable Bishop — to prevent looting.[5] The test case was the destruction of Cigales[6] by the popular hero Padilla. The wanton destruc-

[1] Cf. p. 205. [2] Jan. 8, Danv. III. 23.

[3] Feb. 6, Danv. III. 205. Cf. remarks of the Admiral, Danv. III. 388.

[4] Junta minutes of the sections of Valladolid, Jan. 26, Danv. III. 110.

[5] Junta minutes, Jan. 14, 18, 24, 27, 28; Feb. 5, Danv. III. 98, 100, 101, 102, 279, 281.

[6] This appears to have occurred on Feb. 9 or 10. It was authorized by a vote

tion there of the property of the Count of Benavente, who had ordered that no resistance be made to the Comunero occupation, stirred a majority of deputies to demand an inquest.[1] The city Junta, it appeared, had specifically authorized the destruction.[2] The city was in fact in no mood for control imposed by the national Junta, but eagerly anticipating a Padilla victory and rich opportunity for plunder. The presence of Acuña in Valladolid, as the forces prepared to march, ensured, not restraint, but an orgy of confiscation.

Of this hysterical mood in Valladolid an unwilling but good-humored witness made vivid report. Three weeks before, the Governors had aimed at the capital a vital stroke, the dissolution of the great courts of chancery which from time immemorial held session there and thus gave support for the swarming life of a community of bankers, innkeepers, stationers, lawyers, litigants, and all the paid dependents of the most complicated machinery of complicated Castilian justice.[3] Any Royal messenger who should undertake to serve writ of dissolution was certain to be mobbed. Sr. Protonotary Frias had slipped into Valladolid on January 21, spoken a whispered word on the King's business in the ear of the Chancery President, and in the presence of a justice and a notary, smuggled into his inn room, served his papers. Warned by the President to flee at once, Frias hurried to leave another paper with the Rector of the University. Suspicious persons scented his mission and he was soon beset by a mob shouting 'Traitor!' and had to flee back to the Chancery, where he was bundled into a closet. The mob besieged the building and broke in the doors. The President surrendered Frias to the Captains who, to save the man's life, got him off into the jail.[4]

Three weeks from that day — 'when it seemed to me it was more of a feat to escape and get into safety than to at-

in the city Junta Feb. 7, and known in Tordesillas Feb. 11 (Danv. III. 215) and in Valladolid Feb. 11.

[1] Junta minutes, Feb. 11, Danv. III. 281.

[2] Minutes, Feb. 7, Danv. III. 287.

[3] Martyr describes this move in his letter (Epist. DCCXI) to Mondéjar, of Feb. 8: 'Caesar oculum jussit dextrum illis erui.'

[4] President's report, Feb. 1, Danv. III. 294. The President was forcibly prevented when he tried to leave the city: he was unwilling to make second attempt lest it should prejudice the efforts of the Nuncio and the Portuguese Ambassador, then in Valladolid, toward negotiation. Cf. P. Martyr, Epist. DCCXI, Feb. 8.

tack twenty men in a street and rout them' — Frias was still held in Valladolid [1] and reported the excitement that accompanied the departure of Padilla's expedition. 'There is immense dissension, and knifing and killing daily. More than a week ago they were ready, and are going, it is said, against Simancas. . . . But they had not paid the Gelves troops, who refused to go without pay. As they didn't have it, the Bishop of Zamora went about the churches, monasteries, and colleges, and took from San Benito more than 3000 ducats . . .; and from the churches, chalices, patens, tabernacles, and censers of silver, and divided them among the soldiers [2] and cavaliers, who went through the streets censing and singing with the tabernacles, as a joke. From the College of the Cardinal he took over 2000 ducats belonging to Secretary Cobos, for they take off everything without discrimination. They see plainly their course is safe [2] for whatever seizure, robbing, or killing; and for that each is his own justice.' [3]

These wild and sacrilegious scenes, ominous indication that the soldiery was getting wholly out of hand, did not pass unrebuked. The Bachiller, on February 13, took the matter up in the Junta. The military men of course resented scruple and found a spokesman in the Commissioner General, deputy Gonzalo de Guzmán of León. Angry debates followed, on this day and the next.[4]

After the March truce, which broke up with angry mutual charges of violation, and after the withdrawal from the Junta of Pedrolasso and the Bachiller, the extremists dominated almost without resistance, and finally decreed a war *à outrance* in the resolve of April 10: 'that henceforth the war against grandees, caballeros, and other enemies of the realm, and against their properties and places, be waged with fire and sack and blood.' Citizens of Royalist towns were ordered to return to their homes within three days, else

[1] The minutes of the Valladolid sections committed him to a new jailer on March 26. Danv. III. 462.

[2] Reading *partió a*, for *parte*; and *ven que*, for *vengan*.

[3] Frias's letter to Dr. Beltrán, Feb. 15, Danv. III. 300. A month later the vast machinery of the law in Valladolid had stopped. 'Suits have ceased, through the summons the cleric served. It is proposed to give him soon a canonry in Granada.' (Constable to D. Carlos, March 12, Danv. III. 401.)
Sandoval's account (VIII. xxix (xxx)) matches so closely Danvila's documents that it seems as if he may have seen them. He refers, without printing it, to a letter of the Emperor of Feb. 21.

[4] Junta minutes, Feb. 13, 14, Danv. III. 282.

'they would arrest them, their wives, and their children, seize and sack their property, and demolish their houses.'[1] Other signs of desperation appeared, the fixing of prices; seizure as 'loans' of private wealth; and simultaneous angry demands both for action and for peace.[2] A mob of April 8 invaded the Junta session in the Cathedral, demanding the reason for the intolerable delay; and were told that the reason was the negotiating of new *capítulos*.[3]

Negotiations for peace had in fact been resumed, under conditions more difficult than before, the new commission consisting of but two Junta deputies and three appointees of the city of Valladolid.[4] Article XI, whether Viceroys should or should not require confirmation by the nation, was long disputed; and after a month no accord had been reached.[5] Cities had withdrawn their representation and attendance began to be thin in the Junta, until it became necessary to make it compulsory, authorizing the porter to go and seize property as a fine for those who absented themselves.[6] The Jacobins of the capital were in control of the Revolution.

The Valladolid *enragés* pretty certainly did not represent the sentiment of Castile; but was the Junta itself representative, or a mere Rump? Fifteen cities had voted in Ávila, all of the Cortes towns except the trio of the greater southern cities. Burgos had continued with her sister cities through September and the adoption of the League and Covenant, but had fought through October a losing fight for moderation, and after her bargain with the Constable, who entered the city November 1, repudiated the Ávila congress. After it was dispersed and many of its members captured in Tordesillas, the Junta reorganized in Valladolid, December 15,

[1] Junta minutes, April 10. One deputy, from Segovia, demurred (Danv. III. 618). This order was included in an instruction issued the same day to the Districts of Castile (Danv. III. 631).

[2] Danv. III. 620, 622; 617; 621.

[3] Sandoval, IX. xv; and the *capítulos* in xvi. There is no indication of this episode in the minutes of the Junta; but the *capítulos* appear for discussion in the Section meetings of April 8 (Danv. III. 622). Sandoval (IX. xviii) closes with a picture of the panicky condition of Valladolid.

[4] Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 21, Danv. III. 429. Junta minutes, March 16, Danv. III. 453.

[5] Danv. III. 453, 463; 606, 619. President and Council, faithful to the end, protested on April 22 their alarm at negotiations and asked His Majesty to suspend them! (Danv. III. 647.)

[6] Junta minutes, Feb. 21, Danv. III. 285.

but included only eleven cities.[1] Soria, Guadalajara, and Jaén were not listed nor do their votes afterward appear. It will be remembered that Jaén, Guadalajara, and Murcia did not sign the Solemn League.[2] Even so early as October the half-heartedness of Soria and Guadalajara was matter of gossip, reported to Martyr.[3] One Soria deputy was with the thirteen imprisoned in the fortress of Tordesillas; the other, having undertaken the business almost under compulsion, joined the Constable in Burgos, and Soria turned a deaf ear to the invitation of Valladolid to send new deputies.[4] Jaén had begun to bargain with Adrian;[5] and finally joined the Rambla confederates. Guadalajara applied to the Council for pardon in March.[6]

The devotion of the surviving eleven cities was, however, somewhat dubious. Attendance was timid and absences began to be permanent. Dark rumors circulated that deputies would be glad to desert.[7] On March 16 the Junta assigned the responsibility of presiding in rotation among nine cities. The two names that had now vanished were Cuenca and Madrid. The hill town of New Castile was voting as late as February 12.[8] D. Pedrolasso had boasted when he was haggling with the Governors that he had influence in Cuenca;[9] and his influence may have turned the town, for, two weeks after D. Pedro's secession, it applied, with Guadalajara, for pardon.[10] Madrid had reached an agreement with the Governors, who submitted her *capítulos* to D. Carlos on April 9.[11]

Yet who could deny that León, Zamora, Salamanca, Toro, Segovia, Ávila, Valladolid, Murcia, and Toledo still repre-

[1] Danvila (III. 95) gives a list, from the book of minutes of the Junta, of only ten names, omitting Madrid; but it is clear that Madrid continued in the congress, and voted, e.g., Jan. 31 (Danv. III. 103).

[2] Cf. *supra*, p. 172.

[3] Epist. DCXCIII, 'x Kal. Nov.,' i.e., Oct. 23. Danvila (II. 379, note 1) dates this letter Oct. 13.

[4] Danv. II. 691; III. 161. Soria and Cuenca joined the Burgos moderates in the Ávila Junta; cf. *supra*, p. 135.

[5] Apparently when discouraged by the Tordesillas disaster. Cf. *supra*, p. 240.

[6] Letter of the Council, March 26, Danv. III. 488.

[7] Letter of the Captains Vozmediano, Feb. 23, Danv. III. 234.

[8] Danv. III. 280. [9] *Ibid.* IV. 172.

[10] Danv. III. 488. Danvila's statement (III. 161) that Cuenca returned to obedience before Jan. 1 is clearly in error: D. Carlos's letter of that date (which he briefly summarizes) does not necessarily imply submission.

[11] Cardinal and Admiral to D. Carlos, April 19, Danv. III. 572.

sented the bitter and tenacious heart of Castile and of the great revolt?

The deputations, to be sure, chosen before the weariness of the struggle had weakened wills, before the moderates had despaired of just settlement, might no longer represent the real temper of their cities. Murcia, for example, from the beginning absorbed in a local squabble, had early in February withdrawn in alarm;[1] yet her deputies continued to vote in the Junta,[2] and indignation at the arrest of the Junta envoys in Flanders, coupled with uneasiness about the intentions of the Rambla confederates, threw the city back into the Comunero cause.[3] An attempt to betray the fortress of Zamora to the Count of Alva de Liste in the first week of April provoked in that city a fury of Comunero spirit: the plot was detected and the two leaders hanged and quartered.[4] More than one observer, however, felt certain that fear alone maintained Comunero rule in the Junta cities. The Bishop of Burgos — observing, to be sure, from a safe distance — declared:[5] 'The best sign that Your Majesty's affairs will go right and the rebels and traitors fall is that already many declare themselves openly and support Your Majesty, who at first, from fear or because they were in the Comunero secrets or flattered by their success and hoping to profit by the revolt, refused to a man to declare for Your Majesty; so that in a journey of fifty leagues I found not a place that was really willing to receive me. . . . In these towns of the Communes, as they call them, three quarters of each commune are honest servants of Your Majesty and want to return to your service; for they see that the beginning was petitioning for things that appeared just, but now they see that under color of that they undertake many evil works — tyrannize, rob, behead. . . . Of some towns I know certainly that in the presence of Your

[1] Danv. III. 371. Letter of the city government, summarized, without date. D. Carlos replied Feb. 21.

[2] E.g., March 2, Danv. III. 448; listed March 16, Danv. III. 452.

[3] Danv. III. 533, letter of the city, March 23. It will be remembered that the dramatic appearance of Fray Pablo was on March 10.

[4] *Ibid.* 685. The Count knew of the business. Cf. Admiral, credentials to A. de Bursa, April 15, Danv. III. 600. Record is extant (Danv. IV. 314) of the attempt by rack and 'water cure' to extort evidence from a third suspect (an appalling document).

[5] Letter to D. Carlos, Astorga, Feb. 15, Danv. III. 135. He was Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca, President of the Council of the Indies, organizer of the second expedition of Columbus.

Majesty's troops they would rise.' Even jailed in Valladolid, where mobs had almost lynched him, the Protonotary reported 'three quarters of the city are waiting for nothing more than that the Sr. Constable should come,[1] when not a man of the Junta but would perish, and they will open their gates to him. Show this letter freely to those gentlemen. Though I get away wounded (as I am, from my imprisonment chained to a wall, almost crippled), I must escape thither, soon, on foot — though in my life I have been used to go with a crier in white and a papal banner as against the Infidel.' [2]

[1] Reading *venga* for *vengan*.

[2] Protonotary Frias to Dr. Beltran, Feb. 15, Danv. III. 300. The text is uncertain. *Con el arnudo en blanco* seems to be an erudite locution, approximately rendered as above (*arnudo* for *arnodo*?). Frias was Vicar-General of Orân and a papal ensign. Cf. Constable to D. Carlos, Jan. 29, Danv. III. 154.

CHAPTER XIII

FORTUNE DISPOSES HER CHESSBOARD

With the military men, then, the decision would apparently remain. Had the Revolution found its general, capable of concentrating exasperation and desperation into victory, and of developing from victory a fruitful result? Peter Martyr doubted if the Comuneros had it in them to use a success. In the triumphant days of September he noted that the capital 'had recruited a thousand soldiers for the emergency; but they don't know what they want. They are like the ant with wings who did not know where she was going.' [1] In Valladolid in the wilder days of March he wrote: 'I who am in the midst of the conflagration tell you that the business would be easy if the Comuneros had more sense; but in my judgment the fire will go off in smoke because the leaders of the mad Junta are inexperienced, and the realm knows they are in the game not for the good of the realm but to satisfy their own vainglory.' [2] Yet he felt that as the armies gathered for an ultimate conflict the future of the kingdom was at stake. 'Fortune is disposing her chessboard so that either the realms will shake off the royal oppression and win freedom and be great, or endure a yet heavier oppression under the hands of the grandees.' [3]

Toward the first of these alternatives had the Comuneros any consistent military and political programme? The destruction of Simancas would relieve the capital and brace nerves everywhere. If the dashing Acuña carried Toledo he could devote to the Comunero cause the wealth of the metropolitan see. The recapture of Tordesillas and the Queen would make the Junta master of the realm even more than in the triumphant days of the past autumn. What political use could be made of such mastery?

Ignoring the chapter of accidents, the Comuneros might at least expect, by extended military resistance and success

[1] Epist. DCLXXXV, Sep. 13. Cf. Danv. II. 98.

[2] *Ibid.* DCCXIII, March 2. Cf. Danv. III. 382.

[3] Peter Martyr, Epist. DCCXVIII, March 15: Hic Fortuna suam praeparat tabulam lusoriam, ut vel haec regna sint ampla, excusso jugo regio, libertatem consecutura, vel servitutem multo graviorem in procerum manus subitura. Cf. Danv. III. 469.

to extort from the King the list of *capítulos* — certainly those formulated in the Tordesillas conference, probably those of the Junta. These would satisfy all the desires of the conservative elements in the Comunero movement, would accomplish notable reform of the administration, and would prevent for the future the recurrence of such an episode of plunder as marked D. Carlos's early reign. Opposition of the grandees, even if the King were cowed into concession, might halt Comunero innovations with this much of constitutional change.

Should the young monarch, defiant in the face of conspicuous Comunero victory, trust to his Imperial resources and still refuse any concession, there remained alternatives of chance. The luck of war might place again in the hands of the Junta the unfortunate Dña Juana, who could again be used as a figurehead for a native government. It was even conceivable that she should recover sanity. The Admiral himself had given pretext for such a programme. To the immense alarm of the Royalists, who saw the dangerous implications of his conduct, he insisted, after the rescue of Her Majesty at Tordesillas, upon obtaining from her authority for action. 'Last night,' the Comendador Mayor reported to D. Carlos, 'the Admiral — with an intent not, I think, wrong, but very unnecessary and in my judgment of no small harm — started a business, which was to interview the Queen and bid her order D. Pedro Girón and the others with the troops they have, to inflict no damage upon any estates of the grandees, and to dismiss the troops they have. This occurred in the presence of the two notaries in whose presence the Junta business was transacted. In my judgment that is a very great mistake: (1) it amounts to approving what these Communes did, for when they wished to assert that the Queen gave a command, they proceeded in the same fashion; (2) and very important — to pay no attention to the Queen since Her Highness is in no condition to undertake any business of government. As soon as I knew it I spoke to the Count of Benavente, who has more access to the Admiral than any others, to stop it and not let the attestations get out. He spoke to him and they were stopped and have not been issued.' [1] 'The attestation was destroyed — not by the Admiral's wish; on the contrary, he

[1] Comendador Mayor de Vega, Dec. 9, Danv. II. 639. Same report to the Constable, Danv. II. 638.

was annoyed and in his irritation declared he believed the Queen sane.'[1] 'The Admiral,' the Marquis of Denia wrote in his own hand to the King,[2] 'is much busied about effecting a cure of our Lady the Queen. Though that would be to Your Majesty's service, it is not to be thought of but by your command — the more since to accomplish that would be another raising of Lazarus.' The horrified Marquis related in a cipher note a more vivid scene: 'Four days ago the Admiral went in to our Lady the Queen and asked Her Highness to give her signature, for the realm was going to ruin. Her Highness replied she could not; she was busy. He insisted again. In the end Her Highness did not do so; nor will she, if I can help it. I told him before the Cardinal he ought not to ask Her Highness to sign, for he knows how great a disservice that were to God and to Your Majesty. "Nonsense!" he answered me, "for I'll have the Queen of Fez sign if not my own Queen!" I told him if Her Highness were in condition to do so, we should all urge it and our Lord the King would ask it; but as she is, it is not to be thought of, much less urged. Of what he answered to that, I cite the Cardinal as witness. Believe me, Your Majesty, your servants have more trouble in enduring the Admiral and repairing what he tries to do in detriment of our undertaking, than to fight the traitors twenty times over!'[3]

The Admiral's blunder was drowned in a chorus of protest; but it might become known to the Comuneros. There stood in the acts of the Cortes of Valladolid the vote: 'If at any time Our Lord in His mercy should restore her reason to the most Serene Queen Dña Juana, his mother, the King shall desist from the governance of Castile.' Should Juana fall again into their hands the Comuneros might take her off to Toledo as first projected,[4] proclaim her in her own right, or even marry her.[5]

Even if they never recovered Dña Juana, a sinister example might be copied from recent Castilian history. The sainted Isabel herself reigned only because the Infanta

[1] Anonymous letter from Tordesillas (evidently well informed; possibly still another from the Comendador), Danv. II. 771.

[2] Denia to D. Carlos, Feb. 21, Danv. III. 228. [3] Danv. III. 228.

[4] Peter Martyr, Epist. DCXCIII, Oct. 23. Cf. Danv. II. 379.

[5] Admiral's charge in letter of Dec. 6 to Sevilla, Danv. II. 762. The husband proposed was the Aragonese pretender, the Duke of Calabria. Cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, II. 302; III. 79, note.

Juana, nicknamed 'la Beltraneja,' had been declared illegitimate.[1] Rumors began to be assiduously circulated that D. Carlos was a bastard of D. Felipe and not his heir — a story credible so far as the frequent infidelities of his father were concerned. This scandal, Adrian heard, was even preached in Segovia.[2] The exclusion of D. Carlos would place on the throne the beloved Infante, Fernando. In the chapter of accidents, finally, lurked the possibility that the young Emperor might die. He was of sickly ancestry and frail person;[3] and war and tournament took the lives of princes and even monarchs. In that case again either Dña Juana or D. Fernando would succeed. Or if D. Carlos married and died leaving an infant heir, a regency would follow, it might be under Comunero influences.

The first requisite for any of these possibilities was a military success; and the gravest problem in pursuit of military success was to decide the alternative between these two courses: (1) to skirmish and raid, avoiding pitched battle — though at the certain cost of losing large numbers by desertion — until a French invasion might thoroughly employ the forces of the Constable; or (2) to strike immediately for a conspicuous victory against either part of the still divided Royal forces.

In the larger strategy of the contest the Junta command seemed to have made a mistake. Before reducing the Governors to impotence in Castile, their most vigorous commander, the belligerent Bishop, had gone off, with a considerable body of troops, in quest of personal advancement in Toledo. The Royalists, on the other hand, had accepted a grave risk of invasion from France for the sake of effecting concentration in Castile.

[1] For this unsavory and insoluble historical puzzle cf. Sitges, *Enrique IV e la Excelente Señora*. The substitution of Isabel appears to be of dubious rightfulness. Cf. also Ballesteros, *Historia de España*, III. 116. It is interesting that Cardinal Mendoza was troubled by conscientious doubts in the matter, on his deathbed. Isabel dismissed his cavil with comment that 'the goodman wandered and talked nonsense.' Cf. Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, Part II, Chap. V, note 8.

[2] Adrian to D. Carlos, May 23, Danv. IV. 27. He urged a commission of inquest; and notes that a friar was unfrocked and burned some years before, presumably for a similar offense. The affair in Segovia is noted in the Admiral's credentials to A. de Bursa, April 15, Danv. III. 598.

[3] Alarming report of D. Carlos's illness reached Spain in April. (Danv. III. 604.) He was notoriously subject to colds, so that climate had to be considered in planning his campaigns. (Cf. the Admiral's discussion of an invasion of France in 1523, Danv. V. 463.)

In the more immediate strategy of the campaign in Castile, the Comunero captains elected timid alternatives. If Salvatierra from the north and the army in Torrelobatón were capable of vigorous coördination, they might combine to defeat the Constable before the Viceroy was able to effect a junction with the main Royalist forces. That strategy appeared imperative: failure to achieve it would at the worst leave Padilla free to fall back upon Valladolid, Medina del Campo, and the eastern cities of Castile; or upon Toro, Salamanca, Zamora, and the cities of the western rim; failure to attempt it would imply the most ominous misgivings in the Comunero command as to the efficiency of their force.

The importance of intercepting the Constable was evident to the Junta, which on April 10 summoned the Districts of Castile to concentrate upon Salvatierra, and to thwart and delay the Constable by devastation of the country.[1] The Constable was equally aware of the menace of a Comunero concentration against him, on his march.[2] Salvatierra, however, was kept busy before Medina del Pomar until the Dean of Burgos, who had been detailed to retain his force, was able to arrive, raise the siege, and force the Comunero captain back.[3] The Constable was able therefore to advance slowly toward his desired junction — slowly, because he was picking up detachments along his march, and he paused April 15 before Becerril, which he had to enter by storm.[4] The feeble resistance there was conducted by D. Juan de Figueroa, who was captured and sent back to the capital: the madcap career that had begun in the beautiful alcázar of Sevilla closed in the castillo that frowns over the towers of the cathedral in Burgos. April 19 the Constable appeared, unchallenged, in Peñaflor, within a march of Torrelobatón.

Withdrawal from Lobatón without attempting to resist the Constable's advance had in fact been determined by the Comunero captains as early as March 29, when they informed the Junta of their intent, and urged the forwarding

[1] Danv. III. 631. [2] Constable to D. Carlos, April 12, Danv. III. 584.

[3] Mexía, 230. Salvatierra was aided by J. de Guzmán, then at the French Court, who sharked up a considerable force and joined the besiegers of Pomar. (Maldonado, 253.) The Constable's sister and her children were in the beleaguered town.

[4] Constable to D. Carlos, April 12, Danv. III. 583. Palencia to the Junta, April 15, Danv. III. 683. Mexía, 230; Maldonado, 255.

of all available troops.[1] Padilla was threatened with an inferiority in number; but it might be only temporary. His army, composed of municipal levies which were desired each for defense in their own municipality, was constantly dissolving and recruiting. He might draw off upon either Valladolid or Toro, and, joining with the forces assembled there, regain numerical preponderance. The alternative had been determined; April 3 the captains reported to the Junta their determination to withdraw at once toward Toro and there unite with a force held by D. Pedro Maldonado.[2]

Such a course would awake the liveliest alarm in the Comunero capital.[3] The Constable had not at that date left Burgos: to withdraw then would be the abjectest admission of defeat, and leave Valladolid exposed not merely to Simancas raids but to a siege. Advocates of a vigorous strategy, backed by the outcry of the capital, might still force at least an attempt to intercept the Burgos contingent. One conclusion outstandingly clear was that there ought not to be a confusion of policies: either, on the one hand, a frittering of attack in uncoördinated raids without concentration of every available element against the Constable; or, on the other hand, a lingering till caught between the force united at Rioseco and the force at Simancas and Tordesillas.[4] Precisely the first of these errors appeared

[1] Captains to the Junta, Danv. III. 472 (summary only).

[2] Captains to Junta, April 3, Danv. III. 627 (summary only). Cf. also the anonymous and undated MS. cited in Danv. IV. 605.

[3] Sandoval, IX. xviii, *ad fin.*, has a vivid picture of Valladolid in a mood of panic.

[4] Sandoval has an interesting narrative (IX. xviii) to the effect that Padilla secretly visited Valladolid — apparently in the week after April 8 — proposing to the Junta to unite all available forces, destroy Lobatón, and move on the Constable: 'which,' Sandoval remarks, 'was their best course; but the Valladolid contingent was delayed and the other places responded as slowly; for there is no restraint able to keep a Commune under direction.' Sandoval's more dramatic paragraphs always look suspicious. Considerable correspondence between the Comunero captains and Valladolid (Danv. III. 626–35) does not reveal much as to rival policies. There is some evidence that Padilla did visit Valladolid: Haro heard that the Comunero captain, just after the raid on Tordesillas on April 10, had gone to Valladolid to get troops (Danv. III. 588); and Padilla's letter from Bamba on April 15 (Danv. III. 634) appears to be written as he was escorting troops from Valladolid to Lobatón: 'when I got here it was almost nightfall, and heavy rain; and the troops were very tired because it had rained almost all the way. To exhaust them further, as far as Torre, having had such little refreshment, would have been cruel.' It is to be noted also that April 10 is the date of the Junta summons to the Districts to concentrate against the Constable. Maldonado (256) says Padilla went to rouse Valladolid and reports his speech.

about to be committed. A sally from Lobatón on April 5 threw the Admiral into the acutest alarm about the safety of Tordesillas.[1] Constant marauding parties issued from Lobatón, from which the Royalists occasionally intercepted a harquebuseer or other straggler, and hanged him.[2] But nothing effective was done to halt the Constable; and Padilla was still in Lobatón when the Viceroy appeared in Peñaflor. The Comunero captain had either to effect a withdrawal or to accept battle with apparent disadvantage of numbers.

The Royalists, by the junction of the Constable with his son, had an army which, passed in review on Monday, April 22, mustered some 6000 foot and 2400 horse, of which 1500 were heavy men-at-arms, and included the elements hitherto missing in the Governors' forces — infantry, and artillery both field and siege.[3] Padilla's command at the moment amounted to about 7000 foot and but 400 heavy horse.[4] In a contest between numbers thus approximating a balance, quality was of supreme significance.

The Comunero troops, consisting in the main of local municipal militia, were noted to include a large part of field laborers, with a good sprinkling of small gentlemen and squires, and even of parish clergy.[5]

[1] Admiral to Constable and to C. of Alva de Liste, April 6 with a terrifying list of the forces that might appear against him. The Constable was not unduly alarmed, since the messenger himself made rather more composed report. Danv. III. 564, 566.

[2] Haro to D. Carlos, April 9, Danv. III. 575. Simancas retorted with raids on sutlers' trains entering Valladolid: a company of lances and a company of foot cut out 4000 sheep. (Danv. III. 576.) A raid on April 10 vainly sought to provoke Medina del Campo to a battle. Haro's report, III. 567; Denia's, III. 591; cf. III. 640.

[3] The figures are Mexía's (235). His statement is not wholly clear. Sandoval (IX. xix) takes it over with the understanding given above. Maldonado's figures (256 ff.) are much lower, but appear to mean the numbers actually thrown into combat the next day: 1700 horse (light and heavy); 3000 veteran foot. Considerable forces must have been left to guard Rioseco; and infantry was not useful for the running fight that occurred. D. Carlos's commanders had long been pointing out their helplessness in default of infantry; e.g., Admiral, Jan. 26, Danv. III. 79. The Admiral points out in the same report the lack of all forms of artillery and munitions; even artillery horses are needed, the native mules proving quite inadequate. (*Ibid.*, 84.) Lack of artillery, the Constable reported on Feb. 11 had hitherto kept him out of the field, even when he had sufficient troops. (*Ibid.*, 314.)

[4] Mexía, 234. Sandoval (IX. xix) increases these figures; but Adrian on April 25 reported 6000 to 7000 soldiers, including 400 lances and 1000 harquebuseers, and the rest pikemen. Maldonado (256 ff.) estimated 500 horse and 7000 foot, 'green privates.'

[5] Councillor Polanco, Jan. 18, Danv. III. 49.

The Governors recruited their forces in part from the same sources; but commanded in larger proportion the military retainers of the greater grandees [1] and had some soldiers of the Royal household. They made distinct effort to attain quality rather than numbers. 'The Cardinal and the Admiral,' the King's confidential agent reported, 'intend to take advantage of every source available and seek out excellent infantry troops; for they are not satisfied with much of those here.' [2] Aragon and the Basque provinces were promising recruiting ground. Hardy and trustworthy troops might be had from some of the remoter mountain districts. 'My stay in Briviesca,' the Constable remarked, was devoted 'to getting some infantry from the hill regions; for I have little confidence in that of the towns, because they are all intimate with the Communes and won't respond as they should. I have seen it by experience; for when my estates rose I could not draw a devoted man from all my lands, and they told me plainly they wouldn't go against the Commune.' [3] The Royalists had even the courage and wisdom to dismiss inadequate material. 'We had many useless troops,' Adrian reported in February: [4] 'part of the foot we have discharged — Asturians without arms, and farm hands ill suited for war. Though the Spanish in general are reputed good soldiers, the gentlemen here concede frankly that farm laborers are no use and seem ill suited for war. We try in every possible way to have troops of good quality and find few; for,' the Cardinal concludes ruefully, 'the Junta people got almost all.' Royalist troops, however, felt so certain of a superiority of efficiency that they were inclined to try battle in the face of great superiority in numbers.[5]

[1] Experience revealed the unsatisfactory character of these troops. The Admiral, in a memorial to D. Carlos, probably of the year 1523 (Danv. V. 430), notes: 'The grandees, I perceive, are not very satisfied: what they will offer I do not know; but should it be troops, I remind Your Highness not to account them so valuable as to trust much to them.'

[2] Lope to D. Carlos, Jan. 22, Danv. III. 64.

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, Nov. 3, Danv. II. 476.

[4] To D. Carlos, Feb. 6, Danv. III. 204.

[5] Lope to D. Carlos, Nov. 29, Danv. II. 521. Experience graved the matter in the mind of the Admiral, who wrote in one of his many political testaments addressed to D. Carlos (Danv. V. 430): 'Your Majesty should labor to have his soldiery very efficient, considering not quantity but quality; for troops who are numerous, and poor, involve very great confusion.' P. Martyr so early as Dec. 11 (Epist. DCCV) noted: 'Juncterorum copiae sunt numero plures, rusticanae, vomeribus et ligonibus pertractandis aptiores quam armis.'

Veteran troops in Spain at the outbreak of the disturbances were not numerous, and were stationed chiefly in the southern provinces or in African garrisons. German troops, even if D. Carlos could spare them in the threatening condition of the Empire, Adrian repeatedly and earnestly besought him not to send — though the Constable and others, in desperate moments, clamored for any, 'Turks, if you could land them.' [1] In the rival bidding to enlist in their ranks the veterans of the Gelves expedition the Royalists had not at first notable success. Captain Beamonte had managed to wheedle away some four hundred to enter the Constable's service, whom they helped back into the capital.[2] Just before the dash on Tordesillas the Royalists made a bid for the Gelves veterans in Girón's army by public proclamation of pardon and pay; [3] and the Royal success there appeared to send a considerable contingent over to the Royal banner.[4] Thereafter the troops changed sides as interest or irritation dictated; and each side offered increase of pay and condoning of past offenses, to win them back.[5] Among the Comuneros there were no generals of repute to attract the veterans; and when D. Pedrolasso, who claimed to have great influence with such of the Gelves troops as served with the Comuneros, withdrew, they followed him in considerable numbers.[6]

The judgment of military competence upon the effective force of the two armies was this: [7] 'The deputies . . . are making every effort to assemble troops from the cities of their following. How many will come I do not know, for the cities are exhausted, though Valladolid yesterday pro-

[1] Constable to D. Carlos, Sep. 30, Danv. II. 39.

[2] Constable to D. Carlos, Oct. 10, Danv. II. 257; Oct. 21, Danv. II. 271. Beamonte, reciting his claims, Sep. 5, says he persuaded 450, 'with risk, and insult from their esquires.' (Danv. IV. 218.)

[3] Vozmediano to D. Carlos, Nov. 28, Danv. II. 579. This apparently enabled Comendador H. de Vega to snatch a company: cf. P. Martyr, Epist. DCXCVIII, Nov. 19. (*Septembris* a misprint for *Decembris*.)

[4] Admiral to D. Carlos, Dec. 17, Danv. II. 652.

[5] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Jan. 4, Danv. III. 13. Cf. *ibid.*, 233.

[6] Pedrolasso's *capítulos* in Danv. IV. 172. Cf. F. Maldonado to Junta, April 5, Danv. III. 629, 573. Polanco, April 15, Danv. III. 607. Sandoval (VIII, last §, Letter of March 27) reports general desertion of Gelves veterans from the Comuneros. Sandoval unaccountably calls the Comendador Mayor *Pedro Lujan*. The Admiral's long report (Danv. V. 225) notes general desertion of troops following the withdrawal of Pedrolasso.

[7] Comendador Mayor de Vega to D. Carlos, April 14, Danv. III. 589. There are constant lacunæ, but the text is almost certainly conjecturable.

claimed that one recruit must come from every household. Of one thing I am certain: though many troops respond they will not be efficient. The Governors and the grandees with them propose, I believe, to unite as quickly as possible; for, once united, they will have much and excellent cavalry, and a reasonable force of infantry — and excellent artillery, which is what they have never hitherto had. That done, I believe they propose to seek out the rebels. . . . With the difference there will be in the quality of the troops, though those of the rebels be powerful in numbers, I think, in the course of war, with God's help and Your Majesty's good fortune, we may count victory certain.'

CHAPTER XIV

VILLALAR

ANY last hope the Comuneros may have had of a diversion from the north soon disappeared. Salvatierra, though checked at Medina de Pomar, had turned to another siege, of Vitoria. The connivance suspected between the Comuneros and the French made the possession of the border cities of the utmost importance. To drive the Count from this attempt also, a force was detached from Navarre; and its captain, Martín Ruiz de Avendaño, on April 12 routed the besiegers at the Durana bridge five miles out of the city. The erratic commander escaped; but his lieutenant, Gonzalo de Baraona, fought to the end, was captured, and beheaded in the square of Vitoria.[1]

The defeat of this Comunero leader made all the more necessary for their main army a policy of shift and delay. The French were known to be organizing an invasion of Navarre, which in a month might so seriously threaten that recently annexed realm that the Governors might be obliged almost to abandon immediate attack on the Comuneros, in order to defend the frontier. Padilla's move must accordingly be a cautious withdrawal to the west, on the line of the Comunero cities Zamora and Salamanca.

He had no wish to remain in Torrelobatón threatened by a force now equipped with siege artillery, which certainly would attempt to shut him in; and he decided to withdraw.[2] Monday, April 22, his movements gave indication of departure, and the whole Royalist force, the Constable and the Admiral in person among them, took the field; but no action followed other than reconnoitering. Beamonte was on guard that night and reported an attempt of the Comuneros to slip away in the dark; but he beat them up from two directions and was thus able to detain them so that Padilla did not get started till the gray of the late

[1] Danvila, III. 706 ff.; P. Martyr, Epist. DCCXX, April 27.

[2] Alcocer (48–49) says Pedrolasso urged the Royalists to trap Padilla; and Martyr (Epist. DCCXX) notes that they so intended; and Maldonado (258 ff.) likewise.

rainy April dawn of Saint George's day, the 23d.[1] The armies left behind them on the north horizon of rolling hill the granite donjon tower, blurred by the smoke of the gutted and burning village. It was the birthday of Queen Isabel the Catholic.[2]

The Comunero formation was with their artillery in the van followed by their infantry, with the horse in the rear-guard, under Padilla himself. The army of the Governors started in pursuit, horse and field artillery in the van: their infantry had so belated a start and such difficulties in the roads, churned into mud to the knees, that they took no part in the engagement.[3] For six miles the Royalists vainly harried the Comunero column with artillery fire, which produced some fatalities and was very trying to unseasoned troops, and with dashes of cavalry from both flanks and even against the van.[4] With midday, conditions became increasingly alarming for Padilla's force. Prolonged April rains had made the roads very muddy, a disadvantage much more trying to the Comunero infantry than to the pursuing cavalry. Further, the rain had made the harquebuses of Padilla's large force of harquebuseers almost useless and reduced them to a state of panicky uneasiness.[5] Padilla twice halted and deployed, either as a delaying action or with intent to accept pitched battle. He had for the moment at least only the enemy horse to face, their infantry still struggling along far in the rear.[6] The retreat might have

[1] The Comunero start was betrayed, according to Maldonado's account, by their foolishly starting fires. Beamonte's account of his guard (to D. Carlos, Sep. 5, Danv. III. 754) sounds a little defensive; and in fact Padilla seems to have got a fair start on the Royalists. Santa Cruz (I. 459) says, 'estandos los caballeros muy descuidados.' The Admiral declared that the Comuneros might with proper leadership have withdrawn by night in entire security (Danv. V. 225). P. Martyr heard much the same story as Beamonte's, but about Comendador de Vega (Epist. DCCXX).

[2] Cardinal to D. Carlos, April 30 (?), Danv. III. 752–53. Danvila dates this report April 25; but the text refers to events of 'the 27th of this month' and would seem to be dated xxx instead of xxv. The Governors' writ of May 4 (Danv. IV. 151) declares that the village was quite destroyed (Sandoval, IX. xviii). The destruction had long been planned by the retreating Comuneros (Martyr, Epist. DCCXIX, April 20).

[3] Cardinal's report, April 25, Danv. III. 750.

[4] The Comendador Mayor, in charge of these cavalry rushes, testified to the Cardinal the excellence of the Comunero formation and resistance. Cardinal's report, April 25, Danv. III. 749. My photograph, taken on April 22, shows the flat plain, green with young wheat, admirably open for cavalry maneuvers. Cf. illustration.

[5] This significant detail in Maldonado's account. Cf. Danvila, III. 739.

[6] Sandoval's anonymous witness indicates that the success of the Comunero

been accomplished in order, until succor advanced from Toro, still about eighteen miles distant, had the tormented marchers not been tempted aside by the village of Villalar, a complex of walls, lanes, and small buildings, some seven miles northwest of Tordesillas, where they anticipated the solace of shelter from the cavalry charges, and from bolt and shot. The disastrous moment of their scattering for cover was effectively seized by the Royalists, who threw a cavalry charge of half a hundred men-at-arms into the unsettled ranks. The Comunero artillery unlimbered in the village and attempted by artillery fire to smother this charge, and Padilla with his heavy cavalry made a countercharge.[1] A few of the pikemen had discipline enough to lower their pikes and offer a hedge of points to halt the horse; but most had no will or ability to make the resistance which the walls and lanes would have facilitated, but broke, amid the downpour of rain, into a sauve-qui-peut. Capture of the Comunero captains prevented any reforming. A portion of the force made its escape, though pursued by Haro, to Toro. Padilla was wounded and unhorsed, and seized by D. Alonso de la Cueva; Juan Bravo by Beamonte. So abject had been the rout that the Royalists had but a couple of dozen casualties, the Comuneros about a thousand, half of them fatalities, and most of them from artillery fire.

The humane Cardinal, who went over to consult the Constable on the next day, witnessed in the sodden square of the village a melancholy sight.[2] The proclaimed traitors were, after a brief and uncontested formality of identification, publicly beheaded. The opprobrious phrases of the proclamation Juan Bravo, the Segovia captain, resented and denounced. Padilla quieted him: 'Señor Juan Bravo,

retreat led many of the Royal command to conclude that the line could not be broken and that they could hope only to harry them and force their retreat.

[1] The contemporary narratives give the stories of Comunero treachery repeated in the later chronicles. Alcocer (49) declares that 13 infantry companies and 300 men-at-arms went over to the foe; and the artillerists had been bribed, some deliberately shooting high and others destroying powder. Maldonado (262), not so pro-Padilla, says the artillery was rendered useless by the rain; he notes, however, the popular charge of treachery. Only Sandoval (IX. xx) makes the charge (otherwise unsupported) that D. Pedro Maldonado, the Comunero captain, deliberately disabled the cannon.

[2] Adrian's report, April 25, Danv. III. 750. Alcocer (51) says Adrian and the Constable voted to refer the fate of the captains to D. Carlos; but the Admiral and others overrode them. Alcocer's narrative has many details from the Padilla tradition, but they are not supported by other contemporary evidence.

VILLALAR: THE BATTLE PLAIN

VILLALAR: THE VILLAGE, CHURCH, AND MODERN MONUMENT

yesterday was the day to die like a gentleman; to-day it is left only to die like a Christian.' [1] The Count of Benavente secured stay of sentence for his nephew, D. Pedro Maldonado Pimentel. The heads of Bravo, Padilla, and F. Maldonado were set upon pikes; their dishonored bodies were buried in the little church, and afterward sent to their native cities.[2]

[1] The anecdote is contemporary. Mexía (239) gives Maldonado's version (263); Sandoval (IX. xxi) adopts the antithetical turn given in Alcocer (51).

[2] The contemporary sources for the battle are:
Haro's report: brief, not anecdotic, Danv. III. 747.
Adrian's two reports, April 25 and 30 (?), Danv. III. 749, 752.
P. Martyr, Epist. DCCXX, April 27.
Admiral's note commending la Cueva, Danv. III. 739, n. 2.
Beamonte's letter of Sep. 5, Danv. III. 754.
Constable to Burgos, April 25, Appendix of Cantón Salazar, *Casa del Cordón*: the postscript reads: 'I have been as much distressed as I could express by the death of Juan Bravo, both on his own account but most for his mother and brothers. God forgive them all.'

Of the chroniclers Maldonado and Alcocer are contemporary. Mexía is the compactest and clearest (235–39). He, who is generally exact in dates, misdates Sunday as April *xx*, and Sandoval, who is less accurate, corrects it to *xxi*. Santa Cruz is very brief (459–60). Sandoval (IX. xx–xxi) follows, instead of Mexía, 'who got his account in Sevilla,' an anonymous witness who wrote in much detail. This manuscript exists and was formerly attributed to the chronicler-captain, leader of the Palencia Comuneros, Gonzalo de Ayora. (Cf. Danv. III. 782, n. 6; Ballesteros, *Hist. de Esp.* III. 826; E. Cat, *Essai sur la Vie du chroniqueur G. de Ayora.*) Danvila (III. 734 ff.) summarizes several anonymous narratives; but as he discusses the age and source of none, they can scarcely be used. Sandoval prints two letters which purport to be from Padilla just before his death, to his wife and his city (IX. xxii). Their style is antithetical beyond that of the most rhetorical papers which are of unquestioned authenticity; they appear to have a dramatic eloquence rather than the franker eloquence of truth. It is possible that they are Guevara's reworking from genuine originals, or his inventions, in the manner of the speeches in the Greek historians. They contribute no information.

BOOK IV

Collapse

BOOK IV

COLLAPSE

CHAPTER I

BY AUTHORITY OF THE JEWS AND RASCALS OF THE ZOCODOVER[1]

WHILE the Zamoran Bishop was scouring Castile, another Zamoran cleric had been detached by the Governors to control the situation in New Castile, D. Antonio de Zúñiga, Prior of the Royal Foundation of San Juan de los Reyes in Toledo. His movements so alarmed the Comunero metropolis that it wrote to the Junta on February 4 [2] suggesting that Padilla return to oppose him. Valladolid had no intention of losing the popular captain who was preparing a promising campaign; but personal ambition made Acuña more than willing to enter the metropolitan see of Spain, and the Junta appointed him on February 7.[3] His advancement there would of course not be unopposed. The Constable ordered the cathedral chapter to take no steps toward replacing Croy till His Majesty's return. Further, Padilla's wife, Doña María Pacheco, was organizing her immense influence to secure the election of her brother, Francisco Mendoza, who was papal chamberlain in Rome.[4] On Feb-

[1] The Admiral's contemptuous phrase about Acuña's control in Toledo (Danv. III. 605).

[2] Letter in Santa Cruz, I. 450, 'hoy jueves que son 4'; but Feb. 4, 1521, was Monday.

[3] Junta minute, Danv. III. 279. The *sisa* alone (a food tax collected chiefly in the cities) amounted in Toledo, by the Admiral's estimate, to 200 ducats daily. (Credentials to A. de Bursa, c. Feb. 10, Danv. III. 246.)

[4] Constable to D. Carlos, Feb. 25, Danv. III. 237; Cardinal to D. Carlos, Feb. 27, Danv. III. 240, 241.

A Francisco de Mendoza was Chièvres' administrator in the see of Toledo, and is a different person from Doña María's brother, though Danvila indexes them as one. The administrator discusses the possible election of Doña María's brother in a letter to Chièvres of March 12 (Danv. III. 538; cf. Danv. III. 377, 519).

Doña María's uncle was the aged and infirm Marquis of Villena (Santa Cruz, I. 463, 464; Danv. IV. 6). Her brother, second Marquis of Mondéjar, was the King's Captain-General in Granada. (He names her as his sister in letter to Cardinal, June 15, Danv. IV. 256.) Her father, deceased at this period, was first Marquis of Mondéjar, second Count of Tendilla, son of Íñigo López

ruary 1, a mob of 3000 persons shut the chapter into the cathedral and tried to extort Mendoza's election.[1] Acuña therefore hurried south and seized, in the first week of March, as the basis of his campaign, the city of Alcalá, where he began to assemble an army from all the Comunero cities of New Castile.[2]

The bishop's campaign began with a reverse. The Prior had built up a force of some 6000, about a trained nucleus of 4000 foot and 400 lances supplied him by the Governors; and his war chest had been liberally filled.[3] In a considerable encounter near Ocaña the Prior scored a victory and Acuña was wounded and lost about 600 dead and four pieces of artillery.[4] The town of Ocaña then went over to the Royalists, destroyed its Commune, and turned over its captain to the young ruffians of the place, who burned him.[5] The imperturbable Bishop, however, published a victory; in a week recovered from his two wounds; and moved into Illescas, near the metropolis, into which he slipped on Good Friday, March 29.[6]

So soon as they knew Acuña to be present, an immense mob of the Toledo populace escorted him to the cathedral and placed him on the episcopal throne, with some improvised ceremony of possession.[7] But whatever his ecclesiastical ambitions or his conflict of interest with Doña María,

de Mendoza, first Marquis of Santillana. Her mother was Francisca Pacheco, sister of the Marquis of Villena and daughter of Juan Pacheco, also Marquis of Villena, deceased. (Cf. Danv. VI. 160. He refers confusingly to Mondéjar as her father. Mexía, as usual, is careful in this.)

[1] The Maestrescuela's defense, Dec. 30, 1523, Danv. V. 467.

[2] He had started by March 1 (Danv. III. 384); and was in Alcalá by March 7 (Danv. III. 393). On the parties and dissensions, and the position of the university, in Alcalá, during March and April, cf. Danv. III. 670–78. The Bishop was there but four days.

[3] Mexía, 230. By March 16, 22,000 ducats had been advanced, though he estimated his need at 30,000 (Admiral to A. de Bursa, March 16, Danv. III. 418). The importance of unstinting support of the Prior is urged by the Cardinal (to D. Carlos, April 9, Danv. III. 572).

[4] Santa Cruz (I. 454) dates it Tuesday, March 16; but March 16, 1521, was Saturday. Cardinal's report, March 18, Danv. III. 424; corrected by report of March 21, Danv. III. 428; Admiral to A. de Bursa, March 19, Danv. III. 425; Constable to D. Carlos, March 28, Danv. III. 441. Mexía (231) and Santa Cruz (I. 454) are little in agreement, except that night cut short the struggle.

[5] Cardinal to D. Carlos, March 21, Danv. III. 428.

[6] *Ibid.*, 429; March 28, Danv. III. 435; April 8, Danv. III. 569. Acuña reports his reception in the city in a letter of March 30, Danv. III. 539; Santa Cruz, I. 464.

[7] Acuña's letter of March 29, Danv. III. 539.

the Bishop was too practical a person to allow their differences to paralyze their control of the city.[1] The matter of the bishopric was postponed and Acuña in substitution demanded election as Governor and Captain-General of the realm of Toledo, which was in April obtained from a body of alcaldes and regidors, despite the resistance of the Maestrescuela, who remained defiant even with the bared sword and the lighted harquebus at his breast.[2] This election was confirmed by the Junta and presented for ratification at an excited meeting of the cathedral chapter on April 9.[3]

The Bishop appeared with heavy escort, though the canons had requested, 'since the people of Toledo are naturally tumultuous,' that he come alone. He complained that he had desired to visit the sacristy and no one had been able to find the keys. 'To this article *nullus respondit*.' In reply to Acuña's protests of affection for the Church, the Maestrescuela 'sounded a lofty note and went through certain flourishes of his, entirely satisfying his intention to pledge neither property nor persons.' An immense armed mob had gathered and the Bishop sent a canon out to know the occasion of the uproar, a ruse which permitted a couple of hundred to intrude into the session and demand submission. Upon Acuña's request they were with great difficulty forced out, and he returned to his demands. Again 'extended reply was necessary, believing the mob would get tired of rioting at the door, and that the bishop might be satisfied; and for this purpose the Maestrescuela employed sermons of Saint Anselm and Saint Gregory. The crowd constantly increased and assembled in such numbers, so fully armed and so shameless,' continues the ironical witness, 'that I never saw so many in the church, and all soldiers. Thus more than two hours passed; and nobody gave any answer. The bishop said he would pacify the people while they were determining their reply; and it was just the contrary, for when he left them they were more riotous than ever; and when he came back he swore by his consecration that they were no longer

[1] The fragmentary letter of Haro to D. Carlos, April 9 (Danv. III. 575), reports a reconciliation.

[2] Danv. III. 655. Defense of the Maestrescuela, Dec. 30, 1523, Danv. V. 468. (The office was peculiar to certain cathedral chapters and had formerly been equivalent to a professorship of theology.)

[3] The events of this dramatic occasion are vividly recorded in the Maestrescuela's defense just cited and in an ironical account given in a long anonymous letter of April 16, Danv. III. 658 ff.

in his control, and the mob was so roused that he feared for the lives of those present. To this *nihil respondit*; except that they had already swallowed death: let them do what they would. . . . He asked paper and ink and dictated the text of his demand; and upon examination it was answered that it could never in any wise be granted. He never lost his temper, however many times they refused him; whereat they were all amazed. Meanwhile there was so much shouting and passing of persons in the church that one could not be heard in the chapterhouse. He resumed still a third time, took four canons into the anteroom, and there said that, to prevent all the evils that were to be expected he would content himself with something though it was not all. Since it was already struck one and everybody was on the point of expiring, they had to concede his captain-generalcy in the absence of Padilla, and that he might reduce fortresses, towns, and strongholds in the archbishopric that were not in obedience to this holy church. This is what was conceded and nothing more. This done the door of the chapter hall was opened, and the crowd came in to hear and see what was accomplished; and the Señor bishop said he was satisfied and they had accomplished the matter quite completely: wherewith they went off shouting, and tolled the bells, and two thousand other elegances through the night. All this Señor canon of the church told me.' [1]

His dubious authority the Bishop at once dedicated to the military problem of making head against the steadily increasing pressure of the Prior, who was addressing his resources to an ultimate siege of the city. The spring was full of indecisive raids and skirmishes — among them a tragedy of which the horror much impressed contemporary imagination: the roasting alive of the refugees of the town of Mora, several hundreds of old folk, women, and children, who had barricaded themselves in the church, which was fired.[2]

[1] The splendid chapter hall is extant as in 1521. It is suffocating even to imagine two hundred persons squeezed into it: it is about forty-five by twenty-five feet.

Other striking details of the morning are in another anonymous letter of April 16, Danv. III. 661 ff.

[2] Peter Martyr's letter (DCCXIX) of April 20 reports it. Alcocer (55) reports 50 dead, a more probable estimate than Martyr's 5000! Several narratives are summarized in Danv. III. 667 ff. Santa Cruz (I. 462) prints a letter of the Prior denying responsibility for the horror: the letter gives also an outline of the campaign. Santa Cruz dates the Mora affair April 23 (I. 475), which is evidently impossible if Martyr's letter is rightly dated. Santa Cruz's dates

The morale of the Comunero resistance was, of course, profoundly shaken by the news of Villalar, which reached Toledo the afternoon of April 26.[1] Acuña was at the moment involved in a struggle with the canons to get the wealth of the church, which he demanded as 'administrator of the see.'[2] He had already organized universal enforced loans collected by domiciliary visit.[3] He jailed the Maestrescuela and a dozen canons who opposed the surrender of the church wealth, and was attempting to starve them into submission: 'as news arrived the next day that Juan de Padilla was beheaded, he released us all.'[4] Acuña, however, searched the sacristy, which was found empty; manned the cathedral tower; and centralized the city government in a small committee.[5] Panic reigned in the city, some preparing to stampede to the Royalists, others attempting to destroy Pedrolasso's houses (which Acuña prevented); 'in those days the Comuneros comported themselves stiffer than ever, as their candle was guttering out — though it was plain to be seen in their faces.'[6]

In the crisis the city, even Acuña, welcomed the prospect of mediation through a venerable figure who, through his age and infirmities, had taken no part in the events of the time, the Marquis of Villena, uncle of Doña María Pacheco.[7]

Villena began hopefully. The worst trouble-makers left the city. There was no Royalist party in the metropolis; but Villena rallied the moderates and reached an agreement for

are often erratic; and though he often gives week days with them they also are repeatedly incorrect. Mexía's narrative (232) is taken over verbatim by Sandoval (IX. x).

A reduction of taxes was allowed the desolated town in March, 1522. (Danv. V. 75.)

[1] Danv. IV. 66.

[2] Report to the President of the Council, May 7, Danv. IV. 77.

[3] Picturesquely described by the anonymous ironical Toledan already quoted. Danv. III. 660. Canons to Cardinal, Danv. IV. 66.

[4] Maestrescuela's defense, Dec. 30, 1523, Danv. V. 468. Canons to Cardinal, April 29, Danv. IV. 67. Anonymous letter of April 30, Danv. IV. 69. Canon Ruiz, May 3, Danv. IV. 73. Padilla's widow (Alcocer, Chap. XIII) tried to conceal the news by touring the city, dressed in crimson velvet.

[5] Anonymous letter of May 1, Danv. IV. 69.

[6] Anonymous letter of May 2, Danv. IV. 71 (summarized).

[7] Toledo approached him, and the Bishop also. Acuña seems to have been genuinely alarmed: he approached also D. Pedrolasso (J. de Acuña, May 7, Danv. IV. 77; cf. also Danv. IV. 71, and Santa Cruz, I. 464 ff.). Villena appears to have contributed troops to the Prior, and to have been not unacceptable to the Royalists (Admiral to A. de Bursa, April 15, Danv. III. 600). He was crippled with gout (Villena's letter of Oct., Danv. IV, 565).

partial disarmament on both sides. He hoped to divert the soldiers into defense of the Navarre frontier, and reported Comunero captains as willing, under pardon, to serve there; but he was not completely trusted by the Governors, and was further hampered because the Prior's troops continued to raid and rob. The alarming news from Navarre he tried to suppress by arrest of the messengers; but it got about before his mediation had accomplished anything, and his conciliatory attitude probably rather restored Comunero confidence.[1] So soon as it was generally known that the French were sweeping all before them in the northern province and that the Governors were facing a peril which three weeks earlier would have saved Padilla and the army of Castile, the tenacious and desperate Toledan leaders seized the fighting chance. The frantic Governors, realizing the gravity of this chance, advised compromise with Toledo on almost any terms, so that they might throw all their forces into the defense.[2] But Doña María and Acuña were in communication with the invaders, and hoped to exploit their successes for Comunero advantage. The Bishop started, in disguise, to cross Castile and join his foreign allies; but he was caught a few miles from Logroño, at the very frontier, and was lodged in the prisons of the Viceroy Nájera.

NOTE

Acuña's capture was reported at Burgos May 25 (letter of Constable's wife, May 25, Danv. IV. 47; Bishop of Burgos, May 25, Danv. IV. 109).

The historians have generally assumed that Acuña was running away. That he should really have lost heart, given over the game, and sought security seems to me unlikely, at that time; in that case, flight to Portugal was much safer. It is more consonant with his character and career to suppose he was intending merely to join the invasion and reëstablish the situation in Castile. So believed Fonseca, Bishop of Burgos (letter to D. Carlos, June 9, Danv. IV. 228).

Actual evidence of the communication between the Toledans and the French is scarcely to be expected; but a few scraps exist. Three spies of Doña María were captured and confessed their interviews with French leaders, in October, and their proposal to

[1] Three reports of Villena, May 15; May 15 at night; May 22, in Danv. IV. 78, 81, 82; Santa Cruz, I. 464; Danv. III. 600. An anonymous contemporary quoted in Danv. IV. 283. Alcocer's account (Chap. XV) is very confused.

[2] Admiral, May 7, May 11, Danv. IV. 15–16, 21.

assure Acuña he should be rescued. Their testimony and papers at this date do not prove earlier communication. One captured spy testified that he had been in the employ of the Toledo Commune since Saint John's day (presumably the Baptist, June 24; the Evangelist's day is Dec. 27, and there is a Saint John, Pope and martyr, whose day is May 27). But his testimony clearly implies considerable previous communication. The papers are in Danv. IV. 598–605. Another bit of evidence is in Danv. IV. 615. Fonseca (in the letter cited) declares French assistance was contemplated at the start of the Comunero movement, even before D. Carlos left Spain; but his views are usually more angry than considered. Among the letters captured with L'Esparre in Pamplona was one of his to the King of France, 'in which he said he was in communication with the cities of Castile' (*tenia entelegencia con las Ciudades*). (Admiral, July 10, Danv. IV. 279, 352.) Lope Hurtado, as D. Carlos's special representative, reported, Sep. 4 (Danv. IV. 458), that Toledo expected daily to be succored from France, with which they were in constant communication. It was difficult to prove, however, what Comunero leaders were in correspondence. (Constable, Nov. 1521, Danv. IV. 638.) The Governors, in a report of Oct. 24 (Danv. IV. 539; duplicated IV. 561), make a general charge of this complicity. The Chancellor Gattinara, writing to P. Martyr from Flanders, had early made a general but apparently unsupported charge (Martyr, Epist. DCXCVI, Nov. 8, 1520). Maldonado's comment (contemporary) is interesting: Acuña fled to Navarre 'after long hesitation whither he should first flee. . . . Some of course suspected that Antonio Acuña and María Pacheco had invited the French . . .; but it is not likely that they should choose to summon other masters who had never till the last days doubted of their victory — especially since, after the most diligent investigations into the matter, it was found to be a fable.' (Maldonado, 270.) These words were probably written before Feb. 1523. (Cf. *infra*, p. 366.) For the complicity of Saravia, cf. *infra*, p. 351.

CHAPTER II

NAVARRE

THE cities near the scene of the rout of Villalar had to submit. Valladolid was at once surrounded, the Royalist troops thirsting for an assault and plunder, 'looking for a famous sack and proposing, as they said, to measure out velvet with their pikes'; but the Governors accepted the unconditional surrender of the city and accorded general pardon, excepting but twelve persons.[1] This policy of reserving a dozen exemplary punishments was extended to each surrendered city; and friends and relatives besieged the Governors and monarch with pleas to strike this or that loved name from the dreadful list. A grandee might beg off his servants, and friends set about concealing property of the Comuneros; many towns hastened to certify that the accused were early repentant or Comuneros by compulsion.[2] Carpenters and cutlers, wool-beaters and lime-burners, and other friendless persons remained on the grim lists.

The Governors made a showy entry on April 27 into the sullen Comunero capital.[3] The Chancery courts were reopened; and Licenciado Frias was liberated to see the realization of his prophecies.[4] The Viceroys passed on May 1 into the still ruinous and blackened city of Medina del Campo: preparations were afoot for the great May fair.[5] A week later they were guests of young Fonseca, who had through all the troubles held firm in the fortress of Coca.[6] Their train next filled Segovia with troops, where also the

[1] Sandoval, IX. xxiii. The pardon is in Sandoval, IX. xxiv (number omitted in Pamplona Ed.).

[2] Examples in Danv. IV. 89, 113, 174. Amusingly brazen is the exculpation of the young Comuneros who roused Buendía's town of Dueñas. (Danv. V. 614 ff.) Guadalajara's case is typical (Danv. IV. 247). An indignant official protested that 'the Governors allowed to pass the pardon of Lorca without any exceptions or other punishment, to please the Marquis de los Vélez; for he applied for pardon for them, because the Commune officials of Lorca are his servants and receive the said Marquis's wage, and he clothed them in courtray and silk.' (Danv. IV. 327.)

[3] Sandoval, IX. xxxv.

[4] Danv. III. 787. The Cardinal urged restoration of the courts because the law so required (Danv. IV. 11), the Admiral because the restoration was required for the service of the poor (Danv. IV. 22). There was at once a glut of business (Danv. IV. 496).

[5] Cardinal to D. Carlos, May 1, Danv. IV. 7, 56. [6] Danv. IV. 11.

castillo was thus relieved of a siege almost year-long.[1] The other chief Comunero cities were already passing into the hands of Royalists,[2] or were wholly pacified, so that the Governors could report by May 7 that the realm was obedient, save for Madrid and Toledo.[3] A few days later Madrid was submissive.[4]

But, while still in Segovia, and arranging an advance to pacify Madrid and Toledo, the Governors heard of the French invasion of Navarre, which, beginning May 10, in a period of two weeks occupied almost all that kingdom. Toledo was left to subordinates; the cities were rallied to a programme of national defense; and the Viceroys hurried north to conduct it.

The invasion meant a great hope not merely to the Comuneros, who staked upon it their last-ditch resistance; but also to the Castilian gentlemen who had been unable conscientiously to follow the Comunero revolt through to its radical conclusion. To serve against the French was to serve Castile *and* the King; it offered not merely prospect of pardon, but harmony at last of legal obedience with conviction.

Of these happy warriors one was D. Pedro Girón. His services were accepted and he fought in the relief of Logroño,[5] the siege of which the French were forced to raise on June 11, 1521. In the subsequent campaign to drive the French out of Navarre he also shared, and was present at the Spanish victory of Noain in the valley of Pamplona on

[1] The defense had ruined parts of the adjacent cathedral, which was in the next generation replaced by the great edifice which now stands. (Danv. IV. 233.) The barefoot and ragged defenders, reduced to ass and horse meat, are pictured in Santa Cruz, I. 460.

[2] E.g., León (Danv. IV. 7); Salamanca, May 2 (Danv. IV. 93).

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, May 7, Danv. IV. 12; Admiral to A. de Bursa, May 7, Danv. IV. 15.

[4] She had offered terms, May 7 (Danv. IV. 77) and the fortress was delivered (Admiral to A. de Bursa, May 11, Danv. IV. 23).

[5] This service is mentioned in D. Carlos's commutation of sentence issued from Fres del Val, a monastery near Burgos, Easter Sunday, March 27, 1524 (Danv. IV. 167). A letter of D. Pedro from Logroño, May 28, asks the King's permission to go and serve 'en esas partes,' since he cannot be happy 'to be unemployed in His Majesty's service, seeing others employed in it.' (Danv. IV. 162. The date 1521 of Danvila's title is not in the text; but reference to La Cueva's capture makes it fairly certain. The year date is missing from most of this Girón correspondence, and the assignment in Danvila's titles is often more than dubious.) Danvila understands 'in those parts' to mean Flanders; but the transfer of the war from Castile (Logroño) back into Navarre makes reference to the latter kingdom quite as likely.

June 30,[1] not only risking his life but serving also in heading off the desertion of a body of mutinous troops.[2]

The other Castilian grandee who had abandoned the Comunero revolt shared the same campaign: D. Pedrolasso was in the victory of Noain.[3] Doubtless many a less distinguished and disheartened Comunero there won tacit oblivion of his past.[4]

The distinguished and somewhat ambiguous Gelves veteran, D. Diego de Vera, on the other hand, found in the campaign the eclipse of his glory and repute. His office as captain of artillery, transferred to Herrera, had been, by the King's order, restored to him in the midst of the Navarre war;[5] and his ruffled pride was thereby somewhat soothed. To him was entrusted the frontier fortress of Fuenterrabía, certain to be the prompt subject of attack so soon as the French launched their campaign of recovery.[6] The expected attack was unexpectedly prompt. Fuenterrabía was surrounded and subjected to an artillery fire of unprecedented fury, from twenty-two siege cannon, maintained continuously through ten days, so that there was no opportunity to repair the walls. These were finally demolished and de Vera surrendered, October 17, sacrificing considerable stores of powder and artillery.[7] The Cardinal admitted that the fortress was not adequately provisioned [8] and heard

[1] Also recorded in D. Carlos's commutation of March 27, 1524 (Danv. IV. 167): 'en la cuenca de la cibdad de panplona del nro Reyno de Navarra . . . arriscando y aventurando su persona.' (Sandoval, X. vii.)

[2] D. Pedro to Cardinal, July 9, 1521, Danv. IV. 164. (Both month and year date are in Danvila's title only; the week day, which alone the text includes, corresponds with July 9 of that year, and the reference to events makes the year date and the month fairly certain. Puente la Reina, the place of the letter is just south of Pamplona. Danvila duplicates it in IV. 276.) Constable to D. Carlos, Aug. 12, Danv. IV. 374.

[3] Mentioned in stay of procedure against D. Pedro's property, issued by the Constable and the Admiral, Pamplona, July 1, the day after the battle (Danv. IV. 173; so dated in the text, though Danvila entitles it June 1). Mentioned also in writ of Cardinal, Constable, and Admiral, August 28, securing person, property, and offices of both D. Pedro and his fellow negotiator at Tordesillas, the Bachiller de Guadalajara (Danv. IV. 174). Cardinal to D. Carlos, June 11, Danv. IV. 198; Admiral to A. de Bursa, June 21, Danv. IV. 206.

[4] E.g., Danv. IV. 551 and *passim*.

[5] Constable to D. Carlos, June 11, Danv. IV. 186. Cardinal to D. Carlos, June 11, Danv. IV. 187. Squabble then ensued about allowing his son to succeed to the office. Danv. IV. 393.

[6] Diego Hurtado to D. Carlos, Sep. 9, Danv. IV. 471.

[7] Report of the Governors, Oct. 24, Danv. IV. 539, 541. It is typical that Santa Cruz (I. 471) dates it 'Tuesday, Oct. 28.' Oct. 28 was Monday.

[8] Report to D. Carlos, Oct. 24, Danv. IV. 542.

that the garrison was already on short ration when it surrendered;[1] but D. Carlos's special envoy, Diego Hurtado, reported that the surrender was not compelled by shortage either of men or supply, and the delay of a few days would have saved the place, for weeks of autumn rain following would have driven the French from the field.[2] Thereupon followed the exchange of disculpations and acrimonious recriminations customary with the military after every campaign.[3]

But the reduction of the Comunero peril and the quick recovery of Navarre,[4] by removing the critical necessity for concord, revived all the old rivalries and quarrels. The unwillingness of D. Carlos to follow his Viceroys' recommendations, his curt repudiation of their pledges and promises, exasperated them to protest and disgust.[5] The Admiral relieved his anger by voluminous letters of alternated rebuke and counsel, the Cardinal by brief reports of the cupidity of the others, of their nepotism, of their tricking him into the same exceeding of his commission and authority which they were constantly guilty of.[6] Admiral and Constable, in Adrian's judgment, rated their services very high; the Constable accepted a payment of 10,000 maravedis toward his salary, but he expected to be both Constable and Viceroy in Navarre ('for he is assuming divinity and abandoning humanity: which God alone has reserved for himself,' wrote the contemptuous Admiral), and he made repeated and barefaced demand for the see of Toledo for his son.[7] The Admiral refused offer of the same sum of salary: 'he is not satisfied, nor has he accepted,' reported Adrian;[8] 'and he

[1] Report of Oct. 24, Danv. IV. 545.

[2] To D. Carlos, Nov. 3, Danv. IV. 633; cf. Danv. IV. 550.

[3] The Cardinal held to his view that the besieged were short, even of water; and adds a cipher note to the effect that the main reason was the unwillingness of the garrison to abide a second assault. De Vera, he testified, had long before asked for better supply and repair. (Cardinal to D. Carlos, Dec. 7, Danv. IV. 688.) Insubordination of his troops is de Vera's defense in Sandoval's account (X. xxiv).

The surrender of Fuenterrabía had serious consequences in the bargaining with Toledo. Cf. *infra*, pp. 346, 348.

[4] On the whole Navarre episode cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire* III. 94–106.

[5] Diego Hurtado to D. Carlos, Sep. 9, Danv. IV. 473.

[6] Adrian to D. Carlos, Sep. 18, Danv. IV. 481.

[7] Cardinal to D. Carlos, Nov. 3, Danv. IV. 636; Constable to D. Carlos, Sep. 8, Danv. IV. 465 (the Constable's wife made even more audacious demand for the archbishopric, for their son. To D. Carlos, Sep. 9, Danv. IV. 470; cf. also IV. 267); Admiral to A. de Bursa, June 11, Danv. IV. 194.

[8] To D. Carlos, Nov. 3, Danv. IV. 636.

says he begs no favors. I told him this was not as favor but as salary . . . and that if he wants more he should tell me so, and I would write so and make request of Your Majesty. Therein he made me the same reply, through his chamberlain, saying he is begging no favors. With all this, I think he would like a thousand ducats monthly, as Diego Hurtado reports.' The Admiral's envoy was commissioned to represent to D. Carlos 'that Your Majesty should give Toledo to the Constable for his distinguished services, et cetera; and that favors or grievance he himself would accept for his portion, since Your Majesty combined them.' The disgruntled grandee confined his specific requests to 'six colts of the Naples breed wherewith he might serve His Majesty.' [1] So bitter became the resentment between the Admiral and the Council, whom he wrote of as 'enemies of the realm,' [2] that the Señor President ostentatiously avoided meeting him, to the huge scandal of Castilian etiquette.[3]

To secure some degree of harmony, at least among the Governors, the King sent his special representative, Diego Hurtado, who was glad to report elaborate profession of reconcilement, though the Admiral wrote sarcastic expressions of his resentment at the appointment.[4]

To the querulousness of the Viceroys the grandees added a full chorus of clamor for rewards. 'The caballeros have no fear of the Governors,' reported Adrian,[5] 'nor any wish that Your Majesty's army should be organized or commanded by any of them; but every one of them follows his own wish and marches whithersoever he has a fancy. Surely this triumph in Navarre has come rather by the hand of God than by human effort.' 'The grandees,' he reported later,[6] 'seem not to be displeased by the success of the French. It may be . . . that through increase of Your Majesty's need they may increase the favors they expect from Your Majesty.'

[1] Admiral's commission, printed by Danvila (IV. 360) with documents of 1521; but reference to the departure of the Pope (Adrian) shows it to be of January 1522 or later. It is duplicated at IV. 396.

[2] Admiral to A. de Bursa, Sep. 6, Danv. IV. 460.

[3] Report of Diego Hurtado, Sep. 3, Danv. IV. 457.

[4] Particularly his Instructions to A. de Bursa, Aug. 5, Danv. IV. 343; cf. Danv. IV. 478. The Constable's wife wrote that *she* had effected the reconciliation (Danv. IV. 470).

For the whole squabble cf. Danv. IV. 291, 345, 365, 380, 478, 551, 631, 632.

[5] To Zapata, July 28, Danv. IV. 291.

[6] Oct. 24, after the French captured Fuenterrabía. Danv. IV. 545.

Corpus Christi Church, in Segovia, and House of Juan Bravo

The Church of Corpus Christi, a synagogue of the Moorish period, has by recent removal of subsequent construction been restored to its interesting state as a monument of Moslem art, outwardly indicated by its horse-shoe portal and its *ajimez* window.

The house, occupied, as tradition reports, by the Comunero captain Juan Bravo, has been carefully drawn and studied in the Sketch Book of the Association of (British) Architects, Vol. V, 1901. *Cf.* Dieulafoy, *Spain*, in the series *Ars Una*, p. 231. It is but for modern alterations typical of the fortress-like houses of the fifteenth century, in which no openings, except for the tremendous doorway, pierce the masonry save at a safe elevation of a story or two above the street.



ENTRANCE TO THE CHURCH OF CORPUS CHRISTI, SEGOVIA

THE HOUSE TRADITIONALLY CALLED JUAN BRAVO'S, SEGOVIA

(And a cipher paragraph:) 'We are equipping here again another army, but very slowly, so that many allege publicly that Your Majesty's necessities are pleasing to certain of the satraps, in order that through this fact they may sell their services dear — as has been customary in Castile heretofore. Please God these same satraps may not secretly fan the fire which in public they want it to appear that they desire to quench. The Admiral and the Constable complain that Your Majesty does not allow them authority to grant favors; though, for all that, they do not omit to put through certain sufficiently exorbitant affairs for their kin, friends, and servants. On these sometimes I comment, sometimes not; and they are indignant when I oppose them. They tell me Your Majesty is not informed of the details of happenings (especially in these war matters), and that Castile should be ruled rather by the decision of those here present than by that of Your Majesty or your Council who are absent. When in this matter I adduce the restrictions [of our commissions] they reply that neither has Your Majesty commissioned them to win so many battles.' [1]

Yet the situation continued too grave to compromise by wrangling among the rulers. All the cities, as the Admiral insisted,[2] still had their walls and 'no hearts were yet won.' Disorder had become endemic throughout Castilian society.[3] All classes were terrified by the ominous refusal of the King to concede pardon, and all interests alarmed by the myriad suits for damages that glutted the newly opened Courts of Chancery in Valladolid.[4] The enormous demonstration in Segovia when the dishonored remains of Juan Bravo were taken home was eloquent reminder of the bitter resentments still smouldering in Castile.[5] The army, as Diego Hurtado reported,[6] was disintegrating. Since His Majesty, the Admiral suggested,[7] was sending a special representative 'to repair our errors, or report them,' he had far better 'find another governor who can satisfy troops

[1] Danv. IV. 547. Cf. also Cardinal to D. Carlos, Dec. 7, Danv. IV. 689.

[2] May 11, Danv. IV. 18.

[3] See the picturesque account of how the Duke of the Infantazgo went about recovering a stray hawk. Danv. IV. 121 ff.

[4] Danv. IV. 496.

[5] The riots and the hangings and exile that followed are reported in Vozmediano's report of June 2 or 9. Danv. III. 766 ff.; cf. also IV. 231.

[6] To D. Carlos, Sep. 9, Danv. IV. 472.

[7] The exasperated credentials to A. de Bursa, Aug. 5, Danv. IV. 343, 345.

without paying them.' A considerable reverse in Navarre might kindle Castile to flame.[1] To extinguish the remaining focus of the conflagration, in Toledo, was the agonized desire, therefore, of the Viceroys; and the degree of concession reasonable to pay for this end was among the acutest of the differences that paralyzed the councils of the rulers.

[1] Admiral, July 10, Danv. IV. 279.

CHAPTER III

WIDOW AND PRIOR

WHILE Acuña went to join their foreign ally, the defense of the city of Toledo against the Prior's forces rested with Doña María Pacheco and Gutierre López de Padilla, younger brother of the Comunero captain.[1] Their courage was sustained by the news from Navarre. The second, third, and last weeks of May and the first of June brought only disaster to Castilian arms. The French were across all the breadth of Navarre and besieging the Castilian frontier city of Logroño. The immediate situation of the Toledans was harassed but not hopeless. The Prior harried them by a campaign of raids and skirmishes, which he tried constantly to tighten into a siege; but to beleaguer the city was exceedingly difficult, because the Tajo flowed under its walls and Castilian command was divided.[2] If not victory, favorable compromise appeared at least to be within grasp of the Toledans. This the Viceroys repeatedly urged on the King. The excitable Admiral was all for speed. 'When we were nearing Segovia the city folk came to offer obedience; and over one person [to be] excepted [from the pardon], more or less, we lost two or three days, though the couriers of the Duke of Nájera lost none, nor the French on their march. . . . I was making all haste, and the Cardinal killing himself that Navarre might be succored with more troops. It was my judgment that agreement be reached with Toledo in whatever fashion; and that we and the Prior's army go to Navarre.'[3] The suspended mediation of the Marquis of Villena was consequently resumed. D. Pedrolasso attempted reconciliation;[4] and negotiations were finally entrusted to the Bishop of León and Bari.[5]

[1] Admiral, July 10, Danv. IV. 278.

[2] The inconclusiveness of cavalry raiding without infantry support is noted (Danv. IV. 415). Santa Cruz (I. 471 ff.) records the campaign. In the skirmish of Olias (August 17) the poet Garcilasso was wounded. J. de Rivera, Captain-General on but one side of the river, reports in August (Danv. IV. 410, 412). Bari notes, Oct. 18 (Danv. IV. 560), the futility of controlling but one bank of the rising river.

[3] Report of June 11, Danv. IV. 190, 191; cf. also IV. 15, 21, 391.

[4] Danv. IV. 34 (May 24).

[5] He began negotiation from Sisla, Sep. 14, Danv. IV. 493. Danvila calls

During the French victories the Toledan demands were arrogant.[1] 'Toledo has sent her deputies with several *capítulos*,' reported Adrian, 'and indeed the city demands such considerable things that I fear we cannot reach agreement. I think she could not ask or demand more if she had gained the victory for Your Majesty.'[2] 'The Toledans,' reported the more peremptory Constable, 'have come with some *capítulos*, unofficially (*fuera de su orden*?). They will not be granted, out of consideration for Your Majesty's service. They got a reply very different from their expectation. Their ambassadors have not broken the thread of negotiation.'[3]

What stood chiefly in the way of compromise was the determination of Doña María to protect the interests of her children, and of the city to score its point of honor.[4] However galling that concession, it was not in substance burdensome. The Marquis of Mondéjar urged it: 'After the rout,' he reported to the Cardinal,[5] 'when I knew the death of Juan de Padilla, I wrote his wife, Doña María Pacheco, my sister, and sent my servant to see if I could help her and her sons, since I had no power to help the misfortune of her husband. My messenger writes me he could not manage to get my sister out of there, as I wanted. The principal reason is surely to protect the property of her sons. It seems to me it would serve our lord the King to get her out from there, and that concession should be made — as a favor to me and other of my kin who have served — in the matter of her children's property. I beseech your Reverend Lordship to do me the favor to try to obtain this provision for the property of my sister's children, for it is, I think, little sacrifice, since their father has suffered in person. On that ground I will try to get her away to any place that I can.' To this obviously partial advice the Admiral added impatient protest against haggling over 'a few bits of property.' 'I was always urging

him Bishop of Astorga (IV. 493), but of León (IV. 559). *Doc. Inéd.* (I. 310) assigns him to León; as does P. Martyr, Epist. DCXCV.

[1] Diego Hurtado to D. Carlos, Sep. 18, Danv. IV. 477.

[2] To D. Carlos, May 23, Danv. IV. 30.

[3] *Ibid.*, May 24, Danv. IV. 35.

[4] The masculine quality of this spirited woman is noted in all the contemporary chroniclers. P. Martyr's comment, written at the beginning of the struggle (July 5, 1520, Epist. DCLXXIX) is the most pregnant: 'Elati aiunt animi esse foeminam illam, et mariti maritum.'

[5] June 15, Danv. IV. 256.

that we compromise with Toledo and that the Prior of San Juan with his 5000 foot and 600 lances go to the relief of Navarre, and that all of us should go. Three or four bits of property in Toledo were always rated higher than Navarre; and so the realm was lost. I think when damages and costs are estimated and paid, they will be found to have been bought very dear.' [1] Even in October, to the astonishment of the Cardinal,[2] the Prior (at the end of his money) and the Duke of the Infantazgo and the Marquis of Villena were urging this concession; which was in fact on the 25th of the month incorporated in the convention of Sisla.[3]

This document granted to the city, 'in regard for the fact that the city deserves the name she has of very noble and very loyal,' general pardon and acquittal of 'any stain, infamy, vice, or defect' attaching to the revolt — Junta deputies and officials and persons who assisted in the arrest of the Council alone excepted — and security against any suits of damage or recovery. The property and offices of Juan de Padilla ('may he inherit glory') were secured to his child, and his widow was to have his body for burial as she pleased, and the city was authorized to make her compensation. All exiles were allowed to return. The Governors were to appoint a corregidor and take possession of the gates, bridges, and alcázar. The Governors were to confirm within fifteen days and the King within five months, under penalty of 100,000 ducats; and oath was given never to ask absolution from the promises made.

The city received the compromise with great demonstrations of joy. Doña María appeared to accept the result and to work for its success.[4] Armed resistance was ended. Yet no one can have realized more than Doña María that she continued in Toledo only on sufferance. Acuña could count on no chance of rescue. Evidence of their complicity with the French invasion was in the Viceroys' hands. The Gov-

[1] Instruction to A. de Bursa, June 21, Danv. IV. 202. Cf. similar report, Aug. 27, Danv. IV. 387. (Much of this report is duplicated in long undated report, 347 ff.) The properties were of Padilla, Avalos, and Gaitán. Haggling had cost by Aug. 27, as the Admiral estimated, 100,000 ducats.

[2] Adrian to D. Carlos, Oct. 24, Danv. IV. 544.

[3] The final compromise was preceded by more considerable concessions, gradually whittled down as the Comunero hopes faded. The Cardinal reports on Oct. 24 receipt of *capítulos* more moderate than earlier submitted (Danv. IV. 546). Further draft and emendations, of Oct. 25, are given in Danv. IV. 566 ff.; and the accepted document on pp. 573–85.

[4] Prior to the Governors, Oct. 29, Danv. IV. 587.

ernors were in fact ashamed of the bargain they had accepted in dire necessity. 'The Prior D. Antonio,' reported the Cardinal,[1] 'has reduced Toledo to obedience and service to Your Highness, upon terms little creditable to Your Majesty and your royal preëminence . . .; but every one felt that, to expel the French from these realms and get the troops who were with the Prior, it was most important to reach an agreement with Toledo, even though at a disadvantage, for Doña María Pacheco was in communication with the French. . . . We have certainly conceded very exorbitant *capítulos*, giving full authority for every thing to the said Prior. When we sent him the *capítulos* we were willing to agree to, we gave him direction that, even though he somewhat extended them, we would none the less account them settled and valid. But the Prior went so far and gratified them so much that already the Admiral is beginning to express blame for it. If we now undertook to retract it, it would appear scandalous and pernicious to the whole realm. . . . Of the *capítulos*, the first are very bad and the rest not good. As I have often said in the Council, we have no authority to grant one or the other; but the Prior, after the fall of Fuenterrabía, granted them, of necessity.' The laconic Constable added, 'In regard to Toledo, news reached us last night [2] that it is reduced to your service. The Prior conceded to them what neither he nor we would have desired. It could not be helped; for the expenses Your Majesty was there incurring were all that could be endured, and whoever bargains with necessity cannot bargain well.'

D. Carlos would certainly take the first shadow of justification for repudiating the Sisla agreement. This occurred in certain disorders in the city on February 2, 1522. The sullen streets again heard the shouts of 'Padilla and the Commune!' The demonstrations were ferociously repressed; a boy who had shouted was lashed, his father seized and hanged. Houses were again barricaded and garrisoned, and bloodshed followed. Resistance was now hopeless. Doña María fled, disguised as a farm woman, to Portugal. She was condemned to death in absence. The serviceable Zumel was appointed alcalde mayor, February 18, and proceeded, without trial, to hang, draw, and quarter. He ploughed and

[1] To D. Carlos, Dec. 5, Danv. IV. 678, 681.

[2] *Ibid.*, Dec. 8. The Viceroys were in Vitoria. Danv. IV. 692.

sowed with salt the sites of the houses of Padilla and set up a marble inscription on the spot.[1]

[1] Danv. V. 39 ff., 59, 66, 81, 98; Santa Cruz, I. 505 ff.; Maldonado, 275. Quevedo appends, as note 16, a long excerpt from a manuscript written by a servant of Doña María, about her last days in Toledo and her escape. Alcocer's account (67–83) is picturesquely detailed. A second petition to King Felipe II in 1552 for removal of the inscription was refused. The city was still paying assessments for damages in 1535.

CHAPTER IV

BENIGN TO PARDON

THE rightness and wisdom of a course of forgiveness had for many months been commended to the young monarch by his Governors. The Cardinal so early as January had gently declined the vindictive suggestion that he then list the guilty.[1] The Constable and some even of the Council saw the wisdom of overlooking the past, since rigorous investigation might reveal appalling complicities.[2] The impulsive and generous Admiral could scarcely keep from a single letter his advice that the sovereign learn to forget, arguing that liberal forgiveness was necessary to accomplish any effective closing of the Comunero revolt.[3]

One voice of mercy was unfortunately removed from the royal counsels before D. Carlos came to Spain. Adrian was elected Pope in January, and could not delay the interests of the Catholic Church for the dilatory preferences of the young Emperor.[4] He left Castile in March, 1522.[5]

D. Carlos landed in Spain, July 16, 1522. To his decision in person were still to be submitted the cases of grandees, deputies, soldiers, and humbler folk, captives in the fortresses of the realm or fugitives in the neighboring kingdom. Many of these had hope of pardon, or promise — even the sworn assurance of the Governors, who had throughout the long struggle urged upon all classes that both grievances and offenses be entrusted to the gracious adjustment of the monarch who, Adrian said, was 'of generous and royal mind and heart,' and, as the Admiral declared, 'benign to pardon and liberal in satisfaction.' [6]

[1] Adrian to D. Carlos, Jan. 11, Danv. III. 33.

[2] *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, Danv. IV. 548.

[3] The Admiral points out the gross spitefulness of such absentee wrath (Danv. IV. 346; cf. IV. 350, 352, 354, *et passim*).

[4] Constable to D. Carlos, April 25, Danv. V. 81. This detail certainly dates as of 1522 the reports of the Admiral which Danvila prints as of 1521 (IV. 357, 362).

[5] For a brief and ineffective pontificate. Contemptuous Rome, to which Spain's latest contribution had been Alexander VI Borgia, found a chaste and truthful Pope far too naïve a figure. (The surprising first sentence of the Admiral's *Relación* in Danv. IV. 362 is, I assume, a misprint.)

[6] Cf. *supra*, pp. 179, 192.

Unsparing justice had before his arrival exacted many exemplary punishments. Three Comunero captains perished on the morrow of their defeat, in the muddy square of the village of Villalar. Of the persons excepted when the submission of the cities was accepted by the Viceroys many had already been executed. The voice of legal and inexorable severity was of course the Council. So little were they touched by considerations of policy — still less of mercy — that the Viceroys were themselves appalled. The Council, as the Admiral repeatedly argued to his sovereign, was universally regarded as vindictive and prejudiced, and not to be entrusted with punishment; they stood 'knife in hand, and no sooner is a man arrested than he is beheaded.' [1] By their swift decision the accused who were unprotected by powerful relatives went to as swift a fate. D. Juan de Figueroa, the aristocratic young hothead of Sevilla, was liberated; [2] but the humbler Comunero captain who supported him was condemned to ignominious execution.[3] Only chance saved here and there a friendless Comunero. The farrier of the village of Sepúlveda confessed that, on hearing of the death of Padilla, he had said: 'God grant that he who killed him may end in the same fashion.' He was bitted, publicly lashed with one hundred lashes, and condemned to exile; but the Town Council, in view of the fact that the man was from his punishment at the point of death, and the only veterinary of the village, secured repeal of the exile.[4] His Grace of Granada, President of the Council, wrote to assure D. Carlos that any remissness in prosecutions was in no wise the fault of the Council.[5]

Deputy Saravia, one of the most conspicuous of the *enragés* of Valladolid, had attempted escape.[6] The authorities, seeking a robber in the Districts of Castile, arrested him, though not recognizing him, and sent him to Burgos, where he was identified.[7] He was fleeing to Navarre and was suspected of collusion with the French; torture, it was

[1] Long report of the Admiral (Danv. IV. 353), essentially duplicated at IV. 387, where it is dated Aug. 27, 1521.

[2] Bishop of Burgos, Aug. 29 and Sep. 22, Danv. IV. 435. Cf. V. 291, 448, 558.

[3] Danv. IV. 423. [4] *Ibid.*, 311. [5] Aug. 6, Danv. IV. 407.

[6] Danvila (IV. 402) says he was captured at Villalar. P. Martyr characterized him as 'ex ordine equestri, virum semicatilinarium, sui profusum, alieni appetentem.' (Epist. DCXCV.) He further characterizes the Valladolid Jacobin in Epist. DCC (Nov. 26).

[7] D. Hurtado to D. Carlos, Sep. 3, Danv. IV. 456.

expected, would bring significant confession, but he was beheaded in the Burgos Square, August 19, and took with him to the grave whatever he knew of that.[1]

A more conspicuous culprit came to his account at the same time. D. Pedro Maldonado Pimentel [2] had escaped execution with his fellow captains of Villalar and was still under the powerful protection of his uncle, the Count of Benavente.[3] He was confined in Simancas. A royal writ, secured undoubtedly by his uncle from the Viceroys, secured him against any execution of sentence until D. Carlos's arrival;[4] and uneasiness was felt lest he escape.[5] The authorities of justice proceeded, however, with the prosecution, and ordered, in September, 1521, sequestration of his property, allowing him twelve ducats daily for his expenses in prison.[6] The Emperor after his arrival allowed justice to take its course; the Council convicted, and Maldonado was beheaded in the Simancas Square, August 16.[7]

Meanwhile seven Junta deputies, captives since Tordesillas was recovered twenty months earlier, were awaiting judgment.[8] They had been moved from prison to prison, from insecure Tordesillas on October 4, 1521, to Arévalo and Zamora, and thence to Medina del Campo, where gentler treatment and removal of their fetters seemed to promise mercy.[9] From the donjon of la Mota they peeped out on the sunlight of spring and summer; and half a dozen

[1] *Doc. Inéd.* (I. 289) prints the sentence, which declares the French invasion occurred 'por consejo y cartas del dicho Alonso de Saravia e los otros traidores sus consortes.' But the Viceroys' correspondence reports nothing conclusive from his torture. Adrian to D. Carlos, Aug. 30, Danv. IV. 393, 394.

[2] Danvila makes a confusing presentation of his case, in III. 378 ff. He refers to him sometimes as Maldonado, sometimes as Pimentel. Confusion is increased by the fact that there was also a Pedro Maldonado. Cf. names in general pardon of Oct. 28 (Danv. V. 244, 253).

[3] Danv. IV. 718.

[4] *Ibid.*, III. 778. This is confusingly referred to as a letter from the King, in III. 788.

[5] Cabezudo's *History of Simancas* (MS.), 158 (Danv. III. 778), related that he was invited to escape, before reaching Simancas, and refused.

[6] Danv. III. 779.

[7] *Ibid.*, 780. Danvila (V. 278) states that he was sentenced Nov. 2; but this date is of the *copy* of sentence given in *Doc. Inéd.* I. 294. He is mentioned as already executed in the pardon of October 28.

[8] *Ibid.*, V. 196 lists them thus: Sotomayor, Madrid; Solier, Segovia; Montoya, Toledo; Mencio, Toro; Santiago, Soria; Cabeza de Vaca, Murcia; Sánchez, Salamanca.

[9] *Ibid.*, IV. 627; V. 47, 190.

of them came forth on August 14 only to be beheaded in the still partly ruined square of Medina.[1]

A visit of five days in the early fall [2] with his mother, whose pathetic condition was quite unchanged, might be expected to touch the royal young gentleman to some mood of mercy. A formidable earthquake, that spread death and wretchedness through the southern realms in the middle of the month, made further appeal to all sympathies.[3] On November 1, accordingly, in the great square of Valladolid solemn proclamation of general pardon was made in the presence of the Emperor and the Court.[4] Two hundred and ninety-three persons were by name excepted, and vindictive pains were taken to name a score of persons already executed.[5] Not merely did the long list of exceptions make the document seem more like a bloody sentence than a pardon; but among the excepted persons appeared the names of those to whom the Governors had issued sworn writs of security. The Admiral's letters became accordingly a storm of protests that the sovereign thus flatly repudiated the measures of his Viceroys.[6] The motive of the exceptions was probably in part mercenary, to simplify confiscation of immense properties. The owners had fled in a considerable migration to Portugal.

D. Pedrolasso had unambiguously broken with the Comuneros and had heartily and wholly worked to end the revolt; he had served with distinction in Navarre; no other person was more insistently commended to D. Carlos's clemency.[7] 'As soon as he understood the hoax, he got out,' the Constable wrote, 'and it was a great blow to Your Majesty's enemies.' [8] But his name was among the ex-

[1] Danv. V. 196, 204. Two months later (Oct. 13), Sotomayor of Madrid perished on the same scaffold. It does not appear why his execution was delayed. *Doc. Inéd.* II. 455; Sandoval, IX. xxxi.

[2] Sep. 2–7, Sandoval, XI. iii.

[3] Mexía, 296–98; taken over by Sandoval, XI. iii.

[4] The pardon is dated Oct. 28; the proclamation, Nov. 1 (Danv. V. 250, 251). Mexía misdates Oct. 1; and Sandoval (IX. xxx, number omitted in Ed. 1634) dates the proclamation Oct. 28. Danvila gives the full text with all the names of the excepted (V. 239 ff.). A supplementary pardon listing 32 of the excepted was issued, Aug. 27, 1525 (Danv. V. 557. He miscounts and mistitles as of 35 persons).

[5] Danvila (V. 238) counts 21; but there appear to be 22, Pacheco and Delgado, 'justiciados' (p. 246), being two persons.

[6] E.g., Danv. V. 232, 274, 275, 277, 411.

[7] E.g., Danv. IV. 349, 364 (Admiral); 378 (Cardinal).

[8] To D. Carlos, May 24, 1521, Danv. III. 34, duplicated at 41.

cepted, and he fled to Portugal. For his property and person he had a viceregal writ of security;[1] but his estates were seized. Admiral and Constable tried to reinstate him in his tenancy of Gibraltar;[2] but the fortress was confiscated.[3] Even of his life he was not wholly secure. D. Carlos at once demanded surrender of the exiles; but the Court of Portugal pointed out that no treaty obligations required such extradition, and they were assured a refuge of a few months, which was by connivance extended.[4] The grand gentlemen of Castile, however, cut but a sorry figure prowling about the Portuguese Court, seeking audience that was refused, dodging and apologizing to the Spanish Ambassador, who reported their every move,[5] and reduced, some of them, to teaching grammar to boys, for a living.

Pardon was at some date secured for D. Pedrolasso, coupled with life exile; but this was, on May 13, 1526, mitigated by admission to any parts of Castile except Toledo or the Court.[6]

In spite of brilliant services in the Navarre war, D. Pedro Girón did not, when D. Carlos landed in July, 1522, venture to apply for pardon in person — discouraged, apparently, by the Constable.[7] That the Viceroy's distrust was grounded appeared in the fact that D. Pedro was also excepted from the pardon of October 28. The Admiral had plied D. Carlos with requests for forgiveness, urging D. Pedro's early repentance and constant usefulness, omitting from his plea nothing save the absolute assertion that D. Pedro had betrayed the Comunero cause to the Royalists.[8] 'Valladolid,' he wrote, 'and much of the realm, when Juan de Padilla died, called for D. Pedro Girón; and if he had gone we should now have greater difficulties. We or-

[1] Aug. 23, 1521. The Bachiller de Guadalajara was included: it was an acknowledgment of the attempt of the Tordesillas conferees to bring the Comunero revolt back to reason. Danv. IV. 452.

[2] July 5, 1521, Danv. IV. 268 (summarized only. The year date is suspicious).

[3] Admiral to D. Carlos, Danv. IV. 364. (Among letters of 1521; but reference to the Pope and to Zumel fix it as 1522.)

[4] J. de Rivera to Governors, May 29, 1522 (Danv. V. 122), says three months. *Doc. Inéd.* (I. 287) gives some of the correspondence and mentions two months. Danv. V. 210; cf. V. 369.

[5] Danv. V. 385, 447 ff., 492 ff. [6] *Ibid.*, IV. 176; V. 574.

[7] An abjectly humble letter of Aug. 6 explains why he has not presented himself. (Danv. IV. 165, duplicated in V. 206. The text gives no year date; and I cannot locate the place, 'Valbuena.')

[8] Danv. IV. 346 (Aug. 5); 349; 362; 364.

dered him in His Majesty's name not to accept, and he obeyed; for which His Majesty is under obligation to him.' [1] Pardon was at some subsequent date finally extorted, coupled with the condition that he supply and serve with sixteen lances in Orán against the Moor.[2] Holy Week of 1524 D. Carlos spent, as was his custom, in a convent, at Fres del Val near Burgos, whence on Easter Day [3] he issued a writ reciting D. Pedro's case and commuting his exile so that he might return to Castile, provided he remained on his paternal estates and ten leagues away from Court.[4]

Among the grandee fugitives, apologizing and maneuvering, watched and bullied by D. Carlos's spy at the Court, was the Count of Salvatierra. He shared the Ambassador's

[1] Instruction to A. de Bursa, May 7, 1521, Danv. IV. 16.

[2] That he went there appears from the commutation of sentence, March 27, 1524, Danv. IV. 167.

[3] March 27. Cf. Mexía, 323.

[4] The letter of Danvila (V. 138) from D. Pedro's father, thanking D. Carlos for the favor accorded his son, and recording touchingly the need he has for his son's 'presence and company,' looks like an acknowledgment of this commutation of sentence. Danvila titles it June 15, 1522; but the year date does not appear in the text. The father's reference to going to express thanks in person somewhat implies that D. Carlos is in Spain, which was not the case in June, 1522. My conjecture is that the note should be dated 1524. The place appears as Osuna in the title, Osma in the text. The inferences of Danvila (V. 137) do not at all follow from the letter.

A group of letters misplaced in Danvila seem to be the appeals that obtained this commutation of exile. The Constable writes March 26: 'When Your Majesty was proposing to go to Fres del Val, I asked you to take pity on D. Pedro Girón's wife; and it was left that Your Majesty would consider this. Now, in these holy days when Your Majesty is accustomed to exercise many acts of mercy, I beseech you to remember this woman . . . and that the exile he is passing in Orán may be converted into some penalty here in Castile.' March 26, 1524 is Saturday before Easter. This letter Danvila summarizes (III. 433) among the letters of 1521; and prints (V. 60) with title date of 1522, though no date appears in the text. The reference to Orán excludes 1521 and 1522; the reference to Fres del Val almost determines the date 1524. Guevara's letter of April, 1524 (312), to Girón, says: 'In this monastery of Fres del Val I have preached to our emperor all this Holy Week, during which time the Constable and I have talked with him of your affair.' A letter of the Constable's wife, asking also that D. Carlos allow D. Pedro to 'come to Castile, and there impose on him what penalty he may please,' is summarized (III. 433) as of 1521, but is probably of 1524. A plea of Girón's wife, March 16, to the Count of Nassau, asking his intercession, 'because the time is such as befits pardoning,' with the Emperor, and urging that the Emperor be satisfied with the penitence already performed, is almost certainly of 1524, though Danvila assigns that date with a question. A plea of Girón of May 11, from Zaragoza, speaks of writing recently from Vitoria, and is a general request that his penalty 'be commuted to some other, as heavy as Your Majesty see fit, which shall deliver me from that of being forgotten by you, since I account no other so severe.' This can hardly be, as Danvila entitles it, of 1521 (IV. 162); but is probably subsequent to the commutation of 1524, which exiled D. Pedro from court.

scoldings and lecturings, and heard the vague promises of pardon for the sufficiently humble.[1] Some of the exiles ventured back quietly into Castilian monasteries, or hovered at the border to observe the fate of the bolder.[2] Trusting to the example of grudging clemency extended to Girón and Lasso, the Count had the ill-judged audacity to return to his home in January, 1524, and even to ask for the reopening of his case. He had been condemned in absence to death;[3] and his property was entirely confiscated. Instead of consenting to rehearing, the authorities held Salvatierra gyved in jail, and demanded execution of sentence. He was reduced to extreme poverty, and was supplied with a ducat a day by his brother-in-law, D. Antonio de Fonseca, the burning general of the days of Medina. Before final decision was reached on his request, on Sunday, May 16, 1524, he opened a vein and bled to death. The body was borne to burial with the feet protruding so that the gyves might be seen 'in manifestation of justice'; but many gentlemen followed it, for he was of gentle blood, descended, 'as he said, from father to son, from the Goths.'[4]

The notorious prisoner, of whom most was to be expected, either from confession or from inflicting on him exemplary punishment, was the Bishop of Zamora. He was entrenched in the privileges attaching to his status as cleric and prelate; Papal approval was needed to submit him to torture, and he could not be executed by the civil authorities.[5] The Bishop accepted his imprisonment with composure, was allowed a confessor, an occasional interview, and books, duly examined to detect clandestine messages;[6] he even presented an *apologia*, and applied for pardon.[7] The King's agents were most anxious to get into Royal custody so important a prisoner; and long negotiation was necessary to persuade the Duke of Nájera to hand him over.[8] It was not till the beginning of 1523 that he was

[1] Cipher report of Ambassador Zúñiga, Aug. 29, 1523, Danv. V. 447.

[2] Danv. V. 385. [3] By the Council, Aug. 22, 1522.

[4] The most authoritative material about Salvatierra's end is his *dossier* in the Salvatierra archives. Danvila prints also (V. 485 ff.) the more picturesque accounts of three anonymous chroniclers, one of whom (formerly supposed to be Ayora) is followed by Sandoval, IX. xxxiii.

[5] Danv. IV. 378, 636; Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 121.

[6] Danv. V. 407, 432.

[7] The apologia is mere generalities (Danv. IV. 523). The Cardinal reports the request for pardon to D. Carlos, Dec. 5, 1521, Danv. IV. 683.

[8] Danv. IV. 477, 481, 632, 692, *et passim*.

securely confined in a *cubo* of the fortress of Simancas, and Pope Adrian ordered his trial to proceed. Adrian had died and was succeeded by Clement VII, when Acuña's trial actually began, April, 1524, and dragged through a maze of technicalities, for season after season.[1] Whatever its outcome might have been, a dramatic new turn was given to the case in February, 1526, by an outburst of Acuña's which suspended his trial as Comunero, for drumhead trial as assassin.[2]

The deputy warden of Simancas, Noguerol, had a slave girl Juana, who smuggled in a knife and letters to Acuña, concerting, with a chaplain and a muleteer of Simancas, measures for the Bishop's escape. To accomplish this, Acuña sprang on Noguerol and with his knife and an improvised black-jack [3] despatched the man, and got almost over the battlements, when he was caught, bloody-handed. Ronquillo, the hanging judge of the Segovia days, was assigned to the trial. March 22, Acuña was tortured, and condemned the day following. An escort of friars, singing the Miserere and more distressed than the condemned, accompanied Acuña from his cell to the point of the wall where he had almost escaped. The garrote was there attached and Acuña was strangled. The muleteer had escaped; but the slave girl was tortured by driving candlewood splinters under her finger-nails, by lashing her with one hundred stripes, and by cutting her tongue out. Ronquillo was promptly excommunicated by the Church and thanked and rewarded by the Crown.

[1] Danv. V. 490 ff.

[2] Danvila (V. 568 ff.) summarizes the considerable material about Acuña's second trial. Cf. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 121, and references; Sandoval, IX. xxxii. A full manuscript record of Acuña's trial exists in the Biblioteca Provincial of Toledo (Alcocer Note 24): I have not seen it.

[3] 'Una bolsa de cuero con un grande quijarro.'

CHAPTER V

QUIET AS A HAMLET OF THREE VILLAGERS

THE affairs of the realm were meanwhile settling into their customary courses. Hopeful spirits like Fray Francisco de los Angeles persisted in presenting *capítulos* to the Emperor, some of which were conceded in spite of the protest of the Council President that the friar was no better than a mere Comunero — and 'God grant when I die other angels may bear me to Paradise.' [1] Cortes was assembled again in Valladolid in July, 1523. The sovereign issued with the summons a model commission wherewith the cities were to empower their deputies. The old protest was renewed. The old attempt was renewed to make consideration of the *capítulos* of redress precede granting the *servicio* demanded.[2] Zumel was constantly employed and fulfilled his commissions with distinguished success. He was sent to deal with the troubles in Valencia, and, after the February outbreak, succeeded Bari in Toledo, which he left 'quiet as a hamlet of three villagers.' [3] He accumulated rewards: auditorship of the Valladolid chancery; regidorship of Toledo in place of the rebel Ávalos; the recommendation of the Constable for a place in the Council. He was made guardian of Salvatierra's son and administrator of his property.[4] He was heavily indemnified for his losses in Burgos, and got a life pension of 320 ducats per annum.[5] Even so he was not satisfied; but wrote to the monarch that he had scarce enough to eat, he who had most contributed to the rescue of His Majesty's realms! [6] He developed the querulousness of those who know themselves indispensable. After the Cortes of Toledo, of 1525, he received a *douceur* of two hundred gold ducats.[7]

The troublesome proposal was never renewed of vindicating the royal rights of Doña Juana, who remained, for

[1] Constable and Cardinal, Aug., 1521, Danv. IV. 375, 377; His Grace of Granada, Aug. 6, 1521, Danv. IV. 408.

[2] Danv. V. 537 ff.; Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 122 ff.

[3] Constable to D. Carlos, March 24, 1522, Danv. V. 59.

[4] Danv. IV. 501, 118, 371, 562. [5] *Ibid.*, V. 120, 560.

[6] To D. Carlos, May 26, 1522, Danv. V. 120.

[7] Danv. V. 545.

the rest of the long life which Providence vouchsafed to her, in retirement in Tordesillas, celebrating annual obsequies for her husband D. Felipe; angered and frightened by a conviction that the ladies of her household meant to kill her; and continuing, by a willful preference, to be hungry and dirty.[1]

[1] The Admiral suggested to her that she could spite the ladies if she would persistently eat and sleep. (To D. Carlos, Jan. 2, 1525, Danv. V. 547.) All of Denia's reports speak of the difficulty of persuading her to change her clothing or go to bed.

Doña Juana died on Good Friday, 1555, at the age of seventy-five. Rodríguez Villa, 396.

THE END

APPENDIX
The Sources

APPENDIX

The Sources

Our knowledge of the revolt of the Castilian cities which organized revolutionary communes or *comunidades*, and shook the foundations of the Spanish state in 1521 comes chiefly from nine sources, all available in print, two in Latin, one in a modern Spanish version of an unpublished Latin contemporary account, and the rest in Spanish. These books include two collections of the correspondence of contemporaries; two contemporary narratives, three biographies of the then sovereign, Carlos V, by official chroniclers of the royal household; one colossal biography compounded largely from the previous ones, a century after the event; and a publication of recent scholarship which purports to reprint all the miscellany of documents concerning the revolt which have lain for four centuries in the central and the local archives of Spain.[1]

1. Peter Martyr (1459–1526)

The two letter writers were correspondents in the stately manner of the Renaissance, composers of extended epistles or news letters, intentionally literary in style, circulated doubtless in manuscript, and later, as their authors intended, printed.

Of this pair the earlier was an Italian gentleman and scholar, whose Anglicized name, Peter Martyr, is familiar to readers of Prescott.[2] After completing a humanist's education in Rome he went to the Court of Isabel, was present through the campaign that expelled the Moors, and thereafter took orders and directed the education of a considerable part of the young nobility of Castile. He was employed in a diplomatic mission to the Sultan of Egypt, wrote an account of the great explorations (*De Rebus Oceanicis et Novo Orbe*), and continued, till his death in 1526, the correspondence which was collected in the *Opus Epistolarum*

[1] A thorough discussion of all the sources for the entire story of Carlos V was begun in the late A. Morel-Fatio's *Historiographie de Charles-Quint*, the first volume of which (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Fascicule 202. Paris, 1913) discusses writers before Sandoval. E. Armstrong's standard *Life of Charles V* (2d Ed.); *The Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. I, Chap. XI; R. Altamira's *Historia de España*, Vol. IV; and A. Ballesteros's *Historia de España*, Tomo IV, Primera Parte, Chap. I (Madrid, 1926), will give the student all necessary bibliographical aid.

[2] *Ferdinand and Isabella*, Appendix to Chap. XIV of Vol. I. Other notices, e.g., Mariéjol, *Pierre Martyr*, 1887, are largely superseded by J. Bernays, *Petrus Martyr und sein Opus Epistolarum*, Strassburg, 1891.

(Alcalá, 1530).[1] The later letters give a vivid picture — from the viewpoint of an old courtier who had quite identified himself with the interests of the Castile of Fernando and Isabel — of its confused and restless condition, and the accumulation of resentments which exploded in 1521. His courtly sympathies did not prevent his perceiving the considerable elements of justification that warranted at least the more moderate ambitions of the Comunero movement.

2. Antonio de Guevara (1480(?)–1545)

The second epistolarian, Antonio de Guevara, a gentleman also of the Court of Fernando and Isabel, with an uncle who was majordomo of the household of King Felipe I, and an older brother who was a rather insignificant member of the Royal Council of Castile, attained literary fame in the courtly world with a romance in the manner of the romances of chivalry, which however he presented as actual history — the *Golden Book of Marcus Aurelius*, later expanded into the *Horloge of Princes* (1529). This ornate historical hoax established for Guevara a European reputation,[2] which suggested to him more serious historical work, the *Decades of the Cæsars* (1539). At Isabel's death in 1504 he entered the Franciscan Order and became a popular preacher in the fashionable world, was commissioner of the Inquisition — he claimed to have converted 27,000 Morisco families in Valencia! — preacher to the Royal Chapel of the young monarch in 1521, and finally Bishop. Characteristic productions of this clerical part of his life were two pious works of platitudinous declamation and reflection: *Advice for Royal favorites and Doctrine for Courtiers* (1539), and *Scorn of the Court and Praise of the Village* (1539); and a book of devotional exercises (1542) which Saint Theresa found helpful.

Guevara was by his own account a participant in the struggle of the Comunidades, and in his *Epístolas Familiares* (1539) includes several addressed to the principal Comunero leaders. Have these any more foundation than the *Marcus Aurelius* romance? Earlier students assumed so, taking Guevara seriously as an historian, perhaps chiefly because he was in 1526 appointed chronicler royal, probably to replace Martyr, who died in that year. Since, despite frequent references to work on 'my chronicle' in Guevara's letters, no narrative biography ever appeared,[3] it may be inferred that

[1] My references are from the edition of Elzevir, Paris, 1670; but the numbering of the Epistles does not, I believe, differ in the two editions.

[2] Lord Berners's English version (1534) counted in the establishment of the elaborate Elizabethan style of Euphuism. For Guevara as a literary figure, cf. F-M. Kelly, *Littérature espagnole*, 208 ff.

[3] Morel-Fatio (33) concludes positively that Guevara wrote nothing of a chronicle. Ballesteros, *Historia de España*, IV, Primera Parte, p. 83, n. 62, lists a *Crónica Imperial de Carlos V*, MS.; but he quotes nothing, nor does he

Guevara supposed he might fulfill his obligation as chronicler by composing a correspondence, in the style of his predecessor, Martyr, addressed to the principal actors and so reflecting the main episodes of the Sovereign's reign. Such a method might appeal to a writer who must always have had in mind a fashionable rather than an academic audience. That the King was not satisfied with this imaginative manner of record seems implied in the fact that, though Guevara advanced in the Church and accompanied his master in Italy and on the Tunis campaign (1535), a second chronicler, Sepúlveda, was appointed (1536); and Guevara by will remitted the salary he had drawn after that date, on the ground that he was thereafter occupied in other writings.

The first volume of the *Familiar Letters* appeared in 1539, followed by a second and a third — a book as popular as had been the *Horloge of Princes*.[1] They are essentially moral essays, sometimes frankly sermons — among them a famous discourse on the Trinity addressed to the 'Honored Rabbis and obstinate Jews' of Naples; and the manner of them is ultra-literary and antithetical. Advice on the conduct of wives and warning of the elderly against marriage could in no wise concern history, were there not included the half-dozen letters directly discussing the Comunero revolt.[2] Since these tell us almost nothing not known from other sources, their accuracy need not much concern us did they not contain an almost formal charge of treachery on the part of the first Comunero Captain-General. Close examination of them seriously discredits their value as historical data. They are evidently written (or at least later elaborated) for a wider audience than the persons addressed and contain allusions and explanations quite gratuitous for these but helpful for a general reader. That prolix communications consisting in very large part of classical examples, wise saws, and modern instances should be addressed to leaders in the crisis of a civil war seems itself, at least to modern feeling, improbable. More damaging still is the frequent discrepancy be-

describe the manuscript or say where it exists, though his text declares that Guevara 'left in writing an unpublished chronicle of the emperor.' Is this merely a mistaken inference from Guevara's statements? Sandoval examined Guevara's papers, and comments on them in *Carlos Quinto*, XXVII. vi; cf. also VIII. li, and III. xvi.

[1] The fashion for this extraordinary sort of correspondence persisted for a century in English literature, until the famous *Familiar Letters* of James Howell (1645), historiographer royal to Charles II, the historicity of which is dubious just as in the case of Guevara. Cf. Introduction to the edition of J. Jacobs, 1892.

[2] A. de Guevara, *Epístolas Familiares*. (My references are to the edition of Madrid, 1673.) To Bishop Acuña, Dec. 20, 1521 (p. 219); to Bishop Acuña, March 10, 1521 (p. 224); to J. de Padilla, March 8, 1521 (p. 229); to María de Padilla, Jan. 16, 1522 (p. 238); an address to deputies of the Junta in Villabráxima, followed by a narrative note of the events subsequent (p. 243); and to D. Pedro Girón in exile in Orán, April 16, 1524 (p. 312). For the curious inclusion of six genuine letters of the Admiral in an Italian translation of Guevara's *Epístolas*, cf. Morel, p. 141. Danvila prints five of these.

tween the date of the letter and the contemporary facts.[1] Whether these considerations wholly discredit Guevara's charge against Girón is considered in the preceding narrative.[2] The further charge, brought by modern scholarship, that Guevara not only contributed nothing significant to history, but also tampered with historical material passing through his hands, we may consider in connection with Sandoval, below.[3]

3. Juan Maldonado (c. 1500–post 1545)

The historical value of the Latin narrative, known to us only in a modern Spanish version,[4] composed by a cleric, Juan Maldonado, who declares himself a witness of the Comunero movement, is difficult to estimate, in the absence of any considerable knowledge of the author or of his sources of information. He began to write his narrative about 1525 and was then at least of fully adult age, and lived probably not much beyond the mid-century.[5] Though of Salamancan family, his life was largely identified with Burgos, where he was educated and later became Vicar-General. His narrative, begun when the revolt was scarcely terminated, he retained for many years, working it over 'with reflexion and maturity' that it might be finished by the author's hand before death should overtake him. His story mentions [6] Acuña as still living in captivity in Navarrete, whence that tumultuous bishop was removed to Simancas in February, 1523;[7] yet the notorious trial and execution of Acuña in 1526 precedes the date of Maldonado's Preface by nineteen years. It is perhaps

[1] The letter reprehending Acuña, dated Dec. 20, 1521, makes no reference whatever to the capture of Acuña, generally known in May, 1521 (cf. Danv. IV. 47, 109); or to the death of Padilla, executed in April, 1521, though the letter is chiefly a prophecy of disaster threatening the two Comunero leaders. Guevara calls himself chronicler to the Monarch in the letter of March 10, 1521, and that of April 16, 1524; but he was not appointed chronicler, apparently, till 1526 (cf. Morel-Fatio, *Historiographie*, 26 ff.). The dating of the letter to Padilla, of March 8, 1521, in Medina del Campo is dubious, since that town was in Comunero hands till May, 1521 (cf. Danv. IV. 55). The letter to Doña María Padilla of Jan. 16, 1522, speaks of 'your husband, who is defending [the Commune]; the Bishop of Zamora who is following it; D. Pedro Girón, who lends it his authority; D. Pedrolasso, who preaches it; . . . and D. Pedro Pimentel, who is commander for it.' The letter concludes with the plea that she open the gates of Toledo and welcome her husband. But Padilla was executed and his death known in Toledo in April; Acuña was a captive in June, both of 1521; Girón and Lasso quitted the Comunero party by March of 1521; Pedro Maldonado Pimentel was captured in April, 1521.

A long list of errors in Guevara's classical history was published by Rhua, *Cartas*, 1549.

[2] *Supra*, p. 212. [3] *Infra*, p. 373.

[4] That of J. Quevedo, *Movimiento de España, o sea la Historia de la Revolución conocida con el nombre de las Comunidades de Castilla.* Madrid, 1840.

[5] His history has a preface dated Dec. 1, 1545, which, with the note of N. Antonio (*Bibl. Hisp. Nova*, I. 557), tells us all we know of him.

[6] Page 270. [7] Danv. V. 389.

more likely that his work received no considerable revision after 1526 than that he deliberately omitted mention of Acuña's end.

Maldonado's work is cast in the form of a narrative related by the author, with occasional supplementary comment by an imaginary Toledan, to a Frenchman, a German, and an Italian, chance acquaintances of travel. The bits of ornamental or jocose dialogue attributed to these fictitious figures open and close the seven Books, but do not invade the coherent body of narrative. In that narrative are several speeches doubtless imaginary, but no documents save a single letter.[1] Though the modern reader resents the dialogue make-believe, he welcomes the explanations of Spanish customs and technical terms, included evidently for non-Spanish readers. The story is, as one expects, very full as to matters occurring in Burgos, where the author says [2] he himself saw the assassination of Jofre. He gives no dates; but close reading, after examination of all the documentary record, gives the impression that the narrative is well-informed, well-balanced, and accurate.

4. Pedro de Alcocer (c. 1490–post 1551)

The brief narrative by Pedro de Alcocer is even more narrowly Toledan than Maldonado's is Burgalese; its phraseology, in fact — even its title, shows clearly that it was intended as a concluding chapter of the author's 'History of Toledo'; but it was never published by the author, for prudential reasons that may easily be surmised.

Alcocer, a dependent of the Padilla family of Toledo, accompanied Pedro López de Padilla, father of the Comunero captain (of whom Alcocer was perhaps tutor), in a capacity somewhat menial — for he speaks of serving his master at table — to the Cortes of 1506, of which he was then old enough to note incidents later related. He published in 1554 a 'History of Toledo,' which ends with the reign of Queen Isabel. The further narrative, through the Comunidades — the violence of which in Toledo he seems himself to have witnessed — he did not print; and it remained for three centuries unpublished.[3]

[1] Burgos to D. Carlos, protesting against Jiménez's militia proposal (p. 36).

[2] Pages 97, 106.

[3] *Relación de algunas cosas que pasaron en estos reinos desde que murió la reina católica Doña Isabel hasta que se acabaron las comunidades en la ciudad de Toledo.* Edited in thoroughly scholarly fashion by Martín Gamero for the Sociedad de Bibliófilos Andaluces, Sevilla, 1872. This prints the fullest extant manuscript (of the seventeenth century), in the Colombina Library of Sevilla, noting omissions and variants in the two eighteenth-century copies, in the Provincial Library of Toledo and the Collection of the Academy of History. It entirely replaces the free, fragmentary, and doctored version of H. Ternaux, *Les Communeros: chronique castellane . . . d'après l'histoire inédite de Pedro de Alcocer*, 1834.

The text of eighty-seven pages is followed by extensive annotation and four appendices, which include documents and a notice of the author.

Alcocer's *Relación* is much less mature and well-balanced than Maldonado's — naïve, fond of anecdote, of astrological predictions and fulfillments, and of enumeration of picturesque detail as to ceremonies and costumes; but it is precious as a record coming from the Padilla environment, concerning which it supplies us many details. There are slight inaccuracies in narrating matters away from Toledo, and, as its purpose warranted, extensive omission in regard to the Comunero movement as a whole.

5. Juan Jinés de Sepúlveda (1490–1573)

Of the official royal chroniclers much is known, and their chronicles, though from a biased view, give extended discussions of the revolt.

Juan Jinés de Sepúlveda, a Cordovan youth of family, showed in his studies at Córdova and Alcalá abilities which won him a scholarship in the Spanish college at Bologna, of whose founder he published a biography in 1521. His studies were philological and philosophical. He was in Rome, a fugitive in the castle of Saint Angelo, with his patron, Alberto Pio, during the sack of 1527. He began early a career as controversialist, attacking Luther in 1527, defending Alberto Pio against the formidable Erasmus in 1531, and defending at length, especially against the contentions of the kindly Las Casas, the right of Castilian civilization to subject natives of the barbarous lands newly discovered — a defense maintained not only in a controversial pamphlet, *Democrites Alter* (1547), but even in passages inserted in his later Latin chronicles which attack as unwise the laws adopted, on the recommendation of Las Casas, to secure humane treatment for the American natives. He was early attracted also to historical study; projected a general history of Spain; and wrote an account (1536), based on the evidence of participants, of the Tunis campaign. The Emperor, whom Sepúlveda had previously known in Italy, was induced, perhaps by this military narrative and perhaps by dissatisfaction with Guevara, to appoint Sepúlveda official chronicler and Latin tutor to the Infante Felipe. Of his master he composed a life, of moderate length, *De Rebus Gestis Caroli Quinti*; a work also about the American conquests, *De Orbe Novo*; and three books of a chronicle of his young Royal pupil. These labors occupied the latter term of his life of eighty-three years.

The historical work of this versatile scholar, who was also very much the hard-headed man of the world, is for the story of the Comuneros somewhat disappointing,[1] partly, perhaps, because he was throughout his youth, when the revolt occurred, in Italy; but in greater part because his narrative shuns just those concrete

[1] Two bits of material we owe to him alone: evidence about the burning of Medina (II. 27) and a footnote to the story of Pedrolasso and his brother the poet Garcilasso (XX. 23–24).

details which would make it living for the modern reader but which are excluded because undignified or difficult to express in classical Latin. Besides this dry elevation and abstraction of style, the modern reader also resents the fashion, adopted by all the humanist historians from the classics, of expressing the motives of historic events by imaginary speeches put in the mouths of the chief actors. He himself was interested mainly in that part of his subject nearest to his own observation, the period 1532–39, and undertook with some regret the previous period, for which, as he complained,[1] his predecessor had left him no helpful material. His grave philosophy of history and his quite academic scorn of a popular audience he expounds in a letter (of about 1560) printed as preface to the *De Rebus Gestis*, together with a record of his fidelity in obtaining letters of sovereigns, statesmen, ambassadors, soldiers, especially of the Emperor himself, who had responded in a spirit most devoted to truth; and finally his thorough reading of the narrative historians in all tongues. Yet the finished chronicle he declined to publish, reserving to the end of his days the opportunity of addition and correction, should any authentic material turn up. After Sepúlveda's death the Emperor was too old, Felipe too indifferent, to publish it. Chance rescued the manuscript from a long oblivion, and the Academy of History published it in 1780.

6. Pedro Mexía (1499–1551)

A third chronicler, a decade younger than Sepúlveda, as Sepúlveda was a decade younger than Guevara, Pedro Mexía, is one of the two most important contemporary biographers who narrate in detail the story of the Comunero revolt. Born in Sevilla, of noble family, he had probably, at the time of the Comunidades, completed his studies in his native city and was studying law at Salamanca.[2] He was therefore at his most impressionable years at the period of the struggle — more stirred and better informed than the grave Italianate philologue who preceded him in the office of chronicler. Mexía's patrons were all Spanish: Fernando Colón, bastard son of the discoverer and collector of a great library; Luis Vives, the glory of Castilian humanism. He was a person of courtly rather than academic culture, a distinguished fencer and a poet;[3] yet also a mathematician and astronomer, and active in the

[1] Epist. III, of 26 August, 1540.

[2] He himself says (p. 111) that he saw Magellan's ship before it left Sevilla (Aug. 10, 1519) and when it came back (Sep. 8, 1522), boarded it and talked with those who had made the circumnavigation; 'and they told me very notable things about their journey.'

[3] Anonymity may possibly have deprived Mexía of the credit for compositions enjoyed to-day beyond his commonplace essays: among the ballad collections of the Castilian poets who imitated the old popular ballad or *romance*, one published in Antwerp in 1551, that of L. de Sepúlveda, attributes certain bal-

municipal service of Sevilla. As Sepúlveda's interests were divided between philosophical controversy and history, so Mexía's were divided between literature and history. At forty-two he published the *Silva de Varia Lección*;[1] five years after, *Diálogos Eruditos* — both miscellanies somewhat like Guevara's, in the vein of Montaigne, who borrowed from him also. He published in 1545 the *Historia Real y Cesarea*, a series of biographies of all the emperors from the great Julius to the flamboyant Maximilian, grandfather of Carlos Quinto, a work which, being in the vernacular and composed by a gentleman already distinguished in *belles-lettres*, had a great success, reaching the attention even of the Emperor himself, who appointed the author chronicler, July 8, 1548, with permission, because of delicate health, to pursue his studies in his native residence. This remoteness from Court and from the greater actors of the contemporary scene probably limited Mexía's work; but a much graver limitation was the short bit of life remaining to him. In two and a half years he carried the *Historia de Carlos Quinto* only through the year 1530, which, however, covers the period of the Castilian revolt. His manuscript, though exploited almost *in toto* by his successors, remained unprinted for centuries — the chapters on the Comunidades appearing late in the nineteenth century, and the whole text, better edited, in the *Revue Hispanique* for 1918.

His point of view is, of course, courtly, but it is moderate. He prints no documents save a few of the most formal. He is careful about his dates. His narrative is compact and balanced.

7. Alonso de Santa Cruz (c.1500–72)

Still a third official contemporary biographer narrated the story of his imperial master only to have his work remain quite unknown for four centuries, Alonso de Santa Cruz, cosmographer royal to Carlos and chronicler to Felipe II. He was, much more than Mexía, a typical native of Sevilla, the city which, though leagues from the sea, feels its tides along her wharves and has always turned her face to the great west whither her caravels sailed to explore lands and find gold. He was approximately of Mexía's age, and pursued, presumably in Sevilla, his mathematical and astronomical science, in which he became distinguished by developing the first charts to indicate variations in the magnetic needle.[2] To this theoretical training he added practical experi-

lads to an anonymous 'Caballero Cesareo,' who may be Mexía. If so, the singing voice of our 'very magnificent gentleman' of Sevilla haunts our ear in the *Castilla estaba muy triste*, the *Quien es aquel caballero*, and the *Cansados de pelear*.

[1] This appeared, in translation by Fortescue, as *The Forest*, 1571; and was the source of Marlowe's *Tamburlaine*. Cf. A. W. Ward, *English Dramatic Literature*, I. 322.

[2] Altamira, *Historia de España*, III. 575.

ence: he sailed as treasurer of Sebastian Cabot's voyage to the Spice Islands in 1525. From 1536 he was cosmographer to the colonial board of trade, the Sevillan *Casa de Contratación*. In 1539 came the opportunity to join the excursion to the straits of Magellan; but Santa Cruz was retained by the Emperor to lecture before the Court — to an audience which included Saint Francis Borgia — on cosmography and astronomy. Though without official position as historiographer he composed before 1551 a narrative of the Catholic Sovereigns from 1490 to 1516, extending the chronicle of Pulgar through the death of Fernando; and a biography of Carlos through the year 1550. He sought from the Emperor the direction of the works on the Alcázar, which might enable him to live quietly in his native city with an income adequate to the high prices prevalent in Sevilla because of the enormous influx of precious metals from the New World. If Santa Cruz obtained his request he was probably the person who executed those modernizing repairs which so incongruously introduced Renaissance colonnades and the imperial motto *Plus Ultra* throughout that dazzling jewel-casket of the ferocious King Pedro's Morisco architects — alterations made probably in preparation for D. Carlos's marriage there in 1525.

Though chronicler to Felipe II, Santa Cruz published nothing. A history of the Comuneros in Sevilla mentioned by the bibliographer N. Antonio[1] is unprinted, if indeed it exists; two works still extant Santa Cruz mentions in a letter to D. Carlos of Nov. 10, 1551:[2] the later history of the Catholic Monarchs; and the uncompleted biography of Carlos Quinto. The former of these, existing in several manuscripts, passed under another name till identified by Menéndez y Pelayo,[3] and was used under that name in Rodríguez Villa's *Juana la Loca*: it has not been printed.[4] The life of Carlos, one half of which Ranke examined with approval in Rome, has recently been printed entire.[5]

[1] *Bibl. Hisp. Nova*, 1672. Cf. Ferrer del Rio, *Levantamiento de las Comunidades*, p. xiv.

[2] Morel-Fatio, *Historiographie*, 101.

[3] Laiglesia, *Estudios Históricos*, I. 509.

[4] The manuscript Rodríguez Villa used was attributed in titles, the first part to Alonso and the second part to Felipe Estanques. An early transcript of at least the second part exists in the British Museum. Cf. *Juana la Loca*, 94, n. The Academy of History copy was catalogued to Estanques till, by Menéndez y Pelayo's correction, it was reattributed to Santa Cruz.

[5] Very badly, in five volumes (Madrid, 1920–1925), nominally edited by R. Beltrán y Rózpide and A. Blázquez y Delgado-Aguilera, but really with no editing at all. There is no indication of the portions which, as the preface says, are omitted; no introduction save a reprint of Laiglesia's brief memorandum from the *Boletín* of the Academy of History; nothing in the way of notes; and no indication of the relation between this text and Sandoval. Portions of the text are in italic, for what reason is not indicated. Obvious misprints abound, though they, with many obscure or impossible passages, might have been cor-

Santa Cruz's work differs from all the sources we have previously discussed by its volume and its extended quotation of documents. The plan of the narrative is that of a chronicle and the material seems slightly annalistic, though there are significant sections discussing motives and causes — one such about the great revolt.[1] Considerable statistical material is given in regard to numbers of armies, but these seem no more careful or trustworthy than most similar figures in sixteenth-century historians. Santa Cruz is not careful about his dates, the week days assigned to certain month days being frequently incorrect. The quoted documents — some forty for the Comunero period — are chiefly official papers, manifestoes, petitions, and the like; and even the more private papers — communications between the Monarch and his Council or his Viceroys — are so little confidential that they seem intended for the public and probably were accessible to historians in many manuscript or even in printed copies. It is to be noted that they often affect a very formal style, full of antitheses and allusions to history, mythology, or Scripture. The whole chronicle appears more abundant but less careful than Mexía, and no more meditated or substantial.

8. Prudencio de Sandoval (a.1560–1621)

It is infinitely regrettable that M. Morel did not complete his historiography of Carlos Quinto with the proposed examination of the vast biography which has for centuries been the quarry for writers on all topics of the reign. About this author we have therefore merely the facts gathered by bibliographies and cyclopædias:[2] since Sandoval's work, however, is obviously a compilation, our ignorance about his life does not much matter. He was born in Valladolid, of a family originally Portuguese, before 1560; entered the Benedictine Order (1569) and was a master in theology; was an ardent pluralist, Bishop of Tuy (1608) and of Pamplona (1612), a voluminous writer on antiquities and history, and royal chronicler to Felipe III. Of his listed publications: 'Antiquities of Tuy' (1610); 'Chronicle of Alfonso VII' (1600); 'History of the Kings of Castile' (1615); and the 'Life of Carlos V,' the last was the most popular and alone for our purposes important. Part I appeared at Valladolid in 1604, and Part II there in 1606. Editions appeared at Pamplona in 1614 and 1634,[3] and often thereafter.

rected by reference to the text of Sandoval. One is amazed that such careless historical work can appear — and under the auspices of the Academy — in a country where such admirable historical work as Rodríguez Villa's or the Conde de Cedillo's would seem to have established imperative standards of scholarliness.

[1] Santa Cruz, I. 217.

[2] Cf. Nicolas Antonio, *Bibliot. Hisp. Nova*, II. 255; Cejador, *Lengua y Literatura castellanas*, IV. 193.

[3] My references are to the *Historia de la Vida y Hechos del Emperador*

Since even the vast collection of Danvila does not replace all of Sandoval's material on the Comuneros, it is important to note the sources of this biography, compounded almost a century after the event.

Ranke noted, in a comment on the manuscripts of Santa Cruz,[1] that Sandoval used both Mexía and Santa Cruz. The narrative of the books on the Comunidades is in fact a continuous dovetailing of almost all the text of Mexía and a large part of that of Santa Cruz.[2]

The source of the documents so abundantly included by Sandoval [3] is not so confidently to be stated. His texts constantly vary in details of phrase from the texts of Santa Cruz; but as these changes are repeatedly substitutions of clearer expressions — or more elegant or less old-fashioned — it seems probable that they are Sandoval's polishing of the text Santa Cruz gives. Often the variations are so slight that they might be merely variant readings of the same illegible document;[4] but Sandoval's direct dependence upon Santa Cruz's texts seems the more likely because the narrative matter preceding and following them in Sandoval is often taken bodily from Santa Cruz.[5] It is notable that eight floridly phrased texts in Santa Cruz are still further elaborated by antithetical expansions in Sandoval. This gorgeousness in Sandoval's documents, M. Morel [6] noticed and attributed to Guevara, either

Carlos V . . . Pamplona, 1634. This I cite as *Sandoval*, with references by Book and Section: the enumeration is presumably identical in the different editions. I indicate irregularities in the enumerations of the 1634 edition.

[1] Cf. Morel, *Historiographie*, 103–04.

[2] Sometimes he follows Santa Cruz rather than Mexía: cf. Sandoval, III. xxxvi, with Mexía, 102, and Santa Cruz, I. 205. Since I have noted these borrowings in the passages I refer to, I have not included a tabulation of them all, which would mean listing, in appropriate juxtaposition, of four-fifths of the text of Mexía, Santa Cruz, and Sandoval.

[3] Some sixty bearing on the Comuneros: Book I, 1; Book II, 10; Book III, 3; Book V, 9; Book VI, 4; Book VII, 17; Book VIII, 7; Book IX, 10.

[4] The matter is complicated because the copy from which Santa Cruz is printed, or the proof-reading of that very careless publication, has left there countless obvious blunders.

[5] But it may be noted that the letter of Valladolid to the Governors, of Jan. 30, 1521, in Sandoval, VIII. xxxiv, follows a text reproduced also by Danvila (III. 91), and not Santa Cruz's (I. 425).

[6] *Historiographie*, 38 ff. Since Santa Cruz has been printed later than Morel's discussion, it is well to note these letters:

Toledo to the cities, Nov. 7, 1519, Sandoval, V. iii; Santa Cruz, I. 220. This Morel considers a Guevara forgery, for its antithetical style. Santa Cruz's text is better, reading correctly *magnífica*, for Sandoval's impossible *magestad* in the close; but it is almost identical with Sandoval. Curiously, the placing of *enbiar* which Morel considers typically Guevaresque does not appear in Santa Cruz. Cf. *supra*, p. 53, n. 2.

Speech of Rojas in the Council, June, 1520, Sandoval, V. xxxiv (number omitted in Ed. 1634); Santa Cruz, I. 238.

Speech of Téllez Girón in the Council, June, 1520, Sandoval, V. xxxv; Santa

as fanciful rewriting of genuine documents or as sheer inventions, destined for 'his chronicle' and taken over unsuspectingly by Sandoval. He urges further that countless extant letters, printed by Danvila, show no such elaborateness of expression, and remarks that the absence of any extant originals for the documents most notably in this florid manner is almost conclusively suspicious.

M. Morel's suspicion of these florid documents is, it must be conceded, plausible; yet I feel there are difficulties in the way of accepting it as conclusive against any authentic character in them whatever. First, it is not, I think, true that such floridness cannot be paralleled in documents not open to suspicion. Almost all the papers of the Admiral are astonishingly ornate, both in rhetorical question, allusion, and antithesis.[1] The style of the Prior of San Juan is as antithetical, in the letters Santa Cruz prints; but it is possible that these have been previously touched up by Guevara.[2] Baumgarten, though suspicious in this matter, accepted very florid

Cruz, I. 239. Both speeches are expanded by antithetical elaborations in Sandoval's versions. Note that the scrap of narrative in Sandoval, V. xxxv, is from Santa Cruz, as well as the speech.

Segovia to Toledo, July 29, 1520, Sandoval, V. xlv; Santa Cruz, I. 243. Not notably expanded in Sandoval: Baumgarten, however (*Geschichte Karls V*, I. 251, note; and Morel, *Historiographie*, 39), suspected it on the ground of anachronism, it appearing unlikely that Segovia would appeal to Toledo on July 29 for help which Toledo had reported to Murcia, on July 17 (letter in *Doc. Inéd.* II. 319), as already sent. Considering irregularities in correspondence frequently to be observed in all this documentary matter, I do not feel this wholly conclusive.

Segovia to Medina, Aug. 17, 1520, Sandoval, V. liii (number omitted in Ed. 1634); Santa Cruz, I. 246. Sandoval's additions are notably antithetical. Morel does not mention this letter.

Segovia to Medina, Aug. 24, in Sandoval, V. liv: 'Ayer, jueves que se contaron veynte y tres'; Aug. 28, in Santa Cruz, I. 262, apparently by misreading 23 as 28: 'Ayer jueves que se contaban 28 de Agosto' (but Thursday was Aug. 23; and Aug. 28 was Tuesday, in 1520). Baumgarten (*loc. cit.*) declared the letter false because of the facts mentioned, presumably intending the mention of the capture of Tordesillas, which occurred Aug. 29.

Medina to Segovia, Aug. 22, 1520, Sandoval, VI. i; Santa Cruz, I. 257, preceded by the unusual phrase: 'una carta . . . la cual en substancia decia.' Morel (*op. cit.*, 39) suspects this letter: Baumgarten accepted it.

Toledo to the cities, undated (prob. July, 1520), Sandoval, VI. xiii; Santa Cruz, I. 248. Very antithetical in Santa Cruz. Morel does not mention.

President and Council to D. Carlos, Sep. 12, 1520, Sandoval, VI. xvii (mistitled '*Cardenal* y los del Consejo': cf. *supra*, p. 123, n. 2.); Santa Cruz, I. 271. Santa Cruz's text is very direct; Sandoval's very ornate. Morel does not mention.

[1] E.g., to Valladolid, Oct. 23 (Danv. II. 278, from Simancas archives. A very blundering, but not 'beautified' reproduction of this letter is in Sandoval, VII. xv). Admiral to Sevilla, Nov. 28 (Danv. II. 541, from Academy of History MSS.).

Cf. also Burgos to Salamanca, Oct. 8 (Danv. II. 386, from Simancas archives). Valladolid to cities, March 10, 1521 (Danv. III. 465, from Simancas archives. Notably antithetical).

[2] Santa Cruz, I. 447, 461.

documents, if not otherwise discredited: e.g., the plaint of Medina to Valladolid, Aug. 22, 1520, he accepted, because such expression in such circumstances accords wholly with Spanish temperament.[1]

Second, ornate rephrasing of documents cannot, since the printing of Santa Cruz, be imputed only to Guevara. There are Santa Cruz's ornate versions, appearing more ornate in Sandoval. Santa Cruz's work, finished (so far as we have it) in 1551, seems certainly subsequent to any tampering of Guevara's, who presumably handed over the state papers to Sepúlveda, who succeeded him as chronicler, in 1536. Santa Cruz's texts would then be (1) untouched originals, or (2) originals he himself 'beautified' for publication, or (3) originals which Guevara had already 'beautified.' Since Sandoval pretty certainly took his texts from Santa Cruz, their pronounced ornateness (which M. Morel accounts so suspicious and attributes to Guevara) would be due (1) to Sandoval only, (2) to Sandoval exaggerating Santa Cruz, or (3) to Sandoval exaggerating Guevara.

On the whole, then, I feel we need not assume that the ornate material in Sandoval is Guevaran forgery. It may be (with almost equal possibility) matter either in original version or in versions stylistically altered by any of the writers from whom Sandoval borrowed or by Sandoval himself. All historians, in other words, of the time, would have felt no hesitation in adding the formal elegances of expression which, within a century, Sparks did not hesitate to add to the letters of Washington.[2]

Besides the public or partially public papers of the sort which Santa Cruz included, Sandoval includes a large number of papers probably not accessible outside of the Royal archives; but these are not of the most confidential character — with one curious exception, the report of the Constable to D. Carlos of Nov. 30, 1520 (Sandoval, VIII. vii). This letter is the more precious because it is missing from the series of reports (often in cipher) from the Governors to the Sovereign which constitute the unique and invaluable contribution of Danvila's work.

9. Danvila

Señor Manuel Danvila, of the Royal Academy of History, author of an authoritative work, *El Poder Civil en España*, 1885, published in 1897–1900, as Volumes XXXV–XL of the *Memorial Histórico Español*, his six-volume *Historia Crítica y Documentada de las Comunidades de Castilla*.[3] The material here printed makes

[1] *Geschichte Karls V*, I. 252, note.

[2] The two farewell letters of the Comunero Captain, long admired as touching human documents (Sandoval, IX. xxii) ultra-ornate, and found in no version earlier than Sandoval's, seem justly open to grave suspicion. Cf. R. B. Merriman, *Spanish Empire*, III. 91, n. 1; and *supra*, p. 327, n. 2.

[3] This work I cite always as *Danv.* I–VI.

obsolete all the previous narratives of the great revolt. It consists of more than two thousand pages of documents, from the Simancas archives, the collections of the Academy of History, the municipal and monastic libraries and archives of Spain. The text of the Simancas papers was printed from copies made by D. Anastasio Tomillo, of the Simancas archives, from 3820 documents in that collection; to Señor Tomillo's transcripts Danvila added an immense number of papers collected elsewhere. Unfortunately he does not indicate what material is printed from Señor Tomillo's copy and what from documents direct. The originals of course were full of the inevitable errors of writing, very numerous in sixteenth-century documents. They became defaced and illegible, and doubtless many more errors were added by the copyists. Subsequent errors in printing such difficult material complete the unsatisfactoriness of the texts as we have them in Danvila's volumes.

His title promises a critical and documentary history. It is impossible to overrate their documentary value. For the first time the historian can follow the events in the letters of D. Carlos's Governors in Castile. Fragmentary minutes of the revolutionary Junta are invaluable. Letters of Councillors and other members of the Royalist party are included, and a few, probably intercepted, letters from revolutionary leaders. The official communications and manifestoes of cities and congresses Sandoval and Santa Cruz had given in the main; but Danvila adds important papers of this sort also.

Unfortunately the critical examination of this overwhelming wealth of material Danvila scarcely attempted. No attempt is made to conjecture emendation, or indicate sentence division, or supply *lacunæ*, or to comment in any way on countless passages which as printed are a farrago of nonsense. Documents are repeatedly duplicated; misdated; undated, even when a slight examination of their text reveals their date; misplaced even when dated. No attempt is made in footnotes to correct or supplement the texts. No attempt is made to supply, as may repeatedly be done, corrections or explanations of puzzling points from the other documents (indeed there is no cross-reference), or from the chroniclers.

Further, beyond a not too careful chronological grouping, no attempt is made to construct a 'critical' narrative. Such narrative text as Danvila supplies has many errors as to dates and identity of persons, such as can be detected from a careful examination of his own material.

A sixth volume added a very useful though not impeccable index of personal proper names; very inadequate biographical notices of the principal personages, riddled with confusions and errors; and a few useful appendices, chiefly topographical and iconographical.

It is difficult to speak with due gratitude of Señor Danvila's work: it is irritating and invaluable. His material has not yet been examined and presented in an extended 'critical' narrative in any language. That task is what I have attempted in this volume.

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

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